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Abstract
This thesis considers the evolution of Poland's party-political consensus on 
accession to the European Union, starting with the elections to the contract 
parliament in June 1989 and ending with the accession referendum in June 2003. 
The main finding is that the establishment of consensus in favour of accession 
among Poland's political elites proved much more challenging than the elites' 
declarations of support suggest. Although most parties declared support for 
accession, throughout the entire pre-accession period they also supported 
policy proposals that contradicted accession conditions. The EU's strict neo­
liberal economic requirements and the loss of national sovereignty accession 
entailed proved particularly challenging.
Rather than reconcile their policy proposals with EU's conditions, or change 
their stance on accession, parties rhetorically re-presented the EU into different 
visions that aligned with their ideological offering. Declarations of support for 
'Social Europe', 'Christian Europe' or the 'Europe of Nations' gave the 
appearance of consensus. But in fact no in-depth consensus was possible since 
the way in which political groupings presented the 'Europe' they claimed to 
support was so different as to remove a common denominator they could agree 
on.
As a result, the single biggest change Polish society experienced since 1989 was 
never really addressed in political debate. The integration project was propelled 
forward not by in-depth political consensus but by a series of rhetorical 
compromises. At each stage of the accession process the parties' inability to 
negotiate more than a nominal consensus prevented meaningful public debate. 
During each electoral contest of the pre-accession period voters were presented 
with ambiguous rhetoric in place of alternative policy options that would have 
enabled the electorate to hold decision makers to account.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
Defining their geo-political identity has been traditionally problematic for the 
Poles. As Jacques Rupnik suggests, Poland represents the 'East of the West and 
the West of the East'.1 Positioned between the Roman Catholic West and the 
Orthodox East, the Poles were often exposed to the expansionist ambitions of 
their powerful neighbours. Throughout their history they have, albeit with little 
success, sought to define their place in the international order. When the 
transformation of 1989 brought with it the possibility of re-defining the 
country's relationship with its Eastern and Western neighbours, the notion of 
'Poland's place in Europe' came to the forefront of foreign policy debates.2
Less than a year after the completion of the 1988 round table talks the nascent 
elites used their new found freedom to re-direct Polish foreign policy towards 
integration with the European Communities. The symbolic appeal of the return 
to Europe was used to legitimize what historian Anatol Lieven has described as 
a 'quiet revolution'* the 15 year long process of implementing the EU's 
accession conditionality that would radically alter the political, social and 
economic fabric of the applicant states.
Apart from successfully restructuring their economies to withstand the EU's 
competitive pressures, the applicant states would have to make extensive 
adjustments to a broad range of policy areas including foreign and home affairs, 
competition, agriculture, border control, monetary policy and the environment. 
The fact that legislation imported from well established liberal free market 
democracies was not always well suited to the nascent democracies and 
economies of the post-communist states made the process even more
1J. Rupnik, The Other Europe, (London 1988).
2 J.Jedlicki, 'Poland's Perpetual Return to Europe', Cross Currents: a Yearbook of Central European 
Culture, volume 12, (1993), p78-88.
3 A. Lieven, 'Conclusions', in Ambivalent Neighbors. The EU, NATO, and the Price of Membership, eds. A. 
Lieven and D. Trenin (Washington, D.C. 2003), 295-312, p303.
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challenging. 4 The candidates had very little room for negotiation in accepting 
the EU's conditions. The accession project was largely non-negotiable and the 
scope of any negotiations would be confined to limited delays in the timetable 
under which aspiring members had to implement the required harmonization 
measures. 5 This was a tall order for states that had only just emerged from over 
five decades of authoritarianism and state planning.
Accession conditionality also had other, unintended, consequences on the 
candidate states' nascent multi-party systems. * By providing the post­
communist states with what was in effect a ready-made blueprint for a neo­
liberal, Western democracy, the EU unintentionally pre-empted the political 
debates on alternative policy options that may have otherwise taken place 
among the candidate countries' nascent political groupings. Because of its 
impact on almost all policy areas accession, conditionality was much more 
difficult to implement, and agree on, than individual policies such as for 
example health care or policing. As Sedelmeier has pointed out, the 
enlargement process encompasses too many aspects of policy making to be 
conceptualised as a policy in its own right. 7 Rather, it should be viewed as a
4 E. Dunn 'Trojan Pig: Paradoxes of Food Safety Regulation' (paper presented at workshop on 'Oikos and 
Anthropos: Rationality, Technology, Infrastructure'. Social Science Research Council, Prague, Czech. Rep, 
26-7 April 2002) quoted in L. A. S. Bruszt, David, 'Who Counts? Supranational Norms and Societal Needs', 
East European Politics and Societies, 17,1 (2003), 72-82, p.79.
5 H. Grabbe, 'Challenges of EU Enlargement', in Ambivalent Neighbors. The EU, NATO and the Price of 
Membership, eds. A. Lieven and D. Trenin (Washington, D.C. 2003), 67-89, p77, interview with Jacek 
Saryusz-Wolski, 14 January 2002.
6 R. Bideleux, 'Europeanisation' and the limits to democratization in East-Central Europe' in Prospects for 
Democratic Consolidation in East Central Europe, ed. A.Agh, (Manchester 2001), D.Dakowska, 'Beyond 
conditionality: EU enlargement, European party federations and the transnational activity of German 
political foundations', Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 3/2 May 2002, H. Grabbe, Profiting 
from EU Enlargement (London 2001), H. Grabbe, 'How does Europeanization affect CEE governance? 
Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity', Journal of European Public Policy, 8, 6 (2001), 1013-1031, H. 
Grabbe, 'A Partnership for Accession? The Implications of EU Conditionality for the Central and East 
European Applicants', (Robert Schuman Centre Working Paper 12/99 1999), H. Grabbe, 'The Implications 
of EU Enlargement', in Developments in Central and East European Politics 3, ed. S.White, H. Grabbe and 
K. Hughes, Enlarging the EU Eastwards (London 1998), A. Grzymala-Busse, Innes, Abby, 'Great 
Expectations', East European Politics and Societies, 17, (2003), 64-73, A. Innes, 'The Great Electoral Lottery', 
Comparative Politics 35,1 (2002), 85-105, P. Mair, 'Popular Democracy and EU Enlargement', East 
European Politics and Societies, 17,1 (2003), 58-63, R. Bideleux, 'Europeanization' and the limits to 
democratization in East-Central Europe', in Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in East Central 
Europe, ed. G. Pridham, Agh, Attila (Manchester 2001), 25-53, K. Raik, 'EU Accession of Central and East 
European Countries: Democracy and Integration as Conflicting Logics', East European Politics and 
Societies, 18,4 (2004), 567-594.
7 U. Sedelmeier, 'Eastern Enlargement. Towards a European EU?', in Policy Making in the European 
Union, ed. H.Wallace (Oxford 2005).
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policy framework. And this is what made the establishment of consensus on 
accession so challenging: in order to build in depth consensus both on the 
principle of accession and its requirements, political elites would have had to 
align their existing policy and ideological propositions with the EU's numerous 
and wide ranging membership conditions. Having attained this, political 
parties would then also have had to negotiate consensus with members of 
electoral committees, which often combined several smaller parties that would 
not otherwise have been able to cross parliamentary election thresholds and, if 
successfully elected, they would have had to align their stance further with 
government coalition partners. Moreover, to build the political compromise 
credited with sustaining Poland's integration project, all major parties across 
the political spectrum would have had to agree to the same detailed, wide 
ranging policy blueprint. This, however, would have left little room for political 
competitors to differentiate themselves during electoral contests in terms of 
policy alternatives.
In spite of the harsh economic reforms and extensive legal harmonization 
efforts it entailed, Poland's accession project remained a key priority for all 
post-communist governments. How, given the above challenges, did the Polish 
political elites maintain the consensus that sustained a pro EU membership 
foreign policy throughout the 15 year pre-accession period? What rhetorical 
strategies enabled them to declare support for accession and at the same time 
align its often unpopular policy requirements with their existing ideological 
niche? And how did they reconcile the contradictions between the popularity 
of accession and its unpopular practical implications?
As I will show, at all stages of the pre-accession period, parties were only able 
to attain the appearance of consensus by rhetorically re-inventing the EU. 
Presenting different visions of 'Europe' allowed parties to align their existing 
policy and ideological declarations with accession and facilitated a nominal 
consensus among electoral committee and coalition partners. But at every stage 
of the accession process Poland's political elites failed to establish in-depth
14
consensus on EU membership. Instead, the accession project was propelled by a 
series of rhetorical compromises made as a result of changes in parliamentary 
representation thresholds and coalition building compromises rather than by 
the political elites' in-depth commitment to both EU membership and its 
requirements.
The EU's Eastern enlargement has benefitted from extensive study. Numerous 
analyses approaching the subject both from the perspective of the entire Eastern 
enlargement 8 and ones focusing on the specific Polish case9 are available. EU 
conditionality and the way in which it influenced policy making in the 
candidate states forms a prominent part of this subject area.10
8 G. Avery and C. Fraser, The Enlargement of the European Union (Sheffield 1998), D. Dinan, Europe 
Recast: A History of European Union (London 2004), A. Mayhew, Recreating Europe. The European 
Union's Policy towards Central and Eastern Europe. (Cambridge 1998). Grabbe and Hughes, Enlarging the 
EU Eastwards. Grabbe 'Back to Europe', Grzymala-Busse, Innes, S. Holmes, 'A European Doppelstaat?1, 
East European Politics and Societies, 17,1 (2003), 107-118, B.Tbmquist-Plewa, 'Nationalism and Minority 
Questions in Central and Eastern Europe in the Context of EU Enlargement', CFE Working Paper Series 
12, (Lund 2001), B.Tomquist-Plewa, 'East Goes West or West Goes East? Reflections on the EU 
Enlargement to Eastern Europe, in M.Herslund and R.Samson, ed.Unity in Diversity. Europe and the 
European Union:Enlargement and Constitutional Treaty, (Copenhagen, 2005), G.Pridham, Designing 
Democracy .EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-communist Europe, (Basingstoke 2005). A. M. 
Vachudova, Europe Undivided. Democracy, Leverage & Integration after Communism. (Oxford 2005).
9 M. Marody, Wilkin, Jerzy, ed., Meandry Instytucjonalizacji: Dostosowanie Polski do Unii Europejskiej 
(Kracow 2002), J. Hausner and M. Marody, Jako&f Rz^dzenia: Polska blizej Unii Europejskiej? 2000), J. 
Hausner, Przystqpienie czy Integracja? Polska droga do Unii Europejskiej. (Warsaw 1998), J.Hausner, 
Miroslawa, Polski Talk Show: Dialog Spoleczny a Integracja Europejska (Kracow 2001), J. G6miak, 
Polityczny Wymian Integracji Europejskiej Polski (Kracow 1999), J. Hausner and M. Marody, Three 
Polands: the Potential for and Barriers to Integration with the European Union (Warsaw 1999). A. W. 
Jabloriski, 'The Europeanisation of government in Poland in the 1990's', in Poland and the European 
Union, ed. K. Cordell (London 2000), A. Dybczynski, 'The European Union and Ukrainian-Polish 
Relations', in Poland and the European Union, ed. K. Cordell (London 2000), E. Stadtmuller, 'Polish 
Perceptions of the European Union in the 1990's', in Poland and the European Union, ed. K. Cordell 
(London 2000), 24-44, C. Banasinski, ed., Costs and Benefits of Poland's Membership in the European 
Union (Warsaw 2003), M. Kozak, 'Polskie Regiony wobec Akcesji', in 2003), F. Millard, Anatomy of the 
New Poland (Aldershot 1994), P. Samecki, 'Financial Flows Between the EU and Poland in 2004-2013', in 
Costs and Benefits of Poland's Membership in the EU, ed. C. Banasinski (Warsaw 2003), 3-58, M. Szpunar, 
'Polish Legal System in Light of Membership within the EU - Losses and Gains', in Costs and Benefits of 
Poland's Membership in the EU, ed. C. Banasinski (Warsaw 2003). H. Jahns, 'EU Pre-Accession Assistance 
for Poland', in Poland in the European Union, ed. E. Kawecka-Wykrzykowska, (Warsaw 2004), E. 
Kawecka-Wykrzykowska, 'Implications of Poland's Association with the European Communities for 
Poland's Economy: Preliminary Assessment', in Discussion Papers, (Warsaw 1992), E. Kawecka- 
Wykrzykowska, 'Financial Conditions of Poland's Accession to the European Union', in Poland in the 
European Union, ed. E. Kawecka-Wykrzykowska, (Warsaw 2004), 14-36, E. Kawecka-Wykrzykowska, 
'Effects of the Europe Agreement on the Polish Economy and Pre-Accession Challenges', Yearbook of 
Polish European Studies, 1, (1997).
10 H.Grabbe, 'Europeanization Goes East. Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process, in The 
Politics of Europeanisation, eds. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, Grabbe, Heather (2001) 'How does Europeanization affect CEE governance? Conditionality, 
diffusion and diversity', Journal of European Public Policy 8 (6), 1013-1031; Sedelmeier and 
Schimmelfenning 'The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe', Lucien Cemat 'Europeanization,
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The role of Europe in Polish political discourse and the challenges Polish elites 
experienced in defining themselves in relation to Europe have also been 
addressed in several studies. In a history of ideas analysis of Poland's discourse 
on Europe, Barbara Tornquist-Plewa observes a continuing ambivalence in 
Poland's definition of its relationship with Europe. Over the centuries the Poles 
have struggled, she finds, between the desire to belong to 'Europe' on the one 
hand and the threat of never quite belonging as well as, more recently, being 
treated as 'second rate' Europeans11, on the other. Krystyna Paszkiewicz 
meanwhile, argues that disagreements on the desirability and characteristics of 
the process of European integration were based on fundamental ideological 
differences between the social, political and economic doctrines of the nascent 
elites12 Madalena Pontes-Resende considers the role of 'Europe' in the creation 
of the right-wing and left-wing political identities in Poland. She finds that 
whereas the communist-successor party used support for European integration 
to legitimize their new social-democratic identity, the right side of the political 
spectrum chose to turn against 'Europe' in a populist attempt to gain votes13 
Others question the validity of the language used in Poland to debate European 
integration and point out that the debate was limited to expressions of support 
for 'quick' or 'slow' accession14 and that the language used in it was highly 
abstract and symbolic1*. In a comparative study of how the European issue was 
addressed in party-political competition in Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Varieties of Capitalism and Economic Performance in Central and Eastern Europe', Holmes, D. Ost, The 
Defeat of Solidarity. Anger and Politics in Postcommunist Europe. (Ithaca and London 2005), D. Ost, 'The 
Politics of Interest in Post-Communist East Europe', Theory and Society, (1993), Grzymala-Busse, Innes, 
Mair, Vachudova, W. Jacoby, The Enlargement of the European Union. Ordering from the Menu in 
Central and Eastern Europe (Cambridge 2004).
11 B. Tdmquist-Plewa, 'The Complex of an Unwanted Child: The Meanings of Europe in Polish Discourse', 
in The Meaning of Europe, ed. B. Strath, (Oxford and New York 2002), 215-242.
12 Krystyna Paszkiewicz, 'Koncepcje 'Powrotu do Europy' in Wspolczesna Polska MySl Polityczna, ed. 
Bronislaw Pasierb and Krystyna Paszkiewicz (Wroclaw: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wroclawskiego, 
1996), pp. 15-38.
13 Madalena Pontes-Resende, 'A Party Family Theory of Party Positions on European Integration: A Polish 
Case Study', PhD Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science Department of Government, 
2005, Madalena Pontes-Resende, 'The Change of Fate of a Political Symbol: 'Europe' and the Definition of 
Polish Right and Left Identities', Paper prepared for the 10th Ph.D. Summer School: European Parties and 
Party Systems, 2002.
14 J. Szacki, 'O J^zyku Debaty Europejskiej', in Czy Polska Ma Doktryn? Integracyjng? ed. Ryszard Legutko 
(Kracow: OSrodek MySli Politycznej, 1998).
15 R. Legiutko, 'Debata Europejska -  Retoryka i Polityka', in Czy Polska Ma Doktryn? Integracyjnq? ed. 
Ryszard Legiutko (Kracow: Osrodek Mysli Politycznej, 1998).
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Republic, Laure Neumayer shows that 'Europe' became a useful instrument for 
political parties to bolster their positions in domestic political competition.™ 
Agnes Batory” and Tibor Navracsics18 meanwhile consider the challenges 
Hungarian parties experienced in aligning their policies with accession 
requirements. Batory concludes that Hungarian parties were able to maintain 
consensus only by limiting the way they addressed the EU to its purely 
technical aspects so as not to raise the problematic issue of sovereignty transfer. 
Navracsics observes that the apparent consensus between political parties was 
based on very different conceptions of the European project and its implications 
for Hungary”.
The role of Europe in the discourse of post-communist political elites has hence 
been the subject of several studies. The question of how Polish political elites 
sustained consensus on accession and how they reconciled their declared 
support with the extensive and difficult harmonization accession entailed has 
not, however, been addressed in detail. The most relevant studies are Elzbieta 
Skotnicka-Illasiewicz's study of Poland's parliamentary elites' consensus on 
accession 'Membership in the European Union in the Political Culture of 
Parliamentarians'20 and Jacek Kucharczyk's two analyses of political discourse 
on accession during the 1997-8 period: 'For and Even Against: Political Parties 
and the Prospect of European Integration in the 1997 Election' and 'The
16 L. Neumayer, L'enjeu Europeen dans les transformations postcommunistes. Hongarie, Pologne, 
Republique Tcheque 1989-2004. (Paris 2006), L. Neumayer, 'Euroscepticism in Central Europe', in Central 
European History and the European Union. The Meaning of Europe., ed. S. J. Kirschbaum (Basingstoke 
2007).
17 A. Batory, 'Hungarian Party Identities and the Question of European Integration', in 2001), A. Batory, 
'Attitudes to Europe. Ideology, Strategy and the Issue of European Union Membership in Hungarian 
Party-Politics.', Party Politics, 8,5 (2002), 525-539.
18 T. Navracsics, A Missing Debate? Hungary and the European Union, Sussex European Institute 
Working Paper No.21 (1997).
”  Ibid.
20 E. Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, 'Czlonkowstwo Polski w Unii Europejskiej w Kulturze Politycznej 
Parliamentarzystdw', Obcigzeni Polity kg. Poslowie i Partie, ed. Wlodzimierz Wesolowski (Warsaw: IFIS, 
2001), see also E. Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, Powr6t czy Droga w Nieznane? Europejskie Dylematy Polakow 
(Warsaw: Centrum Europejskie Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 1998).
17
Kidnapping of Europe: European Integration in Polish Political Discourse 1997- 
1998'. 21
In a sociological study of the views on European integration of the members of 
the 1993 and 1997 parliaments, Elzbieta Skotnicka-Ilasiewicz finds that 
consensus in favour of accession was a 'shallow' one.22 While most 
parliamentarians were supportive of EU membership, they differed as to the 
desired speed and conditions of accession. Moreover, Skotnicka-Illasiewicz 
argues that although many parliamentarians opposed accession, a taboo of 
'political correctness' prevented explicit opposition to EU membership. 
Consequently, the political elites divided themselves into those who supported 
speedy accession and those advocating the completion of systemic 
transformation prior to entering the European Union23.
Political scientist Jacek Kucharczyk meanwhile observes that most parties' vocal 
support for EU membership during the 1997 parliamentary contest was not 
matched by a willingness to implement the reforms required for accession24 
Frances Millard draws similar conclusions, finding that adherence to the EU's 
competition policy requirements proved a challenge to both the solidarity- 
successor cabinet between 1997 and 2001 and their communist-successor 
opposition as they struggled to reconcile the requirement to implement harsh 
restructuring measures with the maintenance of support amongst their trade 
unionist electorates23.
21 J. Kucharczyk, 'Za a Nawer Przeciw. Partie Polityczne Wobec Perspektywy Integracji w Wyborach 1997', 
in Polska Eurodebata, ed. L. Kolarska-Bobinska (Warsaw 1999), J. Kucharczyk, 'Porwanie Europy. 
Integracja Europejska w Polskim Dyskursie Politycznym 1997-1998', in Polska Eurodebata, ed. L. Kolarska- 
Bobinska (Warsaw 1999).
22 E.Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, 'Czlonkowstwo Polski w Unii Europejskiej w Kulturze Politycznej 
Parliamentarzystdw', Obciqzeni Politykq. Poslowie i Partie, ed. Wlodzimierz Wesolowski (Warsaw: IFIS, 
2001).
23 E. Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, Powr6t czy Droga w Nieznane? Europejskie Dylematy Polakdw (Warsaw: 
Centrum Europejskie Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 1998).
24 J. Kucharczyk, 'Za a Nawet Przeciw. Partie Polityczne Wobec Perspektywy Integracji w Wyborach 1997', 
in Polska Eurodebata, ed. Lena Kolarska-Bobinska (Warsaw: Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 1999).
25 F. Millard, 'Polish Domestic Politics and Accession to the European Union', Back to Europe. Central and 
Eastern Europe and the European Union, ed. Karen Henderson.(London: UCL Press, 1999).
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In a study of the 1997-1998 parliamentary debates on Europe, Kucharczyk also 
finds that the ideological heterogeneity of both the Solidarity government and 
the communist-successor opposition prevented an in-depth debate on Europe26 
In place of addressing policy options, Kucharczyk observes, parliamentarians 
resorted to the use of symbolic, ideologically polarizing rhetoric. Similarly, 
Klaus Bachman points out the discrepancy between the way in which the 
Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarnosc, AWS) described Europe 
in its rhetoric and the realities of the 'really existing' European Union.22 In an 
analysis of the 2000 presidential contest meanwhile, Alex Szczerbiak finds that, 
surprisingly, an issue as prominent as accession played a very limited role in 
the contestants' programmes.28
The above mentioned studies hence reveal that presenting a clear stance on 
accession proved challenging for political elites. But they all approach the 
problem of building consensus on accession using social science analytical 
frameworks and most make use of data collected at a single point in time 
(primarily during the 1997-2001 AWS-Freedom Union coalition). They do not 
show how parties tackled the issue of accession at different stages of the pre­
accession process and in the context of different coalition configurations and 
electoral ordinations. They also do not explain what strategies parties used to 
sustain consensus on the very complex and wide ranging set of policy areas 
Poland would be required to harmonize with prior to accession. In order to 
understand how consensus on accession evolved, it is necessary to study 
accession as a set of compromises and decisions that propelled the accession 
project forward over the span of 15 years. To understand how consensus on 
both accession and its conditionality was sustained by several very 
ideologically different governments, it will be necessary to study the way such 
consensus evolved throughout the entire pre-accession period.
26 Kucharczyk, 'Porwanie Europy. Integracja Europejska w Polskim Dyskursie Politycznym 1997-1998'.
27 K. Bachmann, 'Polska Kaczka'. Klaus Bachman, 'Polska Prawica Wobec Integracji Europejskiej', Czy 
Polska Ma Doktryn? Integracyjn^? ed. Ryszard Legiutko (Kracow: Osrodek Mysli Politycznej, 1998).
28 A. Szczerbiak, 'Europe as a Re-aligning Issue in Polish Politics?: Evidence from the October 2000 
Presidential Election', (2001), SEI working paper nr.48.
19
An in-depth, historical analysis spanning the entire pre-accession period will 
show whether and if so how parties maintained consensus on a policy 
framework as complex and challenging as EU conditionality. The conclusions 
will be relevant not only for Poland but also for the post-communist and earlier 
members of the EU as well as for current and future candidates. This study 
does not intend to contrast the Polish experience with that of other member 
states. Conversely, by focusing on a detailed, in-depth analysis of a single 
country case it aims to bring forth the empirical material needed to draw 
broader hypotheses about how political elites in current and future member 
states cope with the EU's growing policy scope and competences. The Polish 
accession was of course very much shaped by the fact that it took place in the 
context of wide ranging systemic transformation and this made the challenge of 
building political consensus on accession even more complex. But maintaining 
consensus on the EU is a challenge for all member states and an understanding 
of the problems political parties face as they reconcile domestic policy 
preferences with those governed by the EU is critical to improving electoral 
participation in the European project.
The thesis will be structured chronologically, starting with the elections to the 
contract sejm in June 1989 and ending with the EU accession referendum in June 
2003. The selected time period covers the span of Poland's party-political debate 
and consensus building process on accession. Although Poland's membership 
application to the EU was made only in April 1994 the process of conditional 
integration and harmonization with the European Union started with 
negotiations on the 1991 Association Treaty.
Each of the chronological chapters will broadly correspond to either one or two 
coalition governments. The second chapter will address the evolution of 
Poland's foreign policy under the contract parliament, starting with the 1989 
parliamentary contest and ending with the appointment of the Jan Krzysztof 
Bielecki cabinet in December 1990. Chapter three will focus on the period from 
Bielecki's appointment until the communist-successors' victory in the autumn
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of 1993. The communist-successor cabinets of Waldemar Pawlak, Jozef Oleksy 
and Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz will be addressed in chapter four starting with 
the 1993 parliamentary election campaign and ending with the ascension of the 
Solidarity successor government in October 1997. Chapter five will focus on the 
Solidarity-successor cabinet of Jerzy Buzek and on the first phase of the 
accession negotiations. Lastly, chapter six will address the return of the 
communist-successor government in September 2001 and the final stages of the 
accession negotiations, ending with an analysis of the 2003 accession 
referendum campaign.
All chronological chapters of this study will be structured in a similar way. The 
first sections will cover the key domestic and EU developments and outline the 
main events in the integration process for the relevant time period. The party- 
political debate on Europe and the strategies political elites used to build 
consensus will be addressed in a separate section, which will consider how  
consensus on European issues was attained during parliamentary and 
presidential elections, electoral committee and coalition negotiations and 
parliamentary debates. Structuring the thesis in this manner will bring out how 
parties negotiated consensus during electoral contests, coalition formation and 
in parliamentary debate.
The study is based on a range of primary sources. These include the electoral 
materials of individual parties and political organisations, electoral committee 
programmes, governing coalition agreements and parliamentary debate 
transcripts. Whereas electoral materials such as leaflets of individual candidates 
as well as radio and television interviews were considered as part of the study, 
the presentation of parties' stance on Europe is based primarily on the parties' 
formal programmes. This is to prevent the programme of an individual 
candidate or a remark made during a media interview being misinterpreted as 
the negotiated and agreed approach of the entire party. A majority of the 
electoral material was obtained from the Political Parties' Archive at the 
Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of the Sciences and includes
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available publications for all parliamentary and presidential elections from June 
1989 to May 2003 as well as materials used during the EU referendum 
campaign in 2003. The study covers all major political parties that attained 
parliamentary representation during the June 1989 to May 2003 period.
Primary material also includes a press review of several Polish daily and 
weekly newspapers. The press search included Gazeta Wyborcza, Rzeczpospolita, 
Polityka, Wprost, Nasz Dziennik, Gazeta Polska, Zycie, Trybuna Ludu and Tygodnik 
'Solidarnosc' for the period from May 1988 to August 2003. This selection 
represents all widely read newspapers and magazines in Poland during the 
period in question and is designed to cover publications representing all major 
political groupings. The most widely read daily, Super Express, was not 
included as it rarely reports political issues. These written sources are 
supplemented by data from semi structured interviews with members of 
parliament representing all major political groupings throughout the period in 
question, as well as interviews with former ministers and prime ministers, 
academics, journalists and clergy.
It will at this stage be pertinent to define some of the terms used in this study. 
For the purposes of this study the term 'elites' refers to members of party- 
political decision making bodies, members of parliament and senior level 
government decision makers of ministerial and deputy ministerial ranking. 
'Nascent elites' refers to those members of the political elite who were not 
affiliated with the communist regime i.e. in most cases members of Solidarity- 
successor or other post-dissident political groupings.
'European integration' will denote the entire process of foreign policy re­
alignment, membership negotiations and harmonization with both association 
and accession requirements that begun in 1989. The Association Treaty will be 
treated as part of the EU accession process due to the close alignment between 
the two treaties and the extent of accession conditionality included in the 
association treaty. Institutions such as the Council of Europe, the Hexagonale 
and Pentagonale, the Central European Free Trade Association as well as the
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PHARE programme and less institutionalised cooperation agreements such as 
the Weimar Triangle talks will be addressed where they are relevant for the 
process of EU association and membership. The term 'accession' will be used to 
denote the process of joining the EU that started with the EU membership 
application in April 1994 and will cover all elements of the formal pre-accession 
strategy such as the structural dialogue, screening and negotiations. The term 
'Euro-scepticism' will be used as per Paul Taggart's definition of: 'an idea of 
contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and 
unqualified opposition to the process of European integration'2*. Taggart's and 
Szczerbiak's30 definition of 'hard' euro-sceptics as those outside the consensus 
on the positive nature of accession for their country and 'soft' euro-sceptics as 
those who 'express specific limited objections to the nature of the accession 
process' will also apply.
Lastly, the terms used to denote the ideological space parties occupy on the 
political spectrum require clarification. In Western political systems the 
distinction between 'right' and 'left' wing political groupings has traditionally 
been used to distinguish between an economically laissez faire, politically 
conservative 'right' wing and an economically interventionist, politically liberal 
'left' wing. This distinction does not apply in Poland. Politically conservative 
groupings have often advocated interventionist economic policy and politically 
liberal parties have proposed laissez-faire economic solutions. In the Polish 
context in general and for the purposes of this thesis, the 'right' generally refers 
to Solidarity successor groupings and 'left' to the communist-successors.
29 Taggart, Paul (1998) 'A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European 
Party Systems' European Journal of Political Research Vol.33:363-388.
30 Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, 'Parties, Positions and Europe: Euro-scepticism in the EU Candidate 
States of Central and Eastern Europe' SEI Working Paper No 46, Opposing Europe Research Network 
Working Paper No 2.
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Chapter 2 
'Returning to Europe': European integration under 
the Mazowiecki cabinet
I could not point to a single breakthrough moment. With 
Jacques Delors from the very start we talked with a full 
awareness of common sentiments, in a climate of 
.. .obviousness. Yes.. .for us it was obvious that Poland is 
returning home.. .1 then believed that amidst this great 
transformation relations between us and the EC should be 
increasingly close and that we had the right to expect
support and help.31
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Prime Minister of Poland from 
August 1989 to December 1990
Introduction
1989 confronted Polish political elites with the need to reformulate foreign 
policy in a context of systemic transformation, severe economic crisis and a 
turbulent international climate. After over four decades of Soviet domination a 
pro-Western foreign policy was an obvious choice for the Solidarity-successor 
elites. The powerfully symbolism of the Return to Europe' served as a 
rhetorical umbrella to legitimise a multi-faceted foreign policy that firmly 
placed Poland on a path towards association and eventual membership in the 
future European Union.
This chapter will consider the party-political debate that underpinned Poland's 
European integration policy under the Mazowiecki cabinet. The chapter will 
focus on the way in which the nascent political elites built consensus on 
European integration so early on in Poland's transformation process and in the 
context of limited knowledge of the nature and scope of European institutions. 
What kind of Europe did Polish parliamentarians wish to return to, and how  
closely did it reflect the European Community Poland associated with? Could 
different approaches to the way parties conceptualised 'Europe' be
31 Marek Saryusz-Wolski and Krzysztof Bobiriski, interview with Tadeusz Mazowiecki Polska i Unia, 1, 
October 1998.
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distinguished? Did most political parties maintain a pro-integration stance or 
could tensions between parties support for European integration and their 
domestic ideological and policy platforms already be observed?
The time period under consideration starts with the electoral campaign of the 
June 1989 contract parliament elections and ends with the presidential elections 
of November 1990. The first two sections will provide an overview of the key 
domestic and foreign political developments in Poland during the period in 
question. Section three will introduce the main political actors and present their 
stance on European integration during the 1989 elections, parliamentary 
debates and the 1990 presidential contest.
Domestic developments
1989 marked the start of rapid political and economic change for Poland and its 
Soviet bloc neighbours. In August 1988 the the Polish United Workers' Party 
(Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR) proposed round-table discussions 
to representatives of dissident groups, including Solidarity. While the more 
radical sections of Solidarity were initially suspicious of the government's 
intentions, Solidarity leader Lech Walesa and his advisors eventually agreed to 
the talks, which took place between February and April 19893*. The round table 
agreement resulted in the re-legalization of Solidarity, the decision to hold 
partially free parliamentary elections to the sejm, or the lower house, and a fully 
democratic contest for a re-established senate as well as a strengthened 
presidential post.33
Solidarity won all 35% of parliamentary seats allocated to it according to the 
contract agreement, as well as 99 of 100 seats in the fully contestable senate. As 
per the agreement the regime retained 65% of parliamentary seats34. The 
participants of the talks agreed that fully democratic elections would take place
32 F.Millard, Anatomy of the New Poland, p77-82.
33 Jabloriski, p.128, Jahns.
34 V. Zubek, 'The Phoenix out of the Ashes: the Rise to Power of Poland's Post-Communist SdRP', 
Communist and Post Communist Studies, 28,3 (1995), 275-306.p.278
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no later than four years after the 1989 contest, once a more robust multi-party 
system developed, new elites gained political experience and the economic 
reforms initiated under the incumbent Rakowski government could be 
completed33. But the PZPR soon lost ground when its pre-1989 satellite parties, 
Zjednoczone Stronniciwo Ludowe (United Agrarian Faction, ZSL) and Stronnictwo 
Demokratyczne (Democratic Faction, SD) declared independence36. In August 
1989 a "government of national responsibility" was formed, creating a balance of 
power between PZPR's communist General Jaruzelski in the function of 
President, and the Catholic dissident Tadeusz Mazowiecki as Prime Minister3?. 
The minister of foreign affairs post was assigned to a compromise 
"independent" candidate: lawyer and academic Krzysztof Skubiszewski38.
Political transformation took place in the context of a deep economic recession. 
Hyperinflation, triggered by the PZPR's decision to free agricultural prices 
without limiting earnings, severely destabilized the economy and necessitated 
rapid reforms. The orchestrator of economic transformation was Finance 
Minister and deputy Prime Minister Leszek Balcerowicz, who advocated "shock 
therapy' reforms. The Balcerowicz Plan, implemented in January 1990, was a 
radical move away from a state controlled economy. Controls on retail prices, 
private enterprise and foreign trade were virtually abolished and wages 
indexed to prevent inflation. The success of the plan relied on a lbn USD 
International Monetary Fund stabilization fund, provided on the condition of 
Poland adhering to strict fiscal and monetary policy measures.39 By late 1990 
Poland had become one of the most open economies in the world40 The 
restructuring took a heavy toll on Polish domestic industry however, as the 
majority of state owned enterprises proved unprofitable when competing on 
the global market.41 The years 1990 and 1991 were marked by severe recession.
33 Ibid, p.279
36A. Dudek, Pierwsze Lata HI Rzeczpospolitej, 1989-2001 (Kracow 2005), chapter 3.
37 F. Millard, Polish Politics and Society (London 1999). p.70-76
38 Dudek, p.101.
39E. de Boer-Ashworth, The Global Political Economy and Post-1989 Change. The Place of the Central 
European Transition (Basingstoke 2000), p.158.
40 B. Slay, 'The Dilemmas of Economic Liberalism in Poland1, Europe-Asia Studies, 45,2 (1993), 237-257.
44 Ibid.
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Inflation almost doubled from 259% in 1989 to 586% 1990, unemployment rose 
to 12.3% and real wages decreased by 24.2 %«.
Balcerowicz justified the radical nature of the 'therapy' by arguing it was 
imperative that the painful economic restructuring be carried out during what 
he described as a period of 'extraordinary politics'. During the first months of 
the 'velvet revolution', he argued, the new elite benefited from exceptionally 
high levels of public trust and greater than normal acceptance of painful 
reforms. This was hence the most appropriate time to implement unpopular 
policy that would most likely be rejected in the normal course of democracy 
when interest groups disadvantaged by given policies are sufficiently strong to 
prevent implementation. Economic restructuring could be successful therefore, 
because of the weak nature of Polish democracy. Once interest-based 
democracy was consolidated, Balcerowicz feared, Poland's powerful working 
class would jeopardize the harsh but necessary reform process43.
Ironically, the new elites came to fear the very working class whose support 
brought them to pow ers The 'shock therapy', so reminiscent of a communist 
'five-year plan', was yet another exercise in the 'deferred gratification'45 logic so 
often used to legitimize policy under the communist regime. Although 
designed to eradicate communism, the paradigm behind the top-down 
imposition of the economic reform and its orthodox policy framework was 
reminiscent of the logic of the universal grand-narrative of a communist state 
planned economy4*.
Meanwhile on the political front the absence of electoral legitimization forced 
the PZPR  to adjust to new political circumstances. During its XI congress in 
January 1990 the party dissolved itself and set up a new organization called the 
Social Democracy of the Polish Republic (Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej
42 J. Adam, Social Costs of Transformation to a Market Economy in Post-Socialist Countries. The Cases of 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary (Basingstoke 1999), p.22.
43 L. Balcerowicz, Socialism, Capitalism, Transformation (Budapest 1995), p.316.
44 Ost, The Defeat of Solidarity. Anger and Politics in Postcommunist Europe.
45 Kolankiewicz and Lewis, p.58.
46 de Boer-Ashworth, p50.
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Polskiej, SdRP). The Parliamentary Club of the Democratic Left (Poselski Klub 
Lewicy Demokratycznej, PKLD) was established under the leadership of 
Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, PZPR  reformer, lawyer and former Fulbright 
scholar at Columbia University. Although Cimoszewicz was not a member of 
the SdRP he was closely affiliated with the new party and would later receive 
its backing as a candidate during the 1990 presidential contest.
The dissolution of the PZPR led to renewed calls for free parliamentary and 
presidential elections. Lech Walesa, who at the time did not hold a formal 
position in the government, was particularly vocal about this. He argued that 
since one of the partners had ceased to exist, the Round Table agreement was 
no longer valid and a new presidential election should be organised. Both 
Walesa and Mazowiecki decided to stand for the presidential post and their 
rivalry led to a rift within Solidarity. Walesa's supporters formed the Centre 
Accord (Porozumienie Centrum, PC). Advocates of Mazowiecki united in the 
Citizens' Movement for Democratic Action (Ruch Obywatelskiej Akcji 
Demokratycznej, ROAD). After losing the first ballot, Mazowiecki resigned from 
the post of Prime Minister and Walesa, the winner of the presidential contest, 
appointed Jan Krzysztof Bielecki as Prime Minister in January 1991.
Polish foreign policy
Mazowiecki pursued a 'two-track' foreign policy of re-defining relations with 
both the East and the West47 and especially with Poland's powerful neighbours: 
a gradually disintegrating Soviet Union and a re-unifying Germany. The 
withdrawal of the 56,000 Soviet troops stationed on Polish territory and the 
attainment of border inviolability guarantees from the new German state were 
key priorities48. The 'return to Europe' depended on the new government's 
ability to successfully re-define relations with the East. As long as Soviet troops
47 K. Skubiszewski, Polityka Zagraniczna i Odzyskanie Niepodlegtosci. Przemowienia, Oswiadczenia, 
Wywiady 1989-1993. (Warsaw 1997).
48 Interview with Krzysztof Skubiszewski, 19 May 2006.
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were present in Poland any advances towards the West would have to be made 
with caution.
Poland's position in international structures also underwent a radical 
redefinition. This included the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and of the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), formalization of relations 
with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the institutionalisation of 
the Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) and 
attainment of guest status in the Council of Europe, followed by full 
membership once the first fully democratic elections were held.
The above initiatives occurred in the context of rapid regional transformation. 
The autumn of 1989 saw the velvet revolution in Czechoslovakia, the death of 
Nikolai Ceausescu in Romania and the fall of the Berlin wall. During the first 
half of 1990 fully free democratic elections were held in East Germany, 
Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. By the summer of 1990 Poland's 
contract parliament was the only legislature of the region that had not been 
elected on the basis of a fully free democratic contest. Meanwhile in the USSR 
perestroika progressed and national independence movements gained strength, 
especially in the Baltic republics. But the post-communist states' ambitions of 
European integration met with limited enthusiasm from their Western 
counterparts. There was much disquiet about what would happen to the Soviet 
Empire and how they should react. Western leaders hedged their bets, 
preferring to make vague promises rather than give an explicit go-ahead for 
membership in the European Community.49
Nonetheless, significant progress towards integration was made during the 
Mazowiecki period. First steps in integration with the EC were already initiated 
under the PZPR and Poland completed negotiations for a Trade and Economic 
Co-Operation Treaty with the EC under the 1989 Rakowski cabinet.50 In July 
1989 the European Council assigned the co-ordination of aid for the post­
49 Interview with Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, 21 July 2005, Mayhew, p ll.
50 Ibid, p6-9. The treaty was signed in September 1989 under the Mazowiecki cabinet.
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communist states to the European Commission, 5* Post-communist leaders' 
initial hopes for a 'New Marshall Plan' did not materialize52 but a more limited 
aid programme was put in place.
The PHARE (Poland and Hungary Assistance to Restructuring Economies) 
programme55, initiated in December 1989, provided Poland with 600 million 
ECU of financial aid, targeted primarily on economic restructuring advice and 
agriculture54. A 240 million ECU credit line for state owned enterprise 
restructuring and small and medium sized (SME) businesses was made 
available by the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was established to support the 
private sector.55 Like IMF and World Bank funding, EC aid was conditional. 
Recipients had to show progress towards the rule of law, respect for human 
rights, the introduction of multi-party democracy by means of direct popular 
elections and transformation towards a free market economy5*.
Another key element of Mazowiecki's foreign policy was the initiation of 
discussions about Poland's association with the EC. Otherwise known as the 
Europe Agreements, the association treaties established an institutional 
framework for free trade between the EC and the post-communist states. The 
treaties involved extensive commitment to economic restructuring and limited 
state intervention and protection of domestic industry.
Immediately after being appointed as Prime Minister Mazowiecki hence began 
to re-direct Poland's foreign policy away from the unstable Soviet Union and 
towards the West. European Community institutions meanwhile, were also
51W. Wallace, 'Does the EU have an Ostpolitiek?', in Ambivalent Neighbors. The EU, NATO, and the Price 
of Membership, eds. A. Lieven and D. Trenin (Washington, D.C. 2003), 45-66, p48.
52 Mayhew, pl36.
53 P. Samecki, 'Pomoc Wsp6lnot Europejskich dla Polski', in Polska w Procesie Integracji ze Wspolnotami 
Europejskimi, ed. Z. Wysokiriska (Warsaw 1994), 154-164, pl55.
54 Ibid, pl59.
55 T. Mattli, 'The Demand-Side Politics of EU Enlargement: Democracy and the Application for EU 
Membership ', Journal of European Public Policy, 9,4 (2002), p554.
56 Samecki, 'Pomoc Wspdlnot Europejskich dla Polski', pl56.
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about to undergo extensive structural change. Before turning to the question of 
how 'Europe' and integration was addressed in Polish political rhetoric it will 
hence be pertinent to set out the contemporary institutional context of the 
European Communities.
The EC was confronted with the need to respond to post-communist states' 
demands for inclusion at a time of wide-ranging internal reforms. Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU), the completion of the single market, German 
unification and the debate on the future political framework of the Community 
were all on top of the agenda as the Cold War ended. In early 1990 Jacques 
Delors, the Commission President, and other EC leaders pushed for 
institutional reform towards closer political union and two intergovernmental 
conferences on these subjects opened in Rome in December 1990.
The supra-nationalist agenda gave rise to growing concerns about the EC's 
'democratic deficit'. The democratic deficit was made up of several factors. 
Firstly, the powers of the Community's directly elected parliament were limited 
whereas unelected decision makers at the European Commission had formal 
agenda setting powers. Secondly, the complexity of the EC's decision making 
procedures limited the transparency of the process. Thirdly, decisions made by 
the EC were perceived as technical in nature and turnout to EP elections was 
low. The EC lacked a 'demos', a political community that wished to jointly 
delegate power to Brussels. Most significant however, were proposals for the 
increased use of qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers. In 
principle, the use of consensus limited the democratic deficit in that it provided 
member state representatives with a veto over any decisions they deemed 
unacceptable for their electorates. Qualified majority voting, where decisions 
have been made with approximately 65% majority, made it possible for 
decisions affecting the citizens of a given member state to be made against the 
voting preferences of that member states' representatives in the Council. In 
practice, the actual use of voting in the Council has been infrequent and the 
habit of consensus decision making ingrained in the Council's way of working.
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Nonetheless, the compromises states have made to attain consensus have been 
shaped by potential coalition constellations and the possibility of a vote in the 
event consensus cannot be attained. The possibility of a vote has forced 
sceptical governments to compromise and seek amendments rather than block a 
decision altogether. ^
Increased use of QMV, favoured by Delors and other proponents of political 
union, would hence significantly impact member states' ability to influence 
decisions about their domestic affairs. Together with the implementation of the 
EMU, which entailed a transfer of much of member states' monetary and fiscal 
decision making competences, and the proposals to expand the EC's powers 
into elements of social policy, foreign as well as and policing and border control 
policies meant that EC membership inevitably entailed a significant loss of state 
sovereignty.
In Poland meanwhile, the powerfully symbolic slogan of the 'return to Europe' 
played a prominent role in party-political rhetoric. But the Polish debates 
reflected the nascent elites' limited knowledge of West European institutions 
and did not address Western leaders concerns with political union, EMU or the 
democratic deficit. Rather, Polish political actors begun to develop highly 
symbolic and ambiguous visions of Europe more suited to their new ideological 
identities than to the policy implications of association with the increasingly 
integrated European institutions. The following section will address the 
development of 'return to Europe' discourse under the Mazowiecki cabinet.
The 'return to Europe' in political debate
Debate about Poland's place in Europe was prominent already during the 1989 
contract election and played a central role in the rhetoric of Poland's new 
political elites from the first days of the Mazowiecki cabinet. Apart from being a 
key element of the annual foreign policy debates European integration was also
57 H. Wallace, 'An Institutional Anatomy of Five Policy Models', in Policy Making in the European Union, 
ed. H. Wallace, Wallace, William and Pollack, Mark (Oxford 2005), p.61.
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the subject of discussion during prime ministerial exposes as well as during 
debates on related topics such as the ratification of the treaty on good 
neighbourly relations with Germany. As the OKP and PZPR fragmented into 
new political parties Poland's place in Europe featured in the nascent 
groupings' programmes. This section will firstly address the role of 'Europe' 
and the 'West' in the 1989 elections. The way parties presented their stance on 
European integration in their electoral programmes and during parliamentary 
debate will be addressed in the second sub-section and the role of the European 
discourse in the 1990 presidential election will be presented in sub-section 
three.
Elections to the 1989 contract sejm
The main participants of the 1989 contest were Solidarity and the PZPR  with its 
satellite parties: Stronnictwo Demokratyczne, Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe and 
three PZPR affiliated Catholic groupings, Stowarzyszenie Pax (the Pax Alliance), 
Unia Chrzescijahsko-Spoleczna (Christian-Social Union) and Polski Zwiqzek 
Katolicko-Spoleczny (the Polish Catholic-Social Alliance).^ The results of the 
contest were made public on 8 June 1989, with Solidarity attaining 160 of the 
161 seats available to it in the sejm or the lower house and 92 of 100 in the 
senate. The public preference for the opposition was emphasised even further 
by the fact that only two of the ruling coalition's 35 guaranteed candidates 
gained 50% of the votes. In nearly all cases most voters crossed all names out of 
the guaranteed 'national list' to ensure its non-election69. The 65% of votes 
allocated to the regime side were made up of PZPR with 38%, Zjednoczone 
Stronnictwo Ludowe with 17%, Stronnictwo Demokratyczne with 6% and the 3 
Catholic groupings, which jointly held 5% of votes60.
The 1989 elections, held on 4 June 1989, were primarily a plebiscite on the rule 
of the communist party. Neither the PZPR nor Solidarity expected the Round
58 Dudek, p35.
59 P. Lewis, 'Non-Competitive Elections and Regime Change: Poland 1989', Parliamentary Affairs, 43,1 
(1990), p97.
60 Millard, Polish Politics and Society, p.80.
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Table agreement to become redundant so soon and to have to define policies for 
Poland's unprecedented systemic transformation within weeks, not years, of 
the electoral contest. The programmes of the two main contestants contained 
only limited policy proposals, the PZPR perceiving its victory to be assured by 
the contract agreement61 and Solidarity viewing itself in the role of a future 
opposition to government policy rather than policy maker62.
The PZPR's programme focused on the need to improve Poland's economic 
situation and establish equality of opportunity among different forms of 
property ownership. It also called for a new constitution and confirmed its 
support for trade union plurality. Regarding foreign policy, the PZPR 
emphasised the need for national sovereignty and territorial inviolability. It also 
declared: 'We will strengthen friendship and cooperation with our allies, also 
develop broad relations with other states. We want to continue to actively 
participate in healing international relations. Our planet and our continent have 
too many common aims and threats to maintain divisions among hostile camps. 
®' Regarding foreign trade the PZPR stated: 'We decisively support the opening 
of Poland to the global market. We will act to break through the stagnation in 
the economic integration of socialist states64'. While remaining loyal to the 
Soviet Union therefore the PZPR  supported reform of the communist trading 
bloc and advocated Poland's participation in international economic 
organisations.
Solidarity participated in the 1989 contest as Komitet Obywatelski 'Solidarnosc' 
(Citizen's Committee 'Solidarity', OKP). The establishment of the OKP meant 
that Solidarity lent its name to two separate entities: 'Solidarity' the trade union 
and 'Solidarity' the political grouping institutionalized within the OKP
61J. Hayden, 'Explaining the Collapse of Communism in Poland: How the Strategic Mispreception of 
Round Table Negotiators Produced Unanticipated Results', Polish Sociological Review, 4,136 (2001).
62 Zubek.
63 Deklaracja Wyborcza Polskiej Zjednoczone) Partii Robotniczej, Trybuna Ludu, 6-7 May, 1989.
64 Ibid.
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framework65. The Citizens' Committee mandate united representatives from a 
wide range of opposition organisations. The largest of these were the Solidarity 
trade union and Agrarian Solidarity (Solidamosc Rolnikozv). Other dissident 
groupings such as the Polska Partia Socjalistyczna (the Polish Socialist Party,
PPS) and the Stronnictwo Pracy (the Labour Faction), Konfederacja Polski 
Niepodleglej and the liberal Unia Polityki Realnej (Union of Realist Politics, UPR) 
chose not to stand in the election but they did allow their members to 
participate in the OKP list66.
Solidarity's programme addressed the need to draft a new constitution, abolish 
censorship, impose the rule of law and strengthen the powers of local 
government. It also asserted that the subsequent parliamentary elections should 
be fully democratic with 'no limitations or privileges'67. Regarding economic 
policy Solidarity supported equality of state and private ownership and the 
introduction of hard budget constraints to both65. It also opposed the state's 
direct involvement in the running of economic enterprise6’ and called for the 
establishment of an effective social security system75.
The OKP's foreign policy aims included the consolidation of Polish sovereignty 
and independence, preservation and consolidation of peace in Europe and in 
the world, 'victory over anachronistic European divisions', 'development of 
international co-operation' and the 'strengthening and development and all that 
contributes to the more complete realization of human rights and better quality 
of life'71.
65 M. Wenzel, 'Solidarity and Akcja Wyborcza 'SolidarnoSc'. An Attempt at Reviving the Legend. 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 31,2 (1998), 139-156, p.147-148.
66 Dudek, p.51. The latter two groupings also stood for election independently although neither attained 
representation without OKP backing.
67 OKP 1989 Electoral Programme, section 1/2, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the 
Polish Academy of Sciences, 1989 election folder.
68 Ibid. section 11/11.
69 Ibid. section 11/12.
70 Ibid. Section 11/10.
71 OKP, Polska i Swiat. Oswiadczenie w Sprawach Miedzynrodowych, Political Parties Archive, Institute
of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1989 election folder.
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Regarding the Warsaw Pact the OKP stated: 'Without questioning or 
undermining....the Warsaw Pact...we feel that its functioning has to date been 
based on the rule of submitting the weaker partners to the stronger ones, which 
has led to adverse political, economic and social consequence'. Its stance on the 
political situation in other communist countries was made clear however in the 
declaration of its willingness to co-operate with 'all forces acting for pluralism 
and democracy in the USSR, Hungary and in other East European states'72.
The OKP did not present detailed proposals as to its preferred framework for 
Poland's relations with the EC. But its stance was clearly pro-Western. It called 
for 'multifaceted co-operation with the German Federal Republic, Great Britain, 
France, Italy and other European Community states'73, declared support for 
'strengthening European unity and popularizing European ideals' and asserted 
that 'Poland cannot exist without Europe, and there is no peaceful Europe 
without Poland'74. Improved relations between Poland and Germany and 
mutual respect for 'separate identity and territorial inviolability'75 would play a 
key role in diminishing European divisions, the OKP declared.
Solidarity was hence unmistakeably supportive of Poland's integration with the 
West. 'It is time for Poland to become a country where all are at home' its 
programme stated, 'it is time for Poland to return to Europe'75.
But it also took care not to antagonise the USSR, calling for 'reform' rather than 
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. The presence of Soviet troops on Polish soil and 
the pervading uncertainty about how the USSR would react to any excessively 
overt declarations of dissent may have limited the OKP ability to make its 
foreign policy aspirations explicit.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 OKP June 1989 electoral leaflet, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish 
Academy of Sciences, 1989 election folder.
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Solidarity's pro-Western stance was perhaps best expressed with the famous 
'High Noon' campaign poster. In a parody of the 1952 Oscar winning Western, 
the hero, played by Gary Newman complete with Stetson hat and cowboy 
boots, strode confidently against the backdrop of the 'Solidarity' logo. 'At High 
Noon, 4 June 1989' the caption declared. The poster sent a message louder and 
clearer than the most daring declarations of support for budding democratic 
movements. Vote for Solidarity, it promised, and you will get a chance to be 
part of the West. 'Solidamosc' was undeniably 'Western'. And this in turn made 
it represent everything communism was not. The image of the 'West' evoked a 
powerful promise of escape from Soviet domination and all that it entailed from 
food rations, unending queues, second rate consumer products through 
government corruption, inability to travel and censorship through to lack of 
political agency and, all too often, memories of persecution and loss of friends 
and family at the hands of the Soviet regime.
Skilled in using imagery and metaphor to get their message past censors, the 
dissidents were able to express all that Solidarity stood for more effectively by 
means of a Gary Newman photo than by detailed policy proposals. But while 
electorally effective and full of promise, such potent imagery gave the voters 
little indication of the strategies its representatives would later use to radically 
transform Poland's foreign and domestic policy.
Poland's place in Europe also featured in the programme of the Konfederacja 
Polski Niepodleglej (Confederation for Independent Poland, KPN), an opposition 
party established during the late 1970's under the leadership of Leszek 
Moczulski77. The Confederates stated:
Our main moral and intellectual foundation is a set of 
values typical to the Christian, Western world 
view ....we consider ourselves to be Europeans -  in a 
civilisational way which has been shaped over the past 
one and a half millennia. Being a part of Europe, we are
77 Akt Konfederacji Polski Niepodleglej, 1 September 1979, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political 
Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, KPN folder.
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aware that we constitute, both us and our neighbours -  
its Eastern border, faced with repeated pressure from 
Asia.. .Our tradition springs from the thousand years of 
Christianity in this part of Europe, and especially from 
the thousand years of Polish Catholicism.7*
The KPN 's vision of Poland's place in Europe was hence grounded in Polish 
Catholicism. This was the case, the Confederates implied, since Poland not only 
had been Christian for the past millennium, but also because of its past as 
defender of Western Christianity. 'Repeated pressure from Asia' referred to 
Poland's role as th e 'Antemurale Christiantiatis', or protector of Christian Europe 
from Tartar and Ottoman invasions and more recently its victory in the 1919 
Bolshevik war.
Parliamentary debate
The collapse of communism presented the political elites with the need to 
develop distinct narratives that would enable them to differentiate themselves 
from their competitors. Europe and Poland's role in it was a frequent subject of 
parliamentary discussion and featured in the programmes of almost all political 
groupings established during the Mazowiecki period. But the debate remained 
abstract, its participants favouring the use of metaphors and symbolism over 
precise discussion of the technical nature of EC reform or the association 
process. Polish elites focused on national identity, religion and the question of 
whether Poland already belonged to Europe, by virtue of its past sacrifices as 
the bulwark of European Christianity, or whether it was not yet 'good enough' 
to return and hence obliged to undergo a process of 'catching-up'. The 
symbolism of 'returning to Europe' proved powerful enough to gamer public 
support and ambiguous enough to be adjusted to the parties' nascent 
ideological narratives. The powerful appeal of 'Europe' both legitimized the 
new parties' claims for power and became a conveniently malleable reflection 
of their preferred vision of Poland and its place in the international order.
78 Program Konfederacji Polski Niepodleglej, Uchwalony przez III Kongres KPN, Warszawa-Krakdw, 4 
February - 4 March 1989, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of 
Sciences, KPN folder.
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Tadeusz Mazowiecki's parliamentary expose of 12 September 1989 was one of 
the first opportunities to publicly address Poland's future role in Europe. 
Mazowiecki presented his hopes for Poland and its relationship with Europe as 
follows:
We want a Poland open to Europe and to the world; a 
Poland which -  with no inferiority complex -  will 
contribute to the creation of material and cultural goods;
Poland whose citizens will feel welcome in other countries 
of Europe and the world, rather than like troublesome 
intruders.79
Mazowiecki hence felt it was important for Poles to feel equal to their Western 
counterparts and not suffer from an 'inferiority complex'. He claimed that in 
order to be a part of 'Europe' and to integrate, the Poles had to transform, not 
only their economy and political system, but also their identity. A 
transformation from troublesome gastarbeiters to wealthy, well-adjusted 
members of the rich countries' club was needed for the Poles to no longer feel 
inferior. Mazowiecki's vision implied an awareness of the emotional burden 
which Poland's 'separation' from Western Europe imposed on Polish identity. 
But he simultaneously implied that as things stood, the Poles were not equal to 
their Western neighbours.
Mazowiecki's enthusiasm for European integration was echoed by Bronislaw 
Geremek, dissident intellectual and chair of the OKP parliamentary club. For 
Geremek, the 'return to Europe' was sufficiently important to justify the 
creation of a new constitution. 'We believe that the historic role of this 
parliament is the creation of a new constitution, which will lead Poland into 
Europe, Europe as a family of free nations' he stated.80 Poland's 'place in 
Europe' was clearly of pivotal importance for Mazowiecki and Geremek. They 
both also implied that there was something Poland had to attain, a process it
79 Tadeusz Mazowiecki, speech at parliamentary session nr.7, quoted in Rzeczpospolita, 213(2347), 13 
September 1989, p.4.
80 Bronislaw Geremek, parliamentary session nr.7,12 September 1989,1989 Parliamentary Session 
Transcripts, sejm library (Biblioteka Sejmowa, hard copy transcripts are provided on request and are listed 
by parliamentary session numbers).
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needed to go through, before it could 'return'. Communism had taken Poland 
away from Europe, their rhetoric implied, and now an effort was required for it 
to return. Poland was not yet 'good enough' to claim its right of belonging. 
Mazowiecki's own rhetoric hence reinforced the very inferiority complex he 
was so concerned about. Although the symbolism of the return provided a 
powerful rhetorical justification for a new constitution, neither Mazowiecki nor 
Geremek, or any other participant of the September debate, explained what the 
all-important process of 'returning' entailed. It was not made clear what 
'economic and cultural' tasks Polish citizens would have to complete before 
they could start to feel like 'equal citizens' and not 'troublesome intruders'.
In January 1990, during his speech at the Council of Europe membership 
application, Mazowiecki presented his vision of Poland's relations with Europe 
in similar vein:
Europe is living through an exceptional time. Half the 
continent cut off from its mother trunk half a century ago, 
wants to return. A return to Europe!..Maybe.. .it would be 
more appropriate to speak about a rebirth of Europe 
which...ceased to exist since the Yalta decisions. Europe 
has always been a point of reference for us in our quest for 
our identity; Europe, which the Poles defended and which 
they loved. For three hundred years the idea of the 
'bulwark of Christianity' has been popular in Poland -  the 
bulwark of Europe. So, Europe is present in the Polish 
consciousness as a value for which it was worthwhile to 
live and for which it was sometimes necessary to die.81
For Mazowiecki, as for many other dissidents, European integration held an 
abstract and symbolic significance that could not be reduced to the 
technicalities of customs union or a common currency. Poland was inexorably 
linked to Europe. Tragically, it had been severed from 'its mother trunk' by the 
Soviet invasion. The Poles' European identity and their commitment to Europe 
had been proven by the numerous sacrifices they made while defending
81 Tadeusz Mazowiecki, speech at Council of Europe Meeting in Strasbourg, 30 January 1990, Zbidr 
Dokument6w, nr.l, 1990.
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Western Europe from the un-Christian, barbaric East. Indeed, their allegiance to 
Europe was so great they were willing to die for it. Returning to Europe implied 
a return to freedom, an end to the long and arduous struggle against the Soviet 
oppressor, and to what for many had been a life-long sacrifice for Polish 
independence. European integration represented the culmination of dissident 
struggle and reward for a successful transformation.
Practically no debate about the legislative, economic and political implications 
of Poland's European integration policy took place within the OKP. Poland's 
'return to Europe' remained a catch-all slogan: ambiguous and fluid, a 'sponge' 
concept82 that could be all things to all people. Years later, Mazowiecki spoke of 
the 'obviousness' of the pro-integration policy. Asked when he first felt 
convinced that accession to the European Union was the best solution for 
Poland he replied:
I could not point to a single breakthrough moment. With 
Jacques Delors from the very start we talked with a full 
awareness of common sentiments, in a climate of 
.. .obviousness. Yes.. .for us it was obvious that Poland is 
returning home.. .1 then believed that amidst this great 
transformation the relations between us and the EC should 
be increasingly close and that we had the right to expect 
support and help.88
For Mazowiecki, European integration was a foregone conclusion. While 
Western decision makers remained cautious about making a commitment on 
Poland's membership in Western structures84, the Polish Prime Minister 
believed that the West was obliged to assist in Poland's transformation and 
facilitate its integration with Western Europe.
In September 1989, the vision of the 'return to Europe' met with little 
parliamentary opposition and the only voice of dissent against Poland's pro-
82 A. Wolff-Pow§ska, 'Polska i kraje Europy 6rodkowo-Wschodniej: poszukiwanie dr6g przezwyci^zenia 
podzialu Europy', in Wspdlna Europa mit czy rzeczywistoSc ?, (Poznan 1990).
83 Marek Saryusz-Wolski and Krzysztof Bobiriski, interview with Tadeusz Mazowiecki Polska i Unia, nr.l, 
October 1998.
84 Grabbe, 'Challenges of EU Enlargement', p67.
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Western foreign policy came from PZPR 'hard-liners'85. Rather than openly 
question the idea of closer integration with the European Communities they 
perceptively pointed to Western leaders' lack of enthusiasm. As Marian 
Orzechowski, leader of the PZPR parliamentary club, commented during the 
debate following Tadeusz Mazowiecki's expose :
Poland has traditionally been a country open to Europe 
and to the world, and now it is becoming even more so.
This was not always reciprocated; in fact, this was the case 
more often than not. We experience this to this day.86
Unsurprisingly, relations with the USSR were the main point of dissent 
between the PZPR and the OKP. In 1989 the PZPR continued to question the 
new foreign policy direction and emphasise the importance of friendly relations 
with the USSR for Polish national security.87 But it never directly opposed 
European integration and support for economic co-operation with the EC was 
prominent in its rhetoric. One example of this was the statement of the 
November 1989 XVI Plenum of the Central Committee calling for 'a new  
alignment of relations within a modernized and effective CMEA and a 
fundamentally closer relationship and co-operation with the European 
Communities88'.
The PZPR  eventually dissolved on 29 January 1990. Its successor party, the 
Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, was established immediately 
thereafter. At the time of its dissolution the PZPR  had approximately 2 million 
members. The SdRP began with as few as 20 thousand89. Leszek Miller, PZPR 
'hardliner' and member of the Political Bureau, was appointed Secretary 
General. Aleksander Kwasniewski, a PZPR 'reformer', former member of the 
Socialist Union of Polish Students (Socjalistyczny Zwiqzek Studentow Polskich,
85 Bronislaw Pasierb, 'Spory Parliamentame Wokol Genezy Polskiej Orientacji Europejskiej', Wspolczesna 
Polska MySl Polityczna, ed. Krystyna Paszkiewicz (Wroclaw: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu 
Wroclawskiego, 1996).
86 Marian Orzechowski, speech at parliamentary session nr.7,12 September 1989, Parliamentary Session 
Transcripts, Sejm Library.
87 Ibid.
88 XVI Plenum Komitetu Centralnego PZPR, Warsaw, 6 Nov.1989, section 8.
89 E. Nalewajko, Protopartie i Protosystem. Szkic do Obrazu Polskiej Wielopartyjnosci (Warsaw 1997), p30.
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SZSP) became head of the Executive Committee. Upon its formation the SdRP 
issued a statement on foreign policy, calling for a "thorough reconstruction of 
the COMECON and a gradual change of the role of the Warsaw Pact'.90 It also 
expressed support for the 'development of a common European hom e',91 a 
slogan frequently used, by Mikhail Gorbachev92. The first congress proposed 
establishment of closer links with Western social democratic parties and 
membership in the Socialist International. From its inception, this communist- 
successor grouping pursued a strategy of redefining its image into a 
modernized, West European social democratic party. The SdRP advocated a 
'United Nations of Europe', which was to be founded on social democrat ideals. 
93 A pro-integrationist, pro-Western stance distanced the former communists 
from the atrocities of the ancien regime and was pivotal in the re-definition of 
their identity to a democratically legitimate, electable grouping.
But support for European integration did not mean that the SdRP agreed with 
the government's over-all foreign policy stance. NATO enlargement, German 
unification and the continuing presence of Soviet troops on Polish territory 
were the main points of dissent. In March 1990, in the midst of the German 
unification talks, the SdRP declared: 'Today safe borders and political and 
economic sovereignty are matters of the greatest importance...This is why we 
state that in a Europe divided into military blocs both the stretching out of the 
NATO border, and surrendering the security guarantee constituted by 
membership in the Warsaw Pact are not acceptable. Hence the necessity to have 
a strong Polish army and the point of temporarily stationing Soviet troops in 
Poland on the basis of mutually agreed and adhered to conditions. We consider 
the encouragement of anti-Soviet sentiments to be particularly dangerous. We
90 'Stanowiska i OSwiadczenia w Sprawie Sytuacji Mi^dzyNarddowej, Polityki Zagranicznej i Wspdipracy 
z Silami Lewicy Na Swiecie', Trybuna Kongresowa, 31 January 1990.
9* Ibid.
92 N. Davies, Europe.A History. (London 1997),p.37.
93 Piotr Radzikowski 'Lewica Europejska: jej wartosci i cele', Trybuna Ludu, 04 January 1990.
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point to the manifestation of dangerous nationalist tendencies in both of the 
German states'.94
In April 1990 the SdRP published its socio-economic programme. While 
supportive of the free market its programme also advocated extensive social 
security, public provision of health care, housing and education, and 
privatisation of state enterprises by issuing shares to employees.95 Regarding 
foreign policy the SdRP underscored the need for debt reduction, IMF aid, and 
foreign investment regulation. It also raised concerns about Poland's 
deteriorating economic relations with the USSR and emphasised the importance 
of trade with the Soviet Union for the Polish economy.96
The parliamentary debate on foreign policy of April 1990 presented another 
opportunity to address Poland's European integration policy. The 
parliamentarians considered with what kind of Europe and on what terms 
Poland should integrate. As during Mazowiecki's expose debate however, they 
focused on the abstract question of defining Polish identity in relation to the 
rest of the continent rather than on the technical aspects of EC reform and 
association.
Krzysztof Skubiszewski outlined the new aims of Polish foreign policy. 
European security was a primary concern. As he would later point out, 
Skubiszewski was not as yet able to publicly discuss his ambitions of joining 
NATO97. He did however, call for reform of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON 
as well as for closer integration with the European Communities and the 
Council of Europe98 and for continued co-operation with both Germany and the 
USSR. Relations with the Soviet Union were to be rebuilt on the basis of 
common interests, equality and partnership.
94 'Stanowisko Rady Naczelnej w Sprawach Mi^dzynarodowych', 10 March 1990.
95 'Program Spoleczno-Gospodarczy Socjeldemokracji RP', Trybuna, nr.56,19 April 1990.
96 Ibid.
97 Interiew with Krzysztof Skubiszewski, 19 May 2006.
98 Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Tnformaqa Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych o polityce zagranicznej 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w 1990 r', parliamentary session nr.28,26 April 1990, Parliamentary Session 
Transcripts, Sejm Library.
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The SdRP was supportive of the government's European integration efforts. 
Jozef Oleksy, an SdRP parliamentarian and one of its founders, stated:
We will support the government in its efforts to integrate 
Poland's economic system into the economies of the 
leading European states as well as achieve at least an 
associate status of the EEC.. .The artificial division of 
Europe shaped during the cold war now fades into the 
past. Before us stands a far reaching modification of the 
structures and activities of the politico-military structures 
of the continent.99
But Oleksy's stance was not unequivocally pro-Western. He expressed his 
opposition to German unification as well as to unified Germany's NATO 
membership and called for Poland to participate in the 2+4 talks. In order to 
strengthen European security, Oleksy proposed to assign a more meaningful 
role to the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe, a proposal that 
would be at the forefront of the reformed communists' foreign policy strategy 
for the next two years. He also pointed out that relations with the Soviet Union 
were no less important than those with the West.100
While there was a general consensus in support of establishing some kind of 
affiliation with West European states, parliamentarians differed as to the kind 
of Europe into which Poland should integrate. Many favoured a 'Europe of 
Nations', a term originally coined by Charles de Gaulle in support of a highly 
inter-govemmental European Community, made up of sovereign states where 
Council decisions would be based on consensus rather than qualified majority. 
Others appeared to advocate a more closely integrated European Community. 
But the discussion did not address the impact which these different types of 
international structure might have on Poland and the Poles and the language 
used during the debate was based on broad and vague slogans.
99 J6zef Oleksy, 'Informacja Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych o polityce zagranicznej Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej w 1990 r', parliamentary session nr.28, 26 April 1990, Parliamentary Session Transcripts, Sejm 
Library.
100 J6zef Oleksy, 'Informacja Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych o polityce zagranicznej Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej w 1990 r/, parliamentary session nr.28, 26 April 1990, Parliamentary Session Transcripts, Sejm 
Library.
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The parliamentarians were aware of the need to define what sort of a European 
organisation Poland would integrate with but rather than address the technical 
debates on issues such as the EMU, greater use of QMV or social policy 
competences they continued to use vague and symbolic terms for their 
preferred visions of Europe. Leslaw Lech, of the Stronnictwo Demokratyczne, 
pointed out:
In returning to Europe, what, in the political sense, does it 
mean to get closer to the European institutions, and above 
all to the EEC? We should know what sort of Europe this 
should be. Will it be a Europe of Nations or a Nation 
Europe? It would appear the former notion is preferred.101
As Lech made clear, the ambition to join the EEC was not unconditional. While 
they supported integration, many parliamentarians qualified their enthusiasm 
by opting for what seemed to be an inter-govemmentalist model. Wojciech 
Polak, of the Polish Social-Catholic Union, asserted: "As regards European 
unity it appears that the concept of premier Margaret Thatcher is more realistic, 
one of a loose federation of sovereign European states, largely taking into 
account the civilisational and cultural diversity of the different European 
nations/102
The parliamentarians were hence caught between two ambitions: the desire to 
'return to the West' and form closer links with European institutions on the one 
hand, and concerns for Poland's nascent independence on the other.
References to religion were prominent during the discussion. For many, Polish 
Christianity played a pivotal role in the country's relationship with Europe. As 
Jan Lopuszariski of the Zjednoczenie Chrzescijansko-Narodowe (Christian 
Nationalist Faction, ZChN) commented:
101 Leslaw Lech, 'Informacja Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych o polityce zagranicznej Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej w 1990 r', parliamentary session nr.28,26 April 1990, Parliamentary Session Transcripts, Sejm 
Library.
102 Wojciech Polak, 'Informacja Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych o polityce zagranicznej Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej w 1990 r', parliamentary session nr.28,26 April 1990, Parliamentary Session Transcripts, Sejm 
Library.
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As Christianity was pushed out of the public life in Europe 
there was also less space for Poland and so her misfortunes 
occurred. Poland's hope to re-build the position among the 
family of nations which she deserves is closely linked to the 
hope for re-building an international Christian orders
Lopuszanski hence believed that Poland's relationship with Europe was 
primarily based on Christianity. Others felt that Poland's religious, conservative 
national identity might be a burden rather than a justification of Poland's 'place 
in Europe'. Jan Czaja of the Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish Agrarian Faction, 
PSL) stated: 'We talk about a return to Europe, about writing ourselves into the 
process of European integration, association with the EEC, we want to attract 
foreign capital, but as a society we are closed, insecure and provincial'.104 Lech 
Kozaczko of the OKP meanwhile was concerned about whether the Poles were 
not too poor for their wealthy Western neighbours. He stated: 'Citizens of the 
wealthy European nations have no desire to give up their own living standards 
for the sake of our entry into Europe, given the current state of our economy'.106
While some doubted whether Poland and the Poles were 'good enough' to 
integrate with their West European neighbours, others argued that Poland's 
Christianity guaranteed its 'place in Europe'. On the one hand, the 
parliamentarians wanted to ensure that Poland got its 'honourable' and 'well- 
deserved' position in the international order, on the other they worried whether 
it would gain admittance to the prestigious Western club.
The discussion hence concentrated on broad, non-technical issues and reflected 
the parliamentarians' limited knowledge of European international structures106. 
It was often unclear whether the speakers addressed the process of integrating
103 Jan Lopuszanski, 'Informacja Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych o polityce zagranicznej Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej w 1990 r', parliamentary session nr.28,26 April 1990, Parliamentary Session Transcripts, Sejm 
Library.
104 Jan Czaja, 'Informacja Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych o polityce zagranicznej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 
w 1990 r', parliamentary session nr.28,26 April 1990, Parliamentary Session Transcripts, Sejm Library.
105 Lech Kozaczko, 'Informacja Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych o polityce zagranicznej Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej w 1990 r', parliamentary session nr.28,26 April 1990, Parliamentary Session Transcripts, Sejm 
Library.
106 Interview with Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Warsaw, Government Plenipotentiary for European Integration 
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with the European Community, other West European organizations or whether 
the debate was about Polish national identity and perceptions of Poland being 
either a part of the "East" or the 'West'.
But increasingly distinct stances on Europe were evident in the programmes of 
new parties throughout 1990. While almost all parties continued to express 
support for some form of European integration an increasing number began to 
qualify the kind of Europe they wished Poland to integrate with. Several parties 
conditioned their support by emphasising that the Europe they wished to 
integrate with was a 'Europe of Nations' that did not impinge Polish 
sovereignty. Others however, presented explicit statements of support for 
association, membership and even speedy legal harmonisation of Polish law 
with that of the European Community.
The Polish Social-Democratic Union (Polska Unia Socjaldemoikratyczna, PUS), 
established by a group of former PZPR members under the leadership of 
Tadeusz Fiszbach, declared: We believe that Poland should play an active part 
in the process of European integration by associating and eventually becoming 
a member of the European Community'107. The Centre Accord presented a 
similarly enthusiastic stance in support of EC association and eventual 
membership. The PC was established in May 1990 by supporters of Lech 
Walesa, under the leadership of Jaroslaw Kaczyriski. 'The main trajectory of 
Polish foreign policy is a pro-European orientation. Our guiding aim is the 
entry into a united Europe, the core of which is the European Community. The 
realisation of this task requires...the speediest possible harmonisation of 
financial and legal regulations and political and economic structures with those 
required in Western Europe10*', it stated.
The PC hence advocated urgent harmonisation of Poland's law, political 
institutions and the economy with that of Western Europe. The European
107 Stanowisko Unii Socjaldemokratycznej w Sprawach Mi^dzynarodowych’, Section 3.
108Porozumienie Centrum, Dokumenty i Programy. Tezy do dyskysji nad Polskg Polityk^ Zagraniczn^. 
Polska-Europa, 9 June 1990.
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Community provided a much needed legislative and policy model for the 
transformation. The PC did not specify how such en-masse absorption of 
external legislation should be ratified and what role would parliamentary 
debate play in this process. The 'return to Europe' seemed to take priority over 
lengthy parliamentary procedure. A similar stance was presented by the Forum 
of the Democratic Right (Forum Prawicy Demokratycznej, FPD), established by 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki's supporters in June 1990. 'We see the need to go through 
a transition period, during which Poland will be associated with the EEC by 
means of the Europe Agreement. This period will allow Poland to align with 
European norms',109 it stated.
While it did not explicitly address the association process or future membership 
in the EC, Solidarity continued to emphasise the importance of Poland's 'return 
to Europe'. It declared:
Poland has attained the opportunity of independence, the 
building of a democratic society and a return to 
Europe.. .while participating in the task of repairing the 
Polish Republic we want to shape a democratic state, civil 
society, an economy with a market and different forms of 
ownership. Only such a Poland will take the appropriate 
place in the family of European states.110
'Returning to Europe' was hence presented as the end-goal of the reform 
process. While they did not clarify how and on what terms Poland should 
'return', regaining its 'appropriate place in Europe' was a key priority for the 
trade unionists. In early 1990 the trade union carried out a debate on whether it 
should withdraw from political life and focus on purely trade unionist activities 
or if it would remain in politics. Eventually a compromise was reached and the 
March 1990 congress decided that the union would continue to actively 
participate in political life. Solidarity hence took a challenging decision: it
109 Forum Prawicy Demokratycznej: Trzy Programy, Deklaracja Zalozycielska, 'Zalozenia Programu 
Polity ki Zagranicznej'.
110 'Uchwala Programowa II Zjazdu Delegat6w NSZZ 'SolidamoSd', Gazeta Wyborcza, 29 March 1990, 
dodatek.
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would have to deal with the conflicting interests of a political party on the one 
hand and a trade union on the other111.
Other groupings meanwhile, presented an increasingly qualified stance on 
European integration. They supported the integration process but asserted that 
the 'Europe' Poland would integrate had to be a 'Europe of Nations', that did 
not impinge national sovereignty.
The Polish Agrarian Faction 'Renewal' (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe ' Odrodzenie', 
PSLO), established in November 1989 as successor of the PZPR  satellite United 
Agrarian Faction11* presented such qualified support for European integration: 
'We support the idea of a European Community with the maintenance of 
national sovereignty', their programme stated. 'The aim of our policy is a 
Europe of Nations working together on the basis of equal rights....We were and 
are a part of Europe and want to actively participate in the creation of its 
modern shape and future development based on mutual friendship among the 
countries of our continent1.113
A similar stance was presented by the Pax Association (Stowarzyszenie Pax), 
originally established under the communist regime as a PZPR 'collaborationist' 
organisation comprising Catholic laity and so-called 'patriotic' priests.114 'We 
accept the idea of a common European home', their programme stated, 'but we 
understand this as a 'Europe of Nations' - a community of sovereign states and 
nations with their own historic and cultural identity',115 Pax asserted.
But the most vocal proponent of the 'Europe of Nations' rhetoric was the 
Zjednoczenie Chrzescijansko-Narodowe. Established in November 1989 by activists 
from the 'national-Catholic' strand of Solidarity ZChN  emphasised the
111 'Uchwala Programowa II Zjazdu Delegatdw NSZZ ’SolidamoSc', Gazeta Wyborcza, 29 March 1990, 
dodatek.
112 Nalewajko, p.27-28.
113 PSL 'Odrodzenie' 'W Trosce o Jutro Polski. Korekcyjny Program Gospodarczy PSL 'Odrodzenie1', 10 
March 1990.
114 T. Bale, Aleks, Szczrbiak, 'Why is there no Christian Democracy in Poland (and why does this matter)?', 
(Sussex European Insititute 2006), SEI working paper nr: 91, p ll.
115 Dokumenty Walnego Zgromadzenia Stowarzyszenia Pax. Deklaracja Programowa. 25 March 1990.
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importance of the Catholic Church and advocated state adherence to what it 
saw as Christian values such as the criminalisation of abortion116 and the 
compulsory teaching of religion in schools. From its inception, the ZChN  
expressed qualified support for European integration and 'Europe of Nations' 
frequently featured in its rhetoric.117 In November 1990 Wieslaw Chrzanowski, 
the leader of the ZChN, stated:
I am concerned by the fact that there are circles, especially 
on the left, also the left which has just come out of the 
underground, which make light of the problem. I would 
say that there are even those who present the willingness to 
sell out. They claim that national tendencies should be won 
over on the way to a united Europe, which Poland is 
supposed to 'melt into' so that, consequently, it would melt 
down. Such thinking is very useful for some of the ruling 
elites in Western Germany. We in ZChN  support the 
creation of a 'Europe of Nations, as de Gaulle wanted, and 
which is close to the words of the Holy Father, and not a 
'pan-Europe' which Kohl speaks about...Is the concern 
about Germans undertaking economic initiatives in Poland 
not unjustified, having a political rationale? I am thinking 
of the buying up of land, real estate, under the pretext of 
the needs of some business or other. What is interesting is 
that this is taking place almost exclusively on Polish 
territories previously belonging to Germany. This should 
be opposed.11*
According to the leader of the ZChN  German conspirators strove to re-gain the 
Recovered Territories. The plot was facilitated, Chrzanowski argued, not only 
by the reformed communists, but by the 'left' side of the Solidarity-successor 
wing. The debate on Europe divided the Solidarity-successor camp early in the 
integration process. Whereas dissident intellectuals such as Mazowiecki and 
Geremek saw 'returning to Europe' as an 'obvious' policy direction, the 
Zjednoczenie warned of an impending fourth partition.
116 Program Zjednoczenia Chrzescijarisko-Narodowego, Section 5, June 1990, Informator Parlamentamy 
OKP nr 25,15.10.1990.
117 Program Zjednoczenia Chrzescijarisko-Narodowego, June 1990, Informator Parlamentamy OKP nr 25, 
15.10.1990.
118 Wieslaw Chrzanowski, quoted in 'Dwuglos o Niebiezpieczeristwach Utraty Suwerennosci 
Ekonomicznej' Trybuna, 18 November 1990.
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A similarly qualified approach was presented by Moczulski's party, the KPN. 
The concept of miedzymorze (the between-sea) lay at the heart of KPN's foreign 
policy stance. Reminiscent of the powerful Polish-Lithuanian Union the concept 
of miedzymorze presented an alternative to integration with Western Europe. It 
advocated co-operation among countries in the region stretching from the Baltic 
to the Black seas. Different variants of miedzymorze were proposed but Poland, 
as the largest country of the region, was usually envisaged in a leading role119. 
The KPN  did support some form of future co-operation with the European 
Community, which it presented as the 'Europe of Nations', but its programme 
implied that integration with the West would not happen in the near future. 
Rather the KPN  preferred for this to take place after Poland and other post­
communist states had built up their economic strength by means of regional 
integration1^ .
Different presentations of 'Europe' and approaches to European integration 
could hence be distinguished. But the one thing all parties agreed on was the 
importance of Poland's newly regained sovereignty, which was prominent in 
the programmes of all major political groupings. The communist-successor PSL 
'Odrodzenie' called for the 'strengthening of political and economic 
sovereignty'121. The SdRP declared: 'political and economic sovereignty' to be 
'matters of the greatest importance'122. Both PSL and SdRP therefore 
underscored not only political but also economic sovereignty. The Social- 
Democratic Union emphasised the importance of consolidating sovereignty and 
territorial integrity123. The ZChN  declared: 'An independent state is the 
guarantor of the political identity of the nation and its necessary
119 M. Wolariski, 'Koncepcje Europy w Polskiej Tradycji Politycznej', in Jaka Europa?, ed. M. Wolariski 
(Wroclaw 1998), 11-26., p.20. K. Rogaczewska, 'Narbd-Paristwo-Federalizm w Koncepcjach Adama 
Doboszyriskiego', in Europa i integracja Europejska w polskiej my§li politycznej XX wieku, ed. J. a. T. 
Juchnowski, Janusz (Wroclaw 2003), 120-140.
120 Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej, Program Trzeciej Rzeczypospolitej, Odbudowa Niepodleglego 
Paristwa Funkcjonalnego.
121 Polskie Stronnictwo Ludlowe, 'Program Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego1, 27 November 1989. Section 
II 'Zrodla i Cele'
122 SdRP, 'Stanowisko Rady Naczelnej w Sprawach Mi^dzynarodowych', 10 March 1990.
123 'Stanowisko Unii Socjaldemokratycznej w Sprawach Mi^dzynarodowych1
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embodiment124'. The Forum of the Democratic Right referred to the need for 
Poland to attain a 'sovereign subject status in international relations'125. 
Porozumienie Centrum meanwhile stated: 'Polish national interest requires full 
internal and external sovereignty'125.
Given that Poland had only recently started to establish its independence from 
the weakening but still powerful Soviet Union it is not surprising that 
sovereignty was a key issue for all parties. But it is striking that the two 
developments that would significantly affect Polish sovereignty: EC reform and 
the forthcoming association negotiations127 were not presented as a threat to it. 
Rather, the parties seemed to be trying to square up two contradictory ideas: 
the desire for close integration with the West and for the protection of Poland's 
newly regained sovereignty125. Mazowiecki and Skubiszewski did not, at this 
stage, publicly raise their aspiration for Poland to join NATO for fear of 
repercussions from the USSR129. Closer relations with the EC were hence 
perceived to protect Polish sovereignty from a potential threat from the East. 
Once NATO membership became part of the public foreign affairs agenda 
however the protection of Poland's sovereignty from the USSR and later Russia 
would diminish the strength of the argument in favour of association and 
accession. The first voices of concern about the benefits of integration with the 
EC on Polish domestic industry and national independence could be heard 
towards the end of 1990. As the next section will show several contestants in the 
1990 presidential contest raised such concerns during the campaign.
124 Program Zjednoczenia Chrzescijarisko-Narodowego, 'Zasady', June 1990, Informator Parlamentamy 
OKP nr 25,15.10.1990
125 Forum Prawicy Demokratycznej: Trzy Programy, Deklaracja Zalozycielska, 'Zalozenia Programu 
Polityki Zagranicznej'
126 Porozumienie Centrum, Dokumenty i Programy. Tezy do dyskysji nad Polskq Politykq Zagraniczn^, 
'Suwerenna Polityka Zagraniczna'.
127 Vachudova, p67.
129 Interview with Krzysztof Skubiszewski, 19 May 2006.
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The 1990 presidential elections
The presidential contest of 1990 was post-communist Poland's first fully 
democratic election. The participants included Lech Walesa, Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Roman Bartoszcze of the PSL, Leszek 
Moczulski, and the Polish- Canadian businessman and maverick founder of 
'Party X', Stanislaw Tyminski.
Tyminski attained second place during the first ballot, proving the biggest 
surprise of the election, with 23% of the vote following Lech Walesa's 40%. 
Contrary to expectations, Mazowiecki obtained only 18% of the vote. The 
communist-successor candidate, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, came fourth with 
9% of the vote, the PSL's Roman Bartoszcze attained 7% and KPN  leader Leszek 
Moczulski 2.5%. Walesa eventually won the second round against Tyminski 
with 74%.130
The main themes of the contest included fully free democratic elections, the role
♦
of the presidency, economic reform and the relationship between Church and 
state. Although all candidates presented a stance on foreign policy and 
European integration, few addressed the subject in detail and the rhetoric 
remained equally abstract to that evident in the parliamentary discussions and 
party-political programmes of the period.
Lech Walesa supported EC membership but felt that Poland needed to 'catch­
up' with Western Europe. 'We can only attain accession to the European 
Communities after getting the country out from crisis and lessening the delays 
in our development as compared to Western states' he stated.131. He also called 
for the reduction of Poland's debt, claiming it was the result of the West's policy
*30 Dudek. p.153.
131 Program Wyborczy Lecha Walesy, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish 
Academy of Sciences, 1990 presidential elections folder.
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of issuing generous and unconditional credits in an effort to weaken communist 
states while fully aware of these states' inability to pay.«2
Like that of his grouping, the KPN, Leszek Moczulski's programme advocated 
miedzymorze, mentioned in previous sections. Only such regional cooperation, 
Moczulski argued, would allow post-communist states to compete with the 
European Community^. For Moczulski, integration with the EC was a threat to 
Poland's independence rather than a catalyst for economic and political 
transformation.
In contrast to Moczulski, Tadeusz Mazowiecki had no reservations about EC 
association or membership. 'The already advanced negotiations on the 
association treaty with the European Community will be finalised. Our strategic 
aim is the accession to the Community at the end of the current decade', he
declared.^
Roman Bartoszcze was ambivalent about the benefits of European integration. 
He advised caution in entering international structures and was concerned that 
European integration would threaten national identity. 'New alliances must 
serve to strengthen sovereignty and security, and the processes of European 
integration must not undermine our national identity'.135 Bartoszcze emphasised 
the need to ensure that cooperation with foreign capital was not paid for by lost 
opportunities to domestic investors. He was particularly concerned about 
preventing Polish land from being undersold to foreigners: 'National capital, 
and all arable land, should be protected against being sold at undervalued rates
132 Ibid.
133 Dokumenty sztabu wyborczego Leszka Moczulskiego, Program Wyborczy, Political Parties Archive, 
Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1990 presidential elections folder.
134 Program Wyborczy Tadeusza Mazowieckiego, section III, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political 
Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1990 presidential elections folder, Tadeusz Mazowiecki's 
folder.
135 Program Prezydencki Romana Bartoszcze, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the 
Polish Academy of Sciences, 1990 presidential elections folder.
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to citizens of other countries' he declared.1** He also proposed an interventionist 
economic policy and opposed extensive privatisation. 137
Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz's foreign policy proposals focused on attaining 
guarantees of territorial inviolability and the development of foreign economic 
cooperation. He also emphasised the need for a balance in foreign policy and 
warned against neglecting relations with the Soviet Union.13* Regarding 
economic policy, Cimoszewicz called for greater state involvement and the 
development of an industrial strategy. In line with the SdRP's 1990 program, 
Cimoszewicz opposed the privatisation of natural resources, infrastructure and 
the defence industry.139
Stanislaw Tyminski did not comment on Poland's relationship with the 
European Community or with any other international organization. He did 
however declare his willingness to support Poland's international integration 
and raised concerns about its reputation abroad.
Consensus on some form of European integration hence existed among all 
candidates in the presidential contest. But their rhetoric on the subject remained 
ambiguous and most did not present a stance on the forthcoming EC 
association negotiations or future membership. The West European debates on 
EMU and political union also remained unaddressed. But it was clear that that 
the prospect of association and the transfer of economic sovereignty were not 
unproblematic for all candidates. Although Leszek Moczulski did not explicitly 
address the association agreement he clearly prioritized regional integration 
over speedy association with the EC. Similarly, while not explicitly opposing 
the forthcoming association talks, Roman Bartoszcze was very vocal in his 
concerns for Polish economic sovereignty and the interventionist economic 
proposals of both Bartoszcze and Cimoszewicz contradicted the neo-liberal
138 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
138 Program Wyborczy Wlodzimierza Cimoszewicza, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political 
Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1990 presidential elections folder.
139 Ibid.
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approach of association conditionality that would require Poland to 
significantly limit state aid and eventually privatise almost all sectors of the 
economy.
Conclusions
The end of the communist regime confronted the nascent elites not only with 
the need to come up with a framework for political and economic 
transformation but also with the question of on the basis of what traditions 
should Poland's new identity be constructed.140 Europe, traditionally a key 
element of narratives about Polish national identity141 provided political actors 
with a useful reference point for establishing new narratives about Poland's 
post-communist identity.
The concept of 'Europe' had two qualities which made it particularly suitable 
for this purpose. Firstly, it was a powerful symbol of freedom and prosperity142, 
representing everything that communism failed to deliver. 'Europe', in all of its 
varied interpretations, was inherently positive and desirable. Secondly, both 
popular and elite knowledge about the nature of West European institutions 
was limited and the speed of the transformation the EC was undergoing at the 
time further increased uncertainty about the future shape of its institutions. 
'Europe' was hence both symbolically powerful and malleable, a representation 
of a wide range of desires and ambitions from freedom and democracy, security 
from Soviet influence, plentiful consumer goods and an end to the queues and 
shortages that had plagued the Poles under communism. It proved sufficiently 
ambiguous to be envisaged in creative and often contradictory ways that best 
suited the nascent political actors' new identities and their position in the 
ideological spectrum. Several narratives about Europe and Poland's 
relationship with it were present in Polish political debate during the 
Mazowiecki period.
140 K. Bachmann, Polska Kaczka - Europejski Staw. Szanse i Pulapki Polskiej Polityki Europejskiej.
(Warsaw 1999), p68.
141 TOmquist-Plewa, 2002.
142 Ibid, p235.
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The narrative of the 'return to Europe' was most prominent in the rhetoric of 
the OKP and the Mazowiecki cabinet. Poland already belonged to Europe, the 
slogan implied, but communism had caused a break in the 'natural' historic 
continuum.143 The 'return' served the two-fold purpose of symbolizing the 
process of closer integration with Western Europe but also, implicitly, of 
distancing its proponents from Soviet imposed communism, which, the rhetoric 
implied, caused the need for Poland to return in the first place. For Mazowiecki 
and his dissident colleagues the 'return' was the obvious, and the only, option. 
Confronted with the need to formulate policy much sooner than envisaged by 
the Round Table agreement, Solidarity lacked both a defined strategy for 
political and economic transformation and a narrative to legitimise it politically. 
The 'return to Europe' hence proved useful as a symbol of the new foreign 
policy direction, as well as an end goal of the transformation and a blueprint for 
it. The nature of the changes that would have to be carried out in order for 
Poland to 'return' were not specified but the appeal of 'the West' proved 
sufficiently powerful to justify a range of initiatives from radical economic 
reform to extensive legal harmonization.
In 1989 political actors did not appear to perceive a contradiction between 
Poland's integration with the European Community and the need to retain its 
newly regained sovereignty. Conversely, a closer relationship with Western 
Europe was seen to entail greater independence from the Soviet Union, whose 
troops, still stationed on Polish territory, continued to pose a threat to national 
sovereignty and the democratic transformation.
But by early 1990 the nature of the Polish consensus on European integration 
began to change. Conservative, agrarian groupings such as the PSL as well as 
those originating from Solidarity's Catholic-nationalist wing such as the ZChN  
were increasingly confronted with the contradiction between their ideological
143 B. Z. Alpan, 'Intellectual and Political 'Europe1: Rupture or Continuity in Central Europe', in Central 
European History and the European Union, ed. S. J. Kirschbaum (Basingstoke 2007), p.145.
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emphasis on national sovereignty and the loss of sovereignty that integration 
with the European Community entailed.
The contradiction between these two aims was rhetorically squared by means of 
the 'Europe of Nations'. European integration was acceptable as long as it did 
not impinge upon national sovereignty. Therefore, the Europe Poland 
integrated with would have to be a 'Europe of Nations', an exclusively 
economic community of fully sovereign states. In place of adjusting their own 
rhetoric to the realities of the European Community, the Polish elites adjusted 
the kind of 'Europe' they wished to integrate with. But they did not address the 
extent to which their preferred form of European integration differed from the 
increasingly supranational political, economic and monetary union so 
prominent on the West European agenda at the time. Rather than present a 
stance on the sovereignty transfer inherent in extensive use of qualified 
majority voting, monetary union or the conditionality of the association process 
parties re-invented Europe into something which did not contradict their 
nationalist ideological platform: a community of fully sovereign nation states.
Emphasis on Polish Christianity and its historic role as the 'Bulwark of Europe' 
frequently featured in the rhetoric of the supporters of a 'Europe of Nations'. 
References were made to Poland's difficult history and its role as the Antemurale 
Christiantiatis: the defender of European Christianity against the barbaric East144. 
The 'Christian Europe' and 'Europe of Nations' narratives were juxtaposed 
against the rhetoric of the 'return to Europe'. Poland was not inferior to the 
West, proponents of 'Christian Europe' implied, it already belonged there and 
hence had no need to 'return'. Defining Europe and Poland's relationship with 
it with reference to Christianity enabled the implication that Poland's suffering 
and sacrifice as the 'bulwark of Europe' and defender of the Christian West 
meant that Western Europe was indebted to Poland and should support its re­
integration efforts. Apart from the fact that Western powers failed to recognize
144 J. Jedlicki, 'Historical Memory as a Source of Conflicts in Eastern Europe', Communist and Post 
Communist Studies, 32, (1999), 225-232.
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this point of view, what the proponents of the 'Christian Europe' rhetoric did 
not address was that religion was one of the few policy areas excluded from the 
competences of the European Community.
The vision of Europe advocated by the communist-successor SdRP was 
anything but Christian meanwhile. The SdRP emphasized humanism and the 
enlightenment as key foundations of the European project. The 'Europe' 
presented by the SdRP was strikingly different to 'Christian Europe' and 
'Europe of Nations' advocated by their political competitors on the solidarity- 
successor right. The rhetoric of the 'return to Europe' was unavailable to the 
successors of the PZPR by virtue of its implicit rejection of Soviet imposed 
communism. Although the need to consolidate Polish sovereignty was 
prominent in SdRP electoral materials the transfer of sovereignty inherent in 
European integration did not appear to present a problem for the PZPR's 
successors. What the SdRP did not address however, was the fact that their 
interventionist economic policy and opposition to the privatization of large 
sectors of the economy was in direct contradiction to the foundations of the 
Single Market and the conditionality of the association agreement.
Although all political actors hence declared support for European integration 
their consensus was only nominal. Europe proved easy to agree on as long as it 
was sufficiently ambiguous to be defined according to the parties' over-all 
ideological framework. Such rhetoric did not address the changes that were 
taking place in Western Europe at the time nor their potential impact on Polish 
sovereignty. Proposals for political union and EMU would significantly limit 
national sovereignty and lead to growing concerns about the 'democratic 
deficit'. Far from a threat to democracy or sovereignty however, the liberal 
ruling elites saw European integration as a means of consolidating the 
economic and political transformation and asserting independence from the 
Soviet Union. The question of whether such extensive sovereignty transfer and 
policy conditionality required debate in a fully democratically elected 
parliament did not appear to concern the new decision makers. Poland was still
60
in the period of "extraordinary politics'1*5 and the decision for closer integration 
with Western Europe was deemed 'obvious'.
145 Rose, Amanda. 1999. 'Extraordinary Politics in the Polish Transition/ Communist and Post Communist 
Studies 32:195-210.
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Chapter 3
Putting metaphors into practice: the Association Agreement and
the growth of euro-scepticism
That was my personal statement. The government did not 
express itself on this subject and luckily it does not have to 
express itself, since this matter could lead to its collapse. It 
is hence only reasonable that I, while speaking of the 
Maastricht Treaty, clearly emphasize: me, Goryszewski, and 
not -  me, deputy Prime Minister. Then there is no conflict 
between me and Minister Bielecki.146
Henryk Goryszewski, deputy leader of the Zjednoczenie
Chrzescijansko Narodowe and 
Deputy Prime Minister under Hanna Suchocka.
Introduction
By 1991 the difficult association negotiations led many Polish politicians to 
revise their expectations of European integration. Criticism of the Association 
Agreement was prominent during 1991 elections and although the treaty was 
eventually ratified the parliamentary ratification debate reflected growing 
doubts about the integration project both within the sejm and the cabinet.
The Association Treaty had wide ranging implications for the future shape of 
the Polish transformation. It placed Poland on a path of fast paced trade 
liberalisation, limiting its ability to protect domestic industries. The 
requirement to align domestic legislation with the EC law entailed wide 
ranging legislative adjustment147 that would be made not on the basis of direct 
domestic demand but as part of integration with the EC. Further conditionality 
was introduced with the definition of membership criteria in 1993. Moreover, 
the EC itself was undergoing a wide ranging transformation with the signing 
and eventual ratification of the Maastricht treaty, which would significantly 
increase the body of law Poland would need to adopt to accede.
146 Henryk Goryszewski, quoted in Artur Domoslawski, 'Tajemnica Goryszewskiego', Gazeta Wyborcza, 
nr.254,17/18 October 1992, p. 6.
147 'Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member 
States, of the one part, and the Republic of Poland, of the other part...', 16 December 1991.
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This chapter considers the presentation of association and Copenhagen 
membership criteria conditionality in Polish political discourse. Was the appeal 
of the 'return to Europe' powerful enough to sustain commitment to detailed, 
neo-liberal economic policy and extensive legislative alignment even before the 
Polish electorate was able to elect a fully democratic legislature? Or could euro- 
sceptic dissent already be heard among Poland's newly elected 
parliamentarians? If consensus in favour of European integration existed then 
what was the basis of this consensus and did it address the wide ranging 
commitments made in the Europe Agreement? Did Polish political discourse 
reflect the changes that took place in the West European institutional 
framework and what, if any, was the Polish elites' response to the EU 
membership conditions?
The time period under consideration in this chapter starts with the appointment 
of the Jan Krzysztof Bielecki in January 1991 and ends with the collapse of the 
Suchocka coalition in the summer of 1993. The first two sections will present 
the domestic and foreign policy context during this period. Section three will 
address relations between Poland and the European Communities. Section four 
will consider the political discourse on European integration during the Bielecki 
cabinet, in the course of the 1991 parliamentary contest and during the 
Olszewski and Suchocka cabinets including the parliamentary debates on 
association and regional policy.
Domestic developments
The years from 1991 to 1993 were a turbulent period in Polish politics. In the 
span of less than two years Poland saw four prime ministers: Jan Krzysztof 
Bielecki from January 1991 to December 1991, Jan Olszewski from December 
1991 to June 1992, Waldemar Pawlak for a short 33 days in June 1992 and finally 
Hanna Suchocka from July 1992 to October 1993.148
148 Millard, Anatomy of the New Poland, p84-103.
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The 1991 presidential contest brought about not only a new president in the 
person of Lech Walesa but also a new prime minister, Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, a 
former Solidarity adviser, businessman and member of the Liberal Democratic 
Congress (Kongres Liberalno Demokratyczny, KLD), who was appointed following 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki's December 1990 resignation.
The make-up of the parliament remained the same for almost another year. 
Poland's first fully free parliamentary election eventually took place in October 
1991 and resulted in a highly fragmented parliament with almost 30 political 
groupings attaining representation to eventually form 17 parliamentary clubs. 
The fragmented sejm made government formation a challenging and prolonged 
task. Neither the Unia Demokratyczna nor any of the other Solidarity-successor 
groupings were willing to form a coalition with the communist-successor SLD. 
Allowing the communists back into government only two years after 
Solidarity's 1989 land-slide victory would have represented a resounding defeat 
for the former dissidents. Lengthy discussions between President Walesa and 
the Solidarity-successors ensued and a cabinet was eventually formed on 23 
December 1991 under the leadership of Jem Olszewski. The coalition included 
Porozumienie Centrum, the Zjednoczenie Chrzescijansko Narodowe, several 
unaffiliated MP's, and three small agrarian groupings.149 The coalition 
configuration meant that the relatively small and politically conservative ZChN  
held much more power than its 8% of the vote could be expected to warrant, iso 
It did not help matters that the new Prime Minister did not benefit from the 
support of the President, who would have preferred a less independent minded 
head of government.
Having only limited control over the parliament and plagued by conflicts 
between coalition members and with the President, the Olszewski government 
did not last long. On 4 June 1991 Antoni Macierewicz, Minister of the Interior, 
issued lists of supposed communist collaborators that included several senior
150 V. Zubek, 'The Fragmentation of Poland's Political Party System', Communist and Post Communist 
Studies, 26,1 (1993), 47-71, p63.
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members of the cabinet as well as the President. Walesa withdrew support for 
the cabinet that very evening and the government fell the following day.
After a failed attempt at cabinet formation by the leader of Polskie Stronnictwo 
Ludowe, Waldemar Pawlak,151 the post of Prime Minister was entrusted to 
Hanna Suchocka of the Unia Demokratyczna. Suchocka's grand coalition 
resulted in an even more diverse cabinet than that of Olszewski. It included the 
LTD, the Zjednoczenie Chrzescijansko Narodozve, two agrarian groupings as well as 
the liberal-democrat Polish Economic Programme (Polski Program Gospodarczy, 
PPG). 152
Policy differences quickly emerged between the interventionist peasant parties 
and the laissez-faire liberals. European integration proved a salient point of 
dissent between the pro-integrationist Unia Demokratyczna and the euro-sceptic 
Zjednoczenie Chrzescijansko Narodowe. By the summer of 1993, voting discipline 
became increasingly unreliable. Eventually, the government fell as a result of a 
motion of no-confidence tabled by Solidarity. Walesa called for new elections to 
be scheduled in September 1993. Nonetheless, Hanna Suchocka introduced a 
number of successful reforms, the most relevant being the so-called 'Little 
Constitution', which provided an interim solution until work on the new 
constitution was finalized15*.
The turbulent political situation evolved in the context of an ongoing economic 
crisis154 and subsequent cabinets of the early 1990 were confronted with 
increasing pressure to ease the restrictive fiscal and monetary policies.155 The
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downturn was reversed only in 1993 but real wages continued to be 
significantly lower than before 1989 and unemployment remained high. 155
Foreign policy
Western leaders' reticence to make firm commitments on the post-communist 
states' membership in Western structures and their hard bargaining approach 
during association negotiations157 dispelled East European illusions about 
extensive financial support and swift integration with both the EC and NATO. 
Nonetheless, significant steps were made towards integration into the EC as 
well as other Western and regional structures.
The establishment of formal relations with NATO proceeded slowly. Presented 
with Russian opposition, Western leaders stalled the NATO integration process 
in spite of Poland's and other post-communist countries intensive lobbying 
efforts.158 Matters were complicated further when Lech Walesa, without 
consulting either the minister of Foreign Affairs or the prime minister, 159 
publicly announced his NATO-bis proposal as an alternative to Poland's NATO 
entry.
Better progress was made in re-defining relations with other Western and 
regional structures. On 10 December 1992 Poland entered the European Free 
Trade Association and on 21 December 1992 the Central European Free Trade 
Association (CEFTA) Treaty was signed. A February 1991 meeting of Polish, 
Hungarian and Czechoslovak leaders in the Hungarian town of Visegrad led to 
the establishment of the Visegrad group. Apart from national independence, 
democratic consolidation, economic reform and human rights, the Visegrad
156 Adam, p23.
157 Wallace, 'Does the EU have an Ostpolitiek?1, p51.
158 'Suchocka o polityce zagranicznej, NATO, otwdrz si?!' Gazeta Wyborcza, 9 January 1993, nr 204, p2.
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zagranicznej Polski, 14 March 2002,16th session, day 2, point 11. The content of all parliamentary debates 
after the contract sejm onwards is available on the sejm on-line archive:
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group's key aim was 'total integration into the European political, economic, 
security, and legislative order.'161 Polish and other post-communist leaders were 
unequivocally set on a course of total economic, political and legal integration 
with Western structures from the earliest stages of the transformation, even 
before a fully free domestic parliamentary contest could be held.
The most significant step in Poland's European integration made during this 
period however was Association with the EC. Association was formally 
proposed by Krzysztof Skubiszewski in December 1989, following informal 
discussions during a visit of European Commission President Jacques Delors to 
Warsaw. Initially, the EC was slow to react but in April 1990 the European 
Council declared the intention to complete association agreements with the 
post-communist states162 and issued a set of conditions Poland was to fulfil 
before the association negotiations could begin.163 These included democratic 
elections, progress in economic and political reforms, introduction of the rule of 
law, and respect for human rights. Poland applied for associate membership of 
the EC on 25 May 1990. On the 21 June 1990 it submitted the 'Memorandum of 
the Government of the Republic of Poland concerning the Principles of the 
Association of Poland with the European Economic Community', which 
contained a draft Association Agreement. A key part of the memorandum was 
the assertion that Polish membership in the EC was the ultimate goal of the 
association process. Section 4 of the agreement stated: 'Association would last 
until the year 2000 and would, after this date, lead to Poland's accession to the 
Community'.164 The Commission's response was unenthusiastic however and 
the EC refused to formally commit to enlargement. At this stage Western 
leaders still lacked a well-thought out strategy to respond to the potential 
opportunities of political and economic transformation and the threats posed by
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the perceived security vacuum and possibility of mass migration and growth of 
crime.
Following informal talks with the Mazowiecki cabinet in July 1990, the 
European Commission established a Permanent Delegation in Warsaw in 
September 1990; and on 18 December 1990 the Council of Ministers granted a 
mandate for the Association negotiations to the European Commission. The 
first round of negotiations between the EC and Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic started on 22 December 1990.166
The negotiations did not proceed smoothly. The EC did not agree to formally 
commit to enlargement or to a full customs union. The Community had no 
desire to open its vulnerable markets to cheap imports from Eastern Europe. It 
was agreed that a free trade area, incorporating an Asymmetry principle' in 
Poland's favour, would be established: the EC would lower its import barriers 
for Polish goods at a faster rate than Poland would lower its barriers to imports 
from European Community member states. The extent of the 'asymmetry' 
proved contentious however. The Poles were most concerned with steel, textiles 
and agriculture, which constituted a significant part of the country's GDP. But 
the EC imposed quotas on steel and textile imports; these were to be re­
negotiated each year with the goal of abolishing them completely after ten 
years. Most agricultural and fisheries produce were excluded from the 
agreement.
The financial protocol formed another difficult part of the negotiations. 
Proposed by the Polish side, the protocol was intended to establish an 
institutional framework for the financial assistance provided to Poland by the 
EC.167 The Poles argued that financial assistance was needed to compensate for 
the economic inequalities between the associating parties and would provide
165 Mayhew, pl3.
166 Interview with Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, 21 July 2005.
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for the implementation of the Association Agreement. However, the EC did not 
agree to commit to long-term financial aid and the levels of assistance had to be 
re-negotiated each year.
The association process was structured to allow for the gradual re-negotiation 
of trade barriers between Poland and the EC. Once the Treaty was put in place 
annual talks would be held between the Commission and the Associate states. 
The fact that EC was not willing to sign different agreements with the three 
applicants was an additional hurdle.
The talks stalled in the summer of 1991. Poland had raised tariffs on food 
imports in May 1991 and the European Community retaliated by banning 
imports of Polish lamb.168 Relations between Poland and the EC became 
increasingly strained and the talks were almost suspended in July 1991, during 
the sixth round. The centre of the controversy was the asymmetry principle 
and the EC's insistence on maintaining full quotas on steel and textiles for the 
entire ten year association period.169 According to simulation studies, access to 
the Polish, Czechoslovakian and Hungarian markets would bring 1.4% growth 
in the EEC economies by 1993.170 The Polish side felt that given this, as well as 
the Eastern applicants' limited access to Community agriculture, steel and 
textiles markets, made the agreement disadvantageous for the post-communist 
states.171
Initially the EC, and in particular France, was unwilling to compromise.177 But 
by 20 August 1991 the General Affairs Council confirmed the EC's desire to 
quickly finalise the Association Agreements, a decision which may have been 
precipitated by the Moscow Putsch of 19 August 1991.173
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Agreement on the trade issues was eventually reached in October 1991 during 
the seventh round of the talks. The final association calendar included the 
establishment of a full free trade area within ten years, the lifting of most tariffs 
on industrial products by the time of treaty implementation and of all tariffs by 
1996, and an end to EC quotas by the time of implementation with the 
exception of textile quotes which would be lifted within five years. The quotas 
on agricultural exports were limited and it was agreed that a 50% increase 
could take place in the following five years. Eventually, most of the trade 
barriers were lifted sooner than was expected. But the EC's hard bargaining 
approach fuelled euro-sceptic sentiments among Poland's political elites.
The 'Europe Agreement' was signed on 16 December 1991 but came into force 
in its entirety only on 1 February 1994, over two years after it was signed. The 
treaty had to be ratified by all twelve EC member states, which at the time were 
busy ratifying the Maastricht Treaty. In order for the sections on trade to come 
into force sooner an Interim Agreement on Trade was signed and implemented 
on 1 March 1992, without prior ratification by either the Polish or the member 
states' parliaments. A key part of the Association Treaty was hence 
implemented without parliamentary debate or assent.
By opening access to EC markets, association generated growth in the Polish 
economy. ™ But the agreement has also come under much criticism for 
excluding or limiting EC market access for Poland's most competitive sectors 
such as steel and textiles, which would only attain full market access in January 
1998 and agriculture, which was excluded from the agreement.175 Although the 
asymmetry structured into the agreement meant that the EC lifted trade 
barriers sooner than the East European states, the reduction in trade barriers 
was introduced at the slowest pace where Poland had the biggest export
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potential17* and substantial barriers against some of Poland's most competitive 
sectors continued for five years after the signing of the treaty.177 As well as 
curtailing access for key exports the agreement also limited Poland's ability to 
protect its nascent industries. The interim agreement, introduced in March 1992, 
included the so-called standstill principle, which prohibited signatories from 
introducing new import tariffs or any other measures with similar effects such 
as quotas and export subsidies.178 The competition policy clauses were 
particularly detailed, establishing deadlines for the introduction of necessary 
legislation.179 Given the depth of economic recession Poland was in at the time 
the strict timetable gave Polish manufacturers little time to restructure.180 
Association also significantly curtailed the states' ability to intervene in the 
economy. Article 63 prohibited all state aid which distorted or threatened to 
distort competition by establishing preferred treatment for individual 
enterprises and could thereby adversely affect free trade between Poland and 
the EC.181 Derogations of this rule were allowed under exceptional 
circumstances with the approval of the European Commission182 but in spite of 
these association meant that at a stage where the Polish economy was very 
much in flux the state's ability to use interventionist measures for the nascent 
private sector and for the restructuring of state owned enterprise was 
significantly curtailed.
Another key implication of the association treaty arose from articles 68 to 50. 
These established that the gradual harmonization of Polish law with the 
European body of law, or the acquis communautaire, was a key condition of
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economic integration with the Community.183 The acquis consisted of the 
European treaties, international agreements concluded by the Community, 
legal acts adopted by Community institutions, regulations, which were legal 
acts directly applicable to member state legislation, directives, obliging 
domestic legislators to adapt internal laws to the provisions stipulated in them; 
and recommendations and opinions, which although non-binding were to be 
taken into account in domestic law enforcement process.184 The exact role of 
European legislation in domestic legal systems differs among member states 
and the process of referral of cases from the domestic arena to the European 
Court of Justice has not always proceeded smoothly. But the scope of EC law 
and its impact on the citizens' of the member states has remained significant. 
This was especially the case in the context of systemic transformation, where 
legislation suited to a capitalist economy was lacking in many policy areas. 
Association hence had a large scale impact on the Polish legal system and the 
nature of economic reform. Unilateral adjustment to European trade legislation 
did minimize the opportunity costs of remaining outside the EC economy. But 
much of the sovereignty that would formally be lost through accession was 
already transferred to the EC without the benefits of membership.185
The Association Treaty did include a political co-operation element. An 
institutional framework made up of Association Councils and Committees at 
ministerial, parliamentary and official levels was established to encourage 
political dialogue on wide range of issues of mutual concern such as foreign 
policy, security, international crime, and environment. But from the view point 
of the associated states this was a poor substitute for membership.188 
Association did not provide for access to structural and CAP funding or allow 
individuals to work in EC member states, all of critical importance for the
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CEECs. A dispute resolution procedure was introduced for instances where the 
Association Councils were unable to reach agreement however this was not 
part of the interim agreement and was implemented only after both Poland and 
the EC member states ratified the agreement. Another criticism of the 
association process was that the extensive legislative change it brought about 
was not subject to sufficient oversight from domestic legislatures. A 
Parliamentary Association Committee was established from representatives of 
the sejm, senate and the European Parliament but it had no decision making 
rights and its role was limited to being kept informed about the implementation 
of the agreement and making recommendations. 187 The lack of parliamentary 
oversight was further exacerbated by the fact that the Interim Agreement, 
containing the majority of the high impact trade measures, was implemented 
without parliamentary ratification.
Implementation of association requirements began soon after the sejm ratified 
the treaty. The June 1992 ratification debate resulted in a piece of legislation 
obliging the government to present a programme of action to align the Polish 
economy with association requirements and a separate programme for legal 
harmonization with the Association Treaty, which identified specific tasks for 
ministries and central agencies.188
The two programmes were accepted in November 1992 and January 1993 
respectively.189 The sejm also called for rapid action to protect the Polish 
economy from sudden and unfair competition190, a request which reflected the 
sceptical tone of the debate and Polish elites' growing concerns about the 
advantages of association.
As the Association Agreements came into force, relations between Poland and 
the European Community became increasingly strained. In spite of the
187 Harasimowicz, p.20.
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asymmetry principle, the growth of Polish exports to the Community continued 
to slow throughout 1993. In 1990 Polish exports to the EC grew by 43% but in 
1992 they only rose by 9.7%. Imports from the EC grew faster than Polish 
exports and a negative trade balance developed. Matters did not improve when 
the EU threatened to implement stricter sanitary control measures for Polish 
agricultural products in response to Poland's introduction of import payments 
on agricultural goods.191 In May 1993 the EU refused a loan of ECU 1 billion 
applied for by the Suchocka government in October 1992. 192 Shortly thereafter 
the Commission introduced anti-dumping tariffs on steel imports from the 
associated countries.1*1 Poland's introduction of a 6% import tax, in violation of 
the association treaty's standstill principle1** caused more friction.
The Poles felt that the agricultural restrictions were of a political nature rather 
than based on genuine sanitary concerns. They also claimed that several EC 
states continued to impose import restrictions in spite of the trade agreement 
being in force since March 1992.195 Meanwhile, several member states delayed 
the Association Treaty ratification, which prevented the introduction of a 
formal trade dispute resolution system.19* The Poles found themselves in a no- 
win situation. The non-ratification of the Association Agreement prevented the 
new associates from making a formal complaint as well as from developing an 
early warning system on trade barriers. As the Interim Agreement had been in 
effect since March 1992 however, Polish markets were already open to EC 
exporters.
The difficult association negotiations resulted in marked scepticism about the 
European project on the right side of the Polish political spectrum. Calls for a 
renegotiation of the Association Treaty could be heard with increasing
191 Waldemar Kumor, 'Polska - Wspdlnota Europejska. Niepok6j w obrotach' Gazeta Wyborcza, 08 April 
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frequency from groupings such as Porozumienie Centrum and the Zjednoczenie 
Chrzescijarisko Narodozve. The Solidarity trade union also criticised the 
Association Agreement and its leader, Marian Krzaklewski proposed that the 
treaty should be signed only if clauses protecting trade union rights were 
included. This proposal did not prove effective however, as it was made in May 
1993, some 18 months after the treaty was actually signed.197 Apart from 
manifesting the extent of Krzaklewski's scepticism about the benefits of 
association this statement also exemplified Polish politicians' limited 
knowledge of the integration process.
In June 1992, following the Copenhagen summit, the EC finally made a formal 
commitment to enlargement, declaring that 'the associated countries in central 
and eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European 
Union' and issued the long awaited membership criteria198.Three main accession 
criteria were specified. Firstly, candidate states had to have stable democratic 
institutions protecting the rule of law, human rights and the rights of 
minorities. Secondly, they were to have functioning market economies and the 
capacity to deal with the competitive pressures of market forces within the 
Union. Thirdly, they were expected to adhere to the acquis communautaire, or the 
EU's body of law. Also, the Union's capacity to absorb new members was 
described as an 'important consideration' in the enlargement process.199 But no 
definition of a 'functioning market economy', 'stable democratic institutions' or 
'competitive pressures' was provided at this stage. As Heather Grabbe 
observed, the vague nature of these criteria enabled the EU to set targets for the 
new entrants which were often more demanding than those required of existing 
members. In effect, they allowed the EU to set an ever changing benchmark for 
the candidate countries.200 Moreover, much to the disappointment of the
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prospective entrants, the Copenhagen summit failed to provide the sought-after 
enlargement timetable.
The accession criteria were a tall order. Poland would not only have to align its 
political, judiciary and economic structures with those of the EU but it would 
also have to harmonize its legal system with the entire European acquis. The EU 
decided to use the so-called classical approach to enlargement, where the 
applicant state is expected to complete alignment with EU structures prior to 
accession. There was a significant difference between the bargaining involved 
in EU membership negotiations and those normally carried out between two 
international partners. The point of the talks would not be to attain agreement 
on the terms of accession; these were not negotiable. The purpose of the 
negotiations was to establish how and when the applicant would attain 
membership and whether they would be allowed to delay the implementation 
of a (relatively small) part of the acquis until after accession. 201 The potential use 
of transition periods did provide some limited flexibility for the applicant but 
the scope of policy where transition could be negotiated was too minimal to 
make any real difference to the non-negotiable nature of the accession project.202
In parallel to completing association negotiations West European leaders were 
busy finalising negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty, formally known as the 
Treaty on the European Union (TEU). TEU negotiations were completed in 
December 1991 and the treaty was signed in February 1992. A prolonged 
ratification process followed with an unsettling no vote from the Danish 
electorate, remedied by treaty adjustments and a second Danish referendum.203
Maastricht established the so-called three pillar structure which included the 
European Community, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillars. Although decision making in the latter
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two pillars remained primarily intergovernmental the European Union 
framework had significantly greater competences and influence on domestic 
policy than its predecessor. The TEU was also an important step in the 
implementation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which was part of 
the Community p il la r  and the Maastricht treaty included the economic 
convergence criteria required for the implementation of the common currency. 
Many of the member states' monetary policy competences were transferred to 
the European level. Fiscal policy however remained uneasily positioned 
between Brussels and the member states, and the EU's social policy 
competences remained limited. Maastricht hence significantly broadened the 
scope of the acquis which the aspiring entrants would have to adopt205.
European integration in political debate
Association, the establishment of the Copenhagen membership criteria and the 
internal changes which the European Communities underwent with Maastricht 
would all have significant impact on Polish domestic policy and shape its 
political and economic transformation. The issue of European integration was 
prominent in party political rhetoric of the period. It was a frequent topic of 
discussion during parliamentary debate and featured in the electoral materials 
of all major groupings contesting the 1991 parliamentary elections. But while 
scepticism about European integration and especially the terms of the 
association treaty was prominent the language of the debate remained abstract. 
Debates on association ratification and regional policy made it apparent that 
parliamentarians either had limited knowledge of the technicalities of European 
integration or purposefully elected not to explicitly address key policy 
implications of association and the extensive alignment required for accession.
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The 1991 parliamentary elections
The 1991 elections were post-communist Poland's first fully democratic 
parliamentary contest. Following a lengthy debate on the electoral system 
ordination, a highly proportional option was chosen, which resulted in twenty- 
nine parties attaining parliamentary representation. A low turnout of 43.2%206 
reflected public disappointment with the results of economic reform.
The two most successful parties were Unia Demokratyczna and Sojusz Lewicy 
Demokratycznej, both of which attained 12% of the vote. They were closely 
followed by Wyborcza Akcja Katolicka (Catholic Electoral Action, WAK), a 
Catholic-nationalist coalition established under the leadership of the 
Zjednoczenie Chrzescijahsko Narodowe, which obtained just under 9%. 
Porozumienie Centrum, Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej, Kongres Liberalno- 
Demokratyczny and Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe all attained approximately 8% of 
the vote while Solidamosc achieved a disappointing 5%.207
The communist-successor Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe aimed to represent the 
interests of Poland's impoverished farmers. The PSL declared its main aims to 
be the defence of Polish national interests, consolidation of parliamentary 
democracy and the rule of law, economic growth, and the protection of those 
most disadvantaged by the transformation. The Agrarians argued that to 
achieve real sovereignty Poland needed a strong market economy that 
incorporated principles of social solidarity. They also 'rejected dogmatic 
monetarism and the unquestioned worship of the market'2®* advocating tax 
reductions, state guarantees for foreign investors, customs tariffs, import 
preferences for new technology, and a pragmatic approach to the budget 
deficit.
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The PSL repeatedly called for state protection for the agricultural sector, which 
it believed to have been disadvantaged by the transformation process. The 
farmer, according to the PSL, was integral in ensuring the survival of Poland's 
national identity.209 The Agrarians advocated state aid for agriculture and called 
on the government not to: 'escape from the responsibility.. .for the protection of 
the family farm from competition from the amply subsidized farming sectors of 
developed countries'.210
European integration presented a dilemma for the PSL. While envious of their 
highly subsidized Western counterparts, Polish farmers were predominantly 
conservative, religious, patriotic, and distrustful of the European Community. 
The PSL hence had to weigh up the prospect of substantial financial rewards 
they believed EC membership would bring, in the form of subsidies, against the 
perceived threat to Polish sovereignty and national identity posed by the atheist 
'cosmopolitans' from Brussels.
It should not be surprising therefore that the PSL's programme did not present 
a clear stance on European integration. While welcoming financial aid from the 
EC, the agrarians were concerned about the threat which integration might pose 
to Poland's national identity. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was 
presented as an effective method of improving the quality of life in rural 
regions. The programme stated: 'Let us recall that the history of the European 
Economic Community began with the Common Agricultural Policy, from 
raising the living standards of the most discriminated group...that is the 
farmers'.211 However, only several sentences later it declared: 'The Poland which 
we want is not a Poland representing a narrow group of wealthy and worldly 
Europeans, but it is a Poland which strives for wealth in a spirit of solidarity'.212 
While it wished to make use of the EC's agricultural subsidies, 'Europe' and
209 Ibid.
210 Ibid.
211 Ibid.
212 Ibid.
79
'Europeans' was not something the PSL wanted to be identified with. The PSL's 
programme stated further:
Following the liberalisation of trade between the EEC and 
Poland it is necessary to urgently establish measures for the 
movement of capital and technology from the EEC to 
Poland, and of labour -  from Poland to the EEC, as well as 
implement a compensation programme for the industry 
and agriculture, to be financed among others by 
international organizations and institutions. The deepening 
integration with Western Europe also cannot mean the loss 
of Polish national and cultural values.2^
For the Agrarians the European Community was hence useful in so far as it was 
going to be financially beneficial. The PSL's stance on Europe was consistently 
ambiguous. On the one hand, it presented the costly and inefficient CAP as an 
example for Polish policy makers. On the other, it placated its conservative 
electorate with vocal expressions of concern for the impact of accession on 
Polish national identity, Catholic morality and culture.
Porozumienie Centrum declared the building of a 'strong, democratic and fully 
independent Poland' as its primary policy aim. During its first congress in May 
1991 the PC transformed itself into a traditional, member based party and 
attempted to develop an ideological identity focused on Christian Democratic, 
centre right ideals.214 International security and the consolidation of newly 
regained national sovereignty were now at the top of its agenda. Its programme 
stated:
We put Polish national interest as the first priority. We are 
not satisfied with the status of a buffer state, located in an 
insecure, in-between region. We do not agree to Poland's 
old and new dependencies. We also cannot accept the 
stationing of foreign military on the territory of our 
country. We believe that seeking a third way between the 
West and the East is a dangerous mistake exposing our 
country to isolation and submission to foreign interests.
2«  Ibid.
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Security and Poland's civilisational development are 
attainable only in the context of West European 
communities and alliances.21*
The Porozumienie's pro-integrationist stance was motivated primarily by 
national security concerns rather than by any economic benefits that could be 
derived from EC association or membership. The emphasis on preserving 
Polish sovereignty and independence appeared to contradict the PC's support 
for EC membership, which entailed a transfer of power away from the nation 
state.
Like the PSL, Porozumienie Centrum was hence also confronted with a dilemma. 
It strove to consolidate its anti-communist, Solidarity-successor identity by 
distancing itself from the former Soviet Union. The only viable way of 
achieving this however, short of regional isolation, was integration with 
Western Europe. However, the scope of the European Community's policy 
remit was becoming increasingly broad, encompassing areas such as monetary 
policy and justice and home affairs. Membership in the post-Maastricht 
European Union entailed a significant transfer of competences to Brussels. The 
former dissidents now had a predicament: they could not advocate closer 
cooperation with the post-Soviet states as this would put in question their 
Solidarity-successor roots, but they were also uneasy with the prospect of 
surrendering Poland's newly regained sovereignty to the EU. Consequently, 
their stance on European integration became increasingly ambiguous. Although 
they declared support for membership in the EU, they presented the Union as a 
largely inter-governmentalist, conservative and above all, Christian 
organisation. Rather than acknowledge that membership in the Union entailed 
a transfer of power away from the member states, they declared support for an 
EU which did not impinge on its members' sovereignty.
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The PC frequently emphasised the importance of Polish Catholicism. It 
advocated cooperation between Church and state and defined its electorate as 
Christian. Its programme declared: 'We count on that part of society which has 
retained an awareness of Poland's Christian traditions and which is ready to 
build the prosperity of the Polish Republic on the lasting values given to us by 
Christianity'.216 The Europe in which the PC wanted Poland to participate was 
founded on Christian values. It proclaimed that: 'the place of a sovereign and 
safe Poland is in a Europe shaped by Christian and democratic values'.217
The emphasis on religion served to distance Porozumienie Centrum from the 
atheist successors of the communist regime. It also allowed the PC to express 
support for European integration while retaining the patriotic and religious 
rhetoric associated with the anti-communist opposition. For the Porozumienie 
Centrum , European integration was acceptable as long as it did not threaten the 
traditional, deeply religious Polish national identity; it did not pose a threat as 
long as it was founded on Christian values. There was no room for diversity in 
the PC's rhetoric: the only Europe it could support was a Christian one.
Religion played a prominent role in the 1991 electoral campaign and the Church 
actively supported Catholic, Solidarity-successor groupings.216 One such 
vocally religious contender was the Wyborcza Akcja Katolicka, which united 
parties calling for the Polish state to be organized according to Roman Catholic 
doctrine. W AK's biggest participant was Zjednoczenie Chrzescijansko Narodowe219 
and most of its smaller member organizations, such as the Christian Citizen's 
Movement and the Union of Catholic Laity, eventually merged into ZChN.
W AK  advocated close relations between the Church and state and emphasized 
the special role played by the Polish Catholic Church in the country's history:
'In our difficult history, in shaping our culture, the Catholic Church has played
216 Ibid.
217 Ibid.
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a special role. This cannot be forgotten'.223 In home affairs W AK  proposed a 
strong presidency with the right to rule by decree, the criminalisation of 
abortion and extensive anti-corruption measures. It also called for thorough de- 
communisation and retribution for 'crimes against the Polish nation' committed 
by members of the communist regime. In respect to economic policy W AK  
supported a free market economy, protection for domestic industry and 
agriculture, and measures which would allow women not to participate in the 
labour force.
WAK's programme made no reference to the EU. It declared support for 
Poland's inclusion in 'the Europe-wide security system' but no mention was 
made of membership or association with the European Union. The only 
reference to 'Europe' could be found in point 29 of WAK's programme 
summary which called for 'Poland in a Europe of equal nations'.221 The on-going 
debate about Europe within the Z C h N W A K ' s  founding organisation, may 
form part of an explanation for the lack of clarity on accession in the Catholic 
Electoral Action's programme.
Although it defined itself as 'right wing' Solidarnosc advocated extensive 
redistribution and state subsidies for the failing heavy industry.22* It described 
its philosophy as based on the social teaching of the Catholic Church. Its main 
postulates included active social and industrial policy, privatization, a new 
constitution as well as measures to prevent unemployment. The programme 
only made very limited reference to foreign policy calling for a 'consolidation of 
Poland's sovereignty and independence'. At this stage no reference was made 
to NATO or the European Community.224
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The Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny was established in June 1990 by a group of 
liberal dissidents from Gdansk. Led by Janusz Lewandowski and his deputy, 
Donald Tusk, the KLD executive also included the future Prime Minister, Jan 
Krzysztof Bielecki. The Congress advocated liberal economic policy and backed 
Leszek Balcerowicz's 'shock therapy' reforms. The programme focused on civil 
liberties, emphasising individual freedom and the right to private property. The 
Congress was enthusiastically pro-integrationist. Bielecki, both as Prime 
Minister and later as Minister for European Integration enthusiastically 
supported membership of the EC and NATO, and the grouping often affirmed 
its support for European integration. The KLD's euro-enthusiasm was perhaps 
best encapsulated by the cover of its programme. It presented Bielecki, 
complete with business suit and white gloves, stepping across the map of 
Europe, one foot still in Poland, caught in a hunter's trap, the aimed firmly at 
the region covering France and Germany but here labelled simply 'Europe'.226
Unia Demokratyczna's programme focused primarily on the economy. It 
advocated gin active social policy, pension reforms, housing sector development 
and environmental protection. While supportive of private entrepreneurship 
the UD  called for state enterprises to be given the opportunity to prove whether 
they could be profitable. It asserted that Christian values should form the basis 
of the Polish state. Its main programme did not specify a stance on either the 
European Community or NATO.226
Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej continued to focus on retribution against the 
communist regime. Its programme was critical of the post-1989 cabinets and 
called for radical change in both domestic and foreign policy. Regarding the 
economy, the KPN  advocated measures to prevent inflation and 
unemployment, adequate wages, and a diversified, free-market economy. It
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also argued that unemployment could be prevented by putting an end to what 
it described as the 'over-employment' of women.
The KPN  claimed that the former Soviet bloc countries would be refused entry 
into West European organisations and should therefore develop their own 
regional cooperation structures. It stated:
This region will be refused entry into the West European 
community and it will therefore have to build a Regional 
Common Market. The development of such a market can 
significantly speed up the integration of the whole of 
Europe.227
The Confederates were not opposed to European integration per se. They did 
not, however, believe that Western Europe would allow post-communist states 
to accede to the European Community. In view of this, the KPN  advocated that 
Central and East European states establish their own system of regional 
cooperation in order to withstand competition from the more economically 
advanced West European countries.
The communist successor Social Democracy of the Polish Republic participated 
in the 1991 elections as part of the Social Democratic Alliance, or the Sojusz 
Lewicy Demokratycznej. Established in June 1991, this new coalition consisted of 
approximately thirty communist-successor and left-wing organizations such as 
the All Poland Trade Unions (Ogolno-Polskie Zwiqzki Zawodowe, OPZZ),  the 
Polish Socialist Party, the Democratic Women's Union as well as several smaller 
trade unions and youth movements established under the auspices of the 
communist regime. The SLD was critical of the shock therapy reforms and 
accused the Mazowiecki and Bielecki governments of damaging the Polish 
economy and creating poverty. The SLD emphasized its commitment to
227 Program Wyborczy Konfederacji Polski Niepodleglej, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political 
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democracy, free speech and the rule of law. Its programme also called for a 
clear division between Church and sta te s
Regarding economic policy, the SLD called for the state to play an active role in 
industry and agriculture. It advocated varied forms of ownership, including the 
state, private enterprise and worker co-operatives. Its programme also called 
for measures to reduce unemployment, improve social services and protect 
women's rights, including the right to abortion.
The euro-enthusiasm of reformers such as Jozef Oleksy or Aleksander 
Kwasniewski was not evident in the SLD's programme. While it did not 
explicitly oppose European integration, the Alliance remained very sceptical 
about NATO and called for the re-establishment of closer relations with the 
East. The SLD advocated the development of a pan-European security system 
under the auspices of the CSCE and a re-instatement of the regional ties 
dissolved after the collapse of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact. Its programme 
also called for 'including Poland in a Europe-wide integration process 
encompassing a region stretching from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains, and 
not linking it only with the EEC'.229
Partia Chrzescijanskich Demokratow (Party of Christian Democrats, PChD) was 
established in December 1990 by a group of former Solidarity activists. The 
PChD supported EU membership. Its programme declared:
The development of the legal, economic and social 
framework for Polish accession to the European 
Community is a priority, so as to reach this aim Poland 
should quickly associate with the European 
Community, on the basis, however, of asymmetric rules
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which would allow for a gradual restructuring of the 
Polish economy with international competition.230
Regarding internal affairs, the PChD emphasized the importance of a free 
market economy and the protection of private property. It also called for greater 
recognition of civil liberties and for measures against anti-Semitism and other 
forms of discrimination.
The 1991 electoral campaign reflected a wide range of views on European 
integration. As the nascent political groupings strove to align their stance on 
Europe within their party-political ideologies they developed interpretations of 
what European integration and 'Europe' entailed. Most Solidarity-successor 
groupings emphasised the EC's Christian foundations. Rather than focus on the 
socio-economic impact of European integration, the politicians continued to use 
vague and symbolic references to 'Christian values', 'civilisational 
backwardness' and 'catching-up with Europe'. For the Solidarity-successors, 
who identified with the Catholic, patriotic ethos of the anti-communist struggle, 
the European Community was above all Christian.
Taking a clear cut stance on Europe proved most difficult for right-wing parties 
such as the ZChN, KPN  and Porozumienie Centrum. National security was a 
paramount concern for them and their greatest fear was that Poland would 
once again suffer at the hands of its powerful neighbours. These groupings 
differed, however, in their assessment of which neighbour was to be feared 
most. Some advised against European integration, arguing this would make 
Poland dangerously vulnerable to German influence. Others felt that 
conversely, it was safer to ally Poland with the Western powers to be protected 
from Russia's neo-imperialist ambitions. The KPN  feared German economic 
colonisation and hence warned against integration with the German-dominated 
EU. Porozumienie Centrum, on the other hand, called for a decisive shift towards 
Western security alliances that would distance Poland from the East.
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Meanwhile at the ZChN, the warring Euro-enthusiast and Euro-sceptic factions 
failed to present a coherent strategy on Europe and instead did not outline a 
stance at all.
In spite of their apparent misgivings however, all parties declared support for 
some sort of European integration. They were at least nominally supportive of 
EEC association and accession even though they often presented economic 
policy proposals that contradicted the association agreement. The only explicit 
voice of dissent against the integration project came from the far-right 
Nationalist Faction (Stronnictwo Narodowe, SN), which declared: "We cannot 
surrender elements of our sovereignty for the sake of international structures 
such as the European Economic Community, where Germany dominates. 
Decisions about Poland must be made in Poland'.231
In contrast to the Catholic-nationalist groupings, liberal parties such as Unia 
Demokratyczna and the KLD were more concerned about economic reform than 
about German or Russian expansionist ambitions. For the liberals, European 
integration gave Poland with the opportunity to 'catch-up with the West'. They 
believed that integration would facilitate Polish reforms and consolidate 
democracy. Turning away from the European Community, on the other hand, 
would leave Poland both economically and 'civilisationally' backward and 
would present a grave threat to systemic reform, they argued. The liberal 
groupings saw no viable alternative to EU membership.
European integration in parliamentary debate
Doubts about EC membership were apparent already during Jan Krzysztof 
Bielecki's expose in January 1991. The Prime Minister was emphatically 
supportive of European integration. He confirmed his plans to maintain the 
foreign policy direction of the past fifteen months and stated that membership
231 Program Wyborczy Stronnictvva Narodowego, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of 
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in the European Community remained a strategic objective. 232 In response to 
Bielecki's pro-integrationist stance several parliamentarians pointed out that 
accession could threaten Polish sovereignty and national identity. Bonawentura 
Ziemba, of the Pax Association commented:
Our efforts at acceding to the EEC -  which the Prime 
Minister spoke about -  should be accompanied by an 
awareness that this will be a lengthy process and in the end 
it will depend on us whether and with what we will accede 
to Europe. I believe that the Polish nation has to offer to 
Europe certain values, not only material but also spiritual 
and cultural. Entering the European Communities cannot 
take place at the cost of giving up our identity and 
sovereignty.233
Ziemba hence believed that although Poland may have lacked "material' wealth 
it had 'spiritual and cultural' values to offer. He was concerned about the 
adverse impact which European integration may have on these values and on 
Polish sovereignty.
Similar sentiments were expressed by Ziemba's colleague from Pax, Jozef 
Wojcik:
Let us finally abandon the degrading, as John Paul the II 
put it, slogan of the supposed need for Poland to return to 
Europe. We were and are in Europe and the cultural, 
spiritual and moral contribution we have made towards its 
identity is not insignificant. We have witnessed the 
opposition against two world wars, a sea of suffering and 
millions of corpses, finally the Holocaust in Europe.234
W6jcik hence justified the claim of moral superiority by reference to the 
suffering to which Poland had been subjected during its troubled past. Now it 
was Western Europe's turn to help Poland, he seemed to suggest.
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Similar arguments were presented during the debate on the ratification of the 
Treaty on Good Neighbourly Relations and Cooperation with Germany in 
October 1991. Tadeusz Mazowiecki and those associated with ROAD  saw the 
treaty as a step towards joining the EC and NATO. But Zjednoczenie 
Chrzescijahsko Narodowe, which opposed the ratification, perceived closer 
relations with Germany as a threat. Marek Jurek warned that the clause 
allowing German citizens to purchase property in towns where they were bom  
could become a 'pretext for organized colonising action on the territory of the 
Polish state' . 235 The ZChN  harboured genuine concerns about the possibility of 
German colonisation. It was also increasingly sceptical about the Association 
negotiations. As Henryk Goryszewski, leader of the ZChN, stated in June 1991: 
'Our forefathers did not die in the struggle for Polishness for us to now dissolve 
in some Europeanness or worldliness'.^
The stance of the Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe was similar to that of the ZChN. On 
17 September 1991 the Agrarians proposed a referendum on the Association 
Agreements. Jacek Komorowski, the PSL's press spokesman, described 
association as 'the destruction of agriculture'. 237 The referendum proposal met 
with little support but the Agrarians continued to oppose association. In 
October 1991 Jacek Soska, one of the PSL's staunchest euro-sceptics, called for 
an end to the association negotiations.
Association treaty ratification debate
Doubt and ambiguity about association were also evident in the debates of the 
newly elected sejm. The first parliamentary reading of the Association Treaty 
was held on 21 May 1992, almost three months after the Interim Agreement on 
Trade came into effect on 1 March 1992. As a result, many parliamentarians felt 
they had been presented with a fait accompli, which further contributed to their 
distrust of the association process. Public support for ratification was limited.
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According to a survey carried out by Wprost magazine, as many as 42% of 
respondents opposed ratification, 27% supported it while 31% were 
undecided.238
Krzysztof Skubiszewski, however, was far from sceptical. In the opening speech 
to the ratification debate he argued that European integration would not only 
bring economic and security benefits but would also act as a guarantor of Polish 
independence and democracy. He stated:
There is no event which can be compared to this in the 
history of our state.. ..the Community is today, along with 
the United States.. .the bastion of democracy in the 
world.. .Association with the Community will be a 
guarantee for us, as for other member states, not only of 
economic and social development, but above all it will be a 
guarantee of the retention and expression of our national 
existence.239
Skubiszewski hence believed that European integration would not only 
guarantee economic growth and regional stability but also ensure democracy 
and national sovereignty. His argument implied that the only alternative to 
integration was a totalitarian, socially and economically underdeveloped 
existence which, Skubiszewski suggested, may eventually lead to the 
obliteration of the Polish state.
Piotr-Nowina Konopka of the Unia Demokratyczna presented a similar stance to 
that of Skubiszewski, arguing that Poland had been sent to 'the sidelines of 
history' by communism while its West European neighbours pursued 'God 
given' freedoms to establish free market, liberal democracies. Similarly for 
Nowina-Konopka, the future of Poland's systemic transformation depended on 
the ratification of the Association Treaty. He argued:
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Our future political and economic system depends on 
whether or not we take the decision enabling the president 
to ratify this treaty. Not taking this decision would be an 
unambiguous signal....that Poland has given up on the 
path once taken by developed countries and once again 
relies on a systemic and political experiment as she is 
deciding to go its own way and is shutting herself away 
from other countries, that her choice is isolation and 
autarky.240
On another occasion Leszek Balcerowicz, author of 'shock therapy' reform had 
similar sentiments with regards to the association treaty, describing it as 'a 
matter of survival, a guarantee that we have moved away from the despair of 
the post-Yalta years'241. This kind of 'no-alternative' strategy on Europe in effect 
meant an unquestioning support for a neo-liberal, free-market economy. The 
symbolic desirability of 'returning to Europe' thereby justified policy and 
precluded discussion of policy alternatives to either European integration or the 
'shock-therapy' reforms.
Jozef Oleksy of the SLD was more critical of the Association Treaty. While 
supportive of ratification, he repeatedly questioned the economic benefits the 
treaty would bring to Poland. He also pointed out that the agreement made no 
concrete commitment to enlargement and, while promising aid and further 
integration, did not specify how this was to be provided. Oleksy further 
criticised the negotiators for failing to ensure the inclusion of an accession 
timetable in the Association Treaty. To integrate with Europe, he argued,
Poland would have to achieve greater economic and political stability and 
respect for civil liberties: 'Poland will be reckoned with, when it will be a stable 
and politically predictable state, with respect for law and civic responsibilities,
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offering good products, a country open to European partners and not one that 
is xenophobic and concerned only with itself'.242
The social-democrats hence continued to present the European Community as a 
tolerant, liberal and democratic organization. In order to accede, they implied, 
Poland had to ensure that it was also sufficiently tolerant and open to diversity. 
A multicultural, diverse and most importantly secular vision of Europe was 
posed against the "Christian Europe" envisaged by the Solidarity-successor 
camp.
Leszek Moczulski of the KPN  cautioned against both undue enthusiasm and 
excessive scepticism about integration. His main concerns were the sale of land 
to foreigners and the impact of the Association Treaty on ethical issues such as 
the legalisation of abortion or euthanasia. Moczulski either disregarded or was 
not aware that the Association Agreements had no impact on such matters. He 
also questioned Skubiszewski's and Nowina-Konopka's argument that the 
European Community was a guarantor of Polish democracy and argued that it 
was degrading for Poles to think in this way. The KPN  declared it was not 
prepared to ratify the Association Agreement due to a lack of information about 
its potential economic and legislative implications. It proposed that before 
ratification could be considered the cabinet needed to compile a detailed report 
on the political and economic impact of association. 243
Stanislaw Kalemba, of the Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, pointed out that Poland 
should not neglect its relations with Russia and the Newly Independent States. 
The PSL was critical of the fact that the Polish economy had, over the previous 
two years, become more open to Western Europe than to Poland's Eastern 
neighbours. Like his colleagues from the KPN  and the Zjednoczenie
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Chrzescijansko Narodowe, Kalemba criticised the government for implementing 
the treaty before it had been ratified by parliament. The PSL proposed that the 
ratification request be returned to parliamentary commissions for further 
consideration.244
The subsequent speaker, Henryk Goryszewski, had the difficult task of 
combining a deputy leadership of the euro-sceptic Zjednoczenie Chrzescijansko 
Narodowe with a deputy Prime Ministership in Hanna Suchocka's pro- 
integrationist cabinet. The ambiguity of Goryszewski's presentation reflected 
the difficulty of his position. He stated:
There are different methods of uniting Europe and 
different visions of it. If it is to be a Europe deserving of its 
traditions, and deserving of those traditions of which it was 
a source, creator and which it gave forth to the world, then 
it must be a Europe of Nations. In such a Europe we want 
to find ourselves, in a Europe which will be a community 
of independent and self-governing sovereign nations.245
Goryszewski's presentation was hence ambiguous enough to straddle the ZChN  
's euro-scepticism and the pro-integrationist stance of the Suchocka cabinet. 
Another ZChN  representative, Jacek Truszczynski, was less reserved. He stated: 
'The restrictions contained in European agreements threaten the reconstruction 
of the economies of the Czech and Slovak Republics, Poland and Hungary'.245
Other Solidarity-successor groupings, such the Porozumienie Centrum, the Partia 
Chrzescijahskich Demokratow and Solidamosc questioned the benefits of the 
Association Treaty but did not oppose its ratification. Marcin Przybylowicz of
244 Stanislaw Kalemba, 'Pierwsze czytanie rz^dowego projektu ustawy o ratyfikacji Ukladu Europejskiego 
ustanawiajgcego stowarzyszenie mi§dzy Rzeczgpospolit^ Polskg a Wsphlnotami Europejskimi i ich 
pahstwami czionkowskimi, sporz^dzonego w Brukseli dnia 16 grudnia 1991 r', 21 May 1992,15th session, 
day 1, point 1.
245 Henryk Goryszewski, 'Pierwsze czytanie rzgdowego projektu ustawy o ratyfikacji Ukladu 
Europejskiego ustanawiaj^cego stowarzyszenie mi§dzy Rzeczqpospolit^ Polskq a Wsphlnotami 
Europejskimi i ich pahstwami czionkowskimi, sporz^dzonego w Brukseli dnia 16 grudnia 1991 r', 21 May 
1992,15th session, day 1, point 1.
246 Jacek Truszczynski, 'Pierwsze czytanie rzgdowego projektu ustawy o ratyfikacji Ukladu Europejskiego 
ustanawiajgcego stowarzyszenie mi§dzy Rzecz^pospolitg Polskg a Wsphlnotami Europejskimi i ich 
pahstwami czionkowskimi, sporzgdzonego w Brukseli dnia 16 grudnia 1991 r', 21 May 1992,15th session, 
day i, discussion point 1.
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the Porozumienie Centrum pointed out that association with the European 
Community was a just reward for Poland after the contribution it had made to 
the struggle against communism. While questioning the potential impact of 
association and eventual membership on Polish national identity and religious 
traditions, several M Ps argued that such threats were a product of globalisation 
rather than of the Association Agreements; they argued that non-ratification of 
the treaty would do little to protect Poland against them. The debate ended on a 
critical note from Janusz Korwin-Mikke of the Unia Polityki Realnej (Union of 
Realist Politics, UPR). Korwin-Mikke accused the EC of being 'taken over by 
socialists' and of forcing Poland to abandon legal norms such as capital 
punishment or the ban on abortion. Even slapping a child, Korwin-Mikke 
argued, could put one in jail. He ended his presentation by asking his 
colleagues whether they would vote for membership in the European Union of 
Socialist Republics.
The PSL's suggestion for the ratification proposal to be passed over to 
parliamentary commissions was accepted and the draft was eventually ratified 
by five parliamentary commissions: foreign policy, foreign economic relations 
and fisheries, agriculture, economic policy, finance and the legislative 
commission. The commissions' discussions concerned primarily the economic 
benefits of the treaty. Agriculture was very much a point of dissent and Jacek 
Soska, a representative of the Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, tabled a motion 
against treaty ratification in the agriculture commission. While recommending 
ratification the commissions called for the establishment of a programme of 
action which would harmonise Polish legislation with the Association Treaty. A 
Parliamentary Commission on European Integration was established and 
charged with supervising the implementation of the Association Treaty, 
consultations on negotiations between Poland and the EC, and formulating 
recommendations concerning Poland's relationship with the Community.247
247 'Kolejny Krok w Lipcu' Rzeczpospolita, 12/21 June 1992, nr. 144(3182), pi.
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The second parliamentary debate took place on July 3rd 1992. During the final 
vote, the ZChN  parliamentarians divided. Pro-integrationists such as Wieslaw 
Chrzanowski and Jacek Kurski voted for ratification but the radical wing of the 
party remained sceptical. Jacek Turczynski was adamant in his opposition to 
association with the European Community. He stated: 'Acceptance of the treaty 
associating Poland with the European Communities may mean a complete 
breakdown of the Polish economy as a result of forcing the weaker partner to 
compete with the stronger one7.248
According to Ryszard Czamecki, who at the time was responsible for the 
ZChN's foreign policy strategy, euro-sceptics such as Marek Jurek and Jan 
Lopuszariski voted against the Europe Agreements because they opposed 
eventual membership in the EU. Czarnecki also voted against ratification. He 
later explained that his main motivation for doing so was that Poland had been 
offered worse conditions than those presented to previous entrants. Asked 
whether the Z C hN 's opposition was in any way influenced by the 
establishment of the European Union and the growing transfer of competences 
from member states to Brussels, he replied that the Maastricht Treaty 'was an 
abstraction' and that its impact was considered neither during internal 
discussions at the ZChN  nor during the parliamentary debates.249
The Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej abstained. Leszek Moczulski explained that 
while his party supported European integration, it felt that the Association 
Treaty was forced on Poland by the economically powerful West European 
states. 'Having someone on their knees agree to given conditions is not building 
integration, it is the building of conflicts which will destroy integration'
248 Jacek Turczynski 'Drugie czytanie rz^dowego projektu ustawy o ratyfikacji Ukladu Europejskiego 
ustanawiaj^cego stowarzyszenie mi§dzy Rzecz^pospolit^ Polskg a Wspdlnotami Europejskimi i ich 
paristwami czionkowskimi, sporz^dzonego w Brukseli dnia 16 grudnia 1991 r' 3 Julyl992,19th session, 3rd 
day, discussion point 9.
249 Interview with Ryszard Czamecki, 15 June 2005.
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Moczulski argued. He went on to ask whether those who supported European 
integration were not in fact seeking a replacement for the Soviet hegemony.250
Other groupings, such as Solidarity, Porozumienie Centrum, and PChD 
supported ratification. Their support was qualified however, by concerns for 
Polish national identity as well as the potentially adverse effects of opening the 
country's weak economy to a much stronger competitor.251
Although Jacek Soska once again submitted a proposal for non-ratification, his 
colleagues from the PSL voted in favour of the treaty. Soska argued that the 
Polish agricultural sector was too weak to compete with its heavily subsidised 
West European counterparts and that the government had failed to implement 
adequate restructuring measures which would enable the sector to compete 
with West European farmers. Other PSL representatives, however, pointed out 
that opening up Polish markets may in fact aid the restructuring process and in 
the long term make the local farmers more competitive.252
The liberal parties maintained the enthusiastic stance they had presented 
during the first reading and the Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny proposed that 
membership application be made immediately after the ratification of the 
Association Treaty. The SLD also maintained its previous stance. Although it 
criticised the Solidarity-successor negotiators for failing to ensure that Polish 
interests were fully protected, the Alliance nonetheless supported ratification.
250 Leszek Moczulski, 'Drugie czytanie rzqdowego projektu ustawy o ratyfikacji Ukladu Europejskiego 
ustanawiajgcego stowarzyszenie mi^dzy Rzecz^pospolitq Polskq a Wspdlnotami Europejskimi i ich 
paristwami czionkowskimi, sporzqdzonego w Brukseli dnia 16 grudnia 1991 r' 3 July 1992,19th session, 3rd 
day, discussion point 9.
251 'Drugie czytanie rzqdowego projektu ustawy o ratyfikacji Ukladu Europejskiego ustanawiaj^cego 
stowarzyszenie mi^dzy Rzeczgpospolitq Polskg a Wsp61notami Europejskimi i ich panstwami 
czionkowskimi, sporz^dzonego w Brukseli dnia 16 grudnia 1991 r' 3 July 1992,19th session, 3rd day, 
discussion point 9.
252 'Drugie czytanie rz^dowego projektu ustawy o ratyfikacji Ukladu Europejskiego ustanawiajqcego 
stowarzyszenie mi^dzy Rzeczgpospolitq Polskg a Wspdlnotami Europejskimi i ich panstwami 
czionkowskimi, sporzgdzonego w Brukseli dnia 16 grudnia 1991 r' 3 July 1992,19th session, 3rd day, 
discussion point 9.
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The association treaty was eventually ratified on July 4th 1991 with 238 votes 
against 78, with 20 abstentions. 233 In November 1991 the economist and 
European integration expert Jacek Saryusz Wolski was appointed 
Plenipotentiary for European Integration and charged with coordinating 
association activites. The harmonisation programme legislated during the 
ratification debate was presented to the cabinet in November 1992. In January 
1993 Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, presented the newly established Parliamentary 
Commission for European Integration with a progress report identifying free 
movement of capital and the sale of land as the areas needing most attention.23*
In January the government passed a legal harmonisation programme which 
identified over sixty legislative changes requiring immediate adjustment. 
Saryusz-Wolski pointed out that in addition to introducing the adjustments 
required under the Association Treaty, the programme also prepared Poland 
for future membership in the European Community. The harmonisation 
programme encompassed a broad range of legislation on customs, 
manufacturing, banking, financial reporting, patents, labour law, education, 
tourism, environmental protection and health care.233 The acquis communautaire 
had a widespread impact on Polish legislation even before the membership 
application was submitted.
Regional policy debate
Growing euro-scepticism was also apparent during the Sejm debates on 
regionalisation. In May 1993 Saryusz-Wolski announced that Poland would 
develop a regional policy programme with the aid of EC funds.236 Sixty million 
ECU of European Community aid had been paid out in 1992 and a majority of 
these funds were intended for regional development. As part of the programme
233 G. Sanford, 'Parliamentary Control and the Constitutional Definition of Foreign Policy Making in 
Democratic Poland', Europe-Asia Studies, 51,5 (1999), 769-797.
234 'Jak Si? Dopasowad' Gazeta Wyborcza, 21 January 1993, nr 17, pl5.
233 Dorota Pilot, Gazeta Wyborcza, 27 January 1993, nr 22, pl5.
236 Alina Bialkowska, 'Regionalne Pieniadze EWG' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.135,09 June 1992, p4.
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Polish civil servants were to be educated in formulating effective regional 
policy.
The liberals had no objections to regionalisation. As Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, 
Minister for European Integration in the Suchocka cabinet, stated during a press 
conference: 'Poland is too large a country to effectively integrate with Europe. It 
has to divide into regions'. For the nationalist groupings, however, 
participation in the EU's regional policy was much more than just a cost 
effective way to educate public servants or build better roads. It represented 
their greatest fear: their motherland would once again be partitioned and 
colonized by the German empire, which this time appeared in the guise of the 
European Union.
When the Silesian voivod initiated talks about the formation of a Carpathian 
Euro-region, the KPN, PC, N SZZ Solidamosc and the ZChN  asked Prime 
Minister Suchocka for his dismissal on the grounds that he was destabilising 
Polish sovereignty. They also claimed that the formation of the Euro-region 
contradicted Polish foreign policy and argued it would eventually lead to a 
'soft' incorporation of Silesia into Germany.
The debate on regionalisation brought out stark differences between two of 
Suchocka's biggest coalition partners, the euro-enthusiastic Unia Demokratyczna 
and the euro-sceptic Zjednoczenie Chrzescijansko Narodowe. Both parties raised 
doubts about their compatibility from the start of the coalition. As Bronislaw 
Geremek commented: 'There are deep policy differences between the coalition 
parties, especially the [Democratic] Union and the ZChN. Unia Demokratyczna 
will not agree to a programme of de-communization, hostility to Europe, or 
punishing women and doctors for abortion' .257
The ZChN  also raised concerns about the coalition's ideological compatibility. 
While commenting on Hanna Suchocka's expose Marek Jurek stated:
257 Ewa Milewicz, 'Siodemka si? trzyma', interview with Bronislaw Geremek, Gazeta Wyborcza, 19-20
September 1993, p3.
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Each of the previous Prime Ministers... emphasised the 
role of the Catholic Church in building democracy. Hanna 
Suchocka did not even mention the Church. Secondly, the 
Prime Minister's declaration that the primary aim of Polish 
foreign policy remains integration with Europe. This 
means, that she does not recognize some of our doubts, 
which we presented during the debate on the ratification of 
the Association Agreement.258
The ZChN's vision of what an integrated Europe should look like was very 
different from that advocated by the Unia Demokratyczna. Whereas the liberals 
opted for a closely integrated 'Maastricht Europe', the ZChN  was in favour of 
an intergovernmental 'Europe of Nations'. As the party spokesman, Ryszard 
Czamecki explained: 'We have serious doubts about political integration with 
Europe. In our opinion for example the concept of a United States of Europe 
could become dangerous for Poland.259 He then suggested a re-negotiation of 
the Association Agreements.
The ZChN's participation in a government led by the pro-integrationist, liberal 
Suchocka presented a dilemma for Henryk Goryszewski, who was both leader 
of the ZChN  and deputy Prime Minister. His and his party's stance on 
European integration contradicted that of the Prime Minister. During an 
interview entitled 'Goryszewski's Secret' published by Gazeta Wyborcza 
Goryszewski attempted to distinguish between what he described as his 
personal anti-Maastricht stance, and his 'professional' support for Suchocka's 
pro-integration strategy. Questioned about his criticism of the Maastricht 
Treaty, he replied:
That was my personal statement. The government did not 
express itself on this subject and luckily it does not have to 
express itself, since this matter could lead to its collapse. It 
is hence only reasonable that I, while speaking of the 
Maastricht Treaty, clearly emphasize: me, Goryszewski,
258 'Koalicja szansy czy strachu' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.163,13 July 1992, p ll.
259 Alina Bialkowska, 'Czy Wpuscimy EWG' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.65,17 March 1992, p4.
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and not -  me, deputy Prime Minister. Then there is no 
conflict between me and minister Bielecki.260
The full extent of the conflict between the two coalition partners eventually 
came to light during the parliamentary debate on regionalisation. Following the 
establishment of the Carpathian Region, the ZChN  called for a parliamentary 
debate, requesting the government to justify its support for the region's 
development. Two debates took place, on 20 February and 3 March 1993. The 
ZChN  carried out a full blown attack on both the cabinet and the Unia 
Demokratyczna, arguing that Suchocka's European integration policy would 
eventually lead to the loss of Polish sovereignty. The liberals meanwhile saw 
regionalisation as a means of improving economic cooperation and 
consolidating security. As Krzysztof Skubiszewski stated during the 
inauguration of the Carpathian region: 'This is a new opportunity for 
neighbourly relations, an opportunity to overcome the past and eliminate 
economic divisions'.261
The discussion did not prove fruitful. In his opening speech to the second 
debate, on 3 March, Krzysztof Skubiszewski reiterated his support for 
regionalisation. In response, Jan Lopuszanski of the ZChN  accused the 
government of facilitating a new partition of Poland. 'I know that there are dark 
forces planning to demolish Poland's borders but why are you playing a part in 
this, for God's sake?262 he asked Minister Skubiszewski. Lopuszanski then 
asserted that this kind of behaviour would be paid for in the blood of future 
generations.
Lopuszanski was awarded a standing ovation; one female parliamentarian even 
kissed him. The Porozumienie Centrum meanwhile was increasingly sceptical in 
its support for integration and took the side of the Christian-Nationalists, 
accusing the Unia Demokratyczna of failing to represent Polish national interest.
260 Artur Domosfawski, 'Tajemnica Goryszewskiego', Gazeta Wyborcza, 17/18 October 1992, nr. 245, p6.
261 Edward Krzemien, 'Europa ojczyzn czy regiondw', Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.55, 6-7 March 1993, p3.
262 Piotr Piasek and Dominika Wielowieyska, 'Koalicja dw6ch Swiatdw', Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.44,22 
February 1993, p3.
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But the PC's support for the Christian-Nationalists may have been motivated as 
much by an ambition to fragment the governing coalition as by genuine doubts 
about regionalisation.
Another grouping that was strongly opposed to regionalisation was the Ruch 
Odbudowy Polski (Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland, ROP), 
established by Jan Olszewski following the fall of his cabinet in December 1992. 
Although during his Prime Ministership Olszewski claimed to support 
association, he begem to call for re-negotiation of the Europe Agreements as 
trade disputes with the EU became more frequent. The libertarian Janusz 
Korwin-Mikke also supported the ZChN  and argued that euro-regions were the 
work of masons and would lead to "another Yugoslavia'.
The regional policy debates made manifest the discord within the governing 
coalition and the extent of disagreement about European integration policy. 
After the debate Unia Demokratyczna issued a statement condemning ZChN's 
lack of clear stance on Europe and intra-coalition talks followed, however 
neither party was willing to compromise and the already weak coalition 
suffered further damage.263 Conflicting party-political views on Europe were 
proving divisive even at the early stages of the integration process.
Conclusions
The years 1991 to 1993 saw significant change in party-political approaches to 
European integration. As it became clear that no new 'Marshall Plan' would be 
forthcoming and that the West European states would not welcome their 
impoverished Eastern neighbours with open arms, the Polish political right 
revised its initially enthusiastic approach towards the European project. The 
liberals, meanwhile, remained unwaveringly euro-enthusiastic.
Establishing a clear cut stance on Europe once again proved most problematic 
for groupings competing on a nationalist or religious platform. As the
263 'Unia w zwarciu z ZChN' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr. 47,25 December 1993, p2.
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extensive implications of association on national sovereignty and economic 
policy became clear the Polish right wing increasingly struggled with 
presenting an unambiguous approach to Poland's integration with the EEC.
The hard realities of international trade and the EC's unwillingness to provide 
special treatment to the Central and East European states shattered the 
idealised image of 'returning to Europe' harboured by the Solidarity-successor 
elites, no longer able to reconcile emphasising their role in attaining Poland's 
newly won national sovereignty with the loss of national competences inherent 
in European integration. Groupings such as Porozumienie Centrum and 
Zjednoczenie Chrzescijansko Narodowe found it impossible to maintain 
unqualified support for what they increasingly perceived to be an organisation 
which threatened Polish independence. Moreover, as integration with NATO 
became increasingly likely, security concerns lessened and consequently 
integration with the European Community had to be justified on economic 
grounds, which proved increasingly difficult in light of the growing trade 
deficit.
Another point of tension between the right wing parties' proposals and 
European integration arose in the area of economic policy. The interventionist, 
protectionist economic policies advocated by the PC, Solidamosc and most of the 
agrarian groupings clashed with the association treaty and the Copenhagen 
criteria. All of these groupings supported a range of protectionist measures 
including export subsidies and import tariffs, neither of which were allowed 
under the association agreement.
Even though none of the above parties declared their opposition to EC 
membership they all raised concerns about the benefits of the association treaty 
and repeatedly called for its re-negotiation. By the time they were able to voice 
their concerns in parliament however the main provisions of the treaty had 
become a fait accompli by means of the interim trade agreement. But the 
tumultuous debates on association and regionalisation made it evident that 
Poland lacked in-depth political consensus on European integration and on its
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full implications. The appeal of the 'return to Europe' was no longer sufficient 
to sustain consensus on the complexities of the integration project.
Support for European integration proved far less problematic for the two liberal 
parties: the Democratic Union and the Liberal Democratic Congress. The 
association requirements and the accession criteria were much better aligned to 
liberal economic policy and to the way in which these two groupings presented 
national sovereignty than to that of the other solidarity-successor parties. The 
liberals argued that EU membership would bring the about the economic 
growth necessary for political stability and embed Poland in the Western sphere 
of influence. Moreover, they pointed out, integration would not carry any 
additional economic cost as the reforms required for accession would have to be 
carried out anyway to successfully complete the transformation. The processes 
of systemic economic transformation and European integration were hence seen 
to be interdependent, accession requirements providing a model for transition 
reforms.264
Liberal politicians also argued that European integration would consolidate 
both the transition to democracy and Polish sovereignty. They presented the EC 
as a panacea for all Polish ills, from the dysfunctional economy and unstable 
political system to the lack of international security. They also portrayed the EC 
as a bastion of democracy and economic prosperity, and, by implication, the 
rejection of it accession as a failure of the Polish transition.
But the EC was far from the democratic stronghold the liberals presented it to 
be. As the Polish elites debated the historical parallels between regionalisation 
and the partitions their West European counterparts were increasingly 
confronted with concerns about the EC's democratic deficit. EU membership 
may have indeed served to consolidate democracy and the free market in the 
applicant states in the sense that it served as a perceived 'reward' for reform.
264 'Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny. Deklaracja Programowa -  zasady og6lne', 'Unia Demokratyczna: z 
Programu Unii Demokratycznej', 1991, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish 
Academy of Sciences, 1991 election folder.
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But once in the EU the new entrants would be confronted with complex and 
opaque decision making processes shaping a wide range of decisions that often 
impacted the daily lives of their citizens.
Apart from the EC's internal decision making processes the democratic 
legitimisation of Poland's integration with the Communities also presented 
problems. This was the case for three reasons. Firstly, the integration process 
was driven primarily by the executive, with only very limited involvement 
from the parliament. The association treaty was negotiated by the contract 
cabinet of Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, before the Polish electorate could choose the 
first fully democratically elected sejm. Even after the 1991 elections, when the 
sejm was presented with the opportunity to ratify the association treaty, this 
took place only after the key trade sections had already been implemented. 
Also, the complex, technical nature of both the association and the entire 
integration process did not lend itself to easy parliamentary scrutiny and the 
parliamentarians were often forced to rely on the advice of the Plenipotentiary 
for European Integration.
Secondly, discourse about the political implications of integration remained 
ambiguous and symbolic. Although the issue of sovereignty was at the 
forefront of the debate there was relatively little discussion of the practical 
implications of accession and how it would impact sovereignty, such as the 
limitations on national economic policy, legal harmonization or indeed the very 
scope and means of the EU's decision-making powers. Where parties expressed 
scepticism, this was justified by symbolic rhetoric, such as the comparison 
between regional policy and the partitions or the frequent references to German 
domination. Support for integration meanwhile was often justified by the 
implicit threat that should Poland fail to accede then not only the transition but 
even its very national independence may be put in jeopardy. As Ryszard 
Czarnecki of the ZChN  pointed out, key issues such as Maastricht were an
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'abstraction'265. Instead, political debate addressed historical wrongs, the threat 
of German colonisation and the 'spilling of Polish blood'. Such rhetoric not 
only failed to inform about the key implications of the integration process but 
also did not provide the public with clear policy choices on the basis of which it 
could hold its elected representatives to account with regards to the integration 
process.
Thirdly, electoral choice about European integration was made more 
problematic by the limited nature of public knowledge of the EU and the 
implications of Poland's association and membership in it. CBOS studies of 
March 1992 show that whereas 80% of respondents supported Poland's 
integration with Western Europe only two thirds recognized the abbreviation 
'EEC or had heard about the association agreement.266
Establishing consensus on European integration was also problematic due to 
disagreements within the Suchocka cabinet, which brought together euro- 
enthusiastic liberals such as Suchocka, Bielecki and Skubiszewski with euro- 
sceptics such as Heryk Goryszewski from the Catholic-nationalist ZChN  and 
with the conservative, euro-ambivalent agrarians. The ways in which different 
sides of the political spectrum conceptualised national sovereignty were a key 
factor in the disagreements. The liberals felt that integration with international 
structures strengthened sovereignty by granting Poland a greater say in the 
globalisation process, even if this took place at the cost of competences that 
traditionally lay within the domain of the state. The nationalist groupings 
presented sovereignty in a more traditional manner and saw the loss of national 
competences as form of colonisation, which in turn enabled them to make 
frequent use of an emotionally powerful rhetoric about the past suffering the 
Poles endured at the hands of their neighbours. Meanwhile, as the next chapter 
will show, the two communist-successor groupings were also developing their 
own representations of the EU.
265 Interview with Ryszard Czamecki, 15 June 2005.
266 CBOS report, March 1992 quoted in Kawecka-Wykrzykowska, 'Implications of Poland's Association 
with the European Communities for Poland's Economy: Preliminary Assessment'.
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Chapter 4
SLD-PSL coalition: European integration under the 
successors of the ancien regime
SLD will change its coalition partner if PSL makes Poland's 
entry to the European Union impossible.267
Aleksander Kwasniewski, leader of the Sojusz Lewicy
Demokratycznej
Introduction
This chapter considers the evolution of party-political consensus on European 
integration during the communist-successor SLD and PSL coalition, starting 
with the September 1993 parliamentary contest and ending with the September 
1997 victory of the Solidarity-Electoral Action and Freedom Union coalition.
The period in question saw a number of key developments in Poland's 
accession project. The Association Agreement came into force in January 1994 
and in April 1994 Poland formally applied for EU membership. The years from 
1995 to 1997 saw extensive efforts at preparation for negotiations and eventual 
membership on both the Polish and EU side. As integration progressed Europe 
played an increasingly prominent role in political debate and the establishment 
of party-political consensus on EU membership became increasingly important.
The question of how party-political consensus on accession was established in 
Poland during this critical phase of its integration project is the primary focus of 
this chapter. How did individual political groupings reconcile the increasingly 
detailed accession requirements with their existing policy and ideological 
proposals? What were the key factors shaping the parliamentary debate on 
accession and how was consensus on Europe established within the ruling 
coalition?
The 1993-7 sejm was markedly different from its predecessor in that most of the 
small solidarity successor parties did not manage to cross the newly introduced 
5% representation threshold. The composition of the new sejm influenced the
267 Aleksander Kwasniewski, quoted in 'SLD, PSL i Europa' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.29,3 February 1995, p3.
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tone of parliamentary debate on Europe since representatives of groupings such 
as the Christian-Nationalist Faction, the Movement for the Reconstruction of 
Poland, and Solidarity, which had been increasingly critical of European 
integration both in the incumbent sejm and during the 1993 electoral campaign, 
were now no longer able to voice their concerns in parliament or government. 
The period from September 1993 to August 1997 hence saw little dissent on 
Europe from parliamentary opposition. But vocal concerns and scepticism 
about accession could be heard during the 1993 parliamentary and 1995 
presidential campaign as well as during the 1997 debate on the new 
constitution. The strongest voice of dissent within parliament came from the 
agrarian PSL and discord on Europe between the traditional, conservative 
agrarians and the increasingly euro-enthusiastic Social Democrats was evident 
both during parliamentary debate and in several publicly voiced disagreements 
among the leadership of the two groupings.
Following an overview of domestic developments in section one, the second 
section will account for the progress of Poland's integration with the EU during 
the 1993-7 period. Section three will focus on the party-political debate on 
accession and the evolution of consensus on Poland's EU membership 
including the 1993 parliamentary and 1995 presidential campaigns, 
parliamentary debate, relations between the coalition partners as well as the 
role of European integration in the 1997 debate on the new constitution.
Domestic developments
The September 1993 parliamentary contest saw the return to power of many 
former members of the Polish United Workers' Party, now reformed into a 
Western style social-democratic Alliance of the Democratic Left, or the Sojusz 
Lezvicy Demokratycznej. The SLD's victory was a consequence of two factors. The 
first was popular disenchantment with the harsh economic reforms initiated in 
1990 by Leszek Balcerowicz and continued under the leadership of Jan 
Krzysztof Bielecki and Hanna Suchocka. The second factor was the introduction 
of a 5% parliamentary representation threshold for parties and 8% for
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coalitions, which significantly limited the fragmented solidarity-successor right 
parties' representation in the sejm.
Following unsuccessful coalition talks with the solidarity-successor Democratic 
Union and the Labour Union268 the SLD eventually formed government together 
with the agrarian PSL. The UP agreed to informally back the coalition and Unia 
Demokratyczna pledged support on selected issues. Although the two groupings 
shared a communist-successor heritage the policies of the centre-left, politically 
liberal and pro-integrationist SLD were hardly a compatible match for the 
conservative, agrarian and at times euro-sceptic PSL. A coalition between the 
communist-successor SLD and the Democratic Union and the Labour Union 
might have been more ideologically compatible but neither of the latter two 
groupings was willing to formally co-operate with successors of the ancien 
regime.269
In spite of having won more parliamentary seats than their coalition partner the 
SLD agreed to appoint Waldemar Pawlak, PSL leader, as Prime Minister. This 
helped the Social Democrats dispel public concerns about a return to the 
authoritarian ways of the PZPR. Much to the PSL's dismay, the SLD offered the 
leadership of the parliamentary commission on foreign affairs to Bronislaw 
Geremek of Unia Demokratyczna. The Sojusz thereby provided further proof that 
it had no desire to divert Poland from its pro-integrationist foreign policy. 
Granting this post to an enthusiastically pro-integrationist former dissident 
affirmed the SLD's new, pro-Western stance.
Discord among the coalition partners intensified as the SLD, increasingly 
confident in its new, democratically legitimized role, strove to control the Prime 
Ministerial appointment. Pawlak soon became embroiled in a power struggle 
with Aleksander Kwasniewski and was eventually replaced by J6zef Oleksy of
268 Ka-Lok Chan, Kenneth, 'Poland at the Crossroads: the 1993 General Election', Europe-Asia Studies, 47,1 
(1995), 123-145, pl42.
269 Ibid, pl42.
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the SLD in February 1995.270 Meanwhile, the SLD had not only to contend with a 
difficult coalition partner but also with its increasingly challenging 
relationship27! with President Walesa.272
The power struggle between the president and the coalition centred on control 
over three key ministries: foreign affairs, defence and internal affairs, all of 
which had traditionally been manned by presidential appointment as part of 
the agreement made as part of the power sharing arrangements of the contract 
sejm. According to the "Little Constitution" foreign policy was to be established 
with the co-operation of the President, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the 
Prime Minister but the definition of precisely who was responsible for which 
part of policy formation was open to interpretation.273
In an attempt to influence foreign policy the SLD placed increasing pressure on 
Andrzej Olechowski, the head of foreign affairs, from the start of his 
appointment in October 1993. The communist-successors quickly set about 
attempting to shift policy formation away from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Alternative decision-making centres, such as the Prime Minister's Office for 
International Affairs, established by the PSL's Michal Strqk, or the Ministry for 
Foreign Economic Cooperation were set up. Both institutions promptly began 
forming a "shadow" foreign policy. Civilian control of the military, required for 
NATO membership, was another vocal point of dissent between the coalition 
and the President.274
But the lack of a clear constitutional definition of who was responsible for 
foreign policy making continued to complicate the already difficult relationship 
between the President and the SLD. Foreign policy was now formulated by the 
communist-successor Prime Minister on the one hand and Lech Walesa and his
270 Todtrzymywanie Koalicji' Trybuna, nr.33,8 February 1995.
271V. Zubek, 'The Eclipse of Walesa's Political Career', Europe-Asia Studies, 49,1 (1997), 107-124. pll9-120.
272 J. Wiatr, 'Poland's Three Parliaments in the Era of Transition, 1989-1995', International Political Science 
Review, 18,4 (1997), 443-450, p449.
273 Sanford, p774.
274 Interview with Lech Walesa, 1 September 2005, Pawel Wronski, 'Podkopywanie Wiezy Kontrolnej' 
Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.282,5 December 1994, pl2, Zbigniew Okonski, quoted in Jeffrey Simon, Poland and 
NATO. A study in Civil-Military Relations, (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), p46.
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protege Wladyslaw Bartoszewski on the other. 275 Unlike Pawlak, Jozef Oleksy 
was unambiguously supportive of EU and NATO accession and the President 
and the Prime Minister agreed on a pro-integrationist policy stance.
Establishing a common stance towards Russia276 as well as relations with the 
V atican277 proved far more problematic however. As the 1995 presidential 
contest approached the incumbent president became increasingly blunt in his 
criticism of the communist-successors, 27s even going so far as to publicly 
describe them as " c r i m i n a l s ' .  279 For Lech Walesa, as for most Solidarity-successor 
politicians, Jozef Oleksy's appointment represented not a democratic choice but 
the failure of the pre-1989 struggle. Rather than accept their opponent's election 
both the President and many of the Solidarity-successor elites saw the SLD's 
victory as a call to arms against the communist enemy.
But the solidarity-successors remained fragmented in the run up to the 1995 
presidential contest, which resulted in the victory of Aleksander Kwasniewski 
who competed with over a dozen solidarity-successor backed candidates. The 
communist-successors were now in control of both the cabinet and the 
presidency. But their celebrations quickly ended when on 19 December 1995, 
Andrzej Milczanowski, Minister of Interned Affairs, publicly accused Jozef 
Oleksy of espionage. 280 A parliamentary debate on the subject, instigated by the 
PSL in an attempt to publicize the accusation even further, took place on 
December 22. The case against Oleksy was eventually dropped but by then he 
had little choice but to resign282 and in February 1996 the running of the cabinet 
was taken over by another SLD reformer, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, with
275 'Rzqd o polityce zagranicznej. Tajne korekty' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.92,19 April 1995, p3.
276 'Jak doszlo do awantury o koniec wojny' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.94,21 April 1995, p3.
277 A. Uminska - Woroniecka, 'Stosunki Dyplomatyczne RP ze Stolicg Apostolskg w Latach 
Dziewiedziesigtych', in Kosciofy i Zwigzki Wyznaniowe w Stosunkach Mi^dzynarodowych, ed. T. 
D^bowski (Wroclaw 2003).
278 Zubek, 'The Eclipse of Walesa's Political Career', pll9-120.
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Oleksy taking over the leadership of the SdRP. In spite of the crisis, the SLD 
enjoyed a high level of popular support; 52% of respondents evaluated Oleksy's 
government as 'quiet good' or 'very good' at the time of his resignation .^
While it no longer had to deal with Walesa, the SLD still had to contend with a 
critical coalition partner. Ideological differences between the coalition partners 
became increasingly pronounced. The PSL's conservatism clashed with the 
SLD's growing appreciation of liberal social democracy, resulting in conflicts 
over issues ranging from ministerial appointments to abortion, lustration and 
foreign policy. The ideological schism between the two groupings was 
underscored by the PSL investigating the possibility of a minority coalition with 
the right wing, conservative Confederation for Independent Poland. 
Maintaining internal unity among its numerous member groupings was also 
not an easy task for SLD leadership. Economic policy was a particularly 
problematic point of dissent between the economically liberal reformers in the 
Alliance's leadership and its second largest member organization, the All-Polish 
Trade Union Agreement (Ogolnopolskie Porozumienie Zwiqzkow Zawodowych, 
OPZZ)  as the workers' social welfare demands clashed with the SLD's liberal 
economic approach. ^
The SLD-PSL coalition inherited a healthy economy, with a GDP growth of 5% 
in 1994.285 In spite of fears of excessive wage demands on the part of the OPZZ 
and other lobbies growth continued throughout the subsequent years but by the 
mid-1990's the coalition's failure to reform the social security system became an 
increasing threat to economic stability. ^
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Meanwhile, Aleksander Kwasniewski's resounding victory in the 1995 
presidential contest led to renewed attempts at consolidation on the solidarity- 
successor side of the political spectrum. In June 1996 these resulted in the 
formation of the Solidarity Electoral Action from among 22 parties and other 
political groupings under the umbrella of the Solidarity trade union. The AW S  
was an ideologically heterogeneous coalition and its members included socially 
conservative trade unionists, economic interventionists and liberals as well as 
Catholic nationalists and advocates of state and church separation.287 Rather 
than shared ideological or policy preferences, the key participation criteria 
appeared to be declared anti-communism. 288 The Akcja Wyborcza continued to 
expand and incorporate smaller right wing groupings throughout the 
remainder of 1996289 and was a prominent participant in the debate preceding 
the 1997 referendum on the new constitution.
European integration policy
The communist-successors' return to power in October 1993 led to concerns for 
the continuity of Poland's Western foreign policy o r ie n ta t io n s  Such fears were 
quickly dispelled, however, and the period from 1993 to 1997 saw significant 
progress in the integration project. On 29 March 1994 the Polish cabinet 
unanimously approved Poland's application for EU membership, which was 
submitted on 8 April 1994 following a brief parliamentary debate on 7 April. 291 
EU membership benefited from strong public support which grew from 77% in 
June 1994 to a pre-accession peak of 80% in May 1995.292 The application was 
formally accepted by the EU during the Luxembourg summit of 29-30 October 
1994.
287 Bale, pl39-156.
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But relations between Poland and the EU were not unproblematic. Poland's 
trade deficit with the Union persisted: in the first quarter of 1994 Polish exports 
to the EU amounted to USD 2.1 million while EU imports to Poland were 
valued at USD 2.4 million. The Poles frequently voiced their views on the 
shortcomings of the integration process, the lack of a clear accession timetable 
being their main concern. During the November 1993 Inauguration Session of 
the Joint Polish-EU Parliamentary Commission, for example, Andrzej 
Olechowski called for an unambiguous confirmation of the CEECs' future 
membership status.293
Matters did not improve when in June 1994, during the talks to establish an 
early warning system on trade barriers, the EU refused to accept Polish 
proposals for agricultural price subsidies. 294 The Poles were also disappointed 
not to be invited to the December 1994 European Council at Essen. The Polish 
Ambassador to the EU, Jan Kulakowski, claimed that the German Chancellor, 
Helmut Kohl had previously Ted him to believe' that Poland would be asked to 
participate.293
The Essen summit was a key milestone in the accession process in that it saw 
the formal launch of the pre-accession strategy, which marked the start of the 
practical implementation of the accession criteria defined at Copenhagen.293 
Initially proposed by the Commission in June 1994, the strategy document was 
entitled 'Strategy for Preparing Central and Eastern European Countries for 
Future Accession to the European Union'. The document proposed the 
preparation of a white paper on the expansion of the single market, the 
development of a strategy on agriculture, adjustments to the PHARE program, 
cooperation in areas of foreign policy and justice and home affairs (the so-called
293 'Inauguration Session of the Joint Parliamentary Commission of the Republic of Poland and the 
European Union', Warsaw, November 29,1993, Zbi6r Dokumentbw, nr.4,1993.
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second and third pillars), the environment297, transport policy, culture, 
education and training, regional policy, as well as the structured dialogue298, 
which was defined as: "the holding of meetings between, on the one hand, the 
Council of the Union and, on the other hand, all the associated countries of 
central and eastern Europe on matters of common interest, decided in advance, 
arising in the Union's areas of competence'.299 This involved an annual 
invitation of CEE heads of state for the second day of European Council 
meetings, semi-annual meetings of foreign ministers on second day of General 
Affairs Council as well as bi-annual joint ministerial meetings in connection 
with other Council of Ministers' meetings.300 Although the multilateral nature of 
the structured dialogue addressed the limitations of the bilateral political 
dialogue provided by Association the CEE participants did not benefit from any 
decision making powers during the meetings.301
The strategy incorporated earlier agreements and commitments such as the 
Europe Agreements and PHARE, which aimed to set a framework for the 
adaptation of accession requirements, with the addition of the Single Market 
White Paper and the Structured Dialogue, intended to facilitate the 
harmonization process with the provision of aid and a framework for 
multilateral discussion.302 As Heather Grabbe has pointed out, while the 
strategy provided detailed legislative adaptation measures it only did so in 
limited policy areas, focusing primarily on the liberalization of external 
economic relations and creating the conditions for free movement of industrial 
goods, services and, to some extent capital. It did not however, address
297 Borkowski, p621, Kawecka-Wykrzykowska, 'Effects of the Europe Agreement on the Polish Economy 
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300 M. A. Rupp, 'The pre-accession strategy and the governmental structures of the Visegrad countries', in 
Back to Europe. Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union., ed. K. Henderson (London 1999), 
p94.
01 Gower, plO.
302 H. Grabbe and K. Hughes, 'Central and east European views on EU enlargement: political debates and 
public opinion', in Ibid, p ll.
115
agricultural policy303 and the free movement of labour, both of critical 
importance to Poland. Moreover, it did not provide a timetable for the 
adaptation of the requirements.304
The Single Market White Paper was accepted by the Cannes European Council 
in June 1995.305 It covered the following policy areas: free movement of capital, 
free movement and safety of industrial products, social policy and action, 
agriculture, transport, audiovisual, environment, telecoms, taxation, free 
movement of persons, public procurement, and financial services. ** Rather 
than list all regulations and directives required for internal market adaptation it 
provided a guide to the legal framework which the candidate states were 
expected to adopt.307 In each policy area the required legislation was divided 
into "Stage V  measures, deemed essential to single market implementation and 
"Stage 11 measures, which contained detailed rules for implementation. 
Although some sequencing between the policy areas was recommended it was 
left up to the applicant states to prioritize the implementation of the 
harmonization measures.308
The White Paper also emphasized that creation of conditions for single market 
must go beyond legislative approximation and include the creation of adequate 
structures for regulation, implementation and enforcement to ensure that 
legislation was effective. It also underscored the need for effective 
administrative and legal institutions and a pool of appropriately trained 
officials.309 The Paper extended the conditionality of the Association 
Agreements to a large number of new policy areas. Unlike the Association
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Treaty it was not legally binding*™ but the Commission declared the applicants' 
progress in its implementation as a key measure of their readiness for 
accession311 thereby making its requirements a key concern for CEE decision­
makers and granting it a wide ranging impact on domestic legislation even 
before the EU confirmed a schedule for the start of accession negotiations.
The White Paper suffered from several shortcomings. Firstly, the accession 
conditions for some policy areas, such as the environment, were more stringent 
them those required of existing member states. Secondly, the policy scope of the 
White Paper was selective in that by focusing on the single market it addressed 
only some aspects of the acquis and of the broader conditions outlined at Essen. 
Even within the Single Market area the Paper provided detailed requirements 
for only two of the 'Four Freedoms': the movement of goods and capital. The 
movement of services was addressed in a limited manner and the White Paper 
did not tackle the politically sensitive issue of the free movement of labour. 312 
Lastly, although it was recommending extensive policy reform to the CEECs the 
EU was not willing to commit to clear timelines around either the negotiations 
or actual accession. 313
Nonetheless, the EU continued to put in place the steps needed to start 
negotiations. The December 1995 Madrid European Council requested the 
Commission to prepare opinions on the membership applications and on the 
impact enlargement would have on the EU's budget and policies.314 The Madrid 
Council also established additional membership criteria including the 
development of the applicants' market economies, adjustment of their 
administrative structures and the creation of a stable economic and monetary
310 de Boer-Ashworth, pl21.
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environment.313 In spite of repeated requests from the Polish side however the 
EU continued to refrain from making a firm commitment on an enlargement 
timetable. The lack of a clear accession timetable, as well as the growing trade 
deficit and the practical limitations of the structural dialogue were all raised by 
the Polish Foreign Affairs Minister Bartoszewski during a July 1995 meeting 
with the head of the European Commission, Jacques Santer. Although Santer 
responded that he expected negotiations to start in 1997, he once again refused 
to formally commit to a time table.316
Within the EU meanwhile, the enlargement project confronted decision makers 
with the need to reform its interned structures in order to facilitate a 
significantly larger number of member states and the mid-1990 saw extensive 
debate on this subject.317 The Union also moved closer towards monetary union 
and in 1997 the Stability and Growth Pact was introduced. The pact, founded 
on articles 99 and 104 of the Treaty of European Union specifying that that a 
government whose budget deficit exceeds 3% of GDP or whose public debt 
exceeds 60% of GDP may be required to correct the situation and may be 
subject to sanctions and penalties if it fails to do so.318 The convergence criteria 
had a strong influence on Polish monetary policy. The need to adhere to the 
criteria was emphasized in the National Integration Strategy document of 
1997319 and the requirement to limit public debt to 60% of GDP was seen to be 
important enough for Poland to take the unorthodox step of including it in its 
new constitution. 37°
As part of the preparation of the avis, or its opinion of the candidates' readiness 
for enlargement requested by the Madrid Council, on April 26th 1996 the
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Commission issued the candidate states with detailed questionnaires 
concerning macroeconomic indicators, customs and tax policies, employment 
and welfare, the state of industry and agriculture, compatibility of their 
legislative systems with that of the EU as well as foreign policy, and justice and 
home affairs.321 The Polish response was prepared within three months of 
receipt of the questionnaire and the avis was presented to the Council of 
Ministers in July of 1997322 as part of "Agenda 2000", which dealt with wide- 
ranging EU reforms concerning areas such as the 2000-6 financial framework, 
structural funds, Common Agricultural Policy reform and enlargement.323
The opinion for Poland was based on a range of information sources including 
the April 1996 questionnaire response, bilateral meetings as well as reports 
from Member State embassies, the Commission's Warsaw delegation as well as 
other international and non-governmental organizations. The avis was 
structured around the Copenhagen criteria but the fulfilment of Association 
Agreement requirements and the White Paper recommendations were also 
used as benchmarks for the Commission's assessment. 324 Although none of the 
candidates were deemed to have met the Copenhagen criteria325 the 
Commission's assessment of Poland's ability to do so in the medium term was 
positive and it recommended to the Council that 'negotiations for accession 
should be opened with Poland'.325 While an important step towards the start of 
negotiations at this stage the recommendation required Council approval, 
which would eventually be granted in December 1997. Agenda 2000 also 
included an expanded pre-accession strategy327 and a study assessing the 
consequences of enlargement. The benefits of enlargement outlined in the study 
included a strengthening of the EU's over-all position in global markets,
321R. Stawarska, 'Economics of the EU Enlargement: the Positive Case', Yearbook of Polish European 
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322Mayhew, 'Enlargement of the European Union: an Analysis of the Negotiations with the Central and 
East European Candidate Countries', p7.
323 Gower, pl2.
324de Boer-Ashworth, pl22.
325 Gower, pl3-14.
326de Boer-Ashworth, pl22.
327 Borkowski, p622.
119
enrichment of its human potential in highly qualified labour, a positive impact 
of the CEECs geographic position on transport, energy transit and 
communications as well as those arising from the significant natural resources 
of the acceding states. The study also pointed out however that enlargement 
would require substantial sectoral and regional adjustment, although it was 
forecast that by the time of accession the implementation of the Europe 
Agreements would have led to considerable progress in integrating the EU and 
candidate markets.328
The summer of 1997 also saw the culmination of the negotiations leading to the 
Treaty of Amsterdam. The resulting treaty fell short of expectations in that far- 
reaching institutional reform was postponed until one year before the EU 
would expand to reach 20 member states. 329 Limited extension of qualified 
majority voting was introduced but no modifications were made to the vote 
weighting procedures.330 One important adjustment approved during the 
Amsterdam Council was the incorporation of the Schengen Agreement, dealing 
with the removal of systematic border controls, into the acquis. Until this time 
Schengen had been a separate agreement between five EU member states. Its 
incorporation into the acquis meant that the candidate states would eventually 
be required to implement it along with the rest of European legislation.
The Polish side meanwhile continued with the legal and institutional 
adjustments required to meet the association and membership requirements. In 
1995 the Polish cabinet issued directive 133/95, concerning the implementation 
of obligations required for participation in the Single Market, specifying the 
tasks which individual ministries and other governmental institutions would 
need to complete in order to align with the EU's requirements. New laws
328 Avery and Fraser.
329 Gower, pl2, Borkowski, p622.
330 Gower, p!2.
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liberalizing the sale of land to foreigners were also introduced, albeit with much 
opposition from the Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe.331
On 14 March 1995 the sejm requested the Cabinet to develop a pre-accession 
strategy by January 1997. 332 The 'National Strategy for Integration', published in 
the summer of 1997, outlined the strategic directions and objectives of Poland's 
accession. Framed around the Copenhagen criteria it provided a high level 
description of the tasks required for the adjustment process.333 The Strategy 
pTOvided only a brief and general overview of Poland's integration challenges. 
Presented from the standpoint of accession being a given, it did not forecast the 
costs and benefits that would result from Poland not joining the EU. It also 
outlined the main challenges to accession, the weak preparation of Polish 
administrative staff and limited training potential being salient concerns.334
The mid-1990's saw extensive reform in Poland's institutional structures. 
Regarding European integration the most significant institutional change 
during this period was the establishment of the Committee for European 
Integration (Komitet Integracji Europejskiej, KIEj.333 By 1994 it was clear that the 
existing institutional structures were not adequate for effective co-ordination of 
Poland's integration effort. The Office of the Plenipotentiary for European 
Integration, a part of the Council of Ministers,336 was responsible for this task 
until the establishment of the KIE. The Office came under increasing criticism 
for failing to protect Polish interests under the Association Agreement. In 
September 1994 the Supreme Chamber of Control (Najwyzsza Izba Kontroli, NIK) 
presented the Parliamentary Commission for the Association Agreements with 
a report assessing the performance of the Plenipotentiary for European
331 Tadeusz Samborski, 57th session, day 2,25.08.1995, Sprawozdanie ministra spraw wewn^trznych z 
realizacji w 1994 r. ustawy z dnia 24 marca 1920 r. o nabywaniu nieruchomoSci przez cudzoziemcdw (druk 
nr 937).
332 Kuzinska.
333Komitet Integracji Europejskiej. 1997. Narodowa Strategia Integracji. Warsaw: UKIE, de Boer-Ashworth,
Fa1 2 1 '34 Hausner, Przystgpienie czy Integracja? Polska droga do Unii Europejskiej, pl48.
335 Sanford, p791.
336 J. Borkowski, 'Co-ordination of Poland's European Integration Policy', Yearbook of Polish European 
Studies, 2, (1998), p52.
121
Integration over the period from 1991 to 1993. The issues highlighted in the 
report included under-staffing, insufficient resources and critically, the lack of 
formal authority to co-ordinate the harmonization effort and ensure efficient 
implementation of the Association Treaty in relevant ministries. 337 Although the 
Plenipotentiary did have ministerial rank, he could only participate in Cabinet 
meetings if invited to do so. *>« Moreover, the only mechanism by which he 
could introduce policy change was a 3-year, pre-approved programme of 
action, which in effect meant that he lacked the means to adjust the course of 
integration policy. Lastly, it was only in March 1994 that it became compulsory 
for new legislation to be approved by the Plenipotentiary for compatibility with 
EU regulations and until this time the Office of the Plenipotentiary had very 
little impact on both the economic and legal aspects of the integration process. 
Due to the lack of an effective formal co-ordination mechanism, an informal 
cooperation process between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Office of the 
Plenipotentiary for European Integration and the Ministry for Foreign Trade 
Cooperation developed in the form of the so-called Committee of Three. The 
Committee of Three produced most of the strategic documentation required for 
cooperation with the EU, including the membership application.
The legislation establishing the Committee for European Integration came into 
force on 8 August 1996, as part of a broader programme of state administration 
reforms carried out in 1996 and 1997.339 On 14 October 1996 President 
Kwasniewski appointed Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz as head of the KIE. Danuta 
Hubner, previously responsible for Poland's OECD membership negotiations, 
took on the post of KIE Secretary.340 The Committee was charged with the co­
ordination of Poland's integration efforts, the harmonization of Polish 
legislation to European standards, and the administration of foreign aid. 341
Ibid, p52.
338 Ibid., p52.
339Hausner, Przystgpienie czy Integracja? Polska droga do Unii Europejskiej, pl48.
340 Bemadeta Waszkiewicz, 'Premier na czele Komitetu Integracji Europejskiej' Rzeczpospolita, 15 October 
1996.
341 Borkowski, 'Co-ordination of Poland's European Integration Policy', p52.
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The KIE consisted of a chairperson, a secretary and committee members, who 
were the ministers of foreign affairs, internal affairs, economy and finance, 
environment and natural resources, work and social policy, agriculture and 
food industry, and justice. The Prime Minister could appoint three further 
members whose expertise would aid the realization of the Committee's tasks. 
The head of the central bank and the chair of the governmental Centre for 
Strategic Studies could also participate. Decisions were to be made by 
consensus or majority vote when consensus was not reached.342
According to the 'National Strategy for Integration' the integration process was 
to be structured on three levels: strategic, which was to be overseen by the KIE, 
operational, which lay in the realm of Secretaries or Under-Secretaries of State 
charged with integration matters in respective ministries and lastly the working 
level, which was to be implemented by Chiefs of Units within departments and 
sections of their respective ministries and offices. While outlining the 
responsibilities of the KIE the legislation did not however define the 
instruments of inter-ministerial co-ordination which the Committee could use 
to enforce integration requirements.343 For the time being the lack of such a 
definition did not present extensive problems since the appointment of the 
prime minister as head of the Committee provided it with sufficient authority 
for effective co-ordination.
As Hubner argued during an interview for the Rzeczpospolita daily shortly after 
her appointment, this institutional set up had several important benefits. Its 
broad structure allowed for a horizontal co-ordination of all actions, the 
ministerial rank of the members meant that it did not have to wait for the 
approval of the cabinet, and it allowed for both the over-seeing of day to day
342 Ustawa 8 sierpnia 1996 r. o Komitecie Integracji Europejskiej, Rzeczpospolita, 6 September 1996.
343 Borkowski, 'Co-ordination of Poland's European Integration Policy', 1998.
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policy implementation of the integration process as well as for a long term 
strategy function.*44
The appointment of the Prime Minister as chair of the committee was important 
in that it facilitated co-ordination between all the relevant ministries. The PM 
was senior enough to ensure that the integration process did not get 'hijacked' 
by the interests of the individual ministries. Cimoszewicz explained his 
rationale for personally leading the KIE as follows:
I decided that a very strong co-ordination centre was 
needed since traditionally, Polish ministers did not 
need to work together. There was hence a significant 
danger that they would behave traditionally, that is 
defend their competences. So I decided that the 
Committee should be led by someone whose 
constitutional position is higher than those ministers, 
and this is why I took on the leadership of the 
Committee; and I believe that this is how things should 
remain in Poland for a long time.345
It cannot be disputed that the appointment of the Prime Minister as the 
chairperson of the KIE vested the Committee with sufficient authority to ensure 
that the integration process progressed efficiently. But the institutional set up 
appears to have also been motivated by political reasons. Throughout the 
Oleksy and Cimoszewicz cabinets foreign policy making gradually shifted 
away from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs towards the Prime Minister and the 
Presidential Chancellery. As Jozef Oleksy stated:
I am very comfortable in this area and at a time so 
important for Poland, in the day before her integration 
with Europe, I intend to intensify my efforts in the 
international arena...President Kwasniewski will also
344 Danuta Hubner, interviewed by Zygmunt Slomkowski, 'Ostatnie Przygotowania do decydujacych 
negocjacji' Rzeczpospolita, nr.290,12 December 1996, p ll.
345 Interview with Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, 21 July 1998.
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be very active in foreign policy as he is knowledgeable 
in this area.346
He described the role of the Minister of Foreign Affairs as follows: "It is enough 
that he is a perfect manager of the diplomatic service and coordinator of foreign 
policy between the centres of power'.347
According to Piotr Nowina-Konopka and Jerzy Osiatyriski of the Unia Wolnosci, 
the Committee was intended to duplicate the functions of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Another liberal, Bronislaw Geremek, made similar claims. 
According to Geremek, the policy making role of Dariusz Rosatti, who headed 
Foreign Affairs at the time, was very limited and foreign policy was formulated 
primarily by Kwasniewski and Cimoszewicz.343
Indeed, Dariusz Rosatti appears to have been relegated to the role of a glorified 
administrator rather than key policy maker. The establishment of the 
Committee for European Integration, while certainly providing an efficient 
institutional structure for the integration process, was also motivated by 
internal power struggles within the SLD's desire to shift power away from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs towards the Prime Minister's chancellery.
Rosatti eventually voiced concerns about the persistent lack of co-ordination 
among the different policy making centres: 'In effect Poland is perceived as a 
country in which several institutions, acting in a chaotic manner and often in 
competition with each other, are not building the image of a solid state but 
undermining it'349 he stated during a press interview.
From its inception therefore, the Committee for European Integration was 
influenced by power struggles between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the
346 J6zef Oleksy, quoted in Edward Krzemien, 'Premier wysoko ceni swe talenty dyplomatyczne', Gazeta 
Wyborcza, nr .279,01 December 1995, p3.
347 J6zef Oleksy, quoted in Edward Krzemien, 'Premier wysoko ceni swe talenty dyplomatyczne', Gazeta 
Wyborcza, nr.279,01 December 1995, p3.
348 'Euro-Polacy', Wprost, nr.19 (753), 1105.97.
349 Dariusz Rosatti quoted in Stanislaw Janecki, 'Dyplomacja Kolegbw' Wprost, nr.19 (753), 11 May 1997,
p21-22.
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Prime Minister. As chapter five will show, these problems were exacerbated 
when following Solidarity's return to power Prime Minister Buzek delegated 
the running of the KIE to Ryszard Czamecki of the euro-sceptic Christian- 
Nationalist Faction.
In parallel to consolidating its relations with the EU Poland also made progress 
in integration with other Western structures. In December 1996 NATO formally 
announced its intention to enlarge by its 50th anniversary in May 1998 and in 
July 1997 Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were formally invited to 
join the Alliance. ^  In 1995 Poland became a member of the World Trade 
Organization and in 1996 it joined the OECD. Regional co-operation came to a 
stall however with the January 1994 Czech declaration that the Visegrad 
agreement had become 'obsolete'.351 Some progress was made in further trade 
liberalization within the Central European Free Trade Association.352
European integration in political debate
The sejm brought about by the 19 September 1993 parliamentary contest was as 
much a result of electoral choice as of the new legislation introducing 
representation thresholds of 5% for political parties and 8% for electoral 
coalitions. The SLD and PSL were the two biggest winners, respectively 
attaining 171 and 132 out of the 460 available seats.353 The new electoral 
legislation meant that a ruling coalition could be formed on the basis of less 
than 36% of cast votes, just over 1% more than the 35% of votes that did not 
result in representation.35* While the new law hence served to temporarily 
consolidate the make-up of the parliament it also disenfranchised a large 
proportion of the electorate.355 None of the smellier groupings positioned on the
350 'Deklaracja Madrycka na Temat Euro-Atlantyckiego Bezpieczenstwa i Wsp61pracy Przyj t^a przez 
Szefbw Panstw i Rzqdow Uczestniczqcych w Posiedzeniu Rady Polnocnoatlantyckiej', Madryt, 8 Lipca 
1997r, Zbi6r Dokumentdw, nr. 3,1997, p234.
351 Meiklejohn Terry, p33.
352 Ibid, p33.
353 Ka-Iok Chan, pl23.
354 Ibid, pl39.
355 K. Dawisha, 'Electocracies and the Hobbesian Fishbowl of Postcommunist Politics', East European 
Politics and Societies, 13,2 (1999), 256-270, p256.
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Solidarity-successor right such as the Christian Nationalist Faction, the 
Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland, Centre Accord or Solidarity 
attained representation. Their vocal doubts about the benefits of European 
integration, so prominent during the debates on Regionalization and the 
Association Treaty described in the previous chapter, would be absent from 
parliamentary debate for the forthcoming four years. Moreover, none of these 
groupings would participate in key decisions about Poland's integration 
strategy.
1993 parliamentary election
Key issues addressed during the 1993 campaign were the direction of economic 
reform, relations between Church and state, de-communization as well as 
foreign policy including relations with the EU, NATO and Russia. The social 
cost of economic transition lay at the heart of the campaign and parties 
perceived not to bear responsibility for the harsh reforms such as the SLD, PSL 
and the centre-left Labour Union were able to capitalize. 356 The SLD's core 
electorate consisted of those most disadvantaged by the transformation. While 
advocating a continuation of market reforms the SLD advocated a slower 
approach and placed much emphasis on workers' rights, an approach strongly 
supported by the OPZZ trade union which with 61 parliamentary seats357 was 
the SLD's second largest member organization after the PZPR-successor Socjal- 
Demokracja Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej. Unia Demokratyczna, most closely associated 
with the 'Shock Therapy' reforms continued to advocate a laissez-faire 
economic approach and attained only 11% of the vote which translated into 
16% of parliamentary seats. The other liberal grouping, Kongres Liberalno- 
Demokratyczny, did not attain representation.
Name of grouping Percentage of 
votes
Percentage of 
parliamentary seats
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej 20.41% 37.17%
356 J. Nagle, Democracy and Democratization.Post-Communist Europe in Comparative Perspective 
(London 1999), p399^02.
357 Ibid, p399.
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Name of grouping Percentage of 
votes
Percentage of 
parliamentary seats
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe 15.4% 28.69%
Unia Demokratyczna 10.59% 16.07%
Unia Pracy 7.28% 8.91%
Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej 5.77% 4.78%
Bezpartyjny Blok Wsparcia Reform 5.41% 3.48%
Mniejszosc Niemiecka (German 
Minority)
0.62% 0.9%358
Narodowy Komitet Wyborczy 
'Ojczyzna (National Electoral 
Committee 'Fatherland')
6.37%
Porozumienie Centrum 4.42% -
Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny 3.99% -
Unia Polityki Realnej 3.18% -
Samoobrona 2.78% -
Partia 'X' 2.74% -
Other 6.14%
Table 1: Electoral results of the 1993 parliamentary election, September 1993.359
Relations between Church and state as well as the growing political presence of 
the successors of the ancien regime were a frequent subject of vocal and emotive 
rhetoric from Solidarity-successor right parties such as the Porozumienie 
Centrum, Christian-Nationalist Faction3^  and the Movement for the 
Reconstruction of Poland. 3« The Centre Accord, for example, claimed that the 
Church was being Vehemently attacked by left-wing and post-communist 
environments'362 and declared that it was vital that Poland return to its 
righteous, Catholic moral order, which, the PC claimed, would facilitate a strict 
reckoning with the perpetrators of communist regime. 'Those who have
358 Parties representing ethnic minorities were exempt from the 5% threshold.
359 A.Dudek, Pierwsze Lata III Rzeczpospolitej, (Kracow 2005), p326.
360 Program Wyborczy Zjednoczenia Chrzescijarisko-Narodowego, 1993, Political Parties Archive, Institute 
of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.
361 'Ruch dla Rzeczpospolitej. Program spoleczno-gospodarczy', 1993, Political Parties Archive, Institute of 
Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.
362 'Porozumienie Centrum -  Zjednoczenie Polskie Program Wyborczy 1993', Political Parties Archive, 
Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.
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committed crimes must be rid of their privileges and removed from civil 
service'363, its programme stated.
The SLD meanwhile was emphatically opposed to the use of Catholic doctrine 
in politics and warned against the creation of a state where: 'Catholic doctrine 
holds the monopoly for truth, righteousness, morality and ethics, and where the 
law is based on decisions of the clergy and religious norms. Intolerance and a 
growing feeling of threat among minorities develop in such an atmosphere.364 
As could be expected given its communist heritage, the Alliance's program did 
not extensively address the issue of lustration. It did however ask the electorate 
not to allow 'historic slogans and sentiments become a barrier to a reasonable 
compromise in the interest of our Polish matters'.365
European integration was a prominent topic in the 1993 campaign. With the 
exception of the BBWR and NSZZ Solidamosc all major groupings presented a 
stance on Europe. Although none declared explicit opposition to European 
integration most of the parties on the Catholic right were increasingly sceptical 
about the benefits of both association and EU membership. Their lukewarm 
support was heavily qualified with calls for a slow down to the integration 
process, re-negotiation of the Association Agreements and the need to protect 
the Polish economy from Western competition. Concerns for the impact of 
accession on Polish sovereignty were also prominent. Doubts about European 
integration expressed during the 1993 campaign did not however translate into 
parliamentary debate as with the exception of the KPN  none of the euro-sceptic 
groupings were represented in the 1993-7 sejm.
The Christian Nationalist Faction participated in the 1993 contest as part of the 
Catholic Electoral Committee 'Motherland' (Katolicki Komitet Wyborczy 
'Ojczyzna', KKWO). The Committee also included the PChD and the
363 'Porozumienie Centrum -  Zjednoczenie Polskie Program Wyborczy 1993', Political Parties Archive, 
Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.
364 'Deklaracja Wyborcza Sojuszu Lewicy Demokratycznej', 1993, Political Parties Archive, Institute of
Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.
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Conservative Party (Partia Konserwatywna) alongside a few smaller Catholic- 
nationalist organizations. As could be expected from a coalition dominated by 
Christian-nationalist groupings most KKWO's members were sceptical about 
integration. The Committee's programme made only a brief reference to foreign 
policy, stating that it should be based on Poland's 'national and state interest'.
A closer inspection of the individual Committee members' programmes 
however reveals discrepancies in its members' views on European integration.
As could be expected, the ZChN  was sceptical of EC membership and section 
IV .ll of its programme called for a cautious approach to European integration:
'We should abandon the orthodox approach in pushing 
for a quick entry of Poland to the European 
Communities. We have warned that their stance is 
egotistic. In light of the recession Western Europe is not 
enthusiastic about accepting Polish goods, it makes use 
of restrictions for the so-called sensitive goods.. ..we 
must use those measures included in the Association 
Agreement which will allow for the protection of Polish
interests'.367
Although the ZChN  did not explicitly oppose membership in the European 
Community it argued that the integration process should be slowed down so as 
to protect Polish industry. As an alternative to closer integration with Western 
Europe it proposed regional cooperation with other post-communist states and 
with the U SA .368
The Conservative Party, another KKWO  member, was similarly sceptical about 
EC membership. Its programme stated:
'The Conservative Party does not oppose Polish 
participation in the process of economic unification of 
Europe. It does not accept, however, plans to surrender
366 Broszura Wyborcza KKK 'Ojczyzna', Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the 
Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.
367 Program Wyborczy Zjednoczenia ChrzeScijarisko-Narodowego, 1993, section IV.ll Political Parties 
Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.
368 Ibid. section V.
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the sovereignty of the Polish Republic...we believe that 
the unification of nations in a homogenous European 
organism is an unnatural concept, threatening to 
encourage rather than diminish conflicts/369
A very different stance was presented by the Partia Chrzescijanskich Demokratvw. 
Traditionally pro-integrationist, the PChD maintained its support for EC 
membership during the 1993 campaign. Section 77.1 of its programme stated:
'Developing legal, economic and social frameworks for 
Polish entry to the European Community should be a 
priority in Polish foreign policy. Quick association with 
the European Community and economic co-operation 
with the countries belonging to EFTA are necessary, 
however, on the basis of asymmetries allowing for a 
gradual adaptation of Polish industry to international 
competition. In order to intensify this process the 
harmonization of the necessary legislation with the 
norms and directives operating in the EC should be 
expedited/370
Although it emphasized the need to protect domestic industry, the PChD 
supported Poland's membership in the EU. In contrast to the Conservatives and 
Christian-nationalists' calls for slower integration, the Partia Chrzescijanskich 
Demokratow argued that harmonization measures needed for accession should 
be implemented as soon as possible.
Concerns about the impact of European integration were also evident in the 
stance of the Centre Accord. While declaring support for accession the PC 
emphasized the need to protect Polish interests. Its programme stated: 'It lies in 
our national interest to harmonize accession with the European Economic 
Community with domestic policy and respect for national values and 
traditions. Our diplomacy should be tough in defending the national interest of
369 'Polska 1993: Propozyqa Konserwatywna', Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the 
Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.
370 'Deklaracja Programowa Partii Chrzescijanskich Demokratdw', 1993, Political Parties Archive, Institute 
of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.
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Polish agriculture and industry during negotiations with the EEC.371 The PC 
also advocated the use of trade barriers to protect Polish industry from foreign 
competition. Concerning agriculture, it emphasized the need to: 'protect Poland 
from the unfair competition and the flood of subsidized products from the 
European Economic Community and the post-Soviet territories and the 
simultaneous closure of Western markets to Polish foodstuffs'.372 Its programme 
further called for the adjustment of the level of Polish agricultural subsidies to 
those of the EU.
Ruch dla Rzeczpospolitej (Movement for the Polish Republic, RdR) established by 
Jan Olszewski in December 1993 was markedly sceptical about integration and 
called for the renegotiation of the Association Agreement. The RdR argued:
Integration in the form of membership in the European 
Community, as specified by the Association 
Agreements, will not occur quickly and the conditions 
on which it is expected to take place can be hardly 
thought of as beneficial. The negative economic and 
political effects may already be observed today.373
RdR also emphasized the importance of Polish traditions, Catholicism, family 
values as well as the importance of 'ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious 
unity' of Polish society. National sovereignty was very much a priority for the 
Movement. According to section 6.10.3 of its programme, 'the greatest threat for 
us is yet another Russo-German domination.'374
Although it did not make explicit reference to relations with the EU Konfederacja 
Polski Niepodleglej emphasized the need to ensure that Poland remained 
independent from foreign capital and called for a renegotiation of 'agreements
371 Program Wyborczy Porozumienia Centrum, 1993 Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences 
of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.
372 Ibid.
373 'Ruch dla Rzeczpospolitej. Program spoleczno-gospodarczy', 1993, Political Parties Archive, Institute of 
Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.
374 'Ibid.
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with international institutions', presumably referring to the Association 
Treaty .375
The agrarian Samoobrona (Self-defence) was also sceptical about European 
integration. Registered as a political party in 1992 under the leadership of 
Andrzej Lepper Samoobrona begun as an agrarian protest movement opposed to 
'foreign-imposed reforms'. Adamantly nationalist and often anti-Semitic, 
Samoobrona warned against the adverse impact of international organizations, 
accused the existing political elite of introducing an 'anti-national, anti-Polish 
development path on the orders of foreign superiors'. 376 Stanislaw Skalski, one 
of Samoobrona's candidates for the sejm, declared: 'There is no democracy in 
Poland. There is only J ew o cra cy '^
Regarding economic policy, Samoobrona proposed increased state intervention 
to protect domestic industry and agriculture. It called for a rejection of the: 
'dogmatic thinking, aimed to subject Poland to foreign interests and foreign 
habits, and a surrender of sovereignty and the integration of Poland into the 
"European Soviets", a great, bureaucratized machine governed by international 
financiers'.378 But Self-Defence did not explicitly oppose European integration. 
Instead, it declared its support for the 'Europe of Nations': 'Fully recognizing 
the need for European integration' its programme stated, 'we cannot agree to 
Poland's accession to the EEC on the conditions dictated to a dependent. We 
stand for a Europe of Nations.. .We reject the notion of limiting national 
sovereignty and identity as it is just an incarnation of the Brezhnev doctrine'. 379
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe campaigned on a conservative, religious platform. Its 
programme emphasized the vital role which the Polish smallholder played in
375 Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej, 'Materiaiy Wyborcze', 1993, Political Parties Archive, Institute of 
Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.
376 Moze, a wiec musi byd lepiej. Krajowy Komitet Wyborczy Samoobrona -  Leppera. Materiaiy 
Programowe', 1993, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of 
Sciences, 1993 election folder.
377 Stanislaw Skalski, Self-Defence 1993 sejm candidate, quoted in Ka-Lok Qian, pl53.
378 Moze, a wiec musi byd lepiej. Krajowy Komitet Wyborczy Samoobrona -  Leppera. Materiaiy 
Programowe', 1993, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of 
Sciences, 1993 election folder.
379 Ibid.
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protecting Poland's national sovereignty and the consequent need for state aid 
to said smallholder. The Agrarians' stance on European integration was 
ambiguous. For example, section 20 of their programme stated: 'Poland's 
civilisational aspirations and its central geographic location constitute 
fundamental reasons for the development of international cooperation, above 
all with states of the European Economic Community. Poland should find its 
place in a unified, European economic area'380
The very next section of the programme was less enthusiastic however. It 
stated: 'Full membership in the EC is a matter for the future. A lot can change. 
We treat the current Association Agreement with the EEC as an initial step, 
which does not decide anything'.381 The Agrarians tried to be all things to all 
voters; while never explicitly supportive of accession they also never declared 
opposition to EC membership.
A large part of the PSL's programme was devoted to calls for Western financial 
aid. It made repeated requests for a 'new Marshall Plan' for Eastern Europe and 
argued that Poland should seek reparations for the losses it incurred during 
World War II:
Poland has a special, moral right to seek aid from 
Europe. We made a tremendous contribution to the 
victory against the forces which launched World War II, 
without ever receiving war reparations. The level of the 
reparations, which we should receive, is estimated at 
several hundred million dollars. Currently, a new 
world order is developing and various accounts are 
being settled, it would be just to grant Poland aid 
necessary for it to lift itself out of the backwardness for 
which it is not responsible'.382
In contrast to its future coalition partner the rhetoric of the SLD was 
increasingly pro-integrationist. As it re-defined its political identity from a
380 Program Wyborczy Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego, 1993, Political Parties Archive, Institute of 
Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.
381 Ibid.
382 Ibid.
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successor of the authoritarian Polish United Workers Party to a modem, social 
democratic grouping the SLD's support for a united Europe grew stronger. Its 
programme stated: "Integration with the European Communities is necessary". 
But the Alliance also underscored the importance of Poland's relationship with 
the post-Soviet bloc: "Our position in the West is closely related to the 
development of good, equal political and economic relations with the East'.383
The SLD's euro-enthusiasm was not matched by an economic policy 
proposition that was aligned with the liberal economic requirements of the 
Association Agreement however. The Alliance emphasized a more gradual 
approach to economic reform and the need to protect the most vulnerable 
sections of society from the adverse effects of the transformation was a central 
theme of its campaign. It advocated greater state intervention in the economy, a 
slower privatization programme as well as increased subsidies for state 
industries.384
While supportive of European integration, the centre-left Unia Pracy 
emphasized the need to protect Polish national interest and "dignity".385 It 
expressed support for the continuation of integration efforts but also made it 
clear that in its view "until now Polish policy towards the EEC has been too 
submissive and has not protected Polish economic interests to a sufficient 
extent'.388
The liberal parties, Unia Demokratyczna and Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny, 
continued to present an enthusiastically pro-integrationist stance. The UD 
declared:
The search for opportunities of growth and security ties
us to the European Community and to NATO. For
383 'Program Sojuszu Lewicy Demokratycznej', Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of 
the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.
384 Nagle, p399.
385 'Program Wyborczy Unii Pracy', Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish 
Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.
386 'Program Wyborczy Unii Pracy', Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish 
Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.
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many years of post-war history the West European 
structures ensured the security and stable economic 
situation of the Western part of our continent. They 
were able to consolidate democratic values, and 
allowed their members to experience dynamic 
civilisational and economic growth, preserve peace and 
establish the basis for stabilization....The Association 
Agreement with the European Community.. .constitutes 
a logical consequence of acknowledging that our choice 
is that for membership in a world of democracy, peace 
and economic growth.387
Once again therefore, the liberals equated European integration with 
democracy and prosperity. The UD presented EU membership as the only way 
of ensuring Poland's security, peace and economic growth. Rather than as a 
choice, which could be debated and compared with viable alternatives, the 
liberals viewed accession as the sole means of successful systemic transition.
Although none of the major parties declared explicit opposition to Poland's 
integration with the EU the 1993 campaign saw vocal scepticism about both 
association and membership. Many parties chose to present an ambiguous 
stance, hedging support for integration with numerous conditions concerning 
the protection of the Polish economy, sovereignty and national identity. Several 
groupings, including the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland and the 
Confederation for Independent Poland, called for a re-negotiation of the 
Association Agreement. With the exception of the liberals, almost all 
contestants advocated protectionist economic policies at odds with the EU's 
requirements of fast paced privatization and state subsidy reductions. 
Furthermore, while the euro-sceptic parties supported some form of political 
integration the Europe they indicated the Europe they wished to integrate with 
was a 'Europe of Nations' which did not impinge on national sovereignty. The 
kind of integration many Polish politicians had in mind appeared to be very 
different from that which membership in an increasingly integrated European
387 'Program Wyborczy Unii Demokratycznej', Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the 
Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.
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Union would entail. As most of the small euro-sceptic groupings did not attain 
sufficient votes to ct°ss the representation threshold however their concerns could 
not be heard in Sejm. The lack of parliamentary discord on Europe gave the 
appearance of a broad elite consensus for accession.
1995 presidential elections
For the Solidarity-successor side of the political spectrum, the 1995 presidential 
contest presented an opportunity to re-gain political representation and the 
rhetoric of the 1995 campaign was marked by a growing polarization based on 
attitudes towards the communist past.388 In order to effectively compete with 
the SLD's candidate Aleksander Kwasniewski the numerous right-wing 
groupings would have had to agree to back a single candidate. While aware of 
the need to compromise, many right wing leaders aspired to the presidency and 
the 1995 contest was preceded by several unsuccessful attempts at 
compromising on a common candidate. Kwasniewski was eventually 
confronted with as many as eight competitors: Lech Walesa, Hanna 
Gronkiewicz-Waltz, Tadeusz Zielinski, Andrzej Lepper, Waldemar Pawlak, Jan 
Olszewski, Janusz Korwin-Mikke, and Jacek Kuron. The results of the contest 
are shown in table 2.
Candidate 1st round 
results
2nd round 
result
Aleksander Kwasniewski 35.11% 51.72%
Lech Walesa 33.11% 48.28%
Jacek Kuron 9.22%
Jan Olszewski 6.86%
Waldemar Pawlak 4.31%
Tadeusz Zielinski 3.53%
Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz 2.76%
Janusz Korwin-Mikke 2.40%
Andrzej Lepper 1.32%
Others 1.38%
388 Szczerbiak, 'Dealing with the Communist Past or the Politics of the Present? Lustration in Post- 
Communist Poland'.
389 Tomasz Sakiewicz, 'KoSciof nie dal sie Wciggnad' Gazeta Polska, nr.24(110), 24 August 1995.
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Table 2: 1995 presidential election results390
While the Solidarity-successors' inability to unite was driven primarily by 
personal ambitions of its leaders it also reflected genuine ideological 
differences. These were particularly apparent regarding EU membership, which 
was frequently addressed during the electoral campaign.
The ZChN  backed economist Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz made it clear that it 
was a 'Europe of Nations' she wanted Poland to join. Her doubts about the EU 
were made apparent in contrast to her unequivocal support for speedy NATO391 
membership. Section 1.3 of her programme stated:
Polish accession to the EU should take place on the 
basis of the respect for the subsidiarity and national and 
economic interests of our country, which would require 
e.g. the negotiation of adequately long transition 
periods to protect some sectors of our economy from 
the implementation (once in the EU) of all the 
regulations compulsory for the members of the 
community....Poland, co-operating with the member 
states, should support integrationist tendencies, 
however clearly emphasizing the need to maintain the 
national character and specificity of the member states 
of the EU, and with reference to the concept of the 
'Europe of Nations'.392
Janusz Korwin-Mikke of the libertarian Unia Polityki Realnej was more sceptical. 
Although he saw opening up EU markets to Polish imports as beneficial he 
feared the EU's 'socialist' regulations and a 'vassal' relationship to Brussels. His 
programme declared:
A positive aspect of acceding to the EU is the opening 
of European markets to Polish goods. If however we 
implement all the 'harmonization measures' (European 
standards, production costs, energy costs etc) which 
Brussels is currently suggesting to us, then it could turn
390 Millard, Polish Politics and Society, p92.
391 Program Wyborczy Hanny Gronkiewicz Waltz, 1995, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political 
Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1995 presidential election folder.
392 Ibid.
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out, that at the time of accession our goods and 
production will not be at all competitive any more. The 
invasion of socialism in the form of the social pact and 
the vassalization of our country to the omnipotent 
Brussels bureaucracy is no doubt a danger. 393
Korwin-Mikke was also concerned about whether the final outcome of 
accession negotiations would not be disadvantageous for Poland. Fears of 
Poland once again becoming subservient to another state lay at the heart of his 
and other euro-sceptic politicians' doubts about EU membership. Korwin 
Mikke did not appear to be aware of the fact that Poland would be required to 
adopt the entire European acquis and that it was only the timing around the 
implementation rather than its contents that would be the subject of 
negotiation.
Jacek Kuron, backed by Unia Wolnosci, was very supportive of EU membership. 
Section V of his programme stated:
Poland, while maintaining its identity, must become a 
part of the European Communities and NATO. We 
must strive to this aim with consequence and good 
planning, without giving in to pressure or blackmail.
On this depends our security and the possibility of 
realizing the most vital interests of the state and the 
most important aspirations of the nation. 394
Once again the liberals hence declared their unequivocal support for the EU. 
Kuron saw European integration as vital for Poland. Without membership in 
these Western organizations, he argued, Poland would not be able to realize its 
key interests and aspirations.
Several Solidarity-successor candidates chose not to address EU accession at all. 
Leszek Moczulski, for example, stated that he would 'put foreign and defence
393 'Program Wyborczy Janusza Korwin-Mikke', Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of 
the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1995 presidential election folder.
394 'Program Wyborczy Jacka Kuronia', Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish 
Academy of Sciences, 1995 presidential election folder.
139
policy in line with Polish national interest'.395 He did not however, explain 
what kind of policy this would entail and how it would impact on the 
approaching EU membership negotiations. Marek Markiewicz, of the Partia 
Republikahska, took a similar approach. While not addressing EU accession 
directly he did emphasize the need for maintaining Polish independence and 
promised a 'struggle for sovereignty and the maintenance of national and 
cultural identity, the construction of a state recognizing moral values and the 
legacy of Polish national culture'.39*
Jan Olszewski of the Ruch Odbudowy Polski also did not present a stance on EU 
accession in his programme. He did, however, express support for NATO 
membership.397 Oleszewski's programme referred to the EU only once, in a 
section advocating greater use of agricultural subsidies. These, Olszewski 
argued, would allow Poland to better compete with the EU, third world and 
post-Soviet markets. His euro-scepticism was reflected in his economic policy. 
He proposed strongly interventionist and protectionist measures which, if 
implemented, would have created barriers to Poland's participation in the EU.
Waldemar Pawlak of the PSL hedged his bets on the EU. On the one hand, his 
programme reached out to the euro-enthusiasts claiming that he 'consequently 
strengthened Poland's place among the free nations of Europe'.393 On the other 
hand, it asserted that he did so: 'without unnecessary fireworks, but also 
without begging or hanging at the door-handles of international 
organizations'.3"Pawlak hence remained ambiguous trying to appeal to both 
euro-sceptic and euro-enthusiast voters at the same time.
395 'Program Wyborczy Leszka Moczulskiego - Zobowiazanie Zlozone w Paristwowej Komisji Wyborczej', 
Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1995 presidential 
election folder.
396 'Program Wyborczy Marka Markiewicza', Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the 
Polish Academy of Sciences, 1995 presidential election folder.
397 'Program Wyborczy Jana Olszewskiego', Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the 
Polish Academy of Sciences, 1995 presidential election folder.
398 'Program Wyborczy Waldemara Pawlaka', Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the 
Polish Academy of Sciences, 1995 presidential election folder.
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Samoobrona's Andrzej Lepper was more sceptical. He criticized the prospect of a 
customs union with the EU and instead proposed increased customs barriers on 
agricultural goods and the introduction of state funded promotion of Polish 
products on the world market. Polish peasants, Lepper argued, suffered 
because of the political elites' compliance with international agreements, 
especially with the Association Treaties. His programme stated:
The politicians' intention is to diminish the impact of 
Polish agriculture while simultaneously supporting 
imports of agricultural products from the European 
Union. The continuation of this doomed policy will 
only lead to the collapse of a great number of farms, 
which will be in accordance with the Association 
Agreement. 400
Lepper was sceptical about the acceptance of foreign aid and refused to: 'accept 
aid from foreign institutions and states which attempt to treat Poland as a pawn 
in international games or those which try to make us economically or militarily 
dependant. This has to be clearly stated to protect the national interest and 
national security of Poland'.401
In contrast to the agrarian candidates, Aleksander Kwasniewski was 
unambiguous in his support for membership in both the European Union and 
NATO. He did, however, assert that accession should diminish social 
inequalities and emphasized the need to protect the Polish agricultural sector. 
His programme stated:
What is most important for the development and 
economic security of Poland is the accession to the 
European Union, in parallel to a simultaneous 
expansion of trade relations with the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe. We are all entering the 
Union, the whole society. This cannot be a process 
limited to the chosen few, while robbing others of work 
and prospects. Well thought out protectionist measures
400 Program Wyborczy Andrzeja Leppera, 1995, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of 
the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1995 presidential election folder.
401 Ibid.
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should be provided to Poland's agriculture, so that it 
should gain access to West European markets on the 
grounds of fair competition. 402
Tadeusz Zielinski, backed by the Labour Union, supported accession but 
emphasized the need to ensure that: 'the balance of costs and benefits be fair 
and that Polish national interests are harmoniously incorporated into the 
structure of supra-national interests/ 403 Lech Walesa's programme meanwhile 
gave little indication of the President's views on international affairs. Instead, it 
concentrated on rebuttals of criticism of Walesa causing 'embarrassment'4^  to 
Poland and lacking the skills required to be an effective international statesman.
405
Parliamentary debate
With the most vocal euro-sceptics out of parliament the main lines of dissent on 
European integration during the 1993-1997 coalition ran not so much between 
the government and parliamentary opposition as between the coalition partners 
themselves and between the Solidarity-successor president. Co-habitation 
between President Walesa and the communist-successor cabinet did not prove 
easy. In the final year of his presidency Walesa's diplomacy became 
increasingly outspoken. His demands for a speedy acceptance into the EU and 
NATO on the basis of Poland's sacrifices in the struggle against communism 
appeared to be calculated more towards attaining popular support at home 
than towards building sustainable relations with Western partners. 406
In spite of the President's antics Poland continued to make sound progress 
towards integration. The EU membership application application was not 
subject to parliamentary ratification although a parliamentary discussion on its
402 Program Wyborczy Aleksandra Kwasniewskiego, 1995, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political 
Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1995 presidential election folder.
403 Program Wyborczy Tadeusza Zielirtskiego, 1995, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences 
of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1995 presidential election folder.
404 Program Lecha Walesy, 1995, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish 
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subject in April 1994, lasting less than 30 minutes, did take place. In contrast to 
the heated discussions on the ratification of the Association Agreement the 
submission of the membership application was backed by a consensus both 
within the cabinet and the Sejm. The PSL, represented by Jam Borkowski, 
argued that the interests of the Polish farmers would be better protected with 
the ability to influence EU policy from within. Even the euro-sceptic 
Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej supported the application. Other parliamentary 
groupings, such as Unia Demokratyczna and Unia Pracy, expressed enthusiastic 
support. A more vocal debate may have taken place had groupings previously 
opposed or sceptical towards the Association Agreements been represented in 
the parliament. Neither the Zjednoczenie Chrzescijahsko Narodozve, Porozumienie 
Centrum or Ruch Odbudowy Polski, all of which had expressed vocal concerns 
about integration during the 1993 electoral campaign, could participate in the 
parliamentary debate. Doubts about European integration, harboured by so 
many of the solidarity-successor politicians, were not voiced during the 
membership application debate.
The debate also did not manifest the extent to which the coalition partners 
lacked consensus on European integration. Although both parties were in 
principle supportive of accession they never agreed on a common integration 
policy and Europe continued to cause dissent throughout the SLD-PSL 
coalition. «7 During the February 1995 cabinet re-shuffle the coalition's lack of 
consensus on European integration became so problematic that Aleksander 
Kwasniewski publicly declared the SLD would change its coalition partner 
were the PSL to make Poland's entry to the European Union impossible.4®*
As the SLD's enthusiasm for Europe grew409 the agrarians became increasingly 
concerned about the impact of accession on Poland's economy and national 
sovereignty. The sale of land to foreigners became a salient concern for the PSL,
Interview with Waldemar Pawlak, 20 July 2005.
408 Aleksander Kwasniewski, quoted in 'SLD, PSL i Europa' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.29,03 February 1995, p3.
409 Address by the President of the Republic of Poland Aleksander KwaSniewski before the Chairman and 
Members of the European Commission Brussels, January 18,1996, Zbi6r Dokumentdw, nr.l, 1996.
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many of whose representatives feared that allowing foreign, and especially 
German, nationals to buy Polish land might lead to a form of "economic 
occupation' by Poland's Western neighbour.
The agrarians' concerns were exemplified during the August 1995 sejm debate 
on new legislation liberalizing the sale of land to foreigners. PSL representative 
Tadeusz Samborski described the issue as a 'national problem' and warned 
about the large numbers of German citizens ready to buy out Western Poland.410 
Zielony Sztandar, a farmers' magazine supportive of the PSL, commented on the 
subject of the sale of land laws as follows: 'All historic patriots, starting with 
Boleslaw Chrobry,414 are turning in their graves at the news of the Sejm 
accepting such anti-Polish legislation.'4^
The PSL's critical stance on integration was also apparent during the May 1995 
foreign policy debate when the Stronnictwo was the only grouping not voting in 
support of Foreign Affairs Minister's Bartoszewski's pro-integrationist expose .413 
Waldemar Pawlak confirmed that the PSL supported European integration but 
he also emphasized that critical for this was the consolidation of Poland's 
position in a 'family of sovereign nations'.414 Pawlak begun his presentation by 
calling for honesty and integrity in foreign affairs matters and criticized the 
practice of adopting a subservient attitude towards the EU. He also questioned 
whether Minister Bartoszewski spoke as a 'Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs or 
as an expert from the European Union and NATO?'.415 Pawlak's attack on 
Bartoszewski was a surprise to the SLD, which had previously agreed with the 
PSL to support the expose . Jerzy Wiatr, an SLD parliamentarian, defended 
Bartoszewski: 'We are happy to have such a minister and that Poland is
410 Tadeusz Samborski, 57th session, 2 dzieri. 25.08.1995, Sprawozdanie ministra spraw wewn^trznych z 
realizacji w 1994 r. ustawy z dnia 24 marca 1920 r. o nabywaniu nieruchomoSci przez cudzoziemcdw (druk 
nr 937).
411 Boleslaw I Chrobry was crowned as the first King of Poland in 1025.
412 Zielony Sztandar, 7 June 1996, quoted in Bachmann. pl2.
413 Pawlak wojuje z Bartoszewskim' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.121,26 May 1995, pi.
414 Waldemar Pawlak, 50th session, day 2,25.05.1995, Informacja ministra spraw zagranicznych o 
glownych kierunkach polityki zagranicznej Polski.
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represented in this manner on the international arena'.418 While his tone was 
clearly sceptical of the government's integration approach Pawlak did not 
clarify how this approach should be changed: what accession conditions should 
be questioned or which policies adjusted to attain the PSL's support.417
The PSL's euro-scepticism did not escape criticism from the European Union. In 
July 1997 Wim van Velzen, the head of the delegation of the European 
Parliament to Poland, praised the progress made by the Oleksy and 
Cimoszewicz cabinets but also voiced concerns about the growth of euro- 
scepticism among Polish political parties:
The reforms are continuing. In this regard I do not see 
any major changes from the time when J6zef Oleksy 
took over the presidency. The current head of the 
cabinet also keeps to the same strategy. Matters were 
different under Waldemar Pawlak.. ..When I read the 
declarations of ROP or 'Solidarity' I notice that they 
place more emphasis on matters other them opening up 
the Union or the improvement of the competitiveness of 
the Polish economy, they say more about the 
maintenance of Polish traditions, about protectionism.
PSL has heralded this for years. These three forces -  
PSL, ROP and 'Solidarity' -  support a somewhat 
difference stance to the current one and I do not know, 
what will happen in the near future, especially that you 
are entering a pre-electoral period.418
Van Velzen's criticism was not unfounded. Although their doubts were muted 
by lack of parliamentary representation the Solidarity-successor groupings 
remained sceptical about European integration. None were willing to openly 
oppose accession but they staunchly supported increased tariffs, industrial 
subsidies and other measures that were incompatible with membership. 
According to Jan Olszewski, entering the EU within a five year perspective was 
economically unrealistic. He stated:
416 Jerzy Wiatr, 50th session, day 2,25.05.1995, Informacja ministra spraw zagranicznych o gldwnych 
kierunkach polityki zagranicznej Polski.
417 Waldemar Pawlak, 50th session, day 2,25.05.1995, Informacja ministra spraw zagranicznych o 
gldwnych kierunkach polityki zagranicznej Polski.
18 Malgorzata Grzelec, 'Sarmaci i Europejczycy', Rzeczpospolita, 15 July 1996.
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No country, not even Portugal or Greece, entered the 
Union from such a low level as the one on which we 
find ourselves today. I believe that the future place of 
Poland is in the unifying Europe, because 
civilisationally we have belonged to this region for a 
thousand years. As a euro-realist however, I must say 
that the hopes that we will find ourselves there in four, 
five years, are a mystification. This is simply impossible 
for economic reasons.419
A similarly ambiguous stance on the EU was presented by Marian Pilka of the 
Zjednoczenie Chrzescijarisko Narodowe, who suggested developing closer links 
with the 'Asian tigers' and deepening cooperation with the Central European 
Free Trade Association as alternatives to EU membership.420
Meanwhile the SLD maintained its pro-integrationist rhetoric. In March 1997 
Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz made a televised appeal for a party-political 
agreement on a common stance in support of NATO and EU accession.421 A 
similar statement of support for European integration was issued by foreign 
affairs minister Dariusz Rosatti in an article for Gazeta Wyborcza written jointly 
with the German minister of foreign affairs Klaus Kinkel. Both ministers called 
for the development of a closely integrated 'Europe of citizens' where regional 
policy, structural adjustment and social solidarity would play key roles.422
But not all SLD representatives shared the euro-enthusiasm of their leaders. The 
OPZZ  trade union was much less supportive of integration than the former 
PZPR reformers in the Alliance's leadership. The OPZZ's euro-scepticism came 
to light during a meeting between union representatives and President 
Kwasniewski in April 1996. Speaking in the name of 'trade unionists concerned 
by NATO and the European Union' Stefan Macner of the OPZZ warned the 
President: 'We will find ourselves at the European table in the role of waiters
419 Jan Olszewski, interviewed by Slawomir Mac and Dorota Macieja, Zycie, nr. 11(746), 16 March 1997, 
pl9.
20 Juliusz Urbanowicz, 'Liga Antyeuropejska' Wprost, nr.15 (750), 13 April 1997.
421 Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, 'Sobotnie wyst^pienie telewizyjne premiera Wlodzimierza Cimoszewicza. 
Nie popsujmy tego, co zdolaligmy osi^gnqd' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.52,3 March 1997, p5.
422 Dariusz Rosatti and Klaus Kinkel, 'Wspblnie ksztaltowad Europe' Rzeczpospolita, 15 June 1995.
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and servants. The politician will be known as a 'European', but the average man 
will not gain anything'.428 Another OPZZ  representative, Krzysztof Gwara, 
claimed that EU entry would mean the end of Polish agriculture. Gwara was 
also concerned about the new legislation allowing foreigners to buy land: 'They 
will buy Wroclaw, Poznan and Gdansk', he feared.424
NATO membership was a particularly challenging issue for the SLD. The 
Alliance's stance on NATO membership during the 1993 elections was far from 
unambiguous. It only formally agreed to back NATO accession in the midst of 
the failed coalition negotiations with the Labour Union425 but doubts about 
Poland's membership in Western military structure could be heard from SLD 
parliamentarians well after the 1993 talks426 and the subject continued to cause 
disagreement even during the talks on the SLD's 1997 electoral programme.427
The SLD's euro-enthusiastic rhetoric was not matched by willingness to 
implement the fast paced economic reform required for accession. The liberal 
economic approach of the Association Agreement, the Single Market 
programme and the EU's increasingly strict competition policy428 did not align 
well with the Alliance's emphasis on slower privatization and state 
intervention.42^ Several policy decisions of the SLD-PSL cabinet were 
particularly problematic for accession. The first of these was a law allowing for 
the establishment of 'special economic regions' (strefy gospodarcze) where 
extensive tax reductions were granted to companies. The tax breaks were as 
high as 100% depending on criteria such as where capital investment exceeded 
lm  PLN or where there were more than ten full time employees. The first such
423 Agata Nowakowska and Natalia Skipietrow, 'W OPZZ boj  ^si§ Unii Europejskiej i NATO' Gazeta 
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region was set up by a Council of Ministers directive in October 1995 for the 
duration of 20 years.430 The directive contravened Article 63 of the Association 
Treaty which banned any public aid distorting competition and thereby 
negatively impacting trade between Poland and the Communities and the 
'special regions' as well as other forms of state aid used in Poland eventually 
became a controversial point of discussion with the European Commission.431 
Another controversial breach of the Association Treaty took place when the 
SLD granted permission to Hyundai for the construction of sedan cars, which 
was judged to impinge on the interests of EU producers.432 Other problematic 
policy areas included the signing of a non-visa agreement with Russia without 
consultation with EU as well as a cessation of reform in the telecoms and 
insurance sectors.433
Nonetheless, the SLD continued to present a staunchly pro-integrationist 
rhetoric which increasingly featured the concept of 'Social Europe'. The SLD 
was not able to make use of the 'return to Europe' slogan popular with the 
liberal right; this would have begged the question as to whether it was not the 
Alliance's communist predecessors who caused Poland's need to return in the 
first place. A 'Christian Europe' rhetoric was also not available to the secular 
grouping. Instead, the SLD emphasized its links with European Social 
Democracy and the associated values of tolerance, diversity, open mindedness 
as well as social equality and wealth re-distribution.434 As Jozef Oleksy stated 
during the May 1997 sejm debate on European integration, the SLD's vision of 
future Europe was closest to that of the European social democratic parties.435
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As it progressed in re-defining itself into a modern, social democratic grouping 
the SLD's enthusiasm for European integration grew increasingly 
unquestioning. Like the liberal groupings, the social democrats did not present 
viable alternatives to accession. This stance was reflected in the 'National 
Strategy for Integration' prepared under the auspices of the Committee for 
European Integration, chaired by the SLD's Prime Minister Wlodzimierz 
Cimoszewicz. The tone of the document was unquestioningly supportive of 
accession, proposing speedy integration not only with EU structures but also 
with the Schengen Agreement (which at this time was not yet a part of the EU's 
acquis), Poland's participation in the development of a European defence 
identity and European Monetary Union. The Strategy document reflected the 
euro-enthusiastic stance of the SLD's leadership and did not present an analysis 
of either alternatives to accession or a detailed study of the work required to 
harmonize with the EU and the costs Poland would incur as a result of the 
harmonization effort. Issues such as the impact of accession on Polish national 
sovereignty and transparency of democratic decision making were not 
addressed.436
The Strategy came under severe criticism in parliament. The Federacyjny Klub 
Parlamentamy na Rzecz Akcji Wyborczej 'Solidarnosc' (Federated Parliamentary 
Club for the Cause of Solidarity Electoral Action), established by KPN  and 
BBWR representatives in support of the AW S, was one of the most severe critics. 
Janina Kraus, a representative of the AW S  club, criticized the strategy for 
lacking a clear presentation of accession requirements and the costs involved in 
fulfilling them. She also pointed out that the document was underpinned by the 
assumption that accession was beneficial for Poland and that efforts at meeting 
EU requirements had to be made even though at this stage the Union provided 
neither a formal commitment nor a timetable for enlargement. Kraus also stated 
that it was in Poland's interest to accede as quickly as possible. Speedy 
accession was needed, she argued, because the disadvantageous conditions of
436 Bachmann, p!53-155.
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the Association Agreement meant that Poland was forced to finance its 
restructuring effort with no substantial aid from the EU. She pointed out that 
the economic restructuring brought about by association had an adverse effect 
on the Polish economy, as was reflected by the growing trade deficit with the 
EU. The AW S club did not vote in favour of the Integration Strategy. 437 Andrzej 
Gqsienica-Makowski of the BBWR was also critical of the Integration Strategy 
and called for a slowdown of the integration process438 while Jerzy Wuttke of 
the newly established Christian-Nationalist club Porozumienie Prawicy 
(Agreement of the Right) argued that the Strategy was written from the 
perspective of the EU and did not take Polish economic and political interests 
into account. 439
The agrarians were also critical of the 1997 National Integration Strategy. 
Aleksander Bentkowski, PSL's press spokesperson, claimed:
It is not true that we oppose accession to the EU. It is 
the Polish farmers who would benefit most from 
membership. Union experts have calculated that 
subsidies to Poland's agricultural sector would 
proportionally have to amount to as much as in 
Germany or France that is approx. 5.5 million USD. But 
we also see threats. The programme of integration with 
the Union presented to the parliament does not define 
the benefits which Poland should gain due to entry into 
West European structures. It vaguely talks about bigger 
exports but not about the effects of the free entry of
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goods into our markets or about the supposed necessity 
to allow for an unlimited sale of land to foreigners.440
Jerzy Osiatynski of the Freedom Union on the other hand presented a very 
different stance criticizing the cabinet for being too slow in the implementation 
of reforms required for accession.
The final months of the SLD-PSL coalition hence saw both increased opposition 
to the social democrats' unquestioning rhetorical support for accession as well 
as to their failure to implement the reforms required for EU membership. The 
1994-1997 parliament did not, however, see an in-depth discussion of the 
consequences European integration would have on either the Polish economy 
or on how the transfer of domestic competences would change the way in 
which policy decisions affecting the Polish public were made. Issues such as 
Schengen being made an accession requirement by virtue of its incorporation 
into the acquis, the EU's strict emphasis on the candidates' adherence to single 
market rules and the restrictions on domestic monetary policy enshrined in the 
convergence criteria were not subject of sejm debate. Although scepticism 
towards the integration process was evident it was limited to emotive but 
ambiguous concerns about a threat to Polish independence, Poland 'acceding 
on its knees' or not being treated as an 'equal partner' rather than on how the 
EU's policy requirements would limit the decision making powers of Poland's 
democratically elected representatives or the benefits of harmonizing a country 
undergoing economic transition with a regulatory framework designed for 
advanced economies.
440 Aleksander Bentkowski, interviewed by Zofia Stachura and Dorota Macieja, 'Stronnictwo z Uni^', 
Tygodnik SolidamoSd, nr.l5(750), 13 April 1997, pl9-20.
441 Jerzy Osiatynski, 107th session, day 2, discussion points 7 and 8,21 May 1997 , 7. Rzgdowy raport z 
wykonania programu dzialah dostosowujqcych polskg gospodark? i system prawny do wymagart Ukladu 
Europejskiego oraz przysziego czionkostwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unii Europejskiej w 1995 r. (druk 
nr 1816) wraz ze stanowiskiem komisji (druk nr 2163), 8. Narodowa Strategia Integracji (druk nr 2156) 
wraz ze stanowiskiem komisji i projektem uchwaiy (druk nr 2282-A).
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The 1997 constitution referendum and the ratification of international 
agreements
The transfer of decision making powers to international organizations such as 
the EU was one of the most contested issues in the 1997 constitution 
referendum campaign.442 The referendum took place on May 25th 1997 and the 
proposed draft, prepared by a joint sejm and senate committee chaired by 
Aleksander Kwasniewski, was approved with 54% of the vote.443 Although 
several constitution drafts were proposed by various opposition groupings and 
NGOs the referendum allowed only for a choice for or against the government's 
draft. Articles 90 and 91, which dealt with the ratification of international 
treaties, were among the most contested elements of the draft constitution. 
Section 1 of Article 90 stated: 'The Republic of Poland may, by virtue of 
international agreements, delegate to an international organization or 
international institution the competence of organs of State authority in relation 
to certain matters.'444
The article went on to outline the ratification procedures for international 
agreements. Two alternative methods were allowed: an international treaty 
could be ratified either by 2 /3  parliamentary and 2 /3  senate majority with a 
minimum of 50% attendance in both chambers, or in a referendum. The choice 
of which method would be used was to be settled by a 50% absolute 
parliamentary majority i.e. the proposal would need the support of at least half 
of all elected MP's.445
For the Catholic-nationalists Article 90.1 constituted an unacceptable threat to 
Polish sovereignty and the article formed a key part of the vocal objections 
which the Solidarity-successor right, most of which was now united within the 
Solidarity Electoral Action, presented against the draft treaty. ^  According to
442 Hausner, Przystgpienie czy Integracja? Polska droga do Unii Europejskiej, plOO.
443 K. Jasiewicz, 'Dead Ends and New Beginnings: the Quest for a Procedural Republic in Poland', 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 33, (2000), 101-122, pl03.
444 "The Constitution of the Republic of Poland', 2 April 1997, Dziennik Ustaw, nr. 78, item 483.
445 Ibid.
446 K. Korbonski, 'Poland Ten Years after: the Church', Communist and Post Communist Studies, 33,
(2000), 123-146., p!38.
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the ZChN  the constitution "robbed Poland of sovereignty and gave away 
decisions impacting the future of our nation into the hands of international 
organizations'.447 Ruch Odbudowy Polski harboured similar concerns. Zbigniew 
Romaszewski of the ROP stated: 'This is not the constitution of a sovereign 
state, but of some supranational structure. The article about the possibility of 
surrendering a part of our sovereignty to unspecified international 
organizations is terrifying!'44® The National Commission of NSZZ Solidamosc 
also appealed to the electorate to vote against the draft constitution and called 
for a 'Guarantee of state sovereignty' and the 'removal of the constitutional rule 
allowing for the transfer of state competences to international institutions 
beyond the control of the nation'.4**
The debate on Article 90 was often emotional and at times the Catholic- 
nationalist groupings' interpretations of the article clearly did not reflect the 
intentions of its authors. A pamphlet entitled 'Konstytucji: NIE' ('To the 
Constitution: NO') for example, claimed that section 90.1 meant that the 
President and a 'disciplined Sejm' could transfer state competences to the 
Russian mafia as 'this was too, an international organization'. The pamphlet 
also referred to article 91.1, which stated that a ratified international treaty 
would become part of the national legal system and would be directly 
applicable in national courts. 'Directly' the authors of 'Konstytucji: NIE' argued 
'means that an "international' agent", legally dressed up in a Polish uniform, 
can confiscate your property, act against national interest, and the law will be 
on his side'.*5°
Much of the discussion centred on the exact implications of articles 90 and 91. 
While its opponents, such as ROP"s Zbigniew Romaszewski for example, 
claimed that it would 'force Poland to accept everything, without negotiation
447 Marek Beylin, 'Moja Gazetka Przedwyborcza, Kto z kim...' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr .31,06 February 1997,
j>10.
Zbigniew Romaszewski, quoted in 'Tak czy nie w referendum konstytucyjnym' Zycie, nr.119 (196), 23 
May 1997, p. 2.
449 'Konstytucja 'Solidamosc' przeciw' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.117,21 May 1997, pl8.
450 'Konstytucji: NIE' Tygodnik Solidamosd, nr.21(453), 02 May 1997, pl4.
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and regardless of the level of importance, that will be legislated by the 
European Parliament or another legislative body in international organizations 
to which Poland will belong'R om aszew ski's point about the direct effect EU 
law would have in Poland once the accession treaty was ratified in the manner 
proposed by the 1997 constitution was valid. The SLD on the other hand, did 
not view the transfer of legislative powers to international bodies as an 
infringement on national sovereignty. As Jozef Oleksy pointed out, Poland 
would not be forced to participate in any international organizations and 
international treaties would undergo either the parliamentary ratification 
procedure or be ratified in a country-wide referendum. Any competency 
transfer would be made to an international organization of member states 
which participated in the organization on the same terms as Poland, he also 
argued, and Poland would be able to withdraw from any international 
agreements.^2 Oleksy also asked whether those opposed to the draft 
constitution were spreading false information about its implications and if they 
were not in fact motivated by wanting to sabotage the constitutional framework 
for the ratification of the EU and NATO accession treaties. 'If this is the case', he 
challenged 'then they should directly state they oppose these aims of Poland 
and not pretend that they are concerned with the good of the constitution'. 453
The discussions about the draft Constitution confronted the euro-sceptic 
groupings with the need to present a clear stance on the impact of European 
integration on Polish sovereignty. During electoral campaigns and 
parliamentary debates politicians could remain ambiguous and express 
support for the elusive 'Europe of Nations' or make vague declarations without 
actually stating whether they were for or against accession. During the
451 Zbigniew Romaszewski, Diabel tkwi w Szczegblach, Gazeta Polska, 30 April 1997, quoted in 
Bachmann, Polska Kaczka. Europpejski Staw. pl69.
452 J6zef Oleksy, 107th session, day 2, discussion points 7 and 8,21 May 1997,7. Rz^dowy raport z 
wykonania programu dzialah dostosowujqcych polskq gospodark? i system prawny do wymagah Ukladu 
Europejskiego oraz przysziego czionkostwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unii Europejskiej w 1995 r. (druk 
nr 1816) wraz ze stanowiskiem komisji (druk nr 2163), 8. Narodowa Strategia Integracji (druk nr 2156) 
wraz ze stanowiskiem komisji i projektem uchwaiy (druk nr 2282-A).
453 Ibid.
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constitutional debate, however, they had to take a stance on the practicalities of 
how competences of the Polish state would be delegated to the European 
Union. Consequently, many groupings took a stance against the transfer of 
Poland's decision making powers to the EU. Even if they claimed not to oppose 
EU membership, the constitution referendum debate showed they were not 
willing to agree to a transfer of sovereignty away from the national level. The 
SLD on the other hand remained strong in its euro-enthusiastic rhetoric and 
refused to address the extensive transfer of national decision making powers to 
the EU that accession entailed.
Conclusions
The period of the first SLD-PSL coalition saw significant progress in Poland's 
European integration. But unlike its predecessor the 1993-7 sejm did not witness 
vocal debate on integration issues. Most euro-sceptic groupings remained out of 
power due to their failure to cross the representation thresholds in the 1993 
parliamentary contest and to the victory of Aleksander Kwasniewski in the 1995 
presidential elections. The absence of groupings such as ZChN, ROP and PC 
from parliament gave the appearance of a party political consensus on 
integration. As was evident during the 1993 parliamentary campaign, the 1995 
presidential contest and the 1997 constitution referendum campaign the Polish 
political scene was not free from euro-sceptic concerns. In the sejm the main 
source of criticism of the SLD's pro-integrationist stance came from its agrarian 
coalition partner the PSL, whose stance on Europe was closer to the euro-sceptic 
Solidarity-successor right than to the SLD, whose rhetoric was in turn more 
similar to that of the unquestioningly euro-enthusiastic liberals. Integration 
continued to be a thorny point of dissent for the two groupings and they did 
not manage to develop a shared stance on accession throughout their four year 
coalition.
On entering government, the Alliance of the Democratic Left was confronted 
with the need to convince both the Polish public and Western observers that it 
had genuinely reformed into a social democratic party. The SLD's stance
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towards European integration played a critical role in this. As it redefined itself 
from a successor of the authoritarian PZPR to a social-democratic grouping 
modelled on the West European centre-left parties, its rhetoric took on an 
increasingly pro-integrationist stance.
But the SLD's unquestioningly euro-enthusiastic rhetoric was not matched by a 
commitment to implement the reforms outlined in the Association Treaty and 
the Single Market White Paper. In particular, the interventionist, left wing 
economic policy prerogatives of the OPZZ  trade union, the SLD's second 
largest member grouping were ill matched with the EU's neo-liberal 
requirements. The communist-successor's enthusiasm hence appeared to be 
based more on rhetoric than policy commitment. The PSL meanwhile 
presented a consistently ambiguous stance on European integration, on the one 
hand emphasizing its own efforts to protect the Polish peasant from foreign 
economic occupation and calling for state intervention to protect the Polish 
economy, yet praising the financial benefits of EU membership on the other.
The SLD's increasingly pro-integrationist rhetoric presented a challenge for the 
Solidarity-successor groupings in a difficult position. Support for European 
integration was increasingly associated with the liberal, communist-successor 
left. This was something with which the Solidarity-successor groupings did not 
wish to associate themselves, their anti-Soviet past being at the core of their 
political rhetoric. The Solidarity-successor parties were hence confronted with 
the need to re-invent 'Europe' in a way that would suit their party-political 
identity. As the following chapter will show, this resulted in the development 
of a new integration narrative.
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Chapter 5
Evangelising accession: European integration under 
Solidarity Electoral Action
Those who speak of a 'Europe of Nations', and it is 
particularly the AW S  which emphasised this in its rhetoric, 
they do not understand the processes which are taking 
place in the European Union. They are under the 
impression that it is possible to accede to the European 
Union while remaining completely autonomous with 
regards to all matters related to the economy, the state, 
society.. .this is of course an abstraction... if one 
understands things in this way then one does not want to 
be a member of the European Union since it is simply not
possible.454
Danuta Hubner,
Secretary of the Committee of European Integration, 
September 1996-October 1997
Introduction
This chapter considers the evolution of Poland's political consensus on 
European integration during the 1997-2001 solidarity successor cabinet starting 
with the 1997 election campaign and ending with the fragmentation of the AWS 
in the summer of 2001. The period in question was critical to Poland's 
integration process as it covers the first phase of accession negotiations. The 
chapter focuses on how political consensus on European integration was 
sustained during this key stage of the integration project. Did individual parties 
present an unambiguous stance on accession? How did they reconcile the EU's 
policy requirements with their existing policy and ideological proposals? And 
how did the ideologically heterogeneous Solidarity Electoral Action build 
consensus on Europe both internally and in coalition with the liberal, euro- 
enthusiastic Freedom Union?
The first section will outline the main domestic developments during the 
period. The subsequent two sections will account for integration policy 
developments in the EU and Poland, and the negotiations. Party-political
454 Interview with Danuta Hubner, 24 July 1998.
157
consensus on accession will be addressed in the final section, which will include 
sub sections on the 1997 parliamentary and 2000 presidential contests and 
parliamentary debate.
Domestic developments
When the AW S collected a third of the votes in the September 1997 elections 
some believed that its formation signalled the consolidation of the Polish right 
wing455. The Akcja Wyborcza, it was hoped, would evolve into a Christian 
Democratic, moderate, centre-right grouping capable of achieving consensus on 
a coherent policy programme.456 But it soon became clear that personal politics 
and ideological diversity would impede policy-making. Matters were made 
worse when the AW S formed a coalition government with the liberal Unia 
Wolnosci. European integration became a particularly thorny point of dissent as 
Prime Minister Buzek manoeuvred between the euro-enthusiastic Unia Wolnosci 
and the euro-sceptic Zjednoczenie Chrzescijansko Narodowe, one of the AWS' 
biggest member organisations.
The AW S was established in June 1996 under the initiative of Marian Krzaklewski, 
leader of the NSZZ Solidarnosc. By September 1997 it incorporated 
approximately forty political parties, ranging from euro-sceptic Catholic- 
nationalists to pro-integrationist liberals, whose only common denominator 
was the desire to prevent the successors of the ancien regime from maintaining 
political power. Apart from the 'Solidarity' Trade Union, the AWS' largest 
members were Porozumienie Centrum, Zjednoczenie Chrzescijansko Narodowe, 
Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej, Polska Federacja Stowarzyszeh Rodzin Katolickich, 
(the Polish Association of Catholic Families) and the centre-right Stronnictwo 
Konserwatywno -Ludowe (People's Agrarian Faction, SKL).
The power-sharing arrangements of the AW S  were agreed upon in October
1996. Strategic decisions were made by the Solidarity Trade Union and the
455 Wenzel.
456 Wladyslaw Wesolowski, Partie: Same Klopoty, (Warsaw: IfiS PAN, 2000), p72-73.
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above mentioned organisations. The legislative body of the AW S  was the 
National Commission, which consisted of five to seven representatives of the 
trade union and one representative from each of the other member 
organisations, with a maximum limit of fifty members. The National 
Commission's decisions were approved by a 3A majority and the post of 
chairperson was assigned to the chairperson of the National Commission of 
NSZZ Solidarnosc i.e. Marian Krzaklewski. The Chair was to have four deputies, 
one of whom would be a member of the Solidarity Trade Union. The executive 
of the AW S was the Coordinating Committee which was elected by the 
National Commission and consisted of ten members, half of whom were trade 
unionists and the remainder of whom represented the five largest member- 
organisations. Marian Krzaklewski was also appointed Secretary of the 
Coordinating Committee.
The combined functions of leader of the Solidarity Trade Union, chairperson of 
the AW S legislative and the secretary of its executive made Krzaklewski a 
powerful figure in the Electoral Action. His influence was strengthened further 
on 2 March 1997 when, during a meeting of the AW S National Commission, he 
was granted the authority to make unilateral decisions in crisis situations. 
Deputy chairpersons of the National Commission and members of the 
Executive Committee were also elected during this meeting. Power struggles 
amongst the different factions of the movement were already becoming 
apparent at this early stage. The Catholic-nationalist groupings united to stop 
Lech Kaczynski, leader of the Porozumienie Centrum, from becoming a deputy 
chair. Faced with the radicals' opposition Kaczynski decided not to stand and 
the deputy posts were eventually taken up by Janusz Tomaszewski from 
Solidarity, Marian Pilka of the ZChN  and Adam Slomka of the Konfederacja 
Polski NiepodleglejA57 Kaczynski's place was given to Kazimierz Kapera, leader of 
the Polska Federacja Stowarzyszen Rodzin Katolickich. The centrist, pro- 
integrationist groupings such as such as Porozumienie Centrum or the
457 Witold Zaluska, 'AWS Wybrala Wladze' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.73,27 March 1997, p.3.
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Stronnictzvo Konserwatywno-Ludowe were hence excluded from the Executive 
Committee. In spite of this they chose to remain within the AW S  as this offered 
them a realistic chance of crossing the representation threshold.
With 27% of the vote, the SLD was the second most successful contestant in the 
1997 elections. But as they were limited in their coalition-building ability by 
their authoritarian past the social-democrats were unable to enter government. 
Having attained almost 34% of the vote, the AW S  proceeded to form a coalition 
with the liberal and pro-integrationist Unia Wolnosci. Prior to the election it 
seemed that ideological differences between the two groupings would prevent 
them from governing together. Few pre-electoral discussions between AWS 
and the LZW took place. In fact, they appeared adversarial. Leszek Balcerowicz, 
leader of the Unia Wolnosci, volunteered the following about the AW S's 
economic strategy: 'I have the impression that the page on expenses was written 
by socialists, and the page on taxes by a handful of liberals'.458 In terms of 
policy, the programmes of either ROP  or the PSL would have been a better 
match for the Akcja Wyborcza but neither of these two groupings obtained 
enough votes to build a majority government. Meanwhile, having attained 
over 13% of the vote Unia Wolnosci became an attractive coalition partner. 
Partnership with the interventionist, conservative AW S was hardly an attractive 
option for the liberals however. Hence, to form government, the AW S  was 
forced to make significant concessions in key policy areas. After nearly two 
months of negotiations, the U W  struck a hard bargain and gained control over 
the ministries of finance, foreign affairs, defence, and justice, with Balcerowicz 
appointed as Finance Minister and Deputy Premier. The coalition agreement 
was finally signed on 11 November 1997 and the new government was granted 
the parliamentary vote of confidence on the same day.
More a marriage of convenience than a working partnership, the governing 
coalition was fraught with conflicts from its inception. Rydlewski notes that 
over thirty conflicts between the coalition partners were made public by 30
458 Leszek Balcerowicz, 'Wydatki i Podatki AWS' Gazeta Wyborcza, 28/29 May 1997, p3.
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September 1998.459 The disagreements concerned a wide array of policy matters, 
including ministerial and voivodship appointments, administrative reform, 
economic policy, family planning education in schools, re-privatisation, and 
media reform.
As Hausner and Marody point out, the lack of an ideological common ground 
meant that personnel policy was the main instrument through which the 
governing coalition could maintain coherence and stability. 460 As section 2 will 
show, the European integration process proved a salient example of how 
attempts to resolve ideological differences by means of personnel arrangements 
impeded policy formation.
As per the AW S- U W  coalition agreement, personnel appointments were 
distributed proportionally to the number of votes attained by the coalition 
partners.461 Ministerial and deputy ministerial positions were balanced between 
the U W  and the Electoral Action: where the AW S  appointed the minister, the 
Unia Wolnosci could select their second-in-command, and conversely, where the 
U W  selected the minister the Electoral Action would appoint the deputy. Such 
power-sharing arrangements led to some peculiar ministerial tandems, the most 
striking of which was the appointment of the Unia Wolnosqi's Piotr Nowina- 
Konopka as deputy to the Christian-nationalist head of the Committee for 
European Integration, Ryszard Czarnecki. Correspondingly, another 
nationalist, Adam Slomka of the KPN-OP, was made second in command to the 
liberal Foreign Affairs Minister Bronislaw Geremek.
Apart from a headstrong coalition partner and a communist-successor 
president462 internal disagreements within the AW S  member groupings also 
proved an on-going challenge for Prime Minister Buzek. Having attained power 
on the basis of the symbolically appealing if ambiguous ethos of its anti­
459 G. Rydlewski, Rzadzenie Koalicyjne w Polsce (Warsaw 2000), chapters 2 and 3.
460 Gdrniak, p56.
461 'Umowa Koalicyjna Pomi^dzy Akcjq Wyborczg Solidarnosc i Unig WolnoSci' section 8, in Rydlewski, 
Grzegorz. 2000. Rzadzenie Koalicyjne w Polsce, pl48.
462 Korbonski, p!26.
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communist, Solidarity heritage once in government Akcja Wyborcza Solidarnosc 
was confronted with the need to negotiate policy decisions. The member 
groupings disagreed in their interpretations of the 'real' programme of the AWS 
and in March 1998 the 'Team for the Implementation of the AW S  Programme' 
was established. The 'Team' consisted of twenty-seven parliamentarians 
including a group of Catholic-nationalists, Adam Slomka's Konfederacja Polski 
Niepodleglej -  Oboz Patriotyczny as well as two notoriously anti-integrationist 
members of the ZChN, Jan Lopuszanski and Andrzej Chrzanowski. 463 Two 
particularly contentious issues were administrative reform and the sale of the 
Gdansk shipyard. When Slomka and Lopuszanski voted against the 
government's administrative reform proposal in July they were both expelled 
from the AWS. Another five members of KPN-OP then left the Action as a sign 
of protest against Slomka's expulsion. The AWS' ranks continued to diminish 
when on 24 July seven Catholic-nationalist parliamentarians left in protest 
against the sale of the Gdansk shipyard. Akcja Wyborcza Solidarnosc now had 187 
parliamentary seats, which combined with the Unia Wolnosci's sixty seats left 
the government with a narrow majority of fifteen seats. An attempt at the 
formation of a single AWS party, Ruch Spoleczny AW S (AWS Social Movement) 
proved unsuccessful. 464 Some Catholic-nationalist parliamentarians, such as the 
head of the parliamentary commission for culture Jan Maria Jackowski, or the 
head of the commission for the family, Maria Smerczyriska, chose to remain in 
the Akcja Wyborcza. Paradoxically, as the ranks of the radical Catholics within 
the AWS shrunk, their bargaining power increased. The Akcja needed all the 
votes it could muster, which enabled the radicals to use the threat of leaving to 
their advantage. In spite of the coalition's voting discipline difficulties however 
the Buzek cabinet implemented several key reforms including social security, 
pensions, healthcare and administrative reform. 465
464 Bale, pi 7.
465 Jablonski,pl41.
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Aleksander Kwasniewski's victory and Marian Krzaklewski's disappointing 
third place in the 2000 presidential contest dispelled any illusions to the future 
electoral chances of the AWS. The Akcja fragmented throughout 2001. On 11 
January 2001 Maciej Plazynski, Donald Tusk and Andrzej Olechowski 
established the Platforma Obywatelska (Citizens' Platform, PO) and by 17 January 
2001 eighteen SKL parliamentarians defected to the Platform, leaving the AWS 
with only 157 MF s^. In March 2001 Lech Kaczynski, justice minister and former 
leader of the Porozumienie Centrum, established another new grouping called 
Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc (Law and Order, PiS) and shortly thereafter five 
parliamentarians from the Przymierze Prawicy (Agreement of the Right) left the 
AWS to join Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc. The final straw came in May 2001 when 
NSZZ Solidarnosc also left the Electoral Action.
As the AWS fragmented, a consolidation took place on the left side of the 
political spectrum. Following the communist-successors' failure to form 
government in 1997, J6zef Oleksy resigned from the post of SLD leader and was 
replaced by Leszek Miller, formerly Minister for Labour and Social Security. 
Miller was known for his hard-line approach and good relations with the SLD's 
conservative regional leaders. Miller set out to transform the SLD coalition into 
a single party. Following a year of preparations the founding declaration of the 
new Alliance of the Democratic Left was signed in April 1999. Most SLD 
member organisations joined the new party during its first congress in 
December 1999; only Piotr Ikonowicz's socialists and several other small fringe 
groupings chose not to participate.
The final two years of the Buzek cabinet took place in the context of an 
economic downturn, decreasing popular support for the government and a 
divided coalition. By 2000 unemployment was approaching 20% and the 
economic boom of the late 1990s was quickly disappearing as growth slowed 
from just under 7% in 1996 to 4% in 2000 with bleak forecasts of 1% for 2001.466
466Toland's economic challenge', 24 September 2001, BBC News
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1556641.stm, last accessed 14 May 2005).
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The troubled A W S -U W coalition collapsed in June 1999 and by the summer of 
2001 Jerzy Buzek was faced with a minority government, a budgetary crisis, 
growing unemployment and a stalemate in accession negotiations. During the 
2001 parliamentary elections the Polish right wing was once again divided into 
several small groupings. Neither the Unia Wolnosci nor the AW S  managed to 
cross the 5% threshold required for parliamentary representation following the 
2001 elections.
EU integration policy
The Commission's recommendation to start Eastern enlargement negotiations 
was accepted at the December 1997 Luxembourg European Council, which 
decided to launch the accession process as per article O of the Treaty of the 
European Union. Negotiations were to be opened at the same time with ten 
applicants: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Estonia, Malta, Slovenia and Cyprus. It was agreed that enlargement 
would take place in two phases487. Poland was placed in the first phase, together 
with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus; the 
remaining candidates were expected to accede in the second phase. The 
accession process was launched on 30 March 1998 during a meeting of EU 
foreign ministers with the 10 applicant countries.468
The Luxembourg Council also implemented two key adjustments to the pre­
accession process. Firstly, all financial assistance was to be brought into a single 
framework under the Accession Partnerships and the PHARE programme 
reformed to align more closely with accession requirements. 489 Secondly, 
applicants were expected to make 'precise commitments'470 towards democratic 
consolidation, macro-economic stabilization, nuclear safety and the adoption of
467 J. Blocker, '1997 in Review: EU Finds Success on EMU, Failure on Expansion Reforms', in RFE/RL.
468 Avery and Fraser, pl35.
469 Jahns, p37.
470 Gower, p!4-15.
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national programmes for harmonization with community acquis within a 
precise timetable.471
The Accession Partnerships marked a key stage in the pre-accession process as 
they provided the EU with a structured means of measuring the applicants' 
progress in meeting accession requirements. The Partnership Agreements 
defined short and medium term policy reform priorities for each of the 
applicants, who were required to prepare 'National Programmes for Adoption 
of the Acquis' setting timetables for the adoption of the reforms. Starting in 
November 1998 the Commission issued annual assessments of the applicants' 
progress and the applicant states were expected to update the national 
programmes in line with the assessments. The applicants would be ranked 
according to how far the Commission judged them to have progressed in 
implementing its requirements. The rankings were made public and frequently 
featured in the media, which further strengthened the Commission's ability to 
influence the candidates' domestic policy options. Further to the Commission's 
assessment the European Council could take 'appropriate steps with regard to 
any pre-accession assistance granted to any applicant State', acting by qualified 
majority on a proposal from the Commission, where 'the commitments 
contained in the Europe Agreements are not respected and/or the progress 
towards fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria is insufficient'.472
The Partnerships covered a wide range of policy areas including policy areas 
not adopted by all member states such as Schengen and the Euro. The short 
term economic priorities for Poland included steel industry reform, 
restructuring of the coal sector, acceleration of privatization, restructuring of 
state enterprises, development of the financial sector and banking privatization, 
improvement of bankruptcy proceedings and capital movement liberalization.
471 Borkowski, 'Strategia Integracji Polski z UE', p624.
472 H. Grabbe and K. Hughes, 'Central and east European views on EU enlargement: political debates and 
public opinion', in Back to Europe. Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union, ed. K. Henderson 
(London 1999), pl3.
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473 Political requirements included the reinforcement of institutional and 
administrative capacity, border management and the continuation of legal 
approximation of environmental legislation. 474
In December 1999 the European Commission decided to lift the division 
between the two 'waves' of applicant countries and started negotiations with 
the remaining candidates: Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Slovakia and 
Romania. The issue of when Poland could join and whether it would be able to 
do so together with other 'first wave' candidates hence became a concern for 
the Polish media and consequently, for the political elites. The Buzek cabinet 
aimed for Poland to join as part of the first wave in 2002.475 But delays in the 
harmonisation process caused concerns about the possible postponement of 
accession. 476 Poland had delayed the implementation of required legislative 
changes in the areas of free movement of goods, telecommunications and 
consumer protection.
Renewed attempts at reform of the EU's decision making structures were made 
during the Nice summit of December 2000, which increased the number of 
European Parliament m e m b e r s 477 and implemented a new weighting of votes in 
the Council, which meant that Poland would have 28 votes. The initial proposal 
was for Poland to be granted only twenty-six votes, two fewer than Spain, 
although the difference in population between the two countries was only 
400,000. After some last minute bargaining, the Poles managed to negotiate the 
additional two v o t e s .478 While the EU refused to provide a clear timetable for 
membership it announced that new members could participate in the May 2004 
elections to the European Parliament thereby indicating that the first wave of 
enlargement would take place before this time. If Poland was to accede by this 
date, however, negotiations would have to be completed by the end of 2002
473 Ibid, pl5.
474 Ibid, pl5-16.
475 'Pytanie o Uni?' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr 44,22 February 2000, pl7.
476 Jacek Pawlicki, 'Polska - Unia Europejska, Remanent w obietnicach' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.210,09 
August 1999, p21.
477 Bachmann, pl96.
478 jacek Safuta, 'Szarza na Nice?' Polityka, nr. 51/2000 (2276).
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thereby allowing enough time for treaty ratification. Moreover, the reforms 
agreed at Nice were inadequate to efficiently cope with an EU of 26 states and a 
new Inter Governmental Conference to deal with the EU's constitutional 
structure was scheduled for 2004.479
Another key development within the Union was the launch of the common 
currency. On May 2nd 1998 the Council decided to bring 11 countries into the 
monetary union as of January 11999 . 480 The final exchange rate was set up on 1 
June 1999481 and euro banknotes were introduced on January 1 2002.482 The 
Eastern candidates were not expected to be able to meet the convergence 
criteria on accession. But the strict monetary policy measures needed to attain 
them, including the monitoring of the inflation rate, budget deficit and public 
debt, foreign exchange variation and long term interest rates were a central part 
of the EU's requirements.483 The candidate states were expected to implement 
these monetary measures in spite of the fact that the convergence criteria, 
designed for the economies of the EU-15, did not take into account the specific 
nature of the nature of transition economies whose fast growth led to high 
levels of structural inflation. 484 Meanwhile, the East European economies 
became increasingly integrated with the EU, with the candidates' exports to the 
Union forming 55.6% of 1999 exports, an increase of almost 10% from 45.9% in
1997. For the EU however the trade relationship with the applicant states 
represented only about 5% of exports in 1999.485
479 W. Orlowski, Alan, 'The Impact of EU Accession on Enterprise Adoptation and Institutional 
Development in the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe', in 2001), p6.
480 McNamara, pl47.
481 K. Bachmann, Kt6r§dy do Europy (Warsaw 2002), pl52.
482 The countries adopting the common currency were Austria, Belgium, France, Finland, Germany the 
Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spa Although they met the convergence criteria the UK 
and Sweden opted out, Greece failed to meet the criteria and so was unable to participate and the 
Denmark's participation was rejected in a referendum.
483 B. Gdralczyk, 'Political Dilemmas Behind the European Union Enlargement Towards the East', 
Yearbook of Polish European Studies, 3, (1999), pl48.
484 M. Grzesiak, 'Miejsce Narodowego Banku Polskiego w Europejskim Systemie Bank6w Centralnych', in 
Polska w Unii Europejskiej. Bilans Otwarcia., ed. J. Marszalek-Kawa (Torun 2005), 164-173, pl72.
485 F. Francois, Joseph and Rombout, Machiel, 'Trade Effects from the Integration of the Central and East 
European Countries into the European Union', SEI Working Paper No 41, (Sussex European Institute 
2001), p5.
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In parallel to the progress in EU integration Poland also finalized the NATO 
membership process. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary began 
membership negotiations on 16 September 1997 and the accession protocol was 
signed just over two years later, on 16 December 1999.486
Polish integration policy
Co-ordination among Poland's governmental institutions continued to present 
problems for the integration effort. The institutions responsible for integration 
included the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister's Chancellery and 
the Committee for European Integration. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
charged with policy formulation and KIE was to manage policy development 
and co-ordinate implementation among the different ministries. The office of 
the Chief Negotiator meanwhile was based at the Prime Minister's Chancellery. 
487 The selection of the Chief Negotiator proved contentious. Initially, Jerzy 
Buzek considered Jacek Saryusz-Wolski for the post, however, when the KIE 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not agree to allow Saryusz-Wolski the 
latitude he requested he withdrew his candidacy.488 Eventually Unia Wolnosci's 
Jan Kulakowski, was appointed to the post.489
Unlike his predecessor, Prime Minister Buzek did not chair the Committee for 
European Integration himself. Instead, Buzek delegated the chairmanship to the 
leader of the euro-sceptic Zjednoczenie Chrzescijansko Narodowe, Ryszard 
Czarnecki. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in turn handed to the Unia 
Wolnosci and Professor Bronislaw Geremek was appointed its head.
Czarnecki was a peculiar choice to co-ordinate Poland's integration effort. Less 
than ten months prior to taking up his post at the KIE he opposed the AWS 
expressing any form of support for EU accession. Czarnecki later stated that his 
motivation to lead the KIE was driven by an ambition to achieve ministerial
486 The Warsaw Voice (http://www2.warsawvoice.pl/old/v542/nato/n7.htm, last accessed 27 May 2005).
487 G6miak, p27.
488 'Who Will Lead Us to Europe?' The Warsaw Voice, 01 February 1998 
(http://www.warsawvoice.pl/archiwum.phtml/673/, last accessed 30 June 2006).
489 G6miak, p27.
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rank: "I wanted to be a full minister, and I achieved this, it did not make much 
difference of what, but I wanted to be a minister",490 he stated. According to 
Czarnecki, Buzek had previously offered him the role of Geremek's deputy of 
Foreign Affairs but he turned this down as it was not a 'full' ministerial 
appointment.491 Years later, when he took part in the accession referendum, 
Ryszard Czarnecki voted against membership.4^
The ZChN  advocated a strategy of 'tough' negotiations and Czarnecki readily 
took on the challenge of protecting Polish national interest.493 In March 1998, 
during his parliamentary presentation of the negotiation mandate, he stated 
that Poland aimed to integrate with a 'Europe of Nations', which guaranteed 
protection of national sovereignty and economic interests. He also pointed out 
that Poland did not have to accede to 'Europe' as it already was a part of it and 
had been for centuries.494 Czarnecki declared: 'We always were and are in 
Europe. We do not have to accede to it because we co-created it, and we did so 
with greater effort than those to whom its creation is now attributed, or those 
who grant themselves exclusive rights to "Europeanness"'.493
Ryszard Czarnecki would not be an easy partner for the EU. This became 
apparent when he opposed Poland's contribution to the EU's science and 
technology fund arguing it was contradictory to the Polish value system. The 
unethical nature of the fund lay in the possibility of it carrying out research on 
abortion, euthanasia, genetic engineering, and artificial insemination.493 
Unsurprisingly, conflicts soon developed between Czarnecki and the euro- 
enthusiastic liberals from Unia Wolnosci. The most serious of these was a 
disagreement with deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Leszek 
Balcerowicz concerning the administration of EU aid. The AW S  initially
490 Interview with Ryszard Czarnecki, 15 June 2005.
491 Ibid.
492 Ibid.
493 Ryszard Czarnecki, parliamentary debate on European Integration, 18 March 1998 (www.sejm.gov.pl, 
last accessed 15 February 2004).
494 Ibid.
493 Ibid.
496 J?drzej Bielecki, 'Wqtpliwo§ci Etyczne Polski' Rzeczpospolita, 28 April 1998.
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opposed Balcerowicz's suggestion that EU aid be administered via the Ministry 
of Finance497 but it was forced to change its stance as Czarnecki's management 
style was subjected to increasing criticism.
It became clear that efficient management of the PHARE and structural funds 
was not a top priority for Czarnecki. In early May 1998 Louisewies van der 
Laan, the spokesperson of Commissioner for Enlargement Hans van der Broek 
warned that if the applications for PHARE aid were not submitted by May 15th 
Poland may lose the allocated funds.498 Czarnecki replied by claiming that no 
such deadline existed.499 The Commission also criticised the KIE for delays in the 
submission of documents related to the implementation of the acquis. It was the 
Committee's responsibility to establish a calendar for the implementation of the 
required legislative changes and to assign responsibility for their 
implementation to the relevant institutions. According to van der Broek, Poland 
was the last of the ten applicant countries to submit such a document.500
In the meantime, Unia Wolnosci made renewed attempts at gaining control of 
EU funds. A draft law on public finances, submitted by the U W  in early May 
1998, specified that foreign aid administration would be moved to the Ministry 
of Finance. The U W  was determined to gain control over foreign aid. According 
to Leszek Balcerowicz, allowing the KIE to continue managing the funds would 
only lead to 'multiplying pathology'.501 Czarnecki was the only minister to give 
a votum separatum on the new legislation.
By the time the new regulations were in place, however, the damage had 
already been done. The scandal erupted at the end of July when the European 
Commission rejected 34 million ECU worth of the PHARE aid applications 
submitted by the KIE. Although the documents were submitted on the 15 May 
deadline, many projects were rejected due to poor quality. According to
497 J^drzej Bielecki, 'Na Razie Tajne' Rzeczpospolita, 25 March 1998.
498 Jedrzej Bielecki, 'Na Razie Tajne' Rzeczpospolita, 25 March 1998
499 P Apanowicz and J Bielecki, 'Czarnecki Poprawia van der Broeka' Rzeczpospolita, 09 May 1998.
500 Ibid.
501 K Jedrzejewska, 'Racja po Stronie Balcerowicza' Rzeczpospolita, 15 may 1998.
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Commissioner van der Broek there would have been sufficient time for any 
necessary revisions had the projects been submitted earlier.
Apart from the loss of PHARE funds other problems at the KIE also pointed to 
Czarnecki7 s inability to fulfil the requirements of his position. Inconsistent 
organisational arrangements, the Akcja Wyborcza's ambiguous stance towards 
accession and the question marks over Czarnecki7 s support for it led to 
confusion among the Polish negotiation team as well as at the European 
Commission.502 EU officials complained they did not know with whom they 
should negotiate.503 Concerns were raised about the lack of coordination among 
the ministries responsible for the harmonisation process, the loss of confidential 
documentation and the inefficient manner in which the KIE was run in general. 
By the summer of 1998, close to thirty confidential documents were said to have 
gone missing from the offices of the Committee.504
The SLD was very critical of both the way the integration institutions were 
structured and with Czamecki7s appointment as head of KIE. Wlodzimierz 
Cimoszewicz commented: T believe the Committee functions badly. This is 
largely due to the weak position of the chair of this committee and in this 
particular case the incompetence of a particular individual.505
A report by the Supreme Chamber of Control, published in June 1999, 
eventually brought to light the extent of the management problems at the KIE.™ 
Only 34 of the 119 tasks identified by the National Integration Strategy had 
been implemented as of mid October 1998. The Committee had also not 
adequately monitored the tasks the Strategy set for other institutions. Quality 
control further showed that organisational changes, which were to be 
implemented at the KIE Secretariat following a request from the Prime Minister 
in October 1997 had not been put in place until March 1998. According to the
502 Interview with Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, 21 July 1998, interview with Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, 14 January 2002; 
interview with John O'Rourke, European Commission Representative in Warsaw, 17 January 2002.
503 'Koszt Braku Koordynacji' Rzeczpospolita, 5 April 1999.
504 'Zapowiedz Zmian Personalnych' Rzeczpospolita, 30 July 1998.
505 Interview with Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, 21 July 1998.
506 'Dyskretny zakres og61no£ci, Unia i Polska, nr. 17, June 1999.
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report the delay had 'a negative impact on the completion of tasks the KIE 
Secretariat was responsible for and led to disagreements over competences'.507 
The job descriptions of several managers had not been adjusted to the new 
regulations for over a year. The Council for Information Strategy, whose 
inaugural meeting took place in September 1997, had not met again until 
October 1998. The development of a national information programme was 
discussed during the second meeting but, as NIK noted, no such programme 
was put in place until June 1999 when the quality inspection report was 
published.508
The Committee for European Integration was not the only institution to have 
mismanaged the integration process however. In October 1997 the KIE 
requested the sejm to develop a procedure which would allow it to comment on 
and control all parliamentary legislation with regards to its compatibility with 
EU law. The procedure had not been produced until April 1999. Furthermore, 
the Ministry of Transport was found to have ignored European legislation, at a 
cost of several hundred thousand zlotys, when it failed to harmonise Polish 
fisheries regulations with those of the EU.509
The loss of the PHARE funds was the proverbial last straw that finally led to 
personnel changes at the KIE. Both Ryszard Czarnecki and his deputy Piotr 
Nowina-Konopka were sent on leave510 following the rejection of the funding 
applications. After long discussions with the ZChN, Buzek dismissed Czarnecki 
and Nowina-Konopka and ran the KIE himself.511 The role of KIE secretary was 
filled by Maria Karasiriska-Fendler, previously an expert in European 
integration economics at Lodz University. A ZChN  advisor and a known 
sympathizer of this grouping, she had no formal party-political affiliation. 
Ryszard Czarnecki maintained a ministerial function at the Chancellery of the
507 Ibid.
508 Ibid.
509 Ibid.
510 G. Blazyca and M. Kolkiewicz, 'Poland and the EU: internal disputes, domestic politics and accession', 
Journal of communist studies and transition politics, 15,4 (1999), 131-143, pl32.
511 'Czarnecki Bez Teki' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.173,25/26 July 1998.
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Prime Minister as 'minister with no portfolio' and was charged with promoting 
European integration and developing a programme of European education in 
Poland.
The changes at the Committee for European Integration met with a positive 
response from the Commission. The Commissioner for Enlargement applauded 
the decision to assign the administration of these funds to the Ministry of 
Finance.512 In contrast to the highly politicised style of Czarnecki, Karasiriska- 
Fendler aimed to stick to the day to day integration process. Her priority was: 
'not people but good procedures, not ideology and speaking about how we will 
protect national interests, but keeping an eye on the simple, technical matters'.513 
Under the leadership of the new secretary the KIE made progress in supporting 
the transposition of EU legislation and co-ordination of the integration tasks. 
The involvement of Prime Minister Buzek in disciplining tardy ministers 
allowed for greater coordination in implementing the required legislative 
changes and sped up the process of harmonising Polish law with the European 
acquis. The management of structural aid also improved as Karasinska-Fendler 
made sure that the allocated funds were used effectively and that applications 
were submitted on time.514
Yet problems soon arose as the negotiations on the contentious chapters of 
agriculture and industrial policy began. Disagreements between the 
Commission and the Polish negotiators concerning the industrial policy chapter 
reflected the continuing lack of a unified policy stance on the part of the 
government. When the European Commission refused to back down to Polish 
demands different responses could be heard from the Committee for European 
Integration and from the AWS's deputy-minister for industry, Janusz Kaczurba. 
Whereas Karasinska-Fendler confirmed that Poland would agree to the EU's 
requests, Kaczurba disregarded her stance and continued to push for an
512 Marcin Zdort, 'Informacje' Rzeczpospolita, 29 July 1998.
513 Maria Karasinska-Fendler, quoted in 'Zapowiedz Zmian Personalnych' Rzeczpospolita, 30 July 1998.
514 Interview with Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, 14 January 2002.
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extended transition period for the steel industry subsidies.515 As one senior level 
decision maker at the KIE put it: "Poland consistently lacked an integration 
strategy'.515
The deteriorating relations between Poland and the European Commission also 
became apparent during Commissioner van der Broek's visit to the Sejm in 
November 1998.517 A WS parliamentarians informed the Commissioner that 
Poland did not have to join the EU and could remain economically viable 
outside it. They also questioned the benefits of the Common Agricultural 
Policy. Even representatives of the euro enthusiastic SLD were concerned about 
the EU's ability to undertake the institutional reforms necessary for 
enlargement. On leaving the meeting an irritated van der Broek reminded the 
parliamentarians that the membership application was a Polish initiative and 
that should they not want to accede to the EU, they would not be forced to do
SO.518
The replacement of Ryszard Czarnecki proved insufficient to remedy the lack of 
coordination between the numerous administrative bodies involved in the 
integration process. In December 1998, Karasinska-Fendler recommended to 
Jerzy Buzek that KIE be reformed to allow it greater authority over its 
participant ministries. When Buzek refused to carry out the reforms Karasinska- 
Fendler tendered her resignation stating that she was unable to continue in her 
post due to ineffective institutional arrangements.519
Meanwhile, Ryszard Czarnecki, now based at the Prime Minister's Chancellery, 
worked on developing the Public Information Programme (Program 
Informowania Spoleczeristwa, PIS). Czarnecki's euro-sceptic stance was soon 
affirmed with the appointment of Artur Gurski, previously an editor of the anti- 
integrationist, radical-Catholic 'Nasz Dziennik', to a senior position in his
515 Jfdrzej Bielecki, 'Sp6r Coraz Ostrzejszy' Rzeczpospolita, 14 October 1998.
516 Interview with anonymous KIE employee, 11 October 2002.
517 Blazyca and Kolkiewicz, 'Poland and the EU: internal disputes, domestic politics and accession'., p134.
518 Jedrzej Bielecki, 'Czlonkowstwo na Wlasng OdpowiedzialnoSd' Rzeczpospolita, 27 Novemeber 1998.
519 Interview with anonymous KIE employee, 11 October 2002.
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department. In developing the PIS, Czarnecki set out to provide what he 
described as objective and unbiased information about the EU. As he stated 
during a press briefing: "It is a lot better for those whom we want to reach to 
have a feeling that the government is providing trustworthy information rather 
than some ideology or propaganda'.520 Other contributors to the information 
programme, such as the undersecretary of state at the KIE, Jaroslaw Pietras and 
the sociologist Elzbieta Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, also felt that the PIS should above 
all provide objective information about the EU. However, representatives of 
pro-integrationist NGOs such as the Schuman Foundation and the Polish 
European Movement argued it was not possible to encourage public interest in 
integration without presenting a positive image of the EU.521
The first version of the document, completed in December 1998, set out to 
'promote information and not ideas, to inform without emotion and to sincerely 
educate about the positive and the problematic consequences which EU 
membership brings with it'.522 This caused uproar both at the Committee for 
European Integration and at the cabinet. It was argued that a state which has 
since 1991 declared EU membership as its strategic aim could not now inform 
the public about this in a 'detached' and 'lukewarm' manner. The programme 
was also criticised for lack of consultation with NGOs and the public. While it 
targeted information to specific social groups, e.g.: youth, the unemployed or 
the elderly, none of these groups had been consulted during the preparation of 
the programme. As a result, rather than specifying the kind of information that 
was required, the programme made vague references to the need to establish 
links with social groups.525 A new version of the PIS was eventually produced. 
The emphasis now lay on 'attaining a broad and lasting support of society for
520 Unia i Polska, nr 14, January 1999.
521 Ibid.
522 'Novvy - stary PIS' Unia i Polska, nr. 7, March 1999.
523 G6miak, p28.
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the process of integration with the EU' and a 'rise in society's interest in the 
subject of integration' . 524
Although Ryszard Czarnecki was obligated to consult NGOs while preparing 
the second draft, many non-governmental organisations still felt that they had 
not been given a voice in the preparation of the programme. The European 
Commission also took an interest and, according to Unia i Polska, some of its 
staff felt that Poland should have either asked the Commission for advice or 
outsourced the development of the information strategy to an experienced 
public relations company. One Commission representative felt that since the 
current authors had not managed to create an acceptable programme 'there is 
no point in wasting even more money'.525 The second draft of the PIS was 
eventually approved on 4 May 1999 however its implementation was delayed 
until the autumn of 1999.
In the meantime, Jan Kulakowski set about developing his own European 
information campaign. On top of his responsibilities as Chief Negotiator, 
Kulakowski toured Poland giving lectures about the local impact of integration. 
The programme, comprising of sixteen regional conferences, was entitled 
'Understanding the Negotiations'. When a puzzled journalist asked 
Kulakowski's assistant whether her boss was responsible for information policy 
as well as negotiations she replied: 'It's his hobby'.526 It would appear that the 
Chief Negotiator did not have much confidence in an information programme 
prepared by the former leader of the Zjednoczenie Chrzescijansko Narodowe. 
Kulakowski justified the need for the programme by emphasising that in order 
for negotiations to be effective they needed broad public awareness and 
backing. He stated:
We do not want to negotiate closed up in the silence of
offices. Negotiations make sense only if they are backed by
524 Unia i Polska, January 1999, nr.4
525 'Nowy - stary PIS' Unia i Polska, nr.7, March 1999.
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public opinion. We have to have a sense of what is going 
on in society in relation to the negotiations. 527
Shortly after approving the Public Information Programme in May 1999, the 
cabinet authorized an updated version of the National Programme of 
Preparation to Membership in the European Union' (NPPM). First developed in 
1998 as part of the Accession Partnership framework, the programme had been 
adjusted to address the current integration strategy. The updated version 
identified harmonisation of Polish law with the European acquis as a key 
priority. Other urgent tasks included faster privatisation, the development of 
effective anti-trust policy and restructuring of the economy. The programme 
also addressed the need to reform intellectual property rights as well as to 
strengthen and reform the tax system .528
The NPPM privatisation strategy included plans to sell state owned 
telecommunications, banking, and heavy industry. Polish steelworks were to be 
privatised by 2001 and all loss making mines were to be closed. It was expected 
that over half of the workers employed in heavy industry at the time would be 
made redundant and their compensation packages were to be covered by the 
Polish government partly from the state budget and partly from the PHARE 
funds. 529
The completion of heavy industry reforms was one of the most challenging and 
publicly scrutinised elements of the Single Market adjustment process. The 
restructuring project begun in 1992 with the view to meet the Association 
requirement of full restructuring by 1999. The privatisation process stalled 
however and employment levels had not changed. In 1998 the Polish 
government requested an extension of Association timelines. The new 
restructuring programme was put in place and bolstered with a 30 million euro
527 Ibid.
528 Magda Tadeusiak, 'Priorytet: ambitna koniecznoSd' Unia i Polska, nr.14, June 1999.
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fund for social protection and redundancies. The Commission agreed for 
Poland to maintain a 6% tariff on steel products in 1998 and 3% in 1999.530
Meanwhile, the position of the KIE Secretary remained vacant. According to 
Janina Paradowska of Polityka magazine, Jerzy Buzek initially promised the 
post to the Unia Wolnosci. The U W s  preferred candidate, Jerzy Osiatynski, was 
never appointed however, and the UKIE remained undirected.531 It was also 
speculated that Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, formerly Governmental Plenipotentiary 
for European Integration, might be appointed as UKIE secretary, with 
Karasinska-Fendler as first deputy. But the conditions set by both Saryusz- 
Wolski and Karasinska-Fendler entailed a significant strengthening of the 
Committee and as such were not acceptable to the euro-sceptic ZChN. Saryusz- 
Wolski wanted the KIE to have sufficient authority over its member ministries 
to effectively coordinate the integration processes, and for its internal structure 
to be re-hauled so as to avoid overlapping competences. He also argued that 
there should be a much stronger relationship with the negotiation team and 
with the head negotiator, and a much less 'vassal' relationship with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs including, among other issues, the co-supervision of 
Poland's EU representation in Brussels. Jerzy Buzek, who had to balance the 
interests of the numerous groupings represented in the government, was not 
willing to risk conflict with either the Catholic-nationalists or the liberals by 
placing the KIE under the control of either grouping.532
According to Unia i Polska, several proposals for reform were discussed during 
the first quarter of 1999. The most radical scenario suggested the dissolution of 
the Committee and the transfer of responsibility for negotiations and 
integration policy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This would have given the 
Unia Wolnosci and Bronislaw Geremek full control over the integration process 
and as such was not acceptable to most of the AW S  and especially to the
530 G6miak, p38.
531 Janina Paradowska, 'Akcja Przeciw Unii, Unia Przciw Akcji' Polityka, nr 23 (2000), 
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Zjednoczenie Chrzescijansko Narodowe. Other proposals considered appointing 
someone with sufficient authority, such as a third deputy Prime Minister, to 
head the KIE. While allowing the KIE sufficient clout to coordinate the 
integration process, this would have diminished the role of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs as well as place the Chief Negotiator under the control of the 
new head of KIE, which would not have been acceptable to the UW. The last 
option was for the leadership of the Committee to be taken up by someone who 
did not have partisan affiliations. The KIE would become a monitoring body for 
the progress of integration and responsibility for the implementation of the 
integration policy would remain with the Prime Minister's chancellery and with 
individual ministries.533
In the end, Prime Minister Buzek rejected all of these options. Some 
restructuring took place and the Committee's eight departments downsized to 
seven and Pawel Samecki, a senior staff member of the Committee, was 
appointed as acting UKIE secretary. In June 1999 Buzek asked his former 
cabinet chief Wojciech Arkuszewski to become involved in the co-ordination of 
legal harmonization and Arkuszewski's close relationship with the prime 
minister and authority within the AW S facilitated some progress in the 
harmonization process.534 But a permanent secretary was not appointed for a 
total of sixteen months and the formal leadership of the KIE remained with 
Buzek. The lack of coordination among the numerous institutions continued to 
impact the integration process.
Conflict also developed between the KIE and the Office of the Chief Negotiator. 
The euro-enthusiast Kulakowski never found it easy to get on with the 
Christian-nationalists and communication was finally severed over a conflict 
concerning the sale of land to foreigners. This was one of the most contentious 
and widely debated negotiation areas. For the ZChN, allowing foreigners to buy 
Polish land constituted a means to yet another German occupation. Initially
533 Unia i Polska, nr.4, January 1999.
534 R. Zubek, 'Complying with Transposition Commitments in Poland: Collective Dilemmas, Core 
Executives and Legislative Outcomes', West European Politics, 28, 3 (2005), 592-619, p606.
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therefore, the ZChN  called for a total ban on the sale of land. When in July 1999 
Kulakowski proposed an eighteen year transition period the KIE retorted with a 
barrage of criticism. Eventually the two institutions ceased to communicate 
altogether. In spite of the KIE and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' buildings 
being only some 100 metres away from each other, Jan Kulakowski stopped 
visiting the Committee. When asked why, he commented:
There is currently no one there corresponding to me in 
rank, it is them who should come to see me. I have my 
staff and know what is going on. It is true that Nowina- 
Konopka personally linked the UKIE with the 
negotiation team, and now there is no one fulfilling this 
role; I am incessantly asking the Prime Minister 
reinstate the previous state of affairs.535
Although Kulakowski lacked the backing of many AW S politicians he had the 
support of the President. During a meeting with the negotiation team in June 
1999 Kwasniewski argued that Poland should not request overly long transition 
periods on the sale of land, as this may have meant having to make concessions 
in other areas. He also expressed concerns about the KIE and the 'lengthy 
uncertainty about the appointment of the head of KIE, as well as the manner in 
which this institution is functioning'.535
Legislative harmonization was also subject to criticism. According to Ewa 
Freyberg, an SLD parliamentarian, new legislation often contradicted that of the 
European acquis:
The draft legislation prepared by the cabinet is often so 
bad that I do not know if it cam contribute to the over-all 
improvement of the government's projects. We have 
tremendous problems with how to then turn this into a 
good product. Some of the projects have been 
highlighted by the KIE secretariat as contradictory to 
European Union legislation. Better co-ordination of 
work is necessary, and co-operation of government and 
parliament.. .the Prime Minister, as the Head of the
535 Jan Kulakowski, quoted in Janicki, Mariusz, 'KIE w Dwa Kije', Polityka, 4(1999).
536 Aleksander Kwasniewski, quoted in Unia i Polska, nr.4, June 1999.
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Committee for European Integration, is not able to take 
care of the work of the Committee and at the same time 
lead the secretariat.537
It became clear that the acting head, Jacek Samecki, did not have sufficient 
authority to push the integration process forward. Delays in harmonising 
legislation ensued and led to intensified concerns about Poland not being able 
to accede as part of the first wave. The Commission's 1999 progress report 
noted that Poland had not progressed significantly with legal harmonization. 
Lack of progress was also noted in state aid, and steel, fisheries and agriculture 
restructuring and infrastructure investment. Moreover, as a result of 
disagreements between the interventionist AW S  groupings and the liberals 
within the cabinet Poland also missed a December 1999 deadline for the 
enactment of legislation defining state aid criteria533. It did not help matters 
when negotiations stalled in April 2000 as Poland refused to lower agricultural 
tariffs.539
The legislative harmonization process improved when the parliamentary 
Commission for European Integration, headed by Unia Wolnosci's Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki, proposed draft legislation calling for the government to submit all 
required harmonisation measures for parliamentary ratification by July 2000. 
The proposal also included a request to:
establish a subject who, appointed by the Prime 
Minister and the government, will bear the 
responsibility for the efficiency and co-ordination of 
harmonization measures and for the carrying out the 
scheduled works in a disciplined manner.548
Jacek Saryusz-Wolski proved an acceptable candidate, combining European 
integration expertise with a Solidarity background and a lack of party-political
537 Ewa Freyberg, 'Wirtualna Integracja' Unia i Polska, nr.3(31), 21 February 2000.
538 M. Castle, Democracy in Poland (Cambridge 2002), p223.
539 Arkadiusz Dawidows, 'Libaralizujemy!' Wprost, 27 September 2000, p7.
540 Druk sejmowy 1685, III kadencja (http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki4ka.nsf, last accessed 2 November
2003).
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affiliation. Saryusz-Wolski quickly proceeded to raise the profile of the UKIE 
and improve coordination between the member ministries. As he stated shortly 
after his appointment in April 2000:
The co-ordination role of the Committee for European 
Integration should be strengthened, as well as the back 
office, which is the secretariat of the committee. The 
Secretariat should not only provide information but 
also monitor the legislative work within the 
government. I also foresee a greater participation of the 
KIE secretariat in the work of parliamentary 
commissions so that the legislation accepted by the 
government remains in accordance with EU law after it 
leaves the commissions.^
Saryusz-Wolski's appointment brought long awaited improvements in the 
integration process*42 and a large part of the required draft legislation was 
submitted and voted on by the summer of 2000543 and substantial progress 
made throughout the remainder of that year544. The EU recognised the 
improvement and the 2000 Commission report praised the progress made in 
privatisation and harmonisation of Polish law with European norms. 
Nonetheless, problems still persisted with delays in legal reforms and the 
restructuring of the agricultural sector.545
Negotiations
Although the negotiations formally started in April 1998 the first seven months 
of the process was taken up by 'screening': a detailed assessment of the 
compatibility of the applicant states' legislation with that of the EU. To date 
previous entrants had been required to harmonise their legal system with that 
of the EU. In certain areas applicant states could however negotiate an 
extension of time they had to harmonize. The time allocated for harmonisation
541 Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, interview by Arkadiusz Dawidowski, 'Mister Europa przyspiesza' Trybuna, 19 
April 2000.
542 Interview with John O'Rourke, 10 January 2002.
544 R. Zubek, Core Executive and Europeanization in Central Europe (New York 2008), p33.
545 Jacek Safuta, 'Nieco cieplej' Polityka, nr 47/2000 (2272).
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was known as the transition period. Contrary to popular perception, 
membership negotiations did not concern the conditions of membership but 
only the time within which the candidate states adhered to the EU's 
requirements.
In relation to accession the term negotiation was hence misleading in that a 
negotiation implies discussion and agreement on a set of terms from all 
negotiation partners. The accession process was different however, in that the 
terms of membership were already defined in the acquis communautaire. 
Moreover, any transition periods required unanimous agreement from all 
member states which significantly limited the flexibility needed to 
accommodate the needs of the candidates. As a result, the candidates scope for 
bargaining was minimal and the process largely one sided. ^
The negotiations were divided into thirty one chapters. These included free 
movement of goods, freedom of movement of persons, freedom to provide 
services, free movement of capital, company law, competition policy, 
agriculture, fisheries, transport policy taxation, economic and monetary union, 
statistics, social policy and employment, energy, industrial policy, small and 
medium sized enterprises, science and research, education and training, 
telecommunications and information technology, culture and audiovisual 
policy, regional policy and co-ordination of structural instruments, 
environment, consumer and health protection, justice and home affairs, 
customs union, external relations, common foreign and security policy, 
financial control, financial and budgetary provisions and institutions. Less 
contentious negotiation chapters, such as science and research or education and 
training could be closed straight away as no harmonisation measures were 
necessary. Other areas required lengthy negotiations however.
546 Grabbe, 'A Partnership for Accession? The Implications of EU Conditionality for the Central and East 
European Applicants.1, p.193, Mayhew, 'Enlargement of the European Union: an Analysis of the 
Negotiations with the Centred and East European Candidate Countries.', p!2.
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Agriculture was one of the most contentious negotiation chapters. 25% of the 
Polish workforce was in farming and 40% of its population rural.547 The 
agriculture chapter and specifically the attainment of Common Agricultural 
Policy funds on par with those of existing member states was hence a key 
negotiation area for the Poles. Total farming support levels in the EU were 
estimated to be over ten times higher in 1999 than those in Poland, potentially 
making CAP implementation one of the most financially advantageous aspects 
of enlargement for Poland. Farming support amounted to as much as 12% of 
total Polish budget spend in 1999 but the allocation of spending was much less 
efficient compared to that of the EU.548 9.7% of the 12% spend was used for 
incapacity and pension payments for farmers and only 2.4% on active 
agricultural policy. s« Agricultural restructuring funds were hence limited and 
Poland's agricultural policy and especially the repeated increases of import 
tariffs on agricultural products was not aligned with the CAP reforms taking 
place within the EU throughout the pre-accession period.550
State aid was another contentious issue as the Poles strove to secure a transition 
period until 2017 for the 'Special Economic Zones'.551 Other contentious topics 
included the free movement of capital, which included the sale of land to 
foreigners, as well as the chapters concerned with regional funds and the 
budget.
The first two years of negotiations did not proceed smoothly. As the AW S  
pushed for a 'tough' negotiation stance many chapters remained open and 
membership appeared increasingly distant as successive accession dates proved 
unrealistic. By January 2000 only eight of the thirty negotiation chapters had 
been closed. They included statistics, industrial policy, small and medium sized
547M. Johnson and J.Rollo, 'EU Enlargement and Commercial Policy: Enlargement and the Making of 
Commercial Policy', in 2001), p21.
548 Hausner and Marody, JakoSd Rzqdzenia: Polska blizej Unii Europejskiej?, p35.
Ibid.
558 Ibid.
551 Mayhew, 'Enlargement of the European Union: an Analysis of the Negotiations with the Central and 
East European Candidate Countries.', p26.
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enterprises, science and research, telecoms and IT, consumer and health 
protection and external Relations.
In March 2001 the EU called for seven year transition periods on the free 
movement of labour in exchange for seven years on the sale of land. This was 
not acceptable for the ZChN, whose influence grew as other parties left the 
AWS. Ryszard Czarnecki was not willing to give in:
Any compromise on the subject of land would only 
increase the pressure on Poland from the side of the EU.
We can combine tough negotiations with a quick accession.
Neither this government, nor the next one can afford for 
the prices of land in Poland to be lower than those in the 
EU. Liberalization would cause an increase in German 
interest in our real estate. Polish society is very sensitive in
this matter.552
ZChN  had the support of the euro-sceptic factions of PSL. 'Are you joking?7 
stated one PSL parliamentarian "This is not a compromise. I would call a traitor 
anyone who would agree to this' .553
The elites' tough stance on the sale of land did not reflect the priorities of the 
public however. According to a 1998 Institute of Public Affairs study issues 
identified as important in negotiations with EU were, in the order of priority: 
farming (66%), the right to work in other member states (54%), the right to 
reside in other member states (37%), and purchase of Polish real estate by 
foreigners (10%).554 The issue of the sale of land, so prominent in the rhetoric of 
the euro-sceptic elites, sat well below other public priorities such the ability to 
improve livelihoods by working in the EU and the fear of the adverse impact of 
accession on the Polish farming sector. Perhaps as a reflection of the importance 
attached to the issue in elite debate however the numbers of those opposed to 
the sale of land to foreigners grew from 43% in September 2000 to 51% in March
552 Ryszard Czarnecki, quoted in Katarzyna van Kraainen, 'Propozycja nie do Odrzucenia' Zycie, 
nr.98(1391), 26 April 2001, p3.
553 Ibid.
554 M. Gerszewska and J. Kucharczyk, 'Oczekiwania Polakow Wobec Negocjacji z Unia Europejska1, in 
Polska Eurodebata, ed. L. Kolarska-Bobinska (Warsaw 1999), p30.
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2001.555 In 2001 the majority of respondents also supported a 7tough' negotiation 
strategy. 68% felt that Poland should defend its negotiation stance even if this 
meant a delay to accession and only 14% felt that concessions should be made.
556
The government's unwillingness to compromise on the sale of land led to 
further doubts about Poland's ability to complete the integration process by the 
end of 2002. Nonetheless, Jerzy Buzek still refused to acknowledge that 2002 
was unrealistic. A disagreement between Saryusz-Wolski and Buzek 
concerning the date of accession ensued. What initially appeared to be 
confusion between the date on which Poland would be ready to accede and the 
actual date of accession proved a convenient excuse to discredit the exacting 
head of the KIE Secretariat. On 20 May 2001 Saryusz-Wolski announced that 1 
January 2003 was not a realistic entry date and that Poland could be expected to 
accede on 1 January 2004.557 Only two days later however, at a Brussels press 
conference held jointly with the President of the European Commission, 
Romano Prodi, Buzek stated that there had been no change in the expected 
accession date of 1 January 2003. He further informed the confused journalists 
that his discussions with Prodi had not broached the subject of the accession 
date. Saryusz-Wolski, also present at the press briefing, was reported to have 
appeared flustered and had declined to comment on the discrepancy between 
his and the Prime Minister's statements.558
Saryusz-Wolski retracted his claim several days later. He stated:
In relation to my statement of May 21st on the matter of the 
date of Poland's accession to the European Union, I would 
like to declare that I did not consult its content with the 
Prime Minister. In particular, there was no justification for 
my statement that the Polish side is considering the
555 Hausner and Marody, Jakosd Rz^dzenia: Polska blizej Unii Europejskiej?, p70.
556 Hausner, 2001 Hausner, Polski Talk Show: Dialog Spoleczny a Integraqa Europejska., p70; Centrum 
Badania Opinii Spolecznej 'Public Opinion' Report nr 2001/38.
557 'Negocjacje z UE. Cel: rok 2004' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.118,22 May 2001, p. 1.
558 Jacek Pawlicki, 'Negocjacje z Uniq Europejsk .^ Data? Jaka Data?' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.ll9(2001), 23 
May 2001, p4.
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possibility of postponing in time the actual date of Polish 
accession to the EU that is from the date 2003 to the year
2004.559
The communist-successor opposition was very critical of the government's 
confusion about the accession timetable. Leszek Miller commented: 'This is the 
final break down of the current negotiation strategy'.5^  According to Jozef 
Oleksy it 'made our country appear unprofessional, they make it look like it 
does not have a stable strategy regarding the European U n io n 'l l
Indeed, a strategy did appear to be lacking. The negotiations continued to stall 
throughout the following months and it soon became clear that January 2003 
was indeed an unrealistic target date. In July 2001 Poland had closed only 
sixteen out of thirty-one negotiation chapters and reached the bottom rung in 
the European Commission's progress chart, followed only by Bulgaria and 
Romania. However, neither Jerzy Buzek nor Jan Kulakowski were willing to 
compromise. Kulakowski pointed out: 'We aren't treating this as a race. We are 
taking it seriously, and we think our European partners recognise th is'.552 The 
integration process would not speed up again until a change in negotiation 
strategy was implemented after the SLD's return to power in September 2001.
EU membership in political debate
European integration was a particularly thorny point of dissent during the first 
two years of AW S  rule as Prime Minister Buzek manoeuvred between the euro- 
enthusiastic Unia Wolnosci and the euro-sceptic Zjednoczenie Chrzescijansko 
Narodowe, one of the A W S’ biggest member organisations. The ideological 
diversity of the AWS-171V government greatly problematized the development 
of a coherent European integration doctrine, thereby problematizing policy 
making and hampering the integration process. But in spite of the discord 
between coalition partners the accession project progressed, propelled by the
559 'Saryusz I juz' Trybuna Ludu, 24 May 2001, pi.
560 Ibid.
561 Ibid.
562 John Reed, 'Poland's tough EU negotiator prefers long game' Financial Times, 3 July 2001.
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euro-enthusiast Freedom Union. Once the U W  left the coaltion in June 1999 and 
as the AWS euro-sceptics proved increasingly unwilling to compromise on 
transition periods for the sale of land negotiations slowed down. The challenge 
of building consensus on accession in the ideologically diverse 1997-2001 
cabinet will be discussed in depth in this section.
The 1997 election campaign
The 1997 elections took place on September 21st 1997 on the basis of the same 
electoral ordination as those in 1993, with parliamentary representation 
thresholds set at 5% for parties and 8% for electoral coalitions. It became clear 
early on in the campaign that the contest would be primarily played out 
between the two biggest groupings: the communist-successor SLD and the 
Solidarity-successor AWS. The other contestants included Polskie Stronnictwo 
Ludowe, Ruch Odbudowy Polski, Unia Pracy and Unia Wolnosci. The results of the 
contest are presented in table 3.
Name of grouping Percentage of 
votes
Percentage of 
parliamentary seats
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej 27,13% 35,7%
Unia WolnoSci 13,37% 13,0%
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe 7,31% 5,9%
Ruch Odbudowy Polski 5,56% 1,3%
Unia Pracy 4,74% -
Krajowa Partia Emerytow i Rencistow 2,18% -
Unia Prawicy Rzeczypospolitej 2,03% -
Krajowe Porozumienie Emerytow i 
Rencistow Rzeczypospolitej Polskie j 1,63%
Blok dla Polski 1,36% -
Table 3:1997 parliamentary election results.5*53
Key topics addressed in the campaign included de-communisation, relations 
between Church and state, privatisation, social policy reform and European 
integration. Akcja Wyborcza Solidamosc and Ruch Odbudowy Polski advocated 
thorough de-communisation, a close relationship between the Church and the
563 F.Millard, Polish Politics and Society, (London 1999).
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state and adamantly opposed abortion. In terms of socio-economic policy, the 
AW S  planned reforms to the state administration, social security, education and 
health care. The SLD advocated a separation of Church and state and the 
legalisation of abortion. Women's rights played a prominent role in the 
programme. 564 Regarding economic policy, the SLD advocated continued 
privatisation and an anti-inflationary monetary policy but also emphasised the 
need to prevent unemployment.565 It also proposed an 'active industrial policy' 
advocating the use of tariffs, credit preferences and state concessions.566
A similar economic platform was presented by Unia Pracy. Positioned on the 
left of the SLD the UP focused on social inequalities, poverty and 
unemployment. It criticised both the Solidarity-successor and communist- 
successor government for pursuing neo-liberal economic policies.567 Instead, it 
advocated greater involvement of workers in enterprise management and a 
cautious approach to privatisation. An interventionist economic programme, 
with a strong emphasis on state aid for the farming sector, was also presented 
by the politically conservative Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe.
European integration was a salient issue in the 1997 campaign but the rhetoric 
on Europe remained ambiguous and symbolic. Although most groupings 
declared support for some form of integration they did not reconcile accession 
requirements with their socio-economic and political policy proposals. In terms 
of rhetoric however, the liberal Unia Wolnosci and the SLD were markedly 
enthusiastic about integration whereas politically conservative groupings such 
as the AW S, ROP and PSL took a more sceptical approach.
564 SLD 1997 Electoral Program 'Dobre DziS -  Lepsze Jutro', sections 4 and 5, Political Parties Archive, 
Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1997 election folder.
565 Ibid, section 9.
566 Ibid, section.l.
567 Unia Pracy 1997 electoral program: 'Zaslugujesz na Wiecej. Deklaracja Wyborcza Unii Pracy', section I.
Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1997 election 
folder.
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By 1997 the SLD's stance towards European integration was one of 
unambiguous support for both NATO and EU membership.568 One of its slogans 
stated: "To Europe? To the Left of Course!' Its programme declared: 'We 
consider Poland's membership in the European Union and NATO to be the 
most important foreign policy aims.. ..acceding to the European "Fatherland of 
Fatherlands" will bring better and safer lives to the Poles'.569
The post-communists presented themselves as a modernised, social-democratic 
party capable of cooperating with Western partners on an equal footing.5^  Their 
European integration doctrine was based on the blueprint of 'Social Europe' 
advocated by the Party of European Socialists of the European Parliament. In 
contrast to the AWS' 'Europe of Nations', the SLD advocated a 'European 
Fatherland' (iOjczyzna Europa), favouring close political integration and 
cooperation among the Union's member states. The Alliance emphasised the 
social aspects of the EU, such as the principle of solidarity inherent in the 
structural and cohesion funding programmes, the social charter, human rights, 
and anti-discrimination regulations. The key priorities of 'Social Europe' were 
employment, education, the environment and social security.571 The doctrine 
was outlined in Trybuna (a daily paper closely affiliated with the social 
democrats) by SLD parliamentarian Tadeusz Iwiriski:
The left emphasizes not only the requirements of the 
common market but also the necessity of creating a socially 
integrated Europe -  one of development and solidarity, a 
project combining economic and social factors. It is about a 
humanitarian solution, closer to the average person, and 
related to such problems as employment, education, 
security and the struggle with organized crime.572
569 SLD 1997 Electoral Program, 'Dobre DziS -  Lepsze Jutro', section 15, Institute of Political Sciences of the 
Polish Academy of Sciences, 1997 election folder.
570 Ibid, section 1.
571 Tadeusz Iwiriski, 'Lewicowa Wizja Europy' Trybuna, nr.161,12-13 July 1997, p. 12.
572 Ibid.
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In contrast to the SLD, Jan Olszewski's Ruch Odbudowy Polski took a cautious 
stance on accession. While enthusiastic about NATO m em bership373 ROP's 
support for EU membership was conditioned on protecting the Polish economy 
and maintaining subsidies and customs barriers. It stated:
Poland cannot remain in the grey zone between Western 
Europe and Russia. Poland's participation in Western 
economic structures requires time and money. We must 
prepare for it by modernizing agriculture, re-gaining self- 
sufficiency in agricultural production and gaining a 
positive balance in the trade of agricultural products; 
modernizing the industrial sector, radically raising the 
competitiveness of industrial undertakings, strengthening 
exports.574
ROP's integration strategy hence entailed firstly ensuring that Poland's 
economic development was on par with that of its European trade partners 
before accession could take place. Judging by 1997 growth rates, membership 
could hence be expected to take place in the next ten to twenty years.
ROP also emphasised the importance of keeping strategic industries such as 
banking and telecommunications in Polish hands and advocated interventionist 
economic policy and the use of state concessions, preferential credits and 
customs tariffs. 575
The Movement's highly conditional support for accession may have reflected its 
internal divisions. On the one hand the movement included conservatives such 
as Piotr Naimski and Radek Sikorski who expressed careful support for an 
economic union similar to the stance of British Conservatives. On the other 
hand, concerns about economic occupation, loss of the Recovered Territories 
and surrender of Polish sovereignty expressed in Antoni Macierwicz's paper
573 'Karta NiepodlegloSci Ruchu Odbudowy Polski z 11 Listopada 1996 roku', section 1, Political Parties 
Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1997 election folder.
574 Program Wyborczy Ruchu Odbudowy Polski, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of 
the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1997 election folder.
575 Ibid.
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Gtos indicated a much more sceptical stance, similar to that of the most sceptical 
members of the ZChN  and PSLp*
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe's stance towards EU accession combined the desire 
to protect Polish national identity from 'liberal pressures', 'post-modernism' 
and 'aggressive counter-culture'577 with the ambition to make use of the EU's 
agricultural subsidies and structural funds. For the PSL, EU membership was a 
zero-sum game, to be won either by 'us' or by 'Brussels'. The success of the 
integration process lay in the hands of the negotiators who had to be 'tough' in 
defending Polish national identity, its economy, and above all the agricultural 
sector. As section 8 of the Agrarians' programme specified:
We are going to the European Union for better living 
conditions and not so that things are worse than they are 
now. We should therefore negotiate for such membership 
conditions, which would bring about real structural change 
in Poland with the aid of the Union's funds.. .We want the 
same rules and opportunities in the struggle against 
structural and regional backwardness. We bring the dowry 
of a nation of almost 40 million, qualified professionals, 
extensive natural resources. We have created the European 
heritage for over 1000 years and wish to co-create it on 
terms of partnership and mutual understanding.575
The centre left Unia Pracy saw EU and NATO membership as a guarantee of 
Poland's international security579 but was also concerned about the potentially 
adverse impact on the labour market and emphasised the need to ensure fair 
accession terms for Poland:
Economic integration with Europe is a great opportunity 
for us, but we are badly prepared for it. We must strive to 
quickly develop a competitive industrial sector. In 
integration negotiations we must aim to achieve conditions
576 Bachmann, Polska Kaczka - Europejski Staw. Szanse i Pulapki Polskiej Polityki Europejskiej, pl67-9.
577 'v  Kongres Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego. Dokumenty Programowe', 1997, p.142.
578 Program Wyborczy Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego 1997, Political Parties Archive, Institute of 
Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1997 parliamentary elections folder.
579 Unia Pracy 1997 electoral program: 'Zaslugujesz na Wiecej. Deklaracja Wyborcza Unii Pracy', section I. 
Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1997 election 
folder, section 4.
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not worse than those gained by Spain, Greece, Ireland or 
Portugal. We cannot allow for integration to bring the 
growth of unemployment and turn us into the European 
raw materials base.580
Gaining parliamentary representation and preventing the communist- 
successors from maintaining political power was the primary raison d'etre of 
the AWS. As the 'Declaration of the AWS' stated: 'The aim of the Action is the 
formation of a wide electoral bloc which will have a chance of winning the 
upcoming parliamentary elections'.581 Rather than shared policy goals therefore, 
it was the desire to remove their political competitors from power that united 
the AWS' member groupings.
In light of this formulating the AW S programme was not an easy task, as was 
exemplified by the disagreements involved in the attempts to attain consensus 
on accession. Following a heated debate in March 1997 the AW S eventually 
declared its support for European integration. The most vocal opponents of this 
declaration included the Zjednoczenie Chrzescijahsko Narodowe, the far right 
Nationalist Democratic Faction (Stronnictwo Narodowo-Demokratyczne) and the 
libertarian Unia Polityki Realnej.582 Disagreements on the content of the draft 
document reflected the internal divisions of the AWS. The first version stated 
that the Akcja Wyborcza supported integration with a Europe that was: 'a 
political and economic organization of nation states, which regulate their 
internal political and economic issues in accordance to their own traditions'.585 A 
clause stating that the AW S would support only this kind of Europe was later 
added on the request of Marian Krzaklewski. The amendment was opposed by 
the pro-integrationist groupings including the Conservative Agrarians, Ruch 
Stu and the Conservative Coalition (Koalicja Konserwatywna).584
580 Ibid, section 1.
581 Andrzej Anusz, et al. ABC Akcji Wyborczej Solidarnosc, (Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza Fulmen, 1997), 
p9.
582 Witold Zaluska, 'AWS Wybrala Wladze', Gazeta Wyborcza, nr. 73,27 March 1997, p3.
585 Ibid.
584 Ibid.
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The AWS' economic programme, completed on 2 April 1997, was even more 
ambiguous. 'Poland should remain a sovereign state, not isolated from the 
European Union, but co-operating with the European Communities as well as 
other countries in Europe and the world',585 it stated. The programme did not 
mention accession and seemed to suggest that Poland should only co-operate 
with the European Economic Community, in place of becoming a member of it. 
It also pointed out that Poland's economic interests were not compatible with 
those of the EU and asserted that as Poland could not expect to attain access to 
CAP funding agricultural policy integration should only take place once the 
Polish farming sector was able to compete with that of the EU.586
The ambiguity of the above declarations and the prolonged discussions 
preceding the presentation of the Electoral Action's stance suggest that the AWS 
did not arrive at consensus on an accession strategy prior to the 1997 contest. 
Krzysztof Oksiuta of the Stronnictwo Konserwatywno-Ludowe, one of the AWS' 
member groupings, later confirmed this:
In all our electoral materials it was emphasised that we 
are going to the European Union.... There is the matter 
of the speed of integration with the European Union, 
and here there were very different voices in the 
electoral campaign. There were those who wanted to 
[accede] as quickly as possible, and my grouping, the 
Conservative-Agrarian Faction, was one of those, and 
there were opponents who thought well, the European 
Union, being in Europe does not mean that we have to 
[accede] straight away, that we should reform this 
European Union to a Europe of Nations, retain the 
national character, our institutions and so forth, and so 
because of this the speed of integration should be 
slower. Threats were made about selling out national 
property. That was ZChN  and these radically Catholic 
trends, so there was this stance in the electoral 
campaign. The Solidarity Trade Union also aligned 
itself in this formula in different regions of the country, 
depending on who was the regional head.. ..the leader
585 Program Gospodarczy AWS, 2/4/1997, 'Stosunki Gospodarcze z Otoczeniem Mi^dzynardowym' 
quoted in Madera, 2003, pi 79.
588 Ibid.
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himself, Marian Krzaklewski, did not take a clear stance 
in the electoral campaign.. .it was only after the election 
that the AW S decided to opt for faster integration.587
The AWS's lukewarm stance on Europe proved too much for Andrzej 
Olechowski of the liberal, pro-integrationist One Hundred Movement (Ruch 
Stu). Olechowski announced his withdrawal from the AW S in a letter to Marian 
Krzaklewski published in Gazeta Wyborcza on 21 June 1997.588 The letter was 
very critical of the Electoral Action and of its 1997 electoral programme. 
Olechowski described the Action's stance in the constitutional debate as 
divisive as well as 'immoral and irresponsible'. He pointed out that the 
protectionist economic policy was not one with which a free-market liberal 
could agree. The combination of tax cuts and increased public spending, 
Olechowski argued, was bound to produce double digit inflation and a 
growing budget deficit. He was also critical of the AWS's stance on Europe. The 
letter stated:
The AWS's approach to European integration is 
particularly disappointing. The Action does not appear 
to believe that a speedy membership in NATO and the 
European Union is the only realistic method of 
consolidating the independence and the civilisational 
advancement of the Poles.. .European integration is a 
historic opportunity for escaping the 'balance of power' 
world where international relations are a zero sum 
game.. ..we must not only accede to the European 
Union, but this union must also be 'deep' and be 
continually deepened.589
The ideological diversity represented by the Electoral Action's member 
organisations reflected the views on European integration they presented 
during the 1997 contest. On the one hand, centre-right, liberal organisations, 
such as the Conservative-Agrarian Faction or the Ruch Stu, advocated speedy
587 Interview with Krzysztof Oksiuta, 9 July 1998.
588 Andrzej Olechowski, 'List do przewodnicz^cego AWS, Odchodzqc z AWS' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.143, 
21/21 June 1997, pl3-14.
589 Ibid, pl3-14.
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accession. On the other hand, Catholic-nationalist groupings such as the 
Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej, the ZChN  and the Catholic Families were very 
sceptical of accession. While not explicitly opposed to European integration, 
these parties qualified their support with numerous and often unrealistic 
conditions.
The Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej -  Obdz Patriotyczny (Confederation for 
Independent Poland -  Patriotic Faction, KPN-OP)590 typified such conditional 
support. While it did not explicitly oppose EU membership, the KPN-OP was 
sceptical about the advantages it would bring to Poland. In section 6.8 of their 
programme the Confederates called for the re-negotiation of the Association 
Agreements and claimed that in order for Poland to compete with the EU on an 
equal footing Polish annual growth should average between 10% and 15%. This 
was hardly a realistic expectation given that the Polish economy grew 7% in 
1997. The programme ended with a section entitled "Problems with European 
integration". According to the KPN  these included agricultural over-production, 
growing unemployment, and "a ruthless battle, breaking all established rules, 
for subsidies, production levels, markets and employment".591
Like the Confederates, the Zjednoczenie Chrzescijahsko Narodowe also did not 
explicitly oppose accession and its programme lacked a clear stance on the EU. 
Section 36 called for the "abandonment of dogma' in the nature and speed of 
integration with European and other international economic structures.592 The 
Christian-nationalists" preferred speed and nature of integration were not 
specified however. Moreover, ZChN  made several euro-sceptic declarations 
prior to the campaign. In February 1996, for example, the ZChN  condemned
590 KPN-OP was established in June 1997 by Adam Slomka following a power struggle between Slomka 
and Leszek Moczulski. Moczulski's faction of the Confederation chose to leave the AWS prior to the 
September 1997 elections and hence did not gain parliamentary representation.
591 KPN-OP programme, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of 
Sciences, KPN folder.
592 'Program Gospodarczo-Spoleczny ZChN', Informator Zjednoczenia Chrzescijahsko Narodowego, 
nr.42/7, 29.02.96, Warsaw, section 36, p.8, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the 
Polish Academy of Sciences, ZChN folder.
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new legislation increasing foreigners' rights to purchase land593 and in June 1996 
it called for a re-negotiation of the Association Agreements and extensive 
transition periods in the event of accession.394 The ZChN's euro-sceptic stance 
was also reflected by the fact that it did not seek membership of Christian 
Democratic international organizations such as the European Peoples' Party 
and instead established links with the euro-sceptic, conservative-nationalist 
'Union for Europe' grouping in the European Parliament393.
The ZChN's stance was very different from that of the Porozumienie Centrum. 
The PC was not known for its euro-enthusiasm but even its lukewarm support 
contrasted sharply with the ZChN's scepticism. Having emphasized the need 
for speedy NATO membership393 the PC's 1997 programme stated:
Membership in the European Union lies at the heart of the 
strategic interests of our country, as it ties it civilisationally, 
politically and economically with the West and allows for 
faster economic growth. While considering social and 
economic realities as wide as possible a representation of 
Poland in Union institutions should be ensured and the 
period of waiting for membership should be made as short 
as possible.397
Another grouping that supported speedy membership in the EU was 
Aleksander Hall's Conservative-Agrarian Faction. Its programme not only 
emphasised the need for speedy accession but also criticised those who feared it 
would lead to the loss of national values and identity:
The European Union is not a melting pot which turns 
nations participating in the integration process into a 
homogenous European society. Respect for national
393 ' V Nadzwyczajny Zjazd Krajowy Zjednoczenia ChrzeScijarisko-Narodowego', Uchwala nr.l, Informator 
Zjednoczenia ChrzeScijarisko-Narodowego, nr. 41/6, 28 February 1996, Warsaw, Political Parties Archive, 
Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, ZChN folder.
394 Zjednoczenie ChrzeScijarisko Narodowe, Uchwala nr.20/30/96, 15 June 1996, Archive of Political 
Parties, Insitute of Political Studies, ZChN folder.
393 Bale, pl7.
396 Uchwala nr.5 IV Kongresu Porozumienia Centrum -  Akcja Wyborcza Solidamosc, section 2, Political 
Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Porozumienie Centrum 
folder.
397 Ibid.
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traditions and diversity is the obvious right of each 
member state, and has been made use of by the members 
with no limitations. Membership in the European Union 
will be the consequence of our 1000 year old presence in 
Europe, and not a break with national tradition. 598
In light of the above the AWS' umbrella programme had to be sufficiently 
ambiguous to incorporate the contradictory approaches of its member 
groupings. The heading of the section on European integration stated: 'Full 
membership in NATO and integration with Europe'.599 An implicit distinction 
between NATO membership and 'integration' with the EU was hence 
established. The disparity between enthusiastic support for NATO and the 
lukewarm acceptance of European integration was also prominent further in 
the programme:
We decisively support Poland's full membership in NATO 
to take place as soon as possible. Integration with the 
European Union will create a real possibility of gaining 
direct influence on the shaping of the new European order.
We will be an active participant in international co­
operation, we aim towards the establishment of a Europe 
where free nations are united in a Europe of Nations.*™
Unlike that of NATO membership, the desired timing of integration with the 
European Union was not specified. Moreover, the programme did not explicitly 
state that the Electoral Action supported EU membership and instead only 
declared support for an unspecified form of 'integration'. Integration was 
desirable, the AW S  argued, as it would allow Poland to influence the evolution 
of the new European order. This new Europe would, the programme implied, 
be an intergovernmental 'Europe of Nations'. The Europe which the Electoral 
Action supported had little in common with the closely integrated and 
increasingly federalist European Union. It was also very different from the kind
598 Program Wyborczy Stronnictwa Konserwatywno-Ludowego, Political Parties Archive, Institute of 
Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1997 election folder.
599 Akqa Wyborcza SolidamoSc, 'Peine Czlonkowstwo w NATO i Integracja z Europe', Political Parties 
Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1997 election folder.
600 Ibid.
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of Europe favoured by the euro-enthusiast SLD and Unia Wolnosci. As Danuta 
Hubner, the head of the presidential chancellery, commented:
Those who speak of a 'Europe of Nations', and it is 
particularly the AW S  which emphasised this in its 
rhetoric, they do not understand the processes which 
are taking place in the European Union. They are under 
the impression that it is possible to accede to the 
European Union while remaining completely 
autonomous with regards to all matters related to the 
economy, the state, society.. .this is of course an 
abstraction... if one understands things in this way then 
one does not want to be a member of the European 
Union since it is simply not possible.*01
To compromise between its diverse member organisations the AW S  hence tried 
to do the impossible. Confronted with the need to both oppose and support 
accession, the Action's leadership resorted to an abstraction. They would 
support EU membership, but only if membership did not involve any kind of 
integration. The 'Europe of Nations' that the AW S  supported was a very 
different organisation from that with which it was about to start accession 
negotiations.
In contrast to that of the AWS, the programme of Unia Wolnosci was 
unambiguously supportive of integration, calling for both NATO and EU 
membership to take place as soon as possible. Accession would entail few socio­
economic costs, the Unia argued, since the reforms required for it would have 
had to be carried out anyway if Poland was to successfully transform itself into 
a free-market, liberal democracy. The U W  competed on a neo-liberal, laissez- 
faire economic platform, proposing continued privatisation, abolition of state 
concessions and subsidies, as well as pension and health care reform. 602 Unia 
Wolnosci's neo-liberal economic policy preferences were hence well-aligned 
with accession requirements. Its programme stated:
601 Interview with Danuta Hubner, 24 July 1998.
602 'Program Wyborczy Unii WolnoSci', Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish 
Academy of Sciences, 1997 election folder.
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It should be emphasized that reform efforts, necessary for 
the success of our foreign policy must take place anyway, if 
we want to tear Poland away from decades of relative 
backwardness. These efforts will bring us greater 
international security and faster development when we 
take a reformed Poland into NATO and the European 
Union. Without completing domestic reforms the 
achievement of national aims may prove to be 
impossible.603
In contrast to the AWS, the SLD, Unia Wolnosci and Unia Pracy hence appeared 
staunchly pro-integrationist. Vocal enthusiasm for accession should not be 
taken at face value however. In his analysis of the 1997 electoral campaign Jacek 
Kucharczyk of the Institute for Public Studies in Warsaw, assessed the 
compatibility of the 1997 electoral programmes with the 1996 recommendations 
of the European Commission. The recommendations, known as the avis, 
provided an overview of Poland's readiness to integrate with the EU and 
identified six political and four economic areas that needed reform. The results 
of Kucharczyk's analysis are summarised in table 3. The first political issue 
addressed by the Commission concerned the tax authorities' ability to request 
information from the taxpayer's bank, which was considered to violate banking 
privacy. Secondly, the Commission raised concerns about freedom of the press. 
Journalists could be jailed for up to eight years for making mocking or 
untruthful observations about organs of the state. The third political 
recommendation addressed the lack of a legal definition of non-governmental 
organisations, which prevented them from applying for tax reductions. The 
Commission also addressed civilian control of the military, protection of 
national minorities, funding for the police and the judiciary, and lack of 
compensation for victims of the communist and Nazi regimes. Regarding 
economic policy, the Commission identified the need to restructure the 
agricultural sector, reform social security, eliminate state concessions and 
subsidies, speed up the re-privatisation process as well as privatise the banking 
and telecommunications sectors.
603 Ibid, section 99.
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As is shown in table 3, Unia Wolnosci was the only grouping whose enthusiasm 
for EU membership was matched by a willingness to implement the required 
reforms. The AW S meanwhile failed to address many of the Commission's 
recommendations. Regarding the political requirements it did not address the 
issue of minorities' protection, banking privacy or the establishment of a legal 
definition of NGOs. The Akcja Wyborcza also did not advocate banking and 
telecommunications privatisation nor did it address the requirement to limit 
state subsidies. Although vocal euro-enthusiasm played a key part in the SLD's 
efforts to distance itself from its authoritarian past its policies often contradicted 
the recommendations of the avis. 604 The SLD addressed only four of the 
recommendations: civilian control of the military, better financing for the 
judiciary, minorities protection, and social security and the agricultural reform. 
While the Unia Pracy addressed most of the political recommendations, its 
socio-economic programme was significantly less compatible with the 
Commission's requirements. The UP postulated social security reform and 
restructuring of the agricultural sector but it also advocated protection of the 
domestic industry and the use of subsidies to prevent job losses in the heavy 
industry. «5
ROP's questionable support for European integration appeared even more 
dubious when its programme was considered in light of the recommendations 
of the European Commission. Regarding the political issues, ROP supported 
the need for quick re-privatisation, civilian control of the military, legal 
protection of the press as well as better police and judiciary financing; however, 
it did not address minorities' rights, banking privacy nor the need for a legal 
definition of NGOs. It was the Movement's economic programme, however, 
which was most at odds with the Commission's recommendations. Regarding 
the agricultural sector, ROP argued that Poland should only accede to the EU if 
it was exempted from the Common Agricultural Policy. It also emphasised the 
need to protect domestic markets and ensure adequate governmental support
604 Kucharczyk, 'Za a Nawer Przeciw. Partie Polityczne Wobec Perspektywy Integracji w Wyborach 1997'.
Ibid.
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for Polish industries. ROP  did not support the privatisation of banking and 
telecommunications and argued that these were strategic sectors that should 
remain in Polish hands.606
The PSL's electoral programme also did not match many of the European 
Commission's recommendations. Regarding the political items, it addressed 
only those concerning the need for a more efficient judiciary and civilian control 
of the military. Regarding the agricultural sector, the Agrarians felt that no 
reforms should be undertaken and that the Polish peasants should receive the 
same subsidies as their West European colleagues. PSL advocated an 
interventionist economic policy, calling for slower privatisation and 
emphasising the need to protect domestic industries by means of subsidies and 
concessions. The Agrarians also opposed the privatisation of the banking and 
telecommunications sectors.607
606 Ibid.
607 Ibid.
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Unia
Wolno&ci
Unia Pracy Polskie
Stronnictwo
Ludowe
Sojusz Lewicy 
Demokratycznej
Akcja
Wyborcza
Solidarnosc
Ruch Odbudowy 
Polski
Banking privacy 
legislation
Expressed 
intention to 
resolve
Did not address Did not address Did not address Did not 
address
Did not address
Freedom of the press Proposed new 
legislation
Proposed new 
legislation
Did not address Did not address Proposed new 
legislation
Proposed reform 
of media 
regulation
Judiciary and police 
funding and resource 
provision
Called for
more
resources
Called for more 
resources
Called for more 
resources
SLD did not 
address, SdRP 
called for more 
resources
Called for 
more resources
Called for more 
resources
Measures against the 
discrimination of 
national minorities
Did not 
address
Expressed need 
to allow 
national 
minorities to 
'exist freely'
Did not address Expressed the need 
to protect national 
minorities
Did not 
address
Did not address
Lack of a legal 
definition of non­
governmental 
organizations
Aimed to 
establish an 
'NGO
friendly state'
Planned to 
clarify legal 
situation
Did not address Did not address Did not 
address
Did not address
Civilian control of the 
armed forces
Supported
civilian
control
Supported 
civilian control
Supported civilian 
control
Supported civilian 
control
Supported 
civilian control
Supported 
civilian control
Compensation for 
victims of Nazi and 
Communist regimes
Expressed
strong
support
Did not address Did not address Referred to need 
for re-privatization
Expressed 
strong support
Expressed strong 
support
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Unia
Wolnosci
Unia Pracy Polskie
Stronnictwo
Ludowe
Sojusz Lewicy 
Demokratycznej
Akcja
Wyborcza
Solidarnosc
Ruch Odbudowy 
Polski
Agricultural sector 
reform
Advocated
market
liberalization
Advocated
market
liberalization
Expressed 
intention to 
support small 
family farms (the 
opposite of what 
was required)
Suggested 'dual­
employment' of 
peasants as means 
of restructuring
Advocated
market
liberalization
Proposed for 
Poland to be 
excluded from 
CAP when in the 
EU
Banking and
telecommunications
privatization
Intended to 
privatize
Opposed
privatization
Opposed banking 
privatization and 
called for telecoms 
to remain under 
'state protection'
Did not address 
directly, 
postulated 
telecoms reform
Did not 
address
Opposed 
privatization as 
'strategic sectors'
Abolition of state 
subsidies and 
concessions
Opposed
intervention­
ism
Called for need 
to protect work 
places and 
develop an 
active 
'structural 
policy'
Advocated
interventionism
Proposed an 
'active industrial 
policy' and use of 
concessions
Opposed 
concessions 
and did not 
address issue 
of subsidies
Advocated
interventionism
Social security reform Proposed
reform
Proposed
reform
Proposed reform Proposed reform Proposed
reform
Proposed reform
Table 4:1997 electoral programmes and European Commission recommendations, adapted from Jacek Kucharczyk.608
608 Ibid.
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The above analysis hence highlights the contradictions between the parties' 
declarations of support for Europe and their unwillingness to implement the 
reforms required for accession. It also shows how little the European integration 
doctrines of the AW S and its coalition partner, Unia Wolnosci had in common. For 
the liberal Unia Wolnosci, the processes of systemic transformation and European 
integration were mutually reinforcing. The reforms required for accession would, 
according to the liberals, have to be carried out anyway if Poland was to develop 
into a liberal, free-market democracy. The AWS numerous member groupings 
meanwhile struggled to present a consistent stance on accession. The restructuring 
of the heavy industry went against the interests of many of the Action's trade 
unionist voters and the AW S  was also uncomfortable with the transfer of national 
competences to Brussels. But rather than address these concerns Electoral Action 
declared support for the 'Europe of Nations', a structure which had little in 
common with either the increasingly integrated post-Maastricht EU or the liberal, 
closely integrated community envisioned by Unia Wolnosci.
The 2000 Presidential Elections
The presidential election took place on October 8th, 2000. The Solidarity-successor 
groupings once again proved unable back a single candidate and, as during the 
1995 contest, the incumbent Aleksander Kwasniewski competed with several 
contenders. In total, thirteen candidates registered. Apart from Kwasniewski, they 
included the liberal Andrzej Olechowski, Marian Krzaklewski, Jaroslaw 
Kalinowski of the PSL, the leader of the radical Agrarian Samoobrona movement 
Andrzej Lepper, Jan Olszewski, the libertarian Janusz Korwin-Mikke, Lech Walesa, 
the Catholic-nationalist Jan Lopuszanski, Dariusz Grabowski of the KPN, the 
former Chief of General Staff Tadeusz Wilecki, the socialist Piotr Ikonowicz, and 
Bogdan Pawlowski, who had no party-political affiliation. The results are 
presented in table 5.
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Candidate Results
1 Aleksander Kwasniewski 53.90%
2 Andrzej Olechowski 17.30%
3 Marian Krzaklewski 15.57%
4 Jaroslaw Kalinowski 5.95%
5 Andrzej Lepper 3.05%
6 Janusz Korwin-Mikke 1.43%
7 Lech Walesa 1.01%
8 Jan Lopuszariski 0.79%
9 Dariusz Grabowski 0.51%
10 Piotr Ikonowicz 0.22%
11 Tadeusz Wilecki 0.16%
12 Bogdan Pawlowski 0.10%
Table 5: Results of the 2000 presidential election.609
Aleksander Kwasniewski was presented as a moderate610, "president of all Poles', 
head and shoulders above the squabbling Solidarity-successor candidates. He 
described himself as a 'social-liberal' and a proponent of the Blairite '3rd way':
In the context of democratic values, human rights, I am a 
proponent of the liberal option, which above all underlines the 
individuality of persons and their rights. At the same time I 
expect responsibility. But as far as my political views are 
concerned, then these are undoubtedly social democrat, 
understood as tolerance, religious freedom, independence of 
one's views and faith, concern for human problems. On the 
other hand I do not hide that regarding the relationship 
between the economic sphere and social policy, I support a 
compromise between the so called liberal vision and the social 
democratic one. In this case one could say that I am very close 
to the views expressed by Tony Blair, leader of the Labour 
Party.611
609 Dudek, p490.
610 Program Wyborczy Aleksandra KwaSniewskiego, 2000, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political 
Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2000 presidential election folder.
611 Ibid.
206
His rhetoric was unequivocally supportive of accession and he argued that Poland 
should become a regional leader facilitating future enlargements. His programme 
stated:
We want a Poland which is respected in the world -  we 
should therefore strengthen our presence in NATO, act on its 
further enlargement, build friendly, equal relations in our near 
vicinity leading an active regional policy. We should be 
serious and determined in our preparations to open ourselves 
to Europe, harmonizing our law and economy with the 
requirements of the European Union and making our 
standards and level of quality of life closer to those of the 
highly developed countries. We should strive for the doors to 
European and trans-Atlantic structures to remain open for 
other countries from our region.612
Kwasniewski's euro-enthusiastic stance was very much at odds with that of 
Marian Krzaklewski. Caught once again between the centre-right, pro- 
integrationist side of the Solidarity-successor electorate and the radical Catholic 
supporters of the religious movement and radion station Radio Maryja, 
Krzaklewski exhibited a thinly veiled dislike of the EU.
Presenting an unambiguous stance on the hence EU proved problematic for 
Krzaklewski. He did not oppose accession: 'Our national interest depends on 
ensuring Poland an appropriate and sovereign position in the family of European 
nations. Poland's integration with the EU, as understood by AW S, serves to ensure 
Polish well-being, access for our products to the markets of the European 
Community, ensuring Polish industry and agriculture the conditions for 
development comparable to those that countries that are EU members have, giving 
Poland additional guarantees of external security', he stated. Joining the EU would 
act as, according to Krzaklewski, 'a condition of the better solution of the economic
612 Ibid.
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and social problems faced by Poland and as the road to a fuller realization of the 
national interest and to the strengthening of Polish identity'.613
But the EU Krzaklewski supported was a 'community of free nations that 
remember their identity'.614 He advocated a 'Europe of Nations' as an alternative to 
'left wing federationalist utopias' and warned of 'idealizing accession without 
being aware of the full scale of its costs' and of a 'cultural revolution' purportedly 
planned by left wing euro-enthusiasts. Brussels, Krzaklewski warned, could easily 
become the new Moscow and could once again lead to the 'evil' of communism 
and its successors.613
According to Krzaklewski, a pro-integrationist plot was being hatched by euro- 
enthusiasts from SLD and Unia Wolnosci. Accession, Krzaklewski argued, should 
be seen in cost-benefit terms rather than as an 'ideological aim'. He declared:
The choice which Akcja Wyborcza Solidamosc has to make is 
as follows. Either we will realize the political project 
created by our enemies, or we will realize our own political 
strategy. A strategy of victory! The idea of our opponents 
has already been presented to the public. It has been 
spoken about by both the leaders of the SLD: Aleksander 
Kwasniewski and Leszek Miller, and by the 
representatives of the left wing of the Unia 
Wolnosci.. .According to this project, the basic theme 
organizing the Polish political scene should be integration 
with the European Union, seen as an ideological and not a 
practical aim of Polish policy -  as it is seen by the AW S and 
a large part of the responsible politicians in the 'post- 
August' camp -  it should serve to ensure prosperity for the 
Poles, opening of the markets of the European Community 
to our products, provide Polish industry and agriculture 
with development conditions comparable to those of the
613 Marian Krzaklewski, quoted in Szczerbiak, 'Europe as a Re-aligning Issue in Polish Politics?: Evidence from 
the October 2000 Presidential Election1, p ll.
614 Ibid.
615 Program Wyborczy Mariana Krzaklewskiego, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the 
Polish Academy of Sciences, 2000 presidential election folder.
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economies of the Union's member states, create additional 
guarantees of external security for Poland.616
Krzaklewski hence made no attempt to reach out to the communist-successor 
electorate. He actively alienated voters who had any previous affiliation with the 
communist party617 as well as those on the centre-right, who were dismayed with 
the divisive, polarising politics of Krzaklewski and the A W S . Consequently, his 
electorate was limited to voters with right wing, Catholic-nationalist sympathies. 
On this side of the political spectrum however, Krzaklewski was confronted with 
numerous rivals such as Jan Lopuszanski, Dariusz Grabowski of the Konfederacja 
Polski Niepodleglej, and the former Chief of Staff Tadeusz Wilecki.
Andrzej Olechowski presented himself as a capable businessman with no party- 
political affiliation. His programme focused on educational reform, improvement 
of the judicial system, job creation, the elimination of corruption and party 
nomenclature, infrastructure modernisation and the separation of foreign policy 
from party-political conflicts.
Olechowski was unambiguous in his support for European integration. The 
opening statement of his programme described his pride at the political consensus 
which had led to Poland's membership in NATO and which, he stated, 'will 
shortly lead to membership in the European Union'.616 He was critical of the fact 
that negotiations with the EU had fallen prey to party-political interests and made 
the separation of foreign policy from party politics a key element of his 
programme. Olechowski was also concerned about the growing polarisation of 
Polish political life. He stated:
616 Ibid.
617 Ibid.
618 Program Wyborczy Andrzeja Olechowskiego, 2000, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences 
of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2000 presidential election folder.
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It is a tragic paradox that August -  when all were in solidarity, 
when Solidamosc and Poland were one thing -  has divided 
us.. .If we go on defining our identity in contrast to that of 
others we will deepen our weakness. Mr. Walesa wants to be 
anti-Jaruzelski, Mr.Kwasniewski wants to be anti-Walesa, 
Mr.Krzaklewski wants to be anti-Kwasniewski. This chain 
leads nowhere!619
Like Kwasniewski, Olechowski presented himself as a safe, moderate and capable 
candidate. By distancing himself from party-politics he offered an alternative to the 
Solidarity-successor candidates who were perceived as quarrelsome and 
ineffective. The fact that Kwasniewski and Olechowski, who aimed to heal the 
schism between the post-Solidarity and post-communist sections of political elites, 
attained the most votes indicates how disappointed the electorate was with the 
internal conflicts and polarising approach of the AWS.
Jaroslaw Kalinowski, chairman of the communist-successor Polskie Stronnictwo 
Ludowe, came fourth, with 5.95% of the vote. Kalinowski did not devote much 
attention to foreign affairs, focusing instead on unemployment, social security, 
health care and education. He advocated an interventionist economic policy with 
agricultural export subsidies and payment guarantees for farmers. In contrast to 
his euro-sceptic colleagues, Kalinowski supported membership in the European 
Union, given that it was based on a 'partnership'.
The PSL's main challenge came in the form of the radical Agrarian Samoobrona and 
its leader Andrzej Lepper. Although Lepper attained only 3.05% of the votes, this 
was over a twofold improvement from the 1995 contest where he got 1.32%.62° 
Lepper's radical approach contrasted with Kalinowski's centrist programme. He 
was made famous for organising farmers' protests and was particularly critical of 
the liberal, shock-therapy reformer Leszek Balcerowicz.
619 Ibid.
620 Frances Millard, Polish Politics and Society (Routledge: London, 1999), p92.
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anti-Jaruzelski, Mr.Kwasniewski wants to be anti-Walesa, 
Mr.Krzaklewski wants to be anti-Kwasniewski. This chain 
leads nowhere!619
Like Kwasniewski, Olechowski presented himself as a safe, moderate and capable 
candidate. By distancing himself from party-politics he offered an alternative to the 
Solidarity-successor candidates who were perceived as quarrelsome and 
ineffective. The fact that Kwasniewski and Olechowski, who aimed to heal the 
schism between the post-Solidarity and post-communist sections of political elites, 
attained the most votes indicates how disappointed the electorate was with the 
internal conflicts and polarising approach of the AWS.
Jaroslaw Kalinowski, chairman of the communist-successor Polskie Stronnictwo 
Ludowe, came fourth, with 5.95% of the vote. Kalinowski did not devote much 
attention to foreign affairs, focusing instead on unemployment, social security, 
health care and education. He advocated an interventionist economic policy with 
agricultural export subsidies and payment guarantees for farmers. In contrast to 
his euro-sceptic colleagues, Kalinowski supported membership in the European 
Union, given that it was based on a 'partnership'.
The PSL's main challenge came in the form of the radical Agrarian Samoobrona and 
its leader Andrzej Lepper. Although Lepper attained only 3.05% of the votes, this 
was over a twofold improvement from the 1995 contest where he got 1.32%.'«o 
Lepper's radical approach contrasted with Kalinowski's centrist programme. He 
was made famous for organising farmers' protests and was particularly critical of 
the liberal, shock-therapy reformer Leszek Balcerowicz.
Ibid.
620 Frances Millard, Polish Politics and Society (Routledge: London, 1999), p92.
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Lepper advocated a policy he described as the 'Third Way', rejecting both 
communism and capitalism. His proposals included free access to education and 
healthcare, a right to work and a tax-free minimum income. He also called for state 
support for the construction industry, sales guarantees for agricultural products, 
increased import tariffs, subsidised credits and full pensions for farmers.621
Lepper's programme did not specify whether he supported or opposed EU 
accession. Instead he called for a thorough debate which would allow 'society to 
make a conscious choice'622 about the EU. His programme devoted much attention 
to Poland's relations with the East. He called for a better defined policy towards 
the East which would have included the rebuilding of 'proper, good neighbourly 
relations with the former USSR, especially with Russia, the Ukraine and 
Byelorussia'.62*
Three of the remaining seven contenders campaigned on a strongly anti- 
integrationist platform. These were Jan Lopuszanski, Tadeusz Wilecki and Janusz 
Korwin-Mikke. Of the three, Lopuszanski was the most adamant in his opposition 
to EU membership. Lopuszanski presented his opponents as collaborators, 
working for foreign interests seeking to once again occupy Poland. He described 
the presidential contest as a struggle for Poland's future. His programme stated: 
'Our motherland -  Poland, today finds itself in one of the hardest periods of its 
history.. .Yet another partition of Poland is taking place. Our sovereignty is 
threatened'.624
Lopuszanski's stance on Europe was summed up with the slogan: 'Europe yes -  
European Union -  no!'62* He supported friendly relations with other European
621 Program Wyborczy Andrzeja Leppera, 2000, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the
Polish Academy of Sciences, 2000 presidential election folder.
62* Ibid.
624 Program Wyborczy Jana topuszanskiego, 2000, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the 
Polish Academy of Sciences, 2000 presidential election folder.
62* Ibid.
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states and argued that Poland should use its geopolitical location to serve as a 
bridge between Eastern and Western Europe. If European integration was to take 
place however, it had to be based on Christian principles and in no way impinge 
on the national sovereignty of its participants. His programme stated: "We support 
the unity of Europe -  built on the foundation of its Christian culture. We assert that 
outside of this culture European unity is not possible7.626
Apart from the EU7s secularity, Lopuszanski's main objection to membership was 
its impact on Polish sovereignty. He stated:
Having experienced half a century of totalitarianism, it is with 
the greatest concern that we observe the development of the 
European Union, in which we note elements of the very same 
dangerous utopia -  with its supranational decisions and the 
destruction of the sovereignty of nations.. .This is why we 
want to speak with the representatives of European nations 
about ways of co-operating and coming closer which would 
serve as alternatives to the European Union. About a Europe 
of Nations understood as a Europe of sovereign national 
states. I want this to have a significant dimension within my 
presidency.627
For Jan Lopuszanski EU membership was not just evocative of the partitions; it 
was another partition. He venerated the Polish nation state and was much more 
concerned with its sovereignty than with the quality of life of its citizens. He 
blamed Poland's economic problems on the 'West7, the European Union, and their 
'spies' Leszek Balcerowicz and Aleksander Kwasniewski. Any dissent against the 
EU's 'economic occupation' would, according to Lopuszanski, be quashed by 
NATO forces.
The former Chief of General Staff Tadeusz Wilecki was equally sceptical about EU 
membership. His programme stated:
626 Ibid.
627 Ibid.
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I oppose the speeding up of accession to the European Union.
The entry to it in the current condition of our country will be 
nothing else but a further dependency on foreign capital, 
further diminishment of Polish sovereignty, pushing Poles to 
the role of slaves in their own country. I will demand a nation­
wide referendum in this matter. It cannot be allowed for the 
European Union to tell Poland to solve its problems when it is 
the European Union itself which is the problem.628
Wilecki also advocated the reinstatement of the death penalty, educational reform, 
import barriers and a reform of the taxation system. He emphasised the 
importance of the Catholic Church in Polish society and proposed measures 
against drug abuse and pornography. In contrast to Jan Lopuszanski, Wilecki did 
not oppose Polish membership in NATO. He called for strong, professional armed 
forces which would allow Poland to become a credible member of NATO.
For the libertarian Janusz Korwin-Mikke, 'euro-socialism' presented the greatest 
danger to Poland's sovereignty. As an alternative to EU membership, Korwin- 
Mikke proposed participation in the North American Free Trade Association 
(NAFTA). His programme stated:
While signing and ratifying international treaties I will be 
directed only by Justice and the interest of Poland -  and not 
the interest of foreign states, international organizations, and 
the doctrine of euro-socialism.... I will consider Poland's 
accession to NAFTA, in the face of a growing conflict between 
the USA and the European Union, I would prefer to stand on 
the side of the United States. Washington is further away from 
Honolulu than from Warsaw -  yet Hawaii is a part of NAFTA. 
Moreover, NAFTA does not infringe on states' sovereignty.629
628 Program Wyborczy Tadeusza Wileckiego, 2000, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the 
Polish Academy of Sciences, 2000 presidential election folder.
629 Program Wyborczy Janusza Korwin-Mikke, 2000, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of 
the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2000 presidential election folder.
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Korwin-Mikke's other proposals included the re-introduction of the death penalty, 
reform of the social services, stringent anti-corruption measures, a fully 
professional military and judicial reform.630
While supportive of EU membership, Lech Walesa asserted that Poland should not 
join the European Union 'on its knees'. His programme stated: 'We do not have to 
degrade ourselves. Let us not allow for Poland to enter the Union on the basis of a 
second-category membership...We have the right to expect a partner like 
a pp roach 'In  order to achieve such a partnership Walesa proposed a strategy 
which combined what he described as a 'New Generation Marshall Plan' with 
'good relations with neighbours'.632 He argued that in compensation for the 
economic ruin caused by the cold war the West should develop an extensive and 
well coordinated plan of financial aid for post-communist countries.633
Dariusz Grabowski, of the Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej, presented a very 
cautious stance on accession. His programme declared: 'Poland has existed before 
the European Union, and it will exist even if the European Union was to dissolve 
itself'.63* Grabowski argued that EU membership should only take place if backed 
by a positive referendum result after a fair and unbiased debate. The existing 
debate, he implied, was neither fair nor unbiased. Grabowski described his foreign 
policy objectives as heightening Poland's prestige and importance in the 
international arena and the development of friendly relations with its neighbours. 
While not explicitly opposed to accession he repeatedly called for a referendum: 
'The Nation must decide about the possibility of accession to the European Union
630 Ibid.
631 Program Wyborczy Lecha Walesy, 2000, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish 
Academy of Sciences, 2000 presidential election folder.
632 Ibid.
633 Ibid.
634 Program Wyborczy Dariusza Grabowskiego, 2000, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of 
the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2000 presidential election folder.
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in a referendum. It should therefore be honestly and accurately informed, and 
hence know the truth about the positive and negative effects of our accession'.633
Jan Olszewski, leader of the Ruch Odbudowy Polski, withdrew from the contest on 2 
October 2000 asking his supporters to back Marian Krzaklewski instead.
According to opinion polls, Olszewski stood a chance of gaining as much as 5% of 
the vote. During the campaign Olszewski emphasised that Polish national interest 
should be protected in the process of accession. He advocated measures to protect 
the economy from EU imports and was opposed to foreigners buying Polish land. 
He also wanted to guarantee Polish ownership of strategic industries such as 
banking, energy and telecommunications. While not explicitly opposed to 
accession Olszewski advocated policies which effectively precluded the 
implementation of the European acquis in Poland.**
Widespread support for the moderate, unifying approach of both Aleksander 
Kwasniewski and the runner-up Andrzej Olechowski reflected growing 
disappointment with the AWS. The results also showed support for candidates 
who were unambiguously in favour of EU membership. Of the 61.1% who voted, 
71.2% supported Kwasniewski and Olechowski, both of whom were 
enthusiastically pro-integrationist. Marian Krzaklewski was, as usual, caught up 
between his euro-sceptic, trade unionist support base and the centre-right pro- 
integrationist AW S electorate. Andrzej Lepper also refrained from declaring his 
anti-integrationist stance and resorted to calls for a 'fair' referendum. Although 
they did not declare opposition to EU membership, many candidates advocated 
measures which contradicted accession requirements. In particular, protectionist 
measures such as extensive subsidies and import barriers contradicted the customs 
union and strict limits on state subsidies required for accession.
635 Ibid.
636 Program Wyborczy Jana Olszewskiego, 2000, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the 
Polish Academy of Sciences, 2000 presidential election folder.
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Parliamentary debate
The need to reconcile the Unia Wolnosci's euro-enthusiasm with the scepticism of 
the Catholic-nationalist sections of the AWS was reflected in the coalition 
agreement, which referred to 'Guaranteeing Poland's security by means of 
attaining membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and reforming the 
military as quickly as possible as well as strengthening the economic and political 
position of the country by preparing and effectively carrying out negotiations 
regarding Polish accession to the European Union'. 637 Like the AWS' programme 
therefore, the coalition agreement implicitly contrasted support for quick NATO 
membership with a more qualified stance on the EU. Rather than call for quick 
accession it emphasised the need for 'preparation; and 'effective negotiations'.
As it manoeuvred between the euro-sceptic ZChN  and the euro-enthusiast Unia 
Wolnosci's the AWS' stance toward European integration became increasingly 
ambiguous. The start of the accession negotiations and the EU's increasing 
prominent role in the media confronted Electoral Action with the need to present a 
coherent integration doctrine that would be broad enough to incorporate the 
divergent views of its numerous member organisations as well as those of its 
coalition partner. The AW S  resorted to the well-tested political marketing tool of 
Polish Catholicism and developed the strategy of 're-evangelising Europe'.838
AWS representatives often referred to the benefits that Poland's conservative, 
religious morality offered Europe and the evangelisation opportunity which 
accession to a consumerist, increasingly secular EU offered Polish Catholics. In his 
expose Jerzy Buzek emphasised the need to defend Poland's national identity and 
referred to 'the moral values which will be our contribution to the integrating
637 Umowa Koalicyjna Pomi^dzy Akcjg Wyborczq SolidamoSd i Uni$ WolnoSci' section 8 re-printed in 
Rydlewski, Grzegorz. 2000. Rzadzenie Koalicyjne w Polsce.
638 A. Pluta, 'Evangelizing Accession: Solidarity Electoral Action and Poland's EU Membership', Slovo, 16,2 
(2004) .2.
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E u r o p e ' .  639 While presenting the stance of the AW S  parliamentary club Marian 
Krzaklewski pursued a similar rhetoric, referring to the Christian roots of Europe 
and the opportunity of influencing the European order.640
The AWS' 'evangelisation' rhetoric reflected the stance of the Catholic hierarchy. 
1997 marked a turnaround in the Episcopate's attitude towards the EU. The 
Bishops' fears of imminent secularisation were quelled during a visit to the 
European Commission in November 1997. On their return, Bishop Pieronek urged 
the Polish Church to change the way it thought about Europe. Rather than feared, 
European integration should be seen as a 'wonderful opportunity and a great 
Evangelical challenge for the Church' .«« Bishop Muszyriski explained the new re­
evangelisation doctrine as follows:
This will need to be put into evangelization programmes. The 
nation will need to be told what benefits are related to 
entering the European Union, but also what are the 
inconveniences and burdens connected with it. But if the Poles 
are shown the purpose of it, they will be able to take on 
sacrifices.. .the Union is starting a public ethical debate on the 
subject of what it is doing, and the Churches have the full 
right to come up with an ethical assessment of the politicians' 
doings.642
The church's new stance on European integration was further expounded during a 
1999 meeting of diocesan representatives:
639 Buzek, Jerzy, 3 kadenqa, 2 posiedzenie, 1 dzien (10.11.1997), 1 punkt porzqdku dziermego: Przedstawiony 
przez prezesa Rady Mirristrdw program dziafania Rady Ministrdw wraz z wnioskiem o udzielenie jej wotum 
zaufania.
640 Krzaklewski, Marian, 3 kadencja, 2 posiedzenie, 1 dzien (10.11.1997), 1 punkt porzqdku dziennego: 
Przedstawiony przez prezesa Rady Ministrdw program dzialania Rady Ministrdw wraz z wnioskiem o 
udzielenie jej wotum zaufania.
641 List pasterski Episkopatu Polski z okazji dziesi^ciolecia pontifikatu papieza Jana Pawla II i beatyfikacji slugi 
bozego O.Honorata Kozminskiego, 18 June 1999, quoted in P. Mazurkiewicz, 'Tozsamosc Polskiego Kosciola 
po 1989 R.1, in Koscidl wobec Integracji Europejskiej, ed. J. Grosfeld (Warszawa 1996). p22; Andrzej 
Domoslawski, 'KoSciola Drogi do Europy' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.284. 20 June 1997, p23.
642 Edward Krzemien, 'Uczymy sie Unii' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.261,19 August 1997, pi.
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Our nation, which has suffered so much in the past, and 
especially in the period of the Second World War, has much to 
offer Europe, and above all its Christian tradition, enriched 
with contemporary religious experience. The church in Poland 
hence stands before great historic tasks, for the fulfilment of 
which it will require a fresh approach and missionary fervour.
Sufficient strength must be found for our nation to resist the 
tendencies of modern civilization, which propose a move 
away from spiritual values for the sake of unrestrained 
consumption or the forsaking of traditional religious and 
moral values for a secular culture and moral relativism.643
The Church's support for European integration was also repeatedly affirmed by 
the Pope. During his speech at the Sejm on 11 June 1999 for example he declared: 
'Poland's integration with the European Union has from the start had the support 
of the Holy See. The historic experience of the Polish nation, its spiritual and 
cultural wealth can contribute to the over-all well being of the human family and 
especially to strengthening peace and security in Europe'.644
But the Episcopate's euro-enthusiasm was not unqualified. 645 European integration 
was acceptable as long as it did not adversely affect Polish sovereignty and 
national identity. Many among the Catholic hierarchy still perceived the EU as an 
anti-religious, morally corrupt entity. Jozef Glemp, the Archbishop of Poland, 
described the EU's morally corrupt nature as follows: 'Atheism, secularization, 
which in Europe take the form of ideology together with euthanasia and 
homosexual marriages, these are the great challenges of the Church.'646
The stance of the hierarchy represented that of the majority of Polish priests. 
According to an Institute of Public Affairs (Instytut Spraw Publicznych) poll carried 
out shortly before the start of negotiations the majority of Polish priests supported
643 Drugi Synod Plenamy, Sesja w Pozaniu, 'KoScidl wobec zycia spoleczno-gospodarczego', Kurier Synodalny, 
2(59)/1999 p24, quoted in Jackowska, 2000, pl2.
644 John Paul II, quoted in T. Pieronek, 'Rola Kosciola Katolickiego w Polsce w Procesie Integracji Europejskiej.1 
24 September 2004.
645 Interview with Tadeusz Pieronek, 25 July 2005.
646 Ewa Czaczkowska, 'Zawsze MieliSmy Nadzieje' Rzeczpospolita, 19 December 2001.
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accession and expected it to have a positive influence on the Polish economy, 
living standards, international security, the rule of law, democratization, the 
reform process and education levels. The perceived democratic nature and 
efficiency of EU institutions was highly rated among the clergy. Most priests 
feared the negative consequences of accession for moral and religious standards, 
solidity of family life and religiousness. Some, however, also felt that these 
negative processes were a part of an irreversible civilisational process, independent 
of accession itself. The majority felt accession placed new objectives before the 
church in the form of the evangelist mission in Europe, the development of a 
Christian ethic and the strengthening of the cultural and national identity of Poles. 
«7 For the mainstream of the Church therefore, accession was a challenge rather 
than a threat. But the EU the clergy supported was a 'Europe of Nations' which 
preserved the fullest possible national autonomy^. Like the Christian-nationalist 
political elites therefore, most Polish priests supported accession to a much less 
politically integrated organization than the EU of the late 1990's.
The pro-integrationist stance was not embraced by all members of the Catholic 
Church however. The most euro-sceptic representative of the Church was Father 
Rydzyk's movement of Radio Maryja. Established in 1991 by a small group of 
devout Catholics, Radio Maryja had grown to become a nation-wide organisation 
whose influence on the radical-Catholic electorate made it a force the political 
elites could not ignore.
The movement advocated a populist and nationalist brand of Catholicism, its 
concept of patriotism reinforced by the perception of a continuous threat to 
Poland's national identity. Liberalism, secularism and moral relativism embodied 
in European integration were presented as the greatest dangers to the traditional, 
patriotic mentality of the Poles. The EU's democratic deficit and the fact that
(ATL. Kolarska-Bobiriska, J. Kucharczyk, E. Firlit and B. Roguska, 'Duchowienstwo Polskie Wobec Integracji z 
Unia Europejska', in Polska Eurodebata, (Warsaw 1999), p i09.
648 Ibid, p75.
219
negotiations started before an in-depth public information campaign was carried 
out were also among Radio Maryja's criticisms of the accession process. The pro- 
integrationist Church hierarchy was, according to Radio Maryja, 'infected with a 
communist way of thinking'.«9
For the time being the re-evangelisation doctrine turned out to be an effective, if 
temporary, remedy to reconcile the AW S  member groupings' contradictory views 
on accession. During the opening parliamentary debate in October 1997 Marian 
Krzaklewski presented the following stance on accession:
European integration will allow Poland the chance to speed 
up economic growth. We will also gain a real possibility of 
directly influencing the evolution of the new European order.
We will co-create the unity of the continent, while preserving 
our identity. We will consolidate our Polishness. The only 
concrete foundation of the European community is 
Christianity. And inseparable from it is the love for freedom, a 
responsible freedom. The creators of the idea of a common 
Europe turned to Christianity
The AW S  hence supported European integration as long as the EU to which 
Poland acceded was, above all, Christian. Although it was never clarified how the 
challenging task of evangelising the EU would be carried out, the 're­
evangelisation' doctrine was broad enough to incorporate both the euro-sceptic 
views of the ZChN  and the pro-integrationist stance of the Porozumienie Centrum or 
the Partia Chrzescijanskich Demokratdw. While the need to preserve the traditional, 
Catholic identity of the Poles made accession to the secular, morally corrupt 
Europe unacceptable for the Catholic-nationalist politicians, the prospect of 
preserving Polish national identity and sovereignty by means of evangelising the 
EU's member states allowed a way out of the dilemma. For the time being, the re-
649 G. Tokarz, 'Polski tradycyjny katolicyzm wobec integracji europejskiej w latach 1996-2002', in Koscioly i 
Zwiqzki Wyznaniowe w Stosunkach Mi^dzynarodowych, ed. T. D^bowski (Wroclaw 2003), p57.
650 Marian Krzaklewski quoted in Kucharczyk, 'Porwanie Europy. Integracja Europejska w Polskim Dyskursie 
Politycznym 1997-1998', p304.
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evangelisation doctrine served its purpose, proving sufficiently flexible to 
accommodate both the liberal euro-enthusiasts and the euro-sceptic Catholic- 
nationalists.
The radical-Catholic parliamentarians no longer resorted to veiled doubts and 
ambiguous conditions of support to express their views about EU accession. Their 
anti-integrationism was openly declared with the formation of Rodzina Polska 
(Polish Family) by the Radio Maryja parliamentarians. The grouping campaigned 
on an explicitly anti-integrationist platform in the local elections of October 1998. 
Piotr Jaroszynski, one of Father Rydzyk's closest associates and leader of the 
Rodzina, raised the following objections to EU membership:
What is the spiritual and cultural purpose of the European 
Union? What sort of a thing is this? If there are to be no 
nations, but only some sort of societies, if there is to be 
legalization of abortion, euthanasia, homosexual relationships 
then what a thing is this, is it a cancerous thing? The EU plans 
to weaken us, take away our independence and turn the 
nation into the West's serfs.651
As it was confronted with the need to make concrete policy decisions the Akcja 
Wyborcza.'s consensus on EU accession grew increasingly threadbare. The 
ambiguity of the evangelisation doctrine allowed for very different interpretations 
of the AWS' stance towards the EU, which was quickly capitalised on by its anti- 
integrationist members. As numerous factions claimed to have the only 'correct' 
interpretation of the Akcja's programme its ambiguous nature became increasingly 
salient. A striking example of the different ways in which the AW S programme 
was interpreted took place in October 1998 when Jan Maria Jackowski, a 
nationalist-Catholic parliamentarian associated with Radio Maryja, announced that 
the Akcja was in fact opposed to EU accession. The phrase 'European integration'
651 'Nic nie jest takie jak sie wydaje. Piotr Jaroszynski w rozmowie z Jaroslawem Kurskim' Gazeta Wyborcza, 
nr.239,12 October 1998, p2.
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should not, according to Jackowski, be interpreted to mean 'EU accession' but 
rather as a general statement of support for an unspecified form of association with 
Western Europe. «2
Doubts about accession were also manifest in the rhetoric of the Zjednoczenie 
Chrzescijansko Narodowe. The ZChN's press spokesman, Michal Kaminski, declared 
that the party 'does not look at the European Union with unbounded 
enthusiasm'653. During an interview with the author Kaminski stated that the ZChN  
supported accession. But when asked about benefits of accession for Poland 
indicated he did not think there were any654. He did however, provide a long list of 
costs Poland would incur as a result of it, including an adverse impact on national 
identity and high costs of economic restructuring. He was also concerned that the 
Polish economy not being able to cope with EU competition. Although he declared 
his support for accession therefore Kaminski's stance towards the EU appeared 
contradictory. Although he claimed the ZChN  was in favour of accession he was 
not able to clarify what motivated the parties' support. He was, however, able to 
provide a lengthy list of disadvantages of accession.
The ZChN's stance on Europe was defined in more detail by its General Secretary, 
Artur Zawisza. Describing himself as a 'Euro-sceptic-on the-Vistula, Zawisza 
rejected 'a federal super-state led by Brussels without discussion' in favour of 'a 
Europe of free nations, seeking their inspiration in the Bethlehem grotto.' Zawisza 
defined a set of conditions which the EU would have to meet for the ZChN  to 
support Polish accession. These included the freedom to opt out of the euro, the 
maintenance of legal sovereignty in certain spheres, the retention of the veto, 
rejection of European citizenship, a subordinate role for the Commission, future 
EU enlargement into the Ukraine and Belarus, immediate and equal access to the
652 Kucharczyk, 'Porwanie Europy. Integracja Europejska w Polskim Dyskursie Politycznym 1997-1998', p. 306- 
307.
653 Szczerbiak, 'Public Opinion and Eastward Enlargement: Explaining Declining Support for EU Membership 
in Poland', p ll.
654 Interview with Michal Kaminski, 24 July 1998.
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European single market for Polish agricultural products and appropriate 
derogations in 'sensitive' areas such as the sale of land to foreigners. 655 Later the 
ZChN  also added the condition of Poland attaining the same number of votes in 
the Council of Ministers as Spain.656
Eventually, internal disagreements on accession led several anti-integrationist 
AW S  parliamentarians, primarily from the ZChN, to establish Porozumienie Polskie 
(Polish Agreement), a new, anti-accession grouping under the leadership of Jan 
Lopuszanski in April 1999.657 The Porozumienie was registered as a political party 
in November 1999.65»
The establishment of the Porozumienie softened the euro-sceptic rhetoric of both the 
ZChN, and the entire Electoral Action. But most of the AW S ' participants qualified 
their statements of support for accession with the condition that the Europe Poland 
accede to was a 'Europe of Nations' and their stance appeared to be founded on 
resignation rather than support.659 The Komitet Organizacyjny Chrzescijahskiej 
Demokracji (Organizational Committee of Christian Democracy) which united 
former Porozumienie Centrum, PSL and ROP parliamentarians declared in February 
1999: 'Without integration with Western Europe we are destined to be 
marginalized civilisationally and economically. Entry to EU structures is 
eventually unavoidable, but it will be a difficult process'.660
Jan Lopuszanski's Catholic-nationalist Nasze Kolo (Our Circle) however, many of 
whose members were former AW S members, voted against the ratification of the
655 Szczerbiak, 'Public Opinion and Eastward Enlargement: Explaining Declining Support for EU Membership 
in Poland', p ll.
656 Ibid, p ll.
657 Ibid, p9.
655 Ibid, p9.
659 B. Rogowska, 'Partie Prawicowe Wobec Integracji Europejskiej, 1989-1998', in Europa i Integracja 
Europejska w Polskiej MySli Politycznej XX Wieku, ed. J. Juchnowski, Janusz (Wroclaw 2003), pl46 .
660 OSwiadczenie Komitetu Organizacyjnego Chrzescijahskiej Demokracji 4/2/1999 quoted in Ibid. p!45.
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NATO accession treaty. During the Sejm ratification debate Lopuszanski 
questioned the loyalty of Poland's Western allies:
I imagined, maybe somewhat mischievously, such a scenario:
God forbid, a conflict on the Eastern border. Poland proves its 
will to fight, the Eastern territories of the Polish state are taken 
over by the opponent. The second phase of the war, the allies 
come to Poland's aid, the Western part of Poland is taken up 
by the allies. Are you sure that this scenario is not a possible, 
realistic scenario? We will not support this ratification.^
Parliamentary debate on integration with the EU meanwhile continued to be 
dominated by references to historic heritage and disagreements about moral issues 
between SLD and AWS representatives. As Kucharczyk points out, while 
observing the debate on the EU one had the impression the two sides were 
referring to different organizations.**2 Although both sides declared support for 
accession the contradictory ways in which they conceptualized the EU precluded 
any real consensus on what it was that Poland was acceding to or what kind of 
strategy it should pursue in doing so. The SLD referred to a modem, people- 
friendly European state which was not caught up in normative differences. For the 
communist successors the EU was above all a secular organization, which 
guaranteed the freedom of all its citizens and protected them from religious, ethnic 
and other forms of discrimination.
AWS representatives on the other hand referred to a 'Europe of Nations', founded 
on Christian values and which did not impinge upon the national sovereignty of 
its member states. Rather than question their opponents' conceptualization of the 
EU the solidarity-successor parliamentarians reminded the SLD of its authoritarian 
past and questioned its commitment to the tolerant values it attributed to the EU. 
The communist-successors meanwhile, pointed to the contradictions inherent in
661 Debata proatlantycka, B^dziemy trzymac drzwi do NATO otwarte' Gazeta Wyborcza, 21-22 
Novemberl998, nr, p4.
662 Kucharczyk, 'Porwanie Europy. Integracja Europejska w Polskim Dyskursie Politycznym 1997-19981.
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the AW S' Christian "Europe of Nations' and the realities of the increasingly 
integrated and secular EU.663 Rather than a discussion of the costs and benefits 
which accession might bring to each grouping's respective electorates the debate 
was dominated by rhetorical tactics used to bolster the ideological identity of the 
groupings and differentiate them from their political opponents. Parliamentary 
debate addressed neither the policy implications of accession requirements nor 
internal developments taking place within the EU at the time, such as the debate 
on the Union's future decision making framework, the implementation of the 
common currency or the proposals to increase the EU's competences in the areas of 
justice and home affairs or foreign policy. As Marian Plazynski, one of the AWS's 
most euro-enthusiastic parliamentarians stated: 'The problem does not lie in the 
fact that that Poland has not declared its stance on the internal reform of the EU 
but in that there is nothing which suggests that it has such a stance'664.
The debate on Europe reflected broader characteristics of the party system. The 
Polish parties were legitimized more by symbolism and myth than representation 
of socio-economic interest groups665. Both SLD and AW S  used broad 'catch-all' 
rhetoric, sufficiently vague to appeal to a variety of social interest groups, with the 
only clear ideological distinction being the historic divide between the communist 
and non-communist camps.666 As the parties strove to compete on the basis of 
historic symbolism in place of interest group representation party-political debate 
became increasingly polarized and adversarial. 667 The fact that the numerous AW S  
member organizations' only common denominator was their historic opposition to 
the communist regime polarized the political scene even further as rather than 
focus on policy differences the debate centred on whether one of the political
663 Kucharczyk, ’Porwanie Europy. Integracja Europejska w Polskim Dyskursie Politycznym 1997-1998', p307.
664 Plazynski, Maciej 'Z Otwartymi Oczami', Gazeta Wyborcza, 18-19.03.2000 quoted in J.Hausner, Jako&f 
Rz^dzenia: Polska blizej Unii Europejskiej?, p ll.
665 M. Jezinski, 'The Quest for Myth in the Polish Political Discourse', Polish Sociological Review, 4,136 (2001), 
W. Wesolowski, 'Political Actors and Democracy: Poland 1990-1997', Polish Sociological Review, 119,3 (1997), 
227-248., 1997.
666 Ibid, p231-232.
667 Ibid, p231-232.
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opponents had the right to be a part of the political system in the first place. 668 The 
formation of coalitions on the basis of historic heritage rather than shared policy 
preferences made the debate even more problematic as coalition members were 
forced to resort to even broader 'catch-all' rhetorical strategies once in government 
than those used during electoral campaigns.
The European issue, with its strong symbolic appeal, was easily instrumentalized 
as part of this dynamic. The different visions of Europe the parties presented were 
more of a reflection of their preferred vision of the future Polish state than of their 
views on accession and its impact on Polish society. The lack of interest group 
representation and the consequent fluidity of the party system precluded a debate 
on the costs and benefits of accession and instead led to 'Europe' becoming yet 
another reflection of the symbols and myths the parties had to resort to in order to 
differentiate themselves.
The communist-successor and solidarity-successor divide among political elites 
was reflected in public opinion with the historic conflict being perceived as the 
strongest social conflict above income disparities, wealth, class or the urban and 
rural divide. Polish political competition was based on the symbolism of historic 
heritage rather than on existing socio-economic differences among social interest 
groups. 669 Polls also reflected the consequent weak relationship between political 
elites and society, with government support falling by 10% during the first seven 
months of 199967o and a growing distrust in political parties. According to a 1999 
Centre for the Study of Public Opinion report a majority of respondents felt that 
the government was ineffective and that politicians were untrustworthy, corrupt
668 Ibid, p243-244.
669 CBOS 'Public Opinion' report nr 2000/10 quoted in Hausner and Marody, Jako6<f Rzqdzenia: Polska blizej 
Unii Europejskiej?, p44.
670 Ibid, p40.
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and cared primarily for the interests of their parties rather than those of the 
citizens.
Meanwhile, public support for accession continued to decrease. The number of 
respondents declaring they would vote in favour of accession in the event of a 
referendum dropped from an 80% high in 1996 to 63% in 1998.672 By late 2000 
support levels fell to 57%, with opposition growing to 26%.'™ Moreover, a closer 
inspection of the polls suggests that the prospect of EU membership caused 
significant concerns even among those who supported it.
Firstly, a marked change in public perception of the expected costs and benefits of 
accession took place throughout the 1990's. The impact of accession on the 
farming sector was one of the main areas of concern and in May 1999 61% of 
respondents felt accession would have a negative effect on individual farms while 
only 17% said that it will be positive. These figured contrasted sharply with 
analogous June 1994 figures of 24% and 40% respectively. In 1999 42% thought EU 
membership would have a negative effect on the functioning of public sector and 
state enterprises whereas only 30% who felt it would be positive. Again these 
figures show a marked change of 1994 views from 37% and 32% respectively. The 
number who believed that EU membership would have a positive effect on the 
private sector fell from 67% in 1994 to 48% in 1999 and the numbers of those who 
felt it would have a negative impact increased from 6% to 21% over the same 
period. 46% expected unemployment to increase after accession while only 23% 
thought it would fall. Once again, the figures show a reversal of 1994 polls which 
had found 23% of respondents expecting unemployment growth and 40% 
expecting it to fall. The number who expected accession to have a positive effect on 
their living standards fell from 57% in 1994 to 38% in 1999 and that of those
671CBOS 'Public Opinion' report nr 1999/13, quoted in Ibid, p45.
672 CBOS 'Public Opinion' report nr 103/1998, G6miak., p47-48.
673 A. Dawson, 'A Polish Bridge?1, Geopolitics, 6,1 (2001), 91-106, p 101.
227
expecting a negative impact increased from 10% to 25%.674 Expectations concerning 
the impact accession would have on both Poland as a whole and the respondents 
personally also reflected significant growth in scepticism towards the EU. In 
August 1997, 41% of respondents expected EU membership to bring Poland more 
harm than good and the number of those expecting it to benefit them or their 
families personally fell to 27%, while 31% did not know how the process would 
affect them. 675
Secondly, most Poles were in no hurry for Poland to accede. In September 1998 
60% supported entering the EU with 'no hurry7 (bez pospiechu) whereas only 25% 
felt accession should take place as soon as possible. ^  The number of those who 
supported the earliest possible EU membership as a means of precipitating the 
modernization of the Polish economy fell from 40% in April 1997 to 27% in 
November 1999.677 The numbers of those who believed that modernization should 
precede accession grew from 48% in 1997 to 62% in 1999.678 According to an 
October 1999 study, 74% of Poles believed that Poland should implement 
transition reforms before accession while only 12% felt that reforms and accession 
should take place concurrently. 679
Thirdly, the polls showed a continuing perception of inequality in Poland-EU 
relations. 55% of respondents believed that Poland would be a 'second class 
member'68o and fears of not being treated as 'an equal partner' were prevalent 
among the public. In June 1996 only 19% of respondents felt that EU member 
states would derive the greatest benefit from accession as opposed to Poland; their
674 Szczerbiak, 'Public Opinion and Eastward Enlargement: Explaining Declining Support for EU Membership 
in Poland',
675 Ibid.
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numbers increased to 47% in November 1999. Only 8% felt that Poland would be 
the main beneficiary and 27% thought the benefits of accession would be equal for 
both sides.681 A 2000 Institute of Public Affairs study found that the majority of 
respondents felt the word 'negotiations' did not fit the situation as there was 
nothing for Poland to negotiate. Most perceived Poland as the weaker partner who 
could only accept conditions presented by the EU rather than present its own 
terms. Such sentiments were accompanied by negative emotions towards the EU 
and the perception that integration was a negative, no-win situation for Poland.
Views on accession correlated primarily with professional occupation, age and 
education levels. Farmers were the most sceptical occupational group and only 
25% supported accession. Most support for EU membership came from those 
employed in the public sector, the higher educated, youth and the unemployed. 683 
Opposition to accession also correlated with xenophobia against Jews and the 
Roma as well as with the frequency of listening to Radio Maryja. 684 Support for 
accession also correlated with a perception of equal relations between Poland and 
the EU. 685 Fears about the adverse impact of accession on the Polish economy were 
among the greatest concerns of the public and were especially prominent among 
farmers, low-qualified workers as well as PSL and ROP electorates. 686
A 1998 qualitative study, where respondents were asked to describe their fears 
and expectations of accession, found that support for accession was primarily 
motivated by expectations of attaining geo-political security, economic progress
681 Szczerbiak, 'Public Opinion and Eastward Enlargement: Explaining Declining Support for EU Membership 
in Poland', p6.
682 J. Grzelak, 'Kultura Negocjacyjna Polakow w Kontekscie Integracji z Unia Europejska', (Warsaw 2000), p24.
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Conferencyjne', pl2-14.
684 G6miak, p60.
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and 'civilisational advance'.687 The analysis of fears of accession showed a 
prominent theme of conspiracy and betrayal on part of both EU and domestic 
elites, with fears of losing national independence, German re-occupation and being 
subjugated to foreign influence being among the most salient concerns. The 
respondents also worried about the possible destruction of Polish agriculture and 
the growth of unemployment. 688
In 1997 only 20% of respondents thought European integration was a key electoral 
topic689 and in June 2001 the majority of respondents believed that the ruling elites 
and especially the president, the parliament and the cabinet took a strongly pro- 
integrationist stance. The three political groupings seen as the most euro- 
enthusiastic were the SLD, AW S  and Unia Wolnosci.690 The PSL's stance was 
perceived as ambiguous and Samoobrona was seen as an anti-integrationist 
grouping.691 It was the PSL however, which had the greatest number of euro- 
sceptics among its electorate with as many as 49% of its 1997 voters declaring 
opposition to accession.697
Most respondents also doubted the abilities of the Polish negotiation team. 
According to a Centre for the Study of Public Opinion study the number of Poles 
who said that they trusted the negotiators to defend Polish national interest fell 
from 51% in December 1998 to 42% in October 1999, while the number who said 
that they did not trust them increased from 36% to 42% over the same period. 693 A 
1999 Institute of Public Affairs study showed that 41% of respondents thought 
Polish negotiators made too many concessions during the accession negotiations,
687 H. Palska, 'Polacy o Nadziejach i Obawach Zwiazanych a Przystapieniem Polski do Unii Europejskiej: 
Analiza Tresci Wypowiedzi', in Polacy Wobec Integracji z Unia Europejska, ed. B. Mach (Warsaw 1998).
688 Ibid.
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38% trusted the government's negotiation stance and felt that Poland was well 
prepared for memberships whereas 57% believed that Poland would be ready to 
accede in 2003. Respondents who described themselves as well informed about the 
EU also felt that Poland was well prepared for negotiations; those who felt badly 
informed also felt that the negotiators were not well prepared.698
The lack of public debate about the costs and benefits of accession was reflected in 
the respondents' view that European integration would have little or no influence 
in their lives. As Kolarska-Bobinska points out, the public saw the integration 
project as something taking place 'above1 the citizens. 696 A large proportion of 
those who believe integration would have significant influence on their lives 
however also tended to oppose it** In March 2001 only 7% felt 'well informed' 
about accession.698
According to a 2001 Demoskop study, 67% did not know why Poland should 
accede and as many wished to have more information about accession. 699 Similar 
results were reflected in Institute of Public Affairs 2000 study, which found that the 
majority of respondents felt they were not sufficiently informed about the EU and 
did not know what its purpose was. 700 Moreover, the majority felt that they did not 
know what the accession negotiations were about and as few as 14% were able to 
correctly identify the main topics of negotiation.701
The numbers of those who felt they did not understand the rationale for EU 
membership were hence higher than those who supported it, which raises the
694 Kolarska-Bobinska and J. Kucharczyk, 'Polacy a Unia Europejska. Wyniki Badan Empirycznych', in Polska 
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question of why, admittedly having so little understanding of it, did most 
respondents also declare willingness to vote for accession in the event of a 
referendum. It may have been the case that many respondents felt Poland had no 
choice but to accede. The above mentioned 1998 qualitative study of public views 
on accession provides a possible explanation. According to this study although 
most respondents felt Poland should accede their support was based on the belief 
that accession was a necessity™. Accession was perceived as a 'necessary evil' 
without which Poland would not be able to attain the geo-political security, 
economic progress and 'civilisational advance' it needed703. Rather than base their 
views on the impact accession was expected to have on their every-day lives most 
respondents may have resigned themselves to it on the grounds it was an 
inevitable, elite-supported and driven process that would result in abstract gains 
such as a strengthening of Poland's geo-political situation, 'returning to Europe' 
and 'ending the division between East and West'.™
Conclusions
The establishment of elite consensus on accession proved problematic during the 
1997-2001 period. As the analysis of the 1997 electoral contest shows, the 
ideologically heterogeneous AW S  struggled to define its stance on accession 
during the campaign and presenting a coherent integration strategy proved even 
more problematic once the Akcja Wyborcza entered coalition with the euro- 
enthusiast Unia Wolnosci. The AWS hence resorted to the ambiguous, albeit 
politically profitable, 're-evangelisation' rhetoric. While this provided an effective 
means to gain electoral legitimisation, such neo-messianism could not be 
translated into concrete policy proposals. Eventually, the issue of accession became 
one of the key factors leading to the fragmentation of the AWS. Nominal
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consensus could not replace a clear stance on individual policy issues. Neither 
could the proportional assignation of personnel under the AW S- U W  coalition 
agreement replace the compromise and cooperation required for the formulation 
of one coherent integration strategy.
The formation of party identity on the basis of historical heritage rather than 
representation of socio-economic interest groups was reflected in the political 
debate, which focused on historic divisions rather than policy proposals. Both the 
Solidarity-successor and the Communist-successor sides of the political spectrum 
defined themselves in terms of their past rather than in relation to current and 
future problems facing the Polish state and its citizens. 706 Almost a decade after the 
collapse of communism the threat of the communist regime and the ethos of the 
struggle against it could still legitimise political power. Parallels may be drawn 
between the way the ideologically multifarious dissident Solidarity movement 
maintained unity by reference to the common communist enemy and the manner 
in which the diverse members of the AW S united once again to struggle against the 
reformed communists. For the AWS elites eliminating the political opponent was 
more important than ensuring the progress of the policies they had promised to 
implement. In spite of a very different systemic context, the anti-communist elites' 
claims for political power were still legitimated by the goals of 1980.
The issue of accession reflected this dynamic. Rather than focus on the impact EU 
membership would have on the every-day lives of the electorate, the 
parliamentary debates on accession centred on abstract, symbolic visions of a 
Christian, loosely integrated 'Europe of Nations', favoured by the AW S and the 
SLD's secular, closely integrated 'Social Europe'. Although both sides' declarations 
of support for accession gave the appearance of a nominal consensus on EU 
membership their radically different interpretations of what the EU was meant that
706 Bachmann, Polska Kaczka - Europejski Staw. Szanse i Pulapki Polskiej Polityki Europejskiej, p73.
233
no in-depth debate on the accession project could take place. Support for accession 
was possible precisely because the implications of accession were not discussed.
With the exception of Unia Wolnosci, none of the main political groupings were 
able to reconcile their 1997 electoral proposals with accession requirements. The 
protectionist measures advocated by the PSL and ROP as well as their opposition 
to privatizing key sectors such as telecoms and banking contrasted sharply with 
the requirements defined in the Association Agreement and the Single Market 
White Paper. Both the SLD and AW S  meanwhile struggled to reconcile the need to 
appeal to their trade unionist support bases707 with the EU's increasingly vocal calls 
for Poland to meet its privatization and trade liberalization requirements.
The manner in which the SLD and the AW S  envisaged the 'Europes' they wished 
to accede to precluded a discussion of the political implications of accession700. The 
SLD's unquestioning support for accession to a democratic and tolerant 'Social 
Europe' and the AWS's support for the a-political 'Europe of Nations' uniting 
'fully sovereign states' meant that neither grouping was willing to address the 
extent to which member state competences were transferred to the really existing 
EU.
The only groupings which were willing to address the political impact of accession 
and the extent to which it would diminish the competences of Poland's 
democratically elected decision makers were those on the Catholic-successor 
right709. The issue of the democratic deficit and the loss of national competences 
frequently featured among the rhetoric of the Porozumienie Polskie and in the 
programmes of Radio Maryja. Given the radical Catholic-nationalist stance of these 
organizations however, their concerns could easily be dismissed by the
707 G. Blazyca, 'Polish Socioeconomic Development in the 1990s and Scenarios for EU Accession', Europe-Asia 
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mainstream elites. The increasingly strict conditionality introduced with the 
Accession Partnerships and the influence it granted the EU on the applicants' 
domestic legislative and policy decisions was also not addressed during the 
debate.
But in spite of the challenges which establishing in-depth consensus on accession 
posed during the 1997-2001 period the Buzek cabinet also saw the implementation 
of several key reforms required for accession. These included a wide ranging 
administrative and social security reform as well as the restructuring of the 
mining, energy and steel sectors.710As Bachmann points out, a paradox can be 
observed when comparing the rhetoric and policy records of the SLD and the 
AWS. In spite of its unquestioningly pro-accession rhetoric while in power the SLD 
delayed meeting several key accession requirements such as for example mining 
and steel restructuring. The AWS meanwhile, while often markedly sceptical about 
European integration in its rhetoric, achieved the implementation of these very 
politically contentious reforms711 thus enabling the integration process to move 
forward.
But the reforms implemented by the Buzek cabinet were driven more by closed- 
doors bargaining among the AWS groupings and the Unia Wolnosci than in-depth 
consensus on the need to continue the integration effort. The AWS' ideological 
diversity and its inability to compromise with the pro-integrationist U W  precluded 
the establishment of in-depth consensus on accession.712 The ZChN's partisan 
interests also prevented Jerzy Buzek from appointing the UKIE secretary at a time 
when good coordination of integration policy was crucial. Matters improved 
somewhat when Jacek Saryusz-Wolski finally took up the post in April 2000, 
however the AWS' unwillingness to compromise on the issue of the sale of land 
continued to stall negotiations. The firm stance appeared to be driven by the
710 Bachmann, 'Polska Kaczka - Europejski Staw. Szanse i Pulapki Polskiej Polityki Europejskiej', pl64.
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concerns of the Catholic-nationalist AWS groupings rather than by the concerns of 
the Polish public. As mentioned in the previous section only 10% of respondents to 
a 1998 Institute of Public Affairs study felt that the sale of land should be a priority 
for negotiators. Other issues such as the right to work in the EU were perceived to 
be much more important, with 57% respondents to a study carried out in 2000 
declaring they would oppose EU membership if it meant a ten-year ban on 
employment in EU countries.713 The integration process would continue to move 
forward again only after the 2001 SLD victory and the subsequent negotiation 
stance adjustments, which will be addressed in the following chapter.
713 Dawson, p 102.
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Chapter 6
The completion of negotiations and the accession referendum
How does the Christian faith look? The fall of morality, 
pornography, drugs and more mosques being built than 
Churches; should the Poles, a nation which has endured so 
many sacrifices in its fight for freedom, give this freedom away 
in return for the promise of money? Does accession to the state, 
which is the European Union, not contradict the spilling of 
blood of those who during World War II gave their lives for our
freedom?714
Roman Giertych,MP for Liga Polskich Rodzin
Introduction
This chapter addresses the final two years of the pre-accession period, starting 
with the victory of the SLD-PSL coalition in the September 2001 parliamentary 
contest and ending with the accession referendum in June 2003. It focuses on the 
question of how party-political actors negotiated consensus on joining the EU 
during this final phase of the pre-accession period. To what extent did political 
parties reconcile accession requirements with their policy proposals during the 
2001 contest and in parliamentary debate, and what stance did they take during 
the referendum campaign? How successful was the euro-enthusiastic SLD in 
negotiating support for accession and its negotiation strategy with the euro-sceptic, 
agrarian PSL? What were the key themes of parliamentary debate on Europe? How  
did party-political actors approach the pre-referendum campaign and what 
motivated the strong vote of public support for accession?
Following a brief overview of domestic developments, the second section of this 
chapter presents the evolution of Poland's integration policy during the period in 
question. The party-political debate will be addressed in the third section, which 
includes sub-sections on the 2001 parliamentary contest, parliamentary debate and 
the accession referendum.
714 Roman Giertych, 6th session, day 2,29 November 2001, Stanowisko negocjacyjne rzgdu Rzeczypospolitej 
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Domestic developments
In 2001 Poland was experiencing a severe economic down turn with a skyrocketing 
budgetary deficit and unemployment approaching 18%. The September 2001 
parliamentary contest resulted in victory for the SLD. The incumbent AWS and its 
former coalition partner Unia Wolnosci failed to attain representation. 15 seats 
short of a parliamentary majority the SLD-UP's was not able to govern on its own. 
Initially, Aleksander Kwasniewski suggested that the SLD form a minority 
government71* backed by an informed arrangement with the Platforma Obywatelska. 
When the PO  refused to cooperate, the SLD formed a coalition with the Polskie 
Stronniciwo Ludowe on 10 October 2001.
As during the 1994-1997 SLD-PSL cabinet, differences between the coalition 
partners quickly emerged and EU membership was one of the main points of 
dissent. 716 The SLD saw accession as a way to overcome the economic crisis and 
proceeded to make the compromises necessary to accede as quickly as possible717 
but to the detriment of the coalition. A much criticised example of this approach 
took place when the SLD provided the agrarians with the full details of its new  
stance on the sale of land only after presenting them to the EU.
Progress in negotiations was made easier by the fact that SLD retained control over 
the key cabinet posts responsible for integration. Responsibility for accession 
negotiations was assigned to Foreign Affairs Minister, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz. 
Prime Minister Leszek Miller undertook the leadership of the Committee for 
European Integration and the post of the KIE Secretary was assigned to Danuta 
Hubner, who was also Cimoszewicz's deputy. The new Chief Negotiator, Jan 
Truszczyriski, was to be based at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
715 Interview with Joanna Solska and Renata L s^ka, 3 September 2005.
716 Interview with Waldemar Pawlak, 20 July 2005; interview with Leszek Miller, 26 July 2005.
717 Interview with Leszek Miller, 26 July 2005.
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The agrarians left the cabinet on March 2 2002. European integration was one of 
the key points of dissent but the coalition partners also disagreed on a range of 
other policy areas. The coalition eventually broke down when PSL voted against a 
government proposal on highway taxes. Miller proceeded to form a minority 
government with the informal backing of several small groupings such as the 
Stronnictwo Konserwatywno -Ludowe and the German minority, which gave him a 
precarious majority of 2 with 232 (out of 460) votes.
The cabinet made several attempts at economic reform but recovery was slow and 
Miller's government increasingly unpopular. In 2002 unemployment reached 19% 
and the government's popularity continued to fall with 6 6 % of respondents in a 
2003 survey describing the government's work as bad. 718 Widely reported 
corruption scandals, 719 an on-going conflict between Prime Minister Miller and 
President Krzaklewski, and a highly critical parliamentary opposition did not help 
matters. Miller resigned shortly after the accession referendum and was replaced 
by the former minister of finance Marek Belka.
As well as having to contend with a difficult coalition partner, the SLD was also 
confronted with a largely euro-sceptic parliamentary opposition. The 2001 
parliament included several previously unrepresented parties, most of which were 
sceptical or undecided about accession. For the first time a grouping explicitly 
opposed to accession attained significant representation; the radical-Catholic Liga 
Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families, LPR) received 7.87% of the vote on a 
vehemently anti-integrationist platform.™ Another frequent critic of the EU was 
the agrarian Self-Defence, which, although leaving the decision on whether to join 
in the hands of the electorate, often warned of the perils of accession. Dominated
718 Piasecki, p.50.
719 Ibid, p.49.
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by radical-Catholic rhetoric, the debate on Europe became increasingly pre­
occupied with religious and moral issues, such as abortion and same-sex marriage.
In spite of growing criticism from both the opposition and its coalition partner, the 
SLD pressed on with accession negotiations, which were completed in December 
2002, and the Accession Treaty which was signed on 16 April 2003. The next 
section addresses the final stages of the negotiation process and the results of the 
talks.
The completion of accession negotiations
By late 2001 it was clear that if Poland was to accede as part of the first wave of 
entrants its negotiation strategy had to change. On entering government Miller 
encountered what he described as Serious delays'™ in the integration process. In 
November 2001 Poland was in ninth place amongst the aspiring member states in 
terms of closed negotiation chapters and hence well behind many of the 'second 
wave' countries.722 Fifteen negotiation chapters remained open, including the most 
contentious ones such as the free movement of labour, the free movement of 
capital, agriculture, and the budget. The delays caused problems not only between 
Poland and the EU but also between Poland and other aspiring member states, 
which felt that Poland's hard-line negotiation stance was delaying accession for the 
whole region.™ In order for the negotiations to move forward the government had 
to compromise on the sale of land. Initial discussions took place when Gunther 
Verheugen, the enlargement commissioner, visited Warsaw in early November.™ 
Shortly thereafter Miller announced a change in the negotiation strategy during a 
televised address on 15 November:
721 Interview with Leszek Miller, 26 July 2005.
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Negotiations cannot be delayed, time cannot be lost. There 
is no point waiting for better weather -  it is happening 
now. Over the past four years our negotiating position has 
weakened. It is time to change this, speed up the 
negotiations and achieve success, which is within grasp, in 
the name of the best interest of the Poles.725
The new negotiation strategy consisted of two elements. Firstly, the transition 
period on the sale of farmland to foreigners would be reduced to twelve years 
from the 18 years requested by the AW S negotiators. The proposal also included a 
five year transition period for 'second homes'. Secondly, there would be no 
transition period on the sale of agricultural land that had been leased and farmed 
by the prospective owner for a minimum of three years. The second part of the 
strategy hence reduced the transition period on the sale of land to 3 years with the 
caveat that any EU citizen wishing to purchase land in Poland would first have to 
lease it for 3 years.
The full scope of the compromise was not shared with the Sejm, the public or even 
the PSL until after Cimoszewicz and Hubner presented it to the EU. 726 Only the 
first part of strategy i.e. limiting the transition period on immediate sale from 18 to 
12 years was discussed with the Parliamentary European Integration Commission 
and was announced following a Council of Ministers meeting. The proposal to 
allow EU citizens to purchase land after they have leased it for only 3 years was 
kept secret until it was presented to the EU.
The opposition responded with an uproar even before the full extent of the 
compromise became known. Zygmunt Wrzodak of the LPR made the following 
comments about the reduction of the transition period on recreational land from 
twelve to eighteen years: 'The trade of land, which is our mother, should never
725 Leszek Miller, quoted in 'Pozostaniemy Sobg' Trybuna, 16 November 2001, pi.
726 K. Skowronski, 'Interview with Antoni Macierwicz', in TVN 24 news channel, 11 November 2001).
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take place. In this Polish land there is Polish blood. And today we are selling it to 
the Germans, who have previously caused Polish bloodshed' . 727
When the proposal to allow the sale of agricultural land after a three year lease was 
made public Liga Polskich Rodzin unsuccessfully attempted a vote of no confidence 
in Cimoszewicz. It also called for a parliamentary debate to clarify the 
government's negotiation stance. The debate took place on 29 November 2001. 
Cimoszewicz apologised for the incident, calling it an 'oversight', but showed no 
intention of changing the new negotiation strategy. He stated:
As a result of what was clearly, I confirm this, an error, but 
an error strictly technical-organizational in nature, based 
on the lack of a sufficiently detailed written information, 
and in light of the fact that discussion during the [press] 
conference concentrated on the most important elements of 
the modification of the negotiation strategy, the forwarded 
information turned out to be incomplete. Regarding the 
purchase of land by foreigners', information was given 
about the reduction of the basic transition period from 18 
to 1 2  years as well as a full resignation from the transition 
on the sale of land used for investment. The new stance on 
the sale of so called 'second homes' and the purchase of 
land by farmers previously personally farming the land on 
a lease was not mentioned.728
The head of foreign affairs hence dismissed a radical change in one of the most 
controversial negotiation topics as 'not-important' and described his failure to 
inform the public about this as a mere technical error. Had such a u-turn in the 
negotiation strategy been made public before it was agreed with Brussels it would 
have most likely resulted in a lengthy debate both with parliamentary opposition 
and between the coalition partners. Rather than risk the success of the 
negotiations, the SLD chose to present the Sejm and the public with a fait-accompli.
727 Quoted from Puls Trojki radio interview 15 November 2001 in 'Nie rzucim Ziemi' Wprost, 25 November
2001, p21.
728 Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, 6th session, day 2,29 November 2001, Stanowisko negocjacyjne rzqdu 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w rozmowach z Unig Europejskq.
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Without a compromise the negotiations would have continued to stall, and this 
was not acceptable for the SLD.™
Unsurprisingly, the decision not to consult the new proposals with the PSL came 
under severe criticism from the agrarians. Stanislaw Kalemba of the PSL stated:
We are a coalition member, but we too critically assess the 
manner in which Polish society was informed about the 
change in stance, we had the (parliamentary) European 
Commission. Here at the parliament we discussed, which 
was hard for us to accept, a change from 18 to 1 2  years, 
and from Brussels we receive information that it is 3 years.
This is simply not acceptable.. .this is a foundation of our 
programme and there Eire certain barriers below which the 
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe cannot go . 730
The PSL's criticism once again brought to light the perennial tension between the 
SLD's and PSL's approach to accession. PSL had asserted the need to establish a 
lengthy transition period on the sale of land from the start of the negotiations. Had 
the agrarians been in a position to participate in the formulation of the new 
strategy they would likely have blocked such a far reaching compromise. The SLD 
on the other hand was happy to compromise since it saw the sale of land as a 
political issue blocking access to speedy accession and the urgently needed 
structural and CAP funding that came with it. 731 The SLD's commitment to 
accession hence appears to have outweighed that to its coalition partner.
Cimoszewicz did not dwell on his failure to share the changed proposals with the 
public. Instead, he moved on to argue that even further compromises were needed:
A scrupulous analysis of the negotiation process so far, 
which was undertaken by the cabinet of Prime Minister
729 Interview with Leszek Miller, 26 July 2005.
730 Stanislaw Kalemba, 6th session, day 2,29 November 2001, Stanowisko negocjacyjne rzgdu Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej w rozmowach z Unig Europejsk .^
731 Interview with Leszek Miller, 26 July 2005, interview with Jacek Saryusz-Wolski,14 January 2002.
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Leszek Miller during its first days in office, led to the 
conclusion that some of the current propositions for 
transition periods had a political undertone and did not 
create a real opportunity of closing the negotiations in 
specific areas...It is easy to declare oneself as the defender 
of national interest by proposing an indefensible stance.. .It 
is much harder to later look the truth in the face and lead 
negotiations in such a way so as to achieve as much as 
possible within narrow room for manoeuvre. Such is the 
aim of the current government, we want to attain the best 
possible results, not forgetting, that the negotiation table 
has two sides.732
He went on to re-affirm his cabinet's commitment for Poland to join the EU by 
2004. In order for this to happen negotiations would have had to have been 
completed by the end of 2002. It was the government's intention to close all 
chapters which had no significant financial impact by mid- 2 0 0 2  so as to be able to 
focus on the key issues of agriculture, structural aid and the budget. Cimoszewicz 
also emphasised the importance of broad public participation in the accession 
process and the need to develop a long term strategy on the future of the EU that 
would allow Poland to play a role corresponding to its importance in the Central 
European region.
Disagreements about the sale of land continued into 2002. Whereas the PSL 
claimed that the three year lease period should start with accession the SLD argued 
that it should be counted from the start of the lease.733 Relations between the two 
parties became increasingly problematic. Miller later described the Agrarians' 
stance as 'distrustful and very inquisitive' 734 whereas Waldemar Pawlak
732Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, 6th session, day 2, 29 November 2001, Stanowisko negocjacyjne rzgdu 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w rozmowach z Uni^ Europejsk .^
733 Jerzy Sieradziriski, 'Koniec Sporu?' Trybuna, nr.51(3648), 01 March 2002, pi and 5.
734 Interview with Leszek Miller, 26 July 2005.
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commented that "the SLD's and the PSL's views about European integration had 
always been at odds' . 735
In spite of the disagreements between the coalition partners and criticism from the 
largely euro-sceptic opposition the negotiations progressed and subsequent 
chapters were closed throughout 2002. The 'Free Movement of Capital' chapter 
was closed on 22 March 2002. The EU agreed to a transition period of twelve years 
for farmland and five years on the purchase of 'second homes'. A three year 
transition period was applied to the sale of farmland that had been leased for three 
years in Eastern Poland and for five years in the Western regions. By May 2002, 
twenty three out of the thirty-one negotiation chapters had been closed. Poland 
was still in ninth place in the Commission's rankings, followed by Malta, Bulgaria 
and Romania but progress had been made.
The negotiations were completed on 13 December 2002 in Copenhagen, on the 21st 
anniversary of the introduction of Martial Law in Poland. The results are 
summarised in table 5. The final session covered agriculture and the budget. Until 
24 October 2002, the EU was unwilling to grant any CAP funds to the new  
entrants. Less than two months before the end of the negotiations it finally agreed 
to assign up to 25% of the existing member states' CAP subsidies in the first years 
of membership with an annual 5% increase73*. As could be expected given the 
unfair nature of the proposal737 this was not acceptable for the Poles. Eventually, 
contradicting the economic arguments for the need to liberalise agriculture it used 
to justify its initial proposal738, the Commission agreed that monies from the 
structural funds and from Poland's budget would be used to top up the CAP 
funds. From 2004 to 2006 Polish farmers were to receive 60% of the funds allocated
735 Interview with Waldemar Pawlak, 20 July 2005.
736 Kawecka-Wykrzykowska, 'Financial Conditions of Poland's Accession to the European Union', pl8-19, 
Negocjacje Polska-UE 'Gazeta Wyborcza', Unia latwo nie ustgpi 10.12.2001 Warszawa (PAP) -  Jacek Pawlicki.
737 A. Mayhew, 'A Negotiating Position of the European Union on Agriculture, the Structural Funds and the 
EU Budget', in 2002), p9.
738 Ibid, p9.
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to their West European counterparts and a new budget would to be negotiated 
thereafter. 739
While politically advantageous for the SLD, changing the use of structural funds in 
this manner was less advantageous for Poland's economy. Apart from contributing 
to the budgetary deficit since co-financing would have to be covered from the 
national budget, the new agreement meant that structural funds, normally used to 
help modernise lagging regional economies, were turned into flat subsidies for 
land ownership. 740
The Free Movement of Persons chapter was also closed in Copenhagen. It was left 
to the individual existing member states' discretion whether they imposed a 
transition period on opening up their labour markets to workers from the new 
entrant states. If, after two years, the member state wished to continue the 
transition period it would be allowed to do so for another three years. If the 
member state wished to extend the transition period further after the five years 
had passed it could do so for another two years if it was able to show that non­
extension would severely disturb it domestic labour market. 741
Miller's main concern during the final stages of negotiations was the possibility 
that in spite of being one of the poorest member states Poland would become a net 
contributor to the EU budget. 742 This would not only have increased Poland's 
budgetary deficit but could have also discouraged the public from voting for 
membership during the forthcoming referendum. 743
Although potential gains for Poland from accession amounted to as much as 7 
billion Euros this estimate was based on full use of available structural funds. But
739 Kawecka-Wykrzykowska, 'Financial Conditions of Poland's Accession to the European Union', pl8-19.
740 Ibid, pl8-19.
741 J. Wisniewski, 'Swobodny Przeplyw Os6b', in Czlonkostwo Polski w Unii Europejskiej - Na Jakich 
Zasadach?, ed. M. Kisielewska (Warsaw 2003), 16-26.
742 Interview with Leszek Miller, 26 July 2005.
743 Ibid.
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the funds required co-financing from the Polish side, often as much as 50% of the 
total sum, as well as administrative structures able to efficiently absorb the funds 
by allocating them to suitable recipients. 744 If Poland absorbed less than 35% of 
available structural funds over the 2004-6 period then it stood the risk of becoming 
a net payer into the EU budget745. Moreover, most of the structural funds were 
transferred directly to recipients such as local government, businesses and non­
governmental organisations, while member contributions to the EU, amounting to 
1.3 billion Euros and 20% of Poland's budget deficit in 2004, were made from the 
state budget. The substantial benefits of structural funding for Poland as a whole 
would hence not be reflected in the Polish budget. To resolve the 'net-payer' issue 
the EU agreed to provide a lump sum payment of 1,443 billion Euros payment 
over 3 years, 443 million of which was provided directly from the EU's budget and 
the remainder from structural funds. 746
744 Samecki, 'Financial Flows Between the EU and Poland in 2004-2013', p48.
745 Kawecka-Wykrzykowska, 'Financial Conditions of Poland's Accession to the European Union', p25.
746 Ibid, p23.
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Chapter Date open Date closed Result
1 Free movement of goods 21.06.99 28.03.01, re­
opened and
cloocd on 
28.11.01
Initially Poland did not ask for any transition periods. Chapter 
was re-opened and closed again on 28 November 2001 with a 
transition period extending the deadline for Poland to register 
prescribed medication.
2 Free movement of persons 26.95.99 2 1 .1 2 . 0 1 7 year transition period for Polish citizens to work in EU-15 states. 
After the first 5 years EU-15 member states would have to show 
that allowing Polish citizens' to work seriously affects domestic 
labour market if they were to extend the transition period. Any 
member state that did opt to use the transition period would be 
allowed to opt out at any time.
3 Provision of services 12.11.99 14.11.00 No limitations on majority of services except low cost service 
provision in areas such as building and construction in Austria and 
Germany, which were limited in line with free movement of 
persons restrictions747.
Transition period for implementation of Art. 5, directive 
2000/12/EC re self-financing levels for co-operative banks. Self- 
financing to reach EUR lm  by 31 December 2007.
4 Free movement of capital 15.06.99 22.03. 02 5 years for 'second homes'748, 12 years for rural and forest land, 
land leased in western territories sold after 5 year lease, 3 years in 
Eastern territories.
5 Company law 19.05.99 28.11.01 No transition periods.
6 Competition policy 19.05.99 2 0 .1 1 . 0 2 Transition period until 2011 for Poland to increase state aid for 
small and medium sized enterprises
747 K. Kostrzewa, 'Swoboda Swiadczenia Ushig1, in Czionkostwo Polski w Unii Europejskiej - na jakich zasadach?, ed. M. Kisielewska (Warsaw 2003).
748 K. Kostrzewa, 'Swobodny Przepfyw Kapitalu', in Czionkostwo Polski w Unii Europejskiej - Na Jakich Zasadach?, ed. M. Kisielewska (Warsaw 2003), p34.
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Chapter Date open Date closed Result
7 Agriculture 14.06.00 13.12.02 For the first 3 years of membership Polish farmers would receive 
the following CAP funds as compared to EU-15 farmers:
2004-55%
2005-60%
2006-65%
The funds were to be financed by CAP direct payments, structural 
funds and Polish budget.
8 Fisheries 19.05.99 10.06.02 No transition periods.
9 Transport Policy 10.11.99 10.06.02 Transition period for Poland re directive 96/53 concerning 
maximal size of transport vehicles and transit payments to be 
harmonised until 2 0 1 0 , transition period until 2006 re directive 
91/440 for Poland to allow foreign investors access to its railway 
network.
1 0 Taxation 07.12.99 21.03.02 Transition periods on maintaining lower VAT rates: 5 years on 7% 
for construction VAT, 4 years on 3% for agricultural goods, 5 years 
7% on catering, and 5 years for 0% on specialist books and 
magazines.
1 1 Economic and Monetary 
Union
30.09.99 07.12.02 No transition periods.
1 2 Statistics 19.04.99 19.04.99 No transition periods.
13 Social Policy and 
Employment
30.09.99 01.06.01 One transition period concerning safety at work regulations, until 
31 December 2005.
14 Energy 12.11.99 27.07.01 Transition period until 2008 regarding Poland maintaining 
required minimum stock of oil.
15 Industrial Policy 29.10.98 19.05.99 No transition periods.
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Chapter Date open Date closed Result
16 Small and medium sized 
enterprises
29.10.99 29.10.99 No transition periods.
17 Science and Research 10.11.98 10.11.98 No transition periods.
18 Education and Training 1011.98 10.11.98 No transition periods.
19 Telecommunications and 
Information Technology
29.10.98 22.06.99 Transition period until 2006 for Poland to liberalise postal services.
2 0 Culture and Audiovisual 
Policy
29.10.98 04.12.01 No transition periods.
2 1 Regional policy and co­
ordination of structural 
instruments
06.04.00 0 1 .1 0 .0 2 - All Polish regions were classified as eligible for structural and 
cohesion funds. For 2004-6 Poland attained a total of EUR 7,635.3 
billion structural funds and 3,733.3 billion EUR of cohesion funds.
2 2 Environment 07.12.99 26.10.01 Nine transition periods for Poland in areas concerning sewage, 
landfills, water, packaging, sulphur production, air transport 
emissions and control of refuse disposal outside of EU borders. 
Various deadlines, final deadline in 2017.
23 Consumers and health 
protection
19.04.99 19.05.99 No transition periods.
24 Justice and Home Affairs 06.05.00 30.06.02 No transition periods.
25 Customs Union 21.06.99 29.03.01 No transition periods.
26 External relations 01.05.99 12.11.99 No transition periods.
27 Common foreign and 
security policy
10.11.99 06.04.00 No transition periods.
28 Financial Control 06.04.00 14.06.00 No transition periods.
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Chapter Date open Date closed Result
29 Finance and Budget 26.05.00 13.12.02 To prevent Poland becoming a net payer it was awarded approx. 
1.5 billion EURO. Approximately 1 /3  of this was derived from a 
special fund to diminish the Polish budgetary deficit and 2 /3  from 
structural funds (i.e. funds already awarded to Poland which 
would otherwise have been used for structured aid).
30 Institutions 22.04.02 22.04.02 No transition periods, final agreement based on Treaty of Niece: 54 
of 732 seats in EP, 27 of 231 European Council votes, one 
commissioner, one ECJ judge.
Table 6 : Results of the EU accession negotiations.749
749 Based on The Government of the Republic of Poland, 'Geneza oraz Przebieg Procesu Negocjacji o Czlonkowstwo Polski w Unii Europejskiej' 
(http://www.exporter.pl/zarzadzanie/ue/negocjacje.html, last accessed 26 June 2006).
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The results of the negotiations were widely publicised in the Polish media and 
subject to comments from all major political parties. Unsurprisingly, most 
opposition parties were critical of the negotiation results with the anti- 
integrationist League of Polish Families being the most vocal critic. Roman 
Giertych of the Liga Polskich Rodzin immediately called for the government to stand 
down .750 He also stated:
The decision of Leszek Miller's government for Poland to 
enter the European Union is scandalous. The conditions 
which have been proposed to us and which we have 
accepted are not even conditions of the third, or fourth or 
fifth category. They mean that we will permanently remain 
in the grey zone of the European Union. That we will 
become purely a market for the community states. 751
Danuta Hojarska of Samoobrona was equally sceptical. She stated:
On entering the European Union Poland loses sovereignty.
I will lose markets, my children, who manage a farm, will 
not be able to sell their produce -  since in our shops all the 
goods are from the EU. If we were offered equal, partner 
relations, such as those which other countries got with 
subsequent enlargements, then I would support the Union.
My grandfather died for Poland, and I will in no 
circumstances agree to enter the Union .752
Both LPR and Samoobrona were hence critical of the impact of accession on Polish 
sovereignty and its economy. Most important for them, however, was that Poland 
did not participate in the EU on worse terms than the other member states. Both 
parties frequently expressed concerns that Poland would not be treated equally 
with the Western member states. Once in the EU, they argued, Poland would be 
used as a source of cheap labour and a dumping ground for second rate products.
750 'Unia Nasza' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.292,16 December 2002, p8.
751 'Kopenhaskie rozwi^zanie' Wprost, nr.1047,22 December 2002.
752 Ibid.
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The theme of Poland being inferior to the West, so prominent in the rhetoric the 
euro-sceptic Christian Nationalist Faction, could now be heard once again from 
representatives of Self Defence and LPR753, many of whom were former ZChN  
members.
Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc was not overly critical of the negotiation result but even at 
this late stage of the accession process had not yet decided whether to back EU 
membership. Jaroslaw Kaczyriski stated:
The results of the Copenhagen negotiations are a step in 
the direction which we were expecting. These are gains in 
the framework of the same total sums, but they have been 
made real, their structure is more advantageous. This is not 
a breakthrough, it is not a success, as the pro-govemment 
media are trying to present it, but it is better than it was 
when it was being proposed to accept Brussels' conditions. 
Whether to say yes or no during the accession referendum 
is subject to further analysis, the decision will most likely 
be made on January 18th during the PiS congress.754
The Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe accepted the Copenhagen agreement. Eugeniusz 
Klopotek declared:
The opponents of European Integration are sharpening 
their teeth and will subject the negotiated conditions to 
total criticism. However, its supporters perhaps are not 
falling into euphoria but they have certainly taken a breath 
of relief. It is good that each of the deputy Prime Ministers 
managed to get something, one wants to finally say that in 
the end Poland has won .755
Platforma Obywatelska was the only opposition grouping which unambiguously 
backed the negotiation results. The PO's leader, Donald Tusk, stated: 'The results
753 Interview with Ryszard Czamecki, 15 June 2005.
754 'Unia Nasza' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.292,16 December 2002, p8.
755 Ibid.
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of the Copenhagen summit allow Poles to step towards the accession referendum 
with pride' . 756 Tusk made sure however, that his praise for the negotiation results 
was not interpreted as praise for the government. He declared:
The task of the Platform will now be to convince the Poles 
that voting about Europe is not a vote for Leszek Miller.
The fact that the negotiations ended on the 13th of 
December is a symbolic monument for all those who 
suffered for long years, some of whom perished precisely 
for this great idea of Poland returning to Western 
civilisation.757
Unable to criticise the SLD on the grounds of its stance on Europe, which was 
equally enthusiastic as that of the Platform, Tusk resorted to reminding the 
electorate of the SLD's authoritarian roots as a means of differentiating himself 
from the communist-successors. In spite of close alignment on an issue of such 
historic importance for Poland as accession, as well as shared policy preferences on 
many other matters, the two groupings were still divided by their pre-1989 
heritage.
The results of the negotiations were widely covered in the media and all major 
political groupings outlined their stance on the outcome of the talks. Several 
parties, for example Prawo i S'prawiedliwosc, PSL or Samoobrona, presented the final 
agreement made in the negotiations as a decisive factor in their stance on 
accession. The way in which representatives of these parties talked about the 
negotiation results suggested they were synonymous with the terms of Poland's 
membership in the EU, thereby implying that the Poles had negotiated special 
membership conditions for themselves that derogated Poland from the European 
acquis. But the terms of accession remained non-negotiable throughout the pre­
accession period. The scope of the negotiations was limited to allowing leeway in
756 'Unia Nasza' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.292,16 December 2002, p8.
757 Ibid.
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the amount of time Poland had to fully align with the non-negotiable acquis, not 
the content of the acquis788, and the transition periods that were eventually allowed 
covered less than 5% of the acquis.™ The way in which the parties presented the 
negotiations hence suggested that the negotiators had had some choice as to the 
terms of Polish membership. In fact, the terms of membership were never up for 
negotiation. The parties did not appear to acknowledge this however and instead 
presented the results of the negotiations in a way that suggested much more had 
been at stake than only transition periods for the implementation of laws Poland 
had always been was obliged to adopt as a condition of membership.
Accession in political debate
The 2001 electoral campaign
The 2001 parliamentary elections were held on 23 September 2001. The contest 
took place under a changed electoral system, which favoured small parties. 760 This 
did little to help the AWiS and the Unia Wolnosci however and neither managed to 
enter parliament having attained 5.6% and 3.1% of the vote respectively. The 
economic crisis and growing public disenchantment with the economic 
transformation7^  bolstered the centre-left and the SLD-UP coalition became the 
largest parliamentary grouping with 41% of the votes and 216 parliamentary seats. 
This was the best electoral result in the history of post-communist Poland. But it 
was not enough to form a majority government and so the SLD-UP turned to 
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, which attained 9% of the vote 42 parliamentary seats. 
The results of the contest are presented in table 7.
758 Interview with Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, 14 January 2002.
™ Ibid.
760 Millard, 'Elections in Poland in 2001: electoral manipulation and party upheaval1, p74-5.
761K. Lab^dz, 'Koncepcje Polityczne wspolczesnej Solidamosc (wybrane aspekty)', in Polacy, Polska, Europa. 
Interpretacje Idei Politycznych, ed. T. Godlewski, (Bydgoszcz 2002), 122-133, pl29.
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Name of grouping Percentage of 
votes
Percentage of 
parliamentary seats
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej -  
Unia Pracy 41.04 46.96
Platforma Obywatelska 1 2 . 6 8 14.13
Samoobrona 1 0 . 2 0 11.52
Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc 9.50 9.56
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe 8.98 9.13
Liga Polskich Rodzin 7.87 8.26
Mniejszosc Niemiecka762 0 . 0 2 0.43
Akcja Wyborcza Solidarnosc -  
Ruch Spoleczny 5.60 n /a
Unia Wolnosci 3.10 n /a
Alterntywa 0.42 n /a
Table 7: 2001 parliamentary election results763
The SLD-UP campaign capitalised on the mistakes of the Buzek cabinet and 
promised to return "trust7 and "stability7 to government as well as to "fix7 Buzek7s 
public sector reforms. The communist-successors7 other key proposals included 
investment in information technology, measures to decrease unemployment, 
promotion of economic growth, "fair redistribution" and more "equal life 
opportunities" .764
The SLD continued to unequivocally support EU membership. But in contrast to 
the federalist, "Social Europe" it had advocated previously, the SLD's rhetoric now 
called for the protection of national interest and emphasised that accession should 
be beneficial for Poland and should not be treated as an aim in its own right. 
Accession should "take place as soon as possible" the Alliance declared in its 
programme, but it also insisted that Poland should accede "on conditions that
762 Parties representing ethnic and national minorities were exempt from representation thresholds.
763 Millard, 'Elections in Poland in 2001: electoral manipulation and party upheaval1, p72.
764 Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej -  Unia Pracy, Materialy Wyborcze, Political Parties Archive, Institute of 
Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2001 parliamentary election folder.
256
ensure appropriate and long lasting gains for our country7.765 in the section 
entitled 7To Integrate Profitably7 the SLD's programme stated:
Before us is a great national challenge: the completion of 
the negotiation process with the EU and the preparation of 
Poland for integration. Integration is not an aim in itself.
We want to be a part of the European Union to better 
realize our basic objectives: faster economic growth, the 
modernization of agriculture, infrastructure 
improvements, and equalization of opportunities. 766
The SLD's new rhetoric reflected falling popular support for accession and the 
public7s preference to delay EU entry. 767 The Alliance continued to enthusiastically 
support accession but its new rhetoric also tried not to alienate the increasingly 
euro-sceptic electorate. To ensure that Polish integration into the EU was profitable 
the SLD promised it would negotiate for optimal use of the Common Agricultural 
Policy, sufficient transition periods for agriculture, the right to work in the EU-15, 
access to regional funds, and the attainment of Optimally high levels of EU 
financial aid7. 768
The SLD advocated the use of a referendum to ratify the membership treaty which, 
the Alliance argued, should be preceded by an in-depth public debate on European 
integration to ensure the voters could make a well informed choice during the 
referendum. To facilitate such a debate, the SLD proposed to implement a large 
scale information and education programme. The Alliance also proposed that all
765 Manifest Programowy SLD, quoted in Piasecki, p48.
766 Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej -  Unia Pracy, Materiaiy Wyborcze, Political Parties Archive, Institute of 
Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2001 parliamentary election folder.
767 A. Szczerbiak, 'Polish Public Opinion: Explaining Declining Support for EU Membership1, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 39,1 (2001), 105-122.
768 Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej -  Unia Pracy, Materiaiy Wyborcze, Political Parties Archive, Institute of 
Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2001 parliamentary election folder.
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political parties agree on a non-partisan programme of information about 
accession.?69
Unia Pracy, which campaigned in coalition with the SLD, expressed support for 
accession to a 'modern' and 'Social' Europe but it also emphasised the need to 
protect Polish interests. 'Integration with the European Union presents Poland 
with the opportunity to catch up in civilisational delays and remove differences in 
levels of economic growth. We will, after all, accede to a modern, social Europe' 770 
it stated. But the UP also warned that accession conditions should be analysed in a 
'sober and realistic' manner and that careful attention should be paid to potential 
infringements to the interests of Polish workers, farmers and consumers. Poland 
should not, according to the UP, become a 'second category' member and a clear 
reconciliation of costs and benefits should be made. ™
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe was less enthusiastic about accession than its future 
coalition partners. The Agrarians did declare support for EU entry but emphasised 
that in order to be worthwhile, integration must be financially beneficial for the 
Polish economy and especially for the agricultural sector:
The objective of membership in the European Union, 
similarly to our participation in NATO, is a choice which 
should serve the realization of strategic aims -  the catching 
up on civilisational handicaps, the diminution of economic 
and development differences.. .Integration with the EU 
should bring about an improvement in the quality of life of 
Poles, any other outcome would contradict the rationale 
for integration and the costs associated with it. Society
769 Ibid.
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should be presented with a clear balance of costs and 
benefits.772
The PSL argued that for Poland to benefit from accession it must receive the same 
amount of CAP and structural funds as other member states. As previously, the 
PSL linked its support for accession with the economic benefits Poland would 
attain from it. Section 39 of its programme stated: 'The strengthening of Poland's 
national economic interest should form the basis of integration with the EU 
(strategic integration) and not a passive inclusion of our economy into a greater 
community' . 773
Full access to the CAP funds, a demand which the European Commission was 
unlikely to meet, was of critical importance for the Agrarians. The PSL was also 
concerned about foreign firms taking control of strategic parts of the domestic 
economy as well as the trade deficit with the EU. Although critical of the previous 
cabinet's integration policy which, the Stronnictwo claimed, created an 'assymetry' 
in Polish-EU relations, the PSL supported the AW S' demand for an 18 year 
transition period on the sale of land to foreigners. 774
The PSL continued to advocate an interventionist economic programme, elements 
of which did not sit well with accession requirements. The Agrarians proposed 
export subsidies, credit guarantees and called for a more 'flexible' monetary policy 
as well as state aid to prevent the 'collapse of agriculture' . 775
The Stronnictwo also frequently reused doubts about the benefits of accession for 
the Polish economy and opposed foreign ownership of strategic sectors of the 
economy that would be allowed under the Community's free movement of capital.
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Its position on Europe was made even more problematic by the Euro-enthusiasm 
of the SLD and the euro-scepticism of its main competitor, Self-defence. PSL 
leadership knew that given the SLD's popularity, the Agrarians' only realistic 
chance of entering government would be in coalition with the pro-integrationist 
SLD-UP. Yet at the same time the PSL had to compete with the increasingly 
popular Samoobrona,776 which stood on a populist, euro-sceptic platform. The PSL's 
hence remained characteristically ambiguous about accession, as it tried to balance 
between the conservative, Euro-sceptic politics of the countryside and its main 
competitor on the one hand and the SLD's pro-integrationism and the promise of 
CAP and structural funding on the other.
Samoobrona was one of the biggest surprises of the 2001 contest, becoming the 
third largest parliamentary grouping with almost 10% of the vote. Originating 
from a populist agrarian protest movement established in the early 1990's777 it now 
defined itself as a national-agrarian social grassroots organisation, aiming for a 
'moral and economic renewal' of Poland. It proposed an interventionist economic 
policy,7^  a return to Christian values and a rejection of the 'satanic liberalism'™, 
'uncontrolled consumption' and 'mutant consumerism'7**. It also called for a 
'defence of economic and political sovereignty of the state', which, it claimed was 
'being rapidly lost under the smoke screen of integration with the European Union 
and NATO' . 781 It also advocated the retention of strategic industrial sectors in state 
hands as well as the increase of state benefits and support for agriculture. 782 
Although its programme did not explicitly oppose accession, Samoobrona's rhetoric 
made frequent references to 'economic colonisation' and threats which foreign
776 Millard, 'Elections in Poland in 2001: electoral manipulation and party upheaval', p74-5.
777 A. Prazmowska, 'The New Right in Poland: Nationalism, Anti-Semitism and Parliamentarianism', in The 
Far Right in Western and Eastern Europe, ed. L. Cheles (New York 1995), p211-213.
778 Samoobrona, 'Ogdlne postulaty ideowo-programowe Samoobrony', section a. 
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economic institutions posed to Polish sovereignty. It was particularly concerned 
about economic integration and the impact of global businesses on the Polish 
economy. In one campaign leaflet Samoobrona stated:
Attempts to conquer Poland, in the past made by means of 
"sword and fire"783 today take the form of "without drawing 
the sword", and are primarily economic activities, aiming 
to quickly rid the Polish nation of any state of ownership in 
the economic sphere, stealing national wealth and handing 
it for nothing into the hands of foreign economic 
aggressors. ^
Although it did not present a consistently anti-integrationist stance, instead 
deferring the decision to the referendum, Samoobrona was nonetheless very critical 
of accession.
The League of Polish Families was the only grouping to enter the 2001 parliament 
on an explicitly anti-accession platform. 785 Vehemently anti-integrationist and 
xenophobic, the LPR appealed to conservative, religious voters who felt threatened 
by globalisation and perceived their Catholic morality as superior. Established in 
April 2001 its leaders included Antoni Macierewicz, one of Poland's staunchest 
euro-sceptics and former member of the ZChN  as well as other politicians known 
for their critical stance of accession such as the trade unionist Zygmunt Wrzodak, 
Gabriel Janowski and Roman Giertych788, former member of the far right 
Nationalist Faction (Stronnictwo Narodowe) and leader of the LPR's youth 
organisation All-Polish Youth (Mlodzierz Wszeckpolska), notorious for its 
connections with the skinhead movement.
783 The quote refers to the famous novel by Polish author Henryk Sienkiewicz: 'Ogniem i Mieczem' (By Sword 
and Fire), the novel, criticised as anti-Ukrainian and nationalistic, is set in 17th century Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth and as one of its main themes recounts the bravery of Polish troops battling against Ukrainian 
rebels during the 1648-57 Khmelnytsky uprising.
784 Samoobrona, 'Bronmy Swego', http://www.samoobrona.org.pl/partia.htm, last accessed 7 January 2002.
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The League united Catholic-nationalist organisations such as the National Faction, 
the Polish Agreement and the Catholic-nationalist Movement. It benefited from the 
backing of Father Rydzyk of the radical-Catholic Radio Maryja and had close links 
with the far right.
The LPR's electoral slogan stated: 'For Poland -  Independence, for the Poles -  
work, bread and homes' . 787 The first section of its programme called for the 
removal of articles 90 and 91 from the Polish constitution. As was discussed in 
chapter 4, these articles allowed for international law to be incorporated into Polish 
legislation. According to the LPR, they 'formed the basis of the destruction of the 
sovereignty of the Polish state' . 788
The Liga equated accession with the economic and cultural colonisation of Poland 
by the Western powers, in particular by Germany. EU membership, it argued, 
would lead to loss of national sovereignty and identity, secularisation, moral 
corruption, and the destruction of the Polish economy. Its programme declared:
It cannot be that Polish property is given away into foreign 
hands, the market is open to unfair 'competition', the 
economy is 'cooled down' and the Poles are robbed of 
work, while we pay for the creation of jobs in the European 
Union .789
Sale of land to foreigners was a major concern for the LPR. Given the chance, it 
claimed, wealthy Germans exiled after World War II would return to re-colonise
787 Liga Polskich Rodzin. Materiaiy Wyborcze, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the 
Polish Academy of Sciences, 2001 parliamentary election folder.
788 Ibid.
789 Program Solidaryzmu Narodowego Ligi Polskich Rodzin, section 2, Political Parties Archive, Institute of 
Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2001 parliamentary election folder.
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the Recovered Territories by buying up farmland. This was only a short step away 
from yet another partition, it claimed.
Remaining outside of European structures was, for the LPR, the only way to save 
the Polish nation from engulfment by the European empire. It stated:
We stand before a question today: will we realize a Polish 
programme or programmes foreign to Poland?
Consequently -  will we have jobs, will we eat Polish 
bread? Will we have Polish homes? Or will we, as part of 
the European Union or another such modem Tower of 
Babel, import unemployment, eat foreign bread and live on 
the street? Let us choose an independent and sovereign 
Poland!7^
In place of acceding to the EU, the LPR advocated joining the North American Free 
Trade Association. It argued that while this would provide adequate international 
security and economic integration it would not expose Poland to the dangers of 
annexation by the European super state.
Apart from marginal radical parties7*! the only other grouping to compete on an 
anti-integrationist platform was Alterantywa (The Alternative). Having attained as 
little as 0.5% of the vote however, Altematywa did not enter parliament. Made up 
mostly of former Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej activists, it focused on the 
protection of Polish sovereignty. Like the Liga Polskich Rodzin, it proposed changes 
to articles 90 and 91 of the constitution and a renegotiation of the Association 
Agreement. In place of European integration it advocated greater national self- 
sufficiency.792
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The centre-right, economically liberal Platforma Obywatelska was staunchly euro- 
enthusiastic; two of its three founding members Maciej Plazynski793 and Andrzej 
Olechowski had left the AW S  over disagreement with the Action's 'tough' 
negotiation strategy. The third, future prime minister Donald Tusk, was a former 
Freedom Union member well known for his euro-enthusiasm. Rather than 
explicitly present its a stance in favour of EU membership however, the Platform's 
programme frequently referred to accession as a given and focused on the need to 
put in place policies that would enable Poland to make optimal use of membership 
benefits, for example the establishment of adequate structures to administer aid for 
the agricultural sector.79*
The PO's programme focused on the economy, advocating measures such as a flat 
15% tax rate, liberalisation of company law and employment legislation and a 
lowering of the tax burden on the employer. 795 Its liberal approach to economic 
policy was well aligned with the economic requirements of accession.
Unia Wolnosci presented a centrist, moderate programme. Its slogan stated: 'A 
strong middle class is an opportunity for everyone'.7* The programme emphasised 
the need to reduce inflation, complete the privatisation process, lower and simplify 
taxes as well as introduce measures against unemployment. Section 4 of the U W  s 
programme was entitled: 'The European Union -  an opportunity for the people 
and for the country' . 797 It stated:
Poland's membership in the European Union is a great 
opportunity for Poland and the Poles. It will speed up the 
pace of economic growth, widen the markets for
793 Interview with Maciej Plazynski, 13 July 2005.
794 Platforma Obywatelska. Materiaiy Wyborcze, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the 
Polish Academy of Sciences, 2001 parliamentary election folder.
793 Ibid.
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producers, increase the flow of investment capital, and 
Poland will receive financial aid enabling it to decrease 
unemployment connected to the modernization of the 
economy. The Polish countryside and the agricultural 
sector will also gain a new opportunity -  half of the EU's 
budget is assigned to the Common Agricultural Policy. 798
The programme went on to assert other benefits of EU membership including 
greater international security, access to the EU labour market, and structural aid. 
The U W  warned, however, that in order to benefit from accession it was necessary 
to implement adequate harmonisation measures. It proposed a set of reforms 
which would enable Poland to benefit from accession. These included the de- 
monopolisation of telecommunications, air and rail travel and energy sectors, the 
introduction of EU quality and safety standards, the development of a public 
information programme about the EU and the development of new jobs and 
housing for inhabitants of the countryside.799 The U W s  policy proposals hence 
remained consistent with accession requirements.
Following the withdrawal of the Solidarity Trade Union from the AW S, Electoral 
Action re-named itself Solidarity Electoral Action of the Right (Akcja Wyborcza 
Solidamosc Prawicy, AWSP). The new formation consisted of the Christian 
Nationalist Faction, the Agreement of the Polish Christian Democrats and the 
Social Movement AWS. The AW S  emphasised the importance of family values, 
national identity and justice, and its programme often referred to the Action's 
historical roots in the Solidarity movement. Section V stated: 'Respect for culture, 
history, national values and the Solidarity message is very important for our right 
wing groupings. These protect the Poles from amnesia and from the loss of 
identity' .*»
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The AW S  backed EU membership as long as it did not impinge Poland's national 
identity. The Akcja declared its support for: "The speedy and successful inclusion 
of Poland in a European Union where nation states will maintain their values and 
identity' . 801
The Akcja's support for accession was subject to a number of conditions. Firstly, the 
nations represented by member states, AW S  asserted, had to be treated as 
'constituting subjects' to prevent the erosion of national identity. The programme 
did not specify what kinds of rights member states would be granted by virtue of 
being 'constituting subjects'. Secondly, the AW S  called for the 'affirmation of 
Christian civilisation as the foundation of the European social order' . 802 The 
programme declared: 'We reject dangerous visions of a Europe with no values. 
These threaten the return of totalitarianisms and bring politics down to a game of 
interests, in which victory is had by the strong and the rich -  regardless of who is 
right' . 803 The AW S  hence continued to support integration with an EU founded on 
Christian values.
The Electoral Action campaigned on a centre-right, liberal economic programme 
that advocated the simplification of the tax system and support for small and 
medium sized businesses as well as investment in transport infrastructure and 
subsidies for the agricultural sector to protect it from 'unfair' competition from 
abroad. It also called for a well thought out allocation of structural funds.
Lech Kaczynski's Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc did not present a clear cut stance on 
accession and instead emphasised that the final decision should be made in a 
nationwide referendum:
Our accession to the European Union is the great problem
for today. It is this objective, among all those which we are
801 Ibid.
802 Ibid.
803 Ibid.
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undertaking in the international arena that is both the most 
important and the most controversial. The decision to enter 
the European Union must be a decision of the nation, taken 
in a referendum.804
European integration was indeed problematic for PiS. Its inability to formulate a 
clear stance on EU membership reflected the different views of its members, which 
ranged from reluctant supporters such as Lech Kaczyriski to euro-sceptics such as 
Marian Pilka and Marek Jurek, formerly one of the ZChN's most vocal opponents 
of accession. 805 PiS argued that the conditions on which Poland was to join the EU 
were as yet unknown, and hence it was not possible to formulate a well informed 
opinion. The programme stated: Tn order for a referendum to have any kind of 
sense the Poles must be presented with a trustworthy document describing all the 
effects of entering the EU including the benefits and the costs' . 806
According to PiS, the membership negotiations had proceeded too quickly and the 
negotiators had put speedy accession above good membership conditions. The 
programme stated:
The accession date has for a long time been a central 
problem of negotiations. We do not dismiss this issue but 
we must emphasize very strongly that the efforts to attain 
a position in the Union appropriate and honourable for a 
large European nation like Poland' cannot be sufficiently 
effective when the manner and speed of negotiations are 
defined by subsequent, and as has become apparent not 
very realistic, dates of accession to the Union. What is most 
important is the quality of our presence and, what follows 
from this, a determined defence of our interests.807
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Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc hence did not oppose accession, as long as it took place on 
the right conditions, regardless of how long negotiating such conditions would 
take.
In contrast to its sceptical stance on the EU, PiS was enthusiastic about Poland's 
membership in NATO, arguing that this 'must be the foundation of Poland's 
foreign policy'808. PiS also advocated the development of good relations with the 
Baltic States and the Russian Federation. Regarding the latter however, it urged 
caution due to the Targe assets owned by our partner within our country'.809
PiS' political platform focused on the introduction of tough measures against crime 
and corruption as well as the 'moral cleansing' of the political elite. Its socio­
economic proposals included lower taxes and interest rates as well as extensive 
investment in infrastructure and social policies to help the poor. These would be 
financed, PiS argued, from increased revenues that would be brought about by the 
reduction of corruption.
PiS also advocated the introduction of trade barriers to protect the Polish economy 
from foreign competition. The programme acknowledged that EU membership 
would invalidate most such measures but since speedy membership was 
increasingly unlikely, PiS argued, the current policy of lifting trade barriers was 
not relevant. Its programme then stated that even if accession was imminent, 
Poland should resort to protectionist measures that could be used within the EU 
such as increased controls over permits for new supermarkets, a tax regime that 
incentivised Polish owned export industries and the introduction of health and 
safety requirements to counterbalance similar measures being used against Polish 
exports. PiS also advocated the retention of state control over industries 
'impacting economic security' by means of privatisation laws that allowed the state
808 Ibid, 'Foreign Policy' section.
809 Ibid.
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to retain a controlling stake as well as a ban on Polish state owned pension funds 
investing in foreign stock markets. 81°
If elected, PiS promised to hold a nationwide referendum covering a broad range 
of topics including the 'moral and ideological foundations of the state', the 
'cleansing of public life' and measures against corruption. Regarding accession, it 
proposed that the public should be asked if it wished to be presented with 'a 
document, prepared by a parliamentary commission in co-operation with the 
government, presenting the effects of Poland's entry to the European Union', sn
While not opposed to accession PiS was sceptical about whether it would take 
place quickly and emphasised the need for the decision to be made by the public. 
The protectionist tone of its economic policy did not sit well with the EU's 
requirements to lift trade barriers. PiS acknowledged that some of the 
protectionist economic policy it advocated would be invalidated under 
membership but it nonetheless proposed that protectionist measures be introduced 
on the assumption accession would be delayed. The tone of its programme and its 
underlying assumption that accession was not imminent contrasted with that of 
the euro-enthusiastic Citizen's Platform, which presented quick accession as a 
given.
The 2001 contest resulted in strong parliamentary representation of accession 
opponents with the anti-integrationist LPR and the heavily euro-sceptic Samoobrona 
attaining just over 20% of parliamentary seats between them. Whereas in the 
previous sejm opponents of EU membership had been primarily located on the 
right wing fringes of the Solidarity Electoral Action, they now united in the League 
of Polish Families. Another 20% of seats was held by Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc and 
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, both of which presented a 'soft Euro-sceptic' stance.
810 Ibid, 'The economy -  use of Polish capital' section.
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Although neither opposed accession, they also did not present a clear-cut stance on 
the issue. Both favoured a 'hard-line' negotiation strategy and raised concerns 
about the potentially adverse impact of EU membership on the Polish economy 
and national identity. One example of these two parties' ambiguous approach to 
accession took place when both groupings failed to sign the 'Pact for Europe', an 
attempt to build a formal all party consensus on accession during the 2001 electoral 
contest.
As in previous contests the programmes of the soft euro-sceptic groupings like PSL 
and PiS were often at odds with accession requirements. The PSL advocated 
protectionist measures that included export subsidies, banned under the 
Association Agreement, as well as other protectionist measures such as credit 
guarantees and state aid for agriculture. 812 PiS proposed a range of protectionist 
economic measures designed to protect Polish industry from 'unfair competition'.
As could be expected the programmes of the anti-integrationist LPR as well as that 
of Self-Defence were also at odds with accession requirements. Both advocated 
numerous trade controls and state subsidies that contradicted the Europe 
Agreements and accession requirements. On the other hand the programmes of the 
liberal groupings such as Citizen's Platform and the Freedom Union presented 
policies closely aligned with the EU conditionality. The SLD also aligned its 
programme with accession conditions. The liberal parties' policy proposals had 
always been consistent with accession conditionality. For the SLD however, the 
final stages of the pre-accession period hence saw a much closer alignment 
between policy proposals and the parties' traditionally euro-enthusiastic rhetoric. 
As Miller later explained, this was because by 2001 accession was at the forefront 
of the SLD's political and economic agenda. The SLD leadership saw accession and 
the access to EU aid it brought as a way out of the economic crisis and hence
812 Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe. Materiaiy Wyborcze, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of 
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emphasized effective alignment of government policy with accession requirements 
to ensure optimal absorption levels, wa
Another characteristic of the challenges Polish elites experienced throughout the 
entire pre-accession period that was also evident in the 2001 parliament was the 
discord between the way in which members of the future ruling coalition 
presented accession in the electoral campaign. Whereas the SLD was 
uncompromisingly supportive of membership, the PSL continued its approach of 
conditional support, emphasizing the threats accession posed to Polish identity 
and economy and calling for the need to compensate these threats with financial 
aid.
The growth of the euro-sceptic wing in parliament reflected over-all public 
sentiments, given that as many as 25-30% of voters also opposed accession at the 
time of the election. 814 But in spite of the approaching completion of negotiations 
and the historic significance of accession it was once again not a salient campaign 
issue. As a survey of television campaign coverage of the six main parties 
conducted by Szczerbiak has shown, accession did not play a significant part in 
most parties' campaigns. 813
Equally, for most voters accession was not a determining factor in electoral choice. 
According to a July 2001 study from the Social Research Workshop (Pracownia 
Bada Spolecznych, PBS) only 4% of respondents cited EU membership as one of 
the issues that would have significant impact when determining which grouping 
they would support. A July 2001 Pentor survey found that, only 7% of respondents 
described EU membership as an important election issue.
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Moreover, there was only limited correlation in the proportion of accession 
supporters among the parties' electorates and the parties' stance on the EU. Polling 
evidence indicated that the majority of the mainstream parties' electorates also 
supported accession. Even the harshly euro-sceptic Samoobrona counted more 
supporters of accession among its voters then opponents (33% in favour and 29% 
against).««The only exception was the LPR but even the electorate of this 
staunchly anti-integrationist grouping was made up of as much as 24% accession 
supporters as compared to 52% opponents.817 This fact that support for accession 
often correlated with support for parties whose programmes called for measures 
that contradicted accession requirements such as PiS or Samoobrona suggests that 
public support for the EU was not founded on an in-depth understanding of the 
policy implications of accession.
Parliamentary debate
The prominence of right-wing, Catholic groupings such as LPR, Law and Order 
and Self-Defence among parliamentary opposition put issues of morality and 
religion firmly on the agenda during the final two years of the pre-accession 
debate. The secular SLD meanwhile, increasingly realised that in order to secure a 
yes vote in the approaching accession referendum it had to attain the backing of 
the Catholic Church for accession.8*8
Building a good relationship with the Catholic hierarchy was at the top of the 
SLD's agenda when it came back to power in the autumn of 2001.819 From the start 
of his Prime Ministership Miller ensured he had the backing of the Church. Shortly 
after forming government he visited the Vatican to meet with the Pope and 
Archbishop Glemp was one of the first people Miller briefed following the
816 B. Roguska and J. Kucharczyk. Wybory 2001 a integracja Polski z Uni Europejsk .^ Warsaw: ISP. 2001, pl3.
817 Ibid.
818 Interview with Leszek Miller, 26 July 2005.
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Copenhagen talks. As Miller later commented, he 'tried to take the Church 
seriously'.820
The need to attain the support of the Church led the SLD to revise its approach to 
women's rights, and specifically to abortion. The liberalisation of the strict abortion 
legislation had always been one of the SLD's prerogatives and played a prominent 
role in its 2001 campaign. In March 2001 for example, during a conference on 
'Women and their Role in Politics', Leszek Miller criticised the AW S  government 
for introducing one of 'the toughest anti-abortion laws in Europe' and called for its 
liberalisation.821
The plans to change the law were soon shelved however as the SLD, confronted 
with a harshly euro-sceptic parliamentary opposition and growing public 
opposition to EU membership, realised that it needed the support of the Catholic 
Church. In the autumn of 2001 the SLD and the Episcopate came to an informal 
understanding about abortion. In exchange for the Episcopate's support for 
accession, the SLD was to abandon its plans to liberalise the abortion law. Miller 
explained the agreement as follows: 'Such a thing would not have been written 
down, but there was a certain understanding, a gesture, an unfinished sentence'.822 
Bishop Pieronek also confirmed the existence of such an agreement during an 
interview with the author828 and for Gazeta Wyborcza in January 2002. According to 
the Gazeta, Pieronek claimed that the Episcopate had made a pact with the SLD, 
where in exchange for the maintenance of the status quo on abortion the 
government could rely on the Church's support for accession.82* Archbishop Glemp 
refused to acknowledge the existence of such an agreement. When questioned
820 Ibid.
821 Leszek Miller, speech at the National SLD Conference: 'Women and their Role in Politics', 04 March 2001.
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about it by the radical-Catholic Nasz Dziennik he described it as 'myths and press 
facts' and claimed he knew nothing about it.825
The Episcopate did take an increasingly positive stance towards accession 
however. On 8 November 2001, only three days after the announcement of the 
compromise on the sale of land, Glemp visited Gunther Verheugen in Brussels. 
After the meeting he declared that Poland's entry to the EU was a 'historical 
necessity'.826
Other members of the Episcopate were also supportive of accession. During a 
meeting of the Commission of the Bishops' Conferences of the European 
Community (Commisio Episcipatuum Communitatis Europensis, COMECE), Wiktor 
Skworc, the Bishop of Tamow, commented: 'It is the Poles who need help. It is 
Poland which wants to accede to the Union, and not the Union to Poland. I am 
convinced that the mechanisms functioning in European agriculture will function 
equally well in Poland'.827
Following a lengthy and difficult debate828 the Episcopate formally confirmed its 
support for accession in a document entitled: 'Polish Bishops and European 
Integration', which was drafted during its 316th Plenary Session on the 20th and 
21st of March 2002. The document stated:
The idea of a united Europe was born from the inspiration 
of Christian politicians such as Alcide de Gaspieri, Robert 
Schuman and Konrad Adenauer. After the experience of 
many wars and conflicts on our continent, it expressed the 
desire for a peaceful co-existence of nations which would 
ensure basic human rights, prosperity and security. The 
global Church, and therefore the Polish Church, supported 
this process from the start. Europe, in the understanding of
825 Interview with Tadeusz Pieronek, Secretary, 25 July 2005.
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the Church, is not only an economic and political structure, 
but above all it is a community of history, culture and 
tradition based on the lasting spiritual Judaeo-Christian 
foundations, natural law and Greek thought.829
But the Episcopate's preference for cultural homogeneity and belief in Europe's 
Judeo-Christian foundations contrasted with the views of other European 
Catholics. COMECE supported a more diverse kind of Europe. It issued the 
following statement on European integration:
A new European order of such kind, that it will serve the 
growth of the authentic common good must recognize and 
preserve those values, which constitute the most precious 
heritage of European humanism.. .Cultural roots, from 
which these above mentioned values arise, are diverse: the 
spiritual heritage of Greece and Rome, the input of the 
roman, Celtic, Germanic, Urgofin, as well as Jewish culture 
and the world of Islam.830
The Polish Episcopate was hence caught between the anti-integrationism of the 
radical Catholics and the pro-accession stance of the Pope and COMECE. The 
Episcopate could not go against the wishes of the Vatican, however, and it was 
growing uncomfortable with the radicalism of Radio Maryja.
The SLD meanwhile took care to remind its political opponents of the Vatican's 
support for accession. During the sejm debate on the change in negotiation strategy 
in November 2001 for example, Foreign Affairs Minister Cimoszewicz sought to 
bolster support for the contentious negotiation compromise by reminding his 
audience of the Pope's support for enlargement: 'Poland's integration with the 
European Union has from the beginning been observed and supported by the Holy
829 Gazeta Wyborcza, 22 March 2002, nr 69, p5.
830 Teresa Sotowska, 'Nadzieja, zaufanie, solidarnoSc' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr 287,10 December 2002, pl2.
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See. It sees in [integration] a chance for the development of our continent and a 
platform for common co-operation between nations'.®1
The Vatican's support for integration presented a challenge to the Catholic and 
anti-integrationist Liga Polskich Rodzin. Although they vehemently opposed 
accession, the radical-Catholic politicians could not openly disagree with the Pope. 
It was clear however that they perceived the European Union as un-Christian. In 
response to Cimoszewicz, LPR leader Roman Giertych stated:
How does the Christian faith look? The fall of morality, 
pornography, drugs and more mosques being built than 
Churches; should the Poles, a nation which has endured so 
many sacrifices in its fight for freedom, give this freedom 
away in return for the promise of money? Does accession 
to the state, which is the European Union, not contradict 
the spilling of blood of those who during World War II 
gave their lives for our freedom? 832
The kind of concerns Giertych expressed in November 2001 would continue to be a 
frequent subject of debate in the sejm throughout the final two years of the pre­
accession period. In April 2002 for example, Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc proposed a 
'Declaration about the Sovereignty of the State in the Area of Morality and 
Culture'. The declaration called on the EU to confirm that 'Polish legislation 
protecting the moral social order and in particular unborn life as well as the 
dignity of family, marriage and upbringing' should not be 'in any way limited by 
international regulations'.®3
Jaroslaw Kaczyriski, leader of Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc, justified the proposal as 
follows:
®a Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, 6th session, day 2,29 November 2001, Stanowisko negocjacyjne rzqdu 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w rozmowach z Unig Europejskg.
®2 Roman Giertych, 6th session, day 2,29 November 2001, Stanowisko negocjacyjne rzgdu Rzeczypospolitej 
Polskiej w rozmowach z Uni  ^Europejsk .^
®3 'Nie ingeruje, ale ingeruje' Nasz Dziennik, nr 78(1271), 3 April 2002.
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There could come a day when someone will get the idea to 
make all the European nations recognize homosexual 
marriages or euthanasia. We do not want it to be decided 
by a majority vote that euthanasia is legal and for 
European tribunals to enforce such legislation in Poland.834
The declaration was signed by sixty-four M F s from Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc, 
Samoobrona, LPR and Platforma Obywatelska. The SLD was the only grouping which 
opposed it.835 When the proposal was discussed in parliament, Robert Smolen of the 
SLD explained that the declaration was irrelevant since moral matters did not fall 
under the acquis and that the manner in which the draft was phrased misled the 
public into thinking the EU could force its member states to adopt such legislation. 
Smolen stated: Tt [the declaration] suggests that matters of the moral order, the 
protection of life, the family, the up-bringing of children are a part of the 
community law, which is not true'.836
The opposition was not receptive to the SLD's criticism. Platforma Obywatelska 
confirmed that 'the Union does not interfere in the sphere of morality and culture' 
but it did not withdraw support for the proposal. Roman Giertych of the LPR 
stated that the best way of protecting Polish morality was not to enter the EU at all 
as it threatened to 'break our ethical backbone'.837
The SLD eventually managed to muster enough votes to prevent the declaration 
from being formally presented to the EU. Nonetheless, the subject of morality 
continued to dominate the debates on accession. In May 2002 the European 
Parliament recommended that member states legalise abortion and provide easy 
access to contraception. The opposition parties were outraged. As a result of their 
joint effort the Parliamentary Commission for European Integration passed a
834 Ibid.
835 Dominika Pszczolkowska and Jacek Pawlicki/MoralnoSc po Unii' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr. 50,28 February 
2003, p9.
838 Ibid.
837 'Nie ingeruje, ale ingeruje' Nasz Dziennik, nr.78(1271), 03 April 2002.
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resolution condemning the EFs recommendations. Its authors stated that the 
recommendation 'threatened the competences of sovereign states and the spiritual 
foundations of our civilisation'.838 The Episcopate also opposed the 
recommendation and the Episcopal Council for the Family declared: 'Europe's 
international community sets new difficulties before Poland and other candidate 
states during the negotiations. Its only proposition in the face of a serious 
economic crisis is the legalization of the killing of citizens'.839
Both the parliamentary opposition and the Episcopate interpreted the EP's 
statement as if it was European law. Being only a recommendation however, the 
document was not binding. Danuta Hubner, the Minister for European Integration, 
attempted to clarify:
The matter of abortion does not fall under the acquis 
communautaire. The recommendation, even if it has been 
voted through, has no legislative consequences. This is 
only an opinion of the EP, which the minister 
acknowledges. The matter has not appeared in the 
negotiations, and neither has any other matter related to 
morality.840
The debate on the EFs recommendation suggested that the representatives of the 
euro-sceptic groupings may not have fully understood the EF s decision making 
powers. They interpreted a non-binding statement issued by an institution which 
had no legal remit in moral matters as an attempt to force Poland to legalise 
abortion. Moreover, they also appeared unaware of Art. 30 of the Treaty of the 
European Community that permitted trade restrictions for a number of public 
policy reasons, including morality.841
838 'Klopot z Rezolucj '^ Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.155,05 July 2002.
839 Ibid.
848 Ibid.
841 A. Young, 'The Single Market', in Policy Making in the European Union, ed. H.Wallace (Oxford 2005), 94- 
112., pl02.
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The European Union opposed by Radio Maryja and Liga Polskich Rodzin hardly 
resembled the organisation which Poland was actually acceding to. Rather than an 
international community, the EU was perceived as an immoral coloniser, out to 
destroy the Poles' superior values, buy up their land and force them to legalise 
abortion.
As the above analysis shows, during the final stages of the negotiations the Polish 
debate on Europe was dominated by morality and religion. Symbolic and 
emotional concerns were much more prominent than matters directly affecting the 
quality of life of Polish citizens. The Episcopate formally declared its support for 
accession but the Catholic right continued to claim that EU membership would 
lead to legalised abortion, pornography and homosexual marriages. Practical 
issues such as the right to work in other member states, access to regional funds or 
the economic impact of accession on different social groups hardly appeared in the 
debate as parliamentarians were increasingly preoccupied with the threat of 
abortion on demand or same sex marriage.
Moral and religious sentiments also dominated discussions on the draft European 
Constitution. The European Convention, the body charged with drafting the new 
constitution, was established during the EU's Laeken Summit in December 2000. 
Led by former French President, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, the convention 
included representatives of current and aspiring member states, members of the 
European Parliament, and two representatives of the European Commission. 
Representatives from the candidate countries could participate in the discussion 
but only member states had veto power. The candidate countries were hence 
reduced to observer status in discussions over what was expected to become the 
EU's future constitution. The Polish delegation included Danuta Hubner who 
represented the government, J6zef Oleksy, who represented the sejm and Senator 
Edmund Wittbrodt, who participated on behalf the senate.
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For the Polish representatives the main point of dissent was the inclusion of the 
Invocatio Dei in the constitutional preamble.842 The Invocatio Dei was of primary 
importance for the Catholic Church.848 In its formal declaration of support for 
accession, issued in March 2002, the Episcopate stated: 'We expect that a reference 
to God, who constitutes for religious persons the ultimate reason for existence of 
the basic values, the moral-religious and social order, will be made in future 
European legislation'.844
The SLD appeared to take the Episcopate's concerns to heart. On 7 April 2002 
representatives of the Church hierarchy met with Oleksy, Hubner and Wittbrodt. 
After the meeting, Adam Szultz, the Episcopate's press spokesman, announced 
that all involved agreed that the European constitution should include a direct 
reference to God.845
The convention delegates then met with Jozef Glemp and President Kwasniewski 
in May 2002. Kwasniewski agreed that the Polish delegation should propose the 
inclusion of the Invocatio Dei in the Constitution. Following the meeting Szultz 
announced that it was very important for the Church that the final document took 
account not only of social and economic values but also of spiritual and religious 
ones.^Dariusz Szymczycha, Secretary of State at the presidential chancellery, 
confirmed that Polish representatives in the Convention would strive to 'push 
through these values'. Szymczycha stated: 'The president has pointed out that the 
Church is one of the fundamental European institutions. Therefore when the 
European Constitution is discussed today, we cannot escape from ethical, moral 
values, it is not possible to escape religious values'.847
842 Jacek Pawlicki, 'Sp6r o Boga w unijnej konstytucji' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.265,14 November 2002, pl2.
843 J. Glemp, 'Prymas Polski: czy w konstytucji Unii Europejskiej znajdzie si§ odniesienie do Boga 
(dokumentacja)', in 26 August 2000).
844 'KoScidl a Unia Europejska' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr 217,17 September 2002, p. 16.
845 Ibid.
846 'Spotkanie Prezydenta i Prymasa' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr 106,8 May 2002, p4.
847 Ibid.
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While the Invocatio Dei dominated the debate on the Constitution, the key question 
of what kind of a European Union Poland wanted to participate in remained 
unaddressed. The SLD did not present a vision of what Europe it wanted to join. 
As J6zef Oleksy stated during a press interview in February 2002:
We still have to develop a Polish vision of the Union's 
reforms. And we will present it in a single voice. There are 
different ideas. Last week during the 'Future of the Union 
Forum'.. .President Kwasniewski emphasised a Europe of 
nation states. Different views and different accents are 
appearing in relation to various issues -  it is precisely for 
this reason that the Polish delegates to the Convention 
should be regularly in touch with each 
other...Unfortunately, we did not meet before the start of 
the discussions.848
The SLD hence did not develop a clear vision of the kind of 'Europe' the 
Constitution should establish. 'Europe of Nation States' appeared to imply an 
inter-govemmentalist model, closer to the 'Europe of Nations' favoured by the 
AW S  than to the federalist union which the SLD had supported in the late 1990s. 
However, neither Kwasniewski nor the SLD specified exactly how a 'Europe of 
Nation States' could be established nor how it would alter existing EU policies and 
procedures. Oleksy meanwhile, appeared to waver between support for a 
federalist and an intergovernmental approach throughout convention talks.849
It eventually became clear that the Invocatio Dei would not be included in the 
constitutional preamble. Following eighteen months of talks the first draft of the 
constitution was completed in May 2003. The preamble included a brief reference 
to religion but made no mention of Christianity. Europe, it stated, inherited 
'cultural, religious and humanist values' which have 'embedded within the life of
848 Siawomir Kaminski, 'Wizji Jeszcze Nie Mamy' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.50,28 February 2002, p6.
849 A. Schrijvers, 'Poland and the EU Constitutional Convention', in Central European History and the 
European Union. The Meaning of Europe., ed. S. J. Kirschbaum (Basingstoke 2007), p200.
281
society the central role of the human person and his or her inviolable and 
inalienable rights, and respect for law'.850
As could be expected, both the Episcopate and the opposition parties were 
disappointed with the draft constitution. Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek commented: 'I 
believe that the omission of a reference to Christianity in the European 
Constitution would be a great error. I cannot imagine how one can refer to 
European history and tradition but forget about Christianity. Europe is two 
thousand years of Christianity.'851
Senator Wittbrodt was equally displeased with the draft. He stated:
I am disappointed. I will further strive for the inclusion of 
the statement drafted by me and the European Christian 
Democrats to be included in the final version of the 
constitution: "The Union's values include the values of 
both those who believe in God as a source of truth, justice, 
goodness and beauty, as those who do not share this faith 
but who respect universal values deriving from other 
sources'.852
The SLD however, felt that the draft was a success. Danuta Hubner stated: 'We 
expected that the preamble will be somewhat more similar to the preamble of the 
Polish constitution. It is good however, that this first proposed draft makes a 
reference to religious values. For me this draft is acceptable'.855
Poland's observer status at the Convention meant that it had limited influence on 
the contents on the Constitution in that, unlike representatives of the existing 
member states, they would not be able to formally veto the agreed text. While the
850 Preamble to the 'Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe'. Adopted by consensus by the 
European Convention on 13 June and 10 July 2003 submitted to the President of the European Council in Rome 
on 18 July 2003 (http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf, last accessed 25 June 
2006).
851 'Obraza', Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.125,30 May 2003.
852 Ibid.
855 Ibid.
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Church was very vocal in its calls for the Invocatio Dei, it was aware from early on 
that Wittbrodt's proposal was unlikely to succeed. Bishop Pieronek later claimed 
that Wittbrodt himself did not believe a reference to Christianity would be 
included in the preamble. 'There was no chance of this. Wittbrodt was forthright in 
telling us that [the proposal] would not succeed. The SLD were not. They did not 
tell us that there was no chance of this happening',854 Pieronek stated.
The Polish debate on the European constitution was hence dominated by the 
subject of religion. While some practical issues, such as the number of votes Poland 
would have in the Council of Ministers, were eventually addressed, the discussion 
was limited to symbolic concerns to do with Catholic values and did not address 
future policies or the decision making structure of the EU.
The accession referendum campaign
The question of when and by what means the accession treaty would be ratified 
was a frequent point of discussion during the final two years of the pre-accession 
process. SLD-UP cabinet saw numerous proposals to hold an early referendum 
either on the subject of accession itself855 or the most contentious negotiation topics 
such as the sale of land to foreigners Most were instigated by the League of 
Polish Families but often supported by parliamentarians from euro-sceptic parties 
such as Self Defence, PiS and PSL. The SLD, which opposed the proposals, claimed 
they aimed to derail accession given that Polish legislation prohibited a 
referendum on the same subject to be held more than once every 4 years.857
There was consensus among all major parties that the final decision on accession 
should be made by means of a nationwide referendum. In February 2003 the sejm 
agreed to hold the referendum over the space of two days to encourage turnout
854 Interview with Tadeusz Pieronek, 25 July 2005.
855 e.g.: LPR led proposal of 30/11/2001, druk nr 114.
856 M. Jabloriski, Polskie Referendum Akcesyjne (Wroclaw 2007), p237.
887 Ibid, p235.
283
and the referendum was scheduled for the 7th and 8th of June 2003. The 
parliamentarians also agreed on the following referendum question:
Do you agree for the President of the Polish Republic to 
ratify the international agreement of April 16 2003 'The 
Treaty between Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Greece, Spain, the Netherlands, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Germany, Portugal, Sweden, Great Britain 
and Italy (member states of the European Union) regarding 
the accession of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus,
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, the Polish Republic,
Slovenia and Slovakia to the European Union'?
Most groupings did not raise objections to the proposed wording. Samoobrona 
proposed that the phrase 'on negotiated conditions' be included while the LPR 
suggested that the question should include President Kwasniewski's name.
Neither proposal was accepted.
The sejm also set the rules for the referendum campaign. Access to public media 
was granted to political groupings that attained at least 3% of the vote in the 
September 2001 elections if they competed as individual parties or at least 6% if 
they competed as coalitions. Parliamentary clubs set up on the basis of electoral 
committees, such as Platforma Obywatelska, for example, were also granted media 
access. Non-governmental organisations could make use of publicly owned media 
(such as the Telewizja Polska television channels) if they registered at least one year 
before the referendum. No limitations were placed on the participation of NGOs 
financed by foreign sources. The timing of the referendum coincided with the 
campaign for local elections hence offering the parties an additional forum to 
gather support from local voters.
Prior to the referendum campaign, information about the EU was provided by the 
Centre for European Information, based at the Secretariat of the Committee for 
European Integration. An information campaign managed by Jerzy Wiatr,
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Government Plenipotentiary for European Union Information, was also run in 
2002. But the campaign was criticised as ineffective and the numerous government 
bodies it involved, ranging from the Public Television to Agency of Rural 
Development failed to coordinate their efforts.858
In January 2003 Lech Nikolski was appointed as minister without portfolio and 
charged with developing the government's pre-referendum campaign and 
coordinating the relevant institutions. Nikolski did not want to 'inform for the 
sake of providing information' .s* The SLD needed a 'yes' vote and the campaign 
aimed to attain this. His main concern was turnout. According to opinion polls 
popular support for accession was well above 60% and hence sufficiently high for 
the government to be confident of a 'yes' vote. Even with the referendum spread 
out over two days, however, it was still not certain whether over 50% of the 
electorate would take part.860
The pre-referendum campaign used a number of different channels to disseminate 
information including a national helpline as well as a local information campaign. 
A CD, containing the text of the Accession Treaty, national anthems of Poland and 
the EU as well as a description of the structure and functioning of the Union, was 
sent to all Polish homes and attached to major newspapers. The content of the CD 
was promotional in nature, emphasizing the benefits of the structural funds for 
Poland as a whole and detailing benefits of accession for individuals such 
including the right to work abroad, the transition period on the sale of land and the 
future introduction of the Euro.861
The Poles were hence presented with a large amount of information about the EU. 
But the campaign shed little light on how policy and legislative matters impacting
858 Piasecki, p59-60.
859 Interview with Lech Nikolski, 22 July 2005.
860 Ibid.
861 Jabloriski, Polskie Referendum Akcesyjne, p270.
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the Polish citizens would be decided in the new EU. It emphasized the economic 
benefits of membership such as funding from the structural and common 
agricultural policies and the right to work abroad. The information CD did not 
however, include a clear, transparent explanation of the EU's decision making 
structures. Nor did it address the extent of national competences that would be 
transferred to them as a result of a yes vote in the accession referendum. Given the 
complex nature of the EU providing such an explanation would not have been an 
easy task. But it seems that the authors did not even try to present such an 
explanation, choosing instead to focus on the economic benefits862.
The SLD's key opponents in the referendum campaign were the Liga Polskich 
Rodzin, Samoobrona, smaller right wing organisations such as the Ruch Odbudowy 
Polski and the Unia Polityki Realnej, as well as the anti-integrationist wing of the 
Catholic Church. Supporters of a 'no' vote could also be found among the SLD's 
coalition partner, the Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe. There were occasions when PSL 
and SLD representatives stood on opposing sides during local debates.863 In the 
Lublin region for example, Nikolski clashed with the PSL's Zdzislaw Podkariski, 
who opposed accession on the grounds that it would lead to the sale of land to 
foreigners. Moreover, the PSL's electorate remained sceptical. According to a poll 
carried out of PSL's website 55% of the party's supporters were opposed to 
accession on the basis of the conditions negotiated in Copenhagen, with only 43% 
declaring support.864 But the majority of PSL politicians supported EU membership 
and strove to explain its benefits to their rural electorate. Adam Tariski for 
example, the PSL's Minister for Agriculture, emphasised the importance of 
explaining to farmers that the EU was not anti-Christian. During a seminar on 
Polish agriculture and the EU in April 2003 he stated:
862 Ibid.
863 Interview with Lech Nikolski, 22 July 2005.
864 Piasecki. p57.
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During the pre-referendum campaign it should be stressed 
that the European Union is not an anti-Christian 
organization.. .we know that the views of local religious 
leaders have a lot of influence on the farmers, even though 
they often contradict the views of Bishops. There has to be 
an answer to this. Institutions which organize the pre­
referendum campaign should make clear that the Union is 
not anti-Christian, that it was set up by Christian 
politicians.865
The PSL's leader, Jaroslaw Kalinowski, also frequently expressed support for 
accession and the Agrarians' official stance was to support EU membership, albeit 
on the basis of 'hard negotiations, the protection of Polish land and the defence of 
Polish agriculture', as one PSL leaflet stated.866
The other agrarian party, Samoobrona, campaigned for a 'no' vote. In a leaflet 
entitled 'The European Union? The Choice is Yours' it stated: 'We never opposed a 
common, strong and united Europe. We say NO to a European Union based on the 
negotiated conditions, which will further deepen the financial, economic and social 
crisis'. 867 The leaflet claimed that upon joining the EU, Poland would become a net 
payer to the EU's budget, half of its small and medium sized enterprises would fail 
and 60% of its steel and mining industry would be dismantled. It further argued 
that the agriculture, fisheries and food industry would collapse, energy and food 
prices would increase and unemployment levels would reach more than 20%. 
Consequently, Samoobrona argued, poverty levels would rise, the 'remainder of the 
national capital would be sold or stolen' and 'our land, woods and forests would 
for centuries pass into foreign hands'.868
865 'UE nie jest antychrzeScijariska' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.96,24 April 2003, p4.
866 PSL pre-referendum leaflet, Archiwum Partii Politycznych, European integration folder.
867 Samoobrona pre-referendum leaflet, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish 
Academy of Sciences, European integration folder.
868 Ibid.
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Mixed messages about accession could be heard from the Catholic Church 
meanwhile. The Polish Pope, John Paul II, presented a consistent stance of support 
throughout the campaign. 869 His appeal in support of accession on May 19th 2003 
was particularly influential to the final, enthusiastically pro-integrationist outcome 
of the referendum. Interpreted as an unequivocal statement of support for 
membership by 79% of respondents to a subsequent CBOS study it proved to be 
the strongest argument in favour of accession for 52% of those voting "yes'.870
But the Church was far from united throughout the referendum campaign. 
Although formally the Polish Episcopate supported EU membership there were 
marked divisions among the Bishops and priests, several of whom were vocally 
critical of accession. They included Bishop Edward Frankowski of Sandomierz871 
and Henryk Jankowski, a priest in Gdansk, who presented an exposition of Christ 
laying down, surrounded by EU emblems underneath the slogan: 'No to a Union 
without God'.872 Others however, such as Jozef Zyciriski, Tadeusz Goclawski, 
Henryk Muszyriski and Tadeusz Pieronek frequently made statements in support 
for EU membership.
While the Vatican and the reluctant Polish episcopate declared support for 
accession the radical-Catholic right campaigned against EU membership. Father 
Rydzyk and his nationalist, staunchly religious Radio Maryja movement was a key 
player in this campaign. As the schism between the pro-integrationist Episcopate 
and the anti-accession Radio Maryja deepened, Rydzyk gained support among 
Polish Catholics. According to an opinion poll quoted in Wprost in September 2002, 
as many as 10% of Poles agreed with all of Father Rydzyk7s teachings and 17% did 
not see any discrepancy between his teachings and those of the Polish Catholic
869 Piasecki., p64.
870 Jabioriski, Polskie Referendum Akcesyjne, p 273.
871 Gazeta Wyborcza, 11.03.03 p.2 quoted in Piasecki, p64.
872 Ibid, p64.
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Church.873 Apart from the anti-integrationist rhetoric of the Radio Maryja radio 
channel itself, the movement used Nasz Dziennik, its daily newspaper, to run a 
series of anti-accession ads. These featured such slogans as 'Where norms are god -  
the European Union',874 'the teacher in the kindergarten told us that if we do not 
convince grandpa and grandma to accession we will not get any toys' illustrated 
with a picture of young children,873 and 'he is not conforming to the norms of the 
union -  he is an enemy of the people'.876 Colourful but devoid of humour, the ads 
implied the EU was just another incarnation of Soviet-style totalitarianism.
Like the radical wing of the Church, Liga Polskich Rodzin vehemently opposed the 
'yes' vote. The threat of legalised abortion lay at the heart of the LPR's opposition 
to the EU. It argued that the EU's pro-abortion ideology led to the 'death of 
European nations' and collapse of Christian values. In a leaflet entitled:
'Threatened Life, Threatened Land', it stated:
Liga Polskich Rodzin condemns the resolution of the 
European Parliament calling for the legalization of 
abortion by all candidate states. With this resolution the 
European Parliament has shown its true, inhumane face.
This is yet another example of the spreading of the 
ideology of the European Union, which brings moral 
degeneration and a civilisation of death. While European 
nations are dying out, European Union decision makers 
call for an even greater reduction to population growth.
This means a slow death of the nations of Europe and the 
collapse of its culture and Christian values. Under the 
guise of 'responsibility' and 'conscious planning' not only 
the killing of unborn children is planned but in the longer 
perspective also the acceptance of sexual deviations.877
873 Boguslaw Mazur, 'Rozlam w KoSciele' Wprost, nr.1033,15 September 2002; Piasecki, 2005, p64.
874 Nasz Dziennik, nr.l27(1623), 2 June 2003.
873 Ibid.
876 Ibid.
877 Liga Polskich Rodzin pre-referendum leaflet, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the 
Polish Academy of Sciences, European Integration Folder.
289
According to the LPR, EU membership would lead to sexual deviation, abortion on 
demand and a general collapse of Poland's value system. Apart from destroying 
Polish morality, the League also claimed accession would impoverish the Poles. Its 
leaflet asked: 'In the long run, who do you think will stay in farming: you, Polish 
farmers, or the German farmer, the French one, or any other one within the EU?'878 
The LPR also claimed that Poland would be a net payer into the EU's budget. It 
based this assertion on the assumption that accession would decrease Treasury 
income by 3 billion zlotys per year. Its programme did not explain, however, how  
this number was calculated.
Another contributor to the no-campaign was a coalition of three small right wing 
parties: Ruch Odbudowy Polski, Porozumienie Polskie, and Solidarnosc Rolnicza. In a 
statement issued on 16 April 2003 they declared:
The Accession Treaty signed today on behalf of Poland by 
Prime Minister Leszek Miller and negotiated by his 
government contains fundamental errors and proposals 
disadvantageous for Poland. It will be disadvantageous for 
Poland and for the Polish nation, its implementation will 
consolidate economic underdevelopment and threatens to 
deepen the socio-economic crisis.87*
The three groupings called for the 'protection of the family and morality' from the 
EU. Their main concerns about accession were supremacy of EU law over the 
Polish constitution, the sale of land in the Recovered Territories to foreigners and 
the introduction of abortion and euthanasia.880 They also argued that the 
agreements concerning the fisheries and steel industries were disadvantageous for 
Poland, as were demands to break down trade agreements with CEFTA and the 
USA. 'For these reasons' they concluded 'we believe that the Accession Treaty acts
878 Ibid.
879 Ruch Odbudowy Polski, Porozumienie Polskie and SolidamoSd Rolnicza pre-referendum leaflet, Archiwum 
Partii Politycznych, European Integration Folder.
880 Ibid.
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against Polish interests and precludes an equal agreement between the states and 
nations of Europe, which we support'.881
Another anti-accession grouping, the Liga Polityki Realnej, produced a leaflet 
outlining 100 reasons why Poland should not accede to the 'Great Socialist 
European Republic'.882 UPR's concerns about accession, which was described as the 
'anschluss', included the propagation of bureaucracy, homosexuality and 
euthanasia. Its leaflet compared the EU to the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany and 
described it as 'anti-civilisational'. Like other anti-integrationist opposition 
groupings, UPRf used the pre-referendum campaign to express its opposition to 
both the EU and to the current government. A poster featuring Leszek Miller, 
Aleksander Kwasniewski, Danuta Hubner, Leszek Balcerowicz, and Jacques Santer 
stated: 'say no to them'. For the anti-integrationist parties, the no vote was as much 
about opposing the communist-successor government as about opposing 
accession.888
Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc reluctantly supported the yes vote.884 It stated:
The basic rationale concerning Poland's national security 
speaks in support of taking the risk of confronting the 
unsatisfactory social and economic accession conditions.
The accession of Poland and of other Central and East 
European nations to the Union entails a re-integration of 
Europe, divided as a result of World War II and of Soviet 
expansion. We are a great European nation. Poland hence 
has a particular responsibility to participate in and 
influence the evolution of our continent. Polish historical 
experience, spiritual and cultural wealth can produce a 
significant contribution to the building of a common 
Europe. Integration with the Union presents us with an
881 Ibid.
882 Unia Polityki Realnej, pre-referendum leaflet, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the 
Polish Academy of Sciences, European integration folder.
883 Ruch Odbudowy Polski, Porozumienie Polskie and SolidamoSd Rolnicza pre-referendum leaflet, Archiwum
Partii Politycznych, European Integration Folder.
^Piasecki, p57, Szczerbiak, 'After the Election, Nearing the Endgame: the Polish Euro-debate in the Run up to
the 2003 Accession Referendum'.
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opportunity of undertaking a fight for the respect which 
Poland deserves, for the importance of Poland both in 
Europe and globally.888
Although Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc did not believe the accession conditions were 
favourable, it was nonetheless willing to support EU membership on the grounds 
that it would strengthen Poland's geopolitical position.
Unia Wolnosci's enthusiastically pro-accession campaign contrasted sharply with 
Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc's calculated support. 'I love Union.E' read U W  stickers and a 
poster proclaimed 'This is your ticket to Europe'. 886 Wladyslaw Frasyniuk, the 
leader of the U W  asked 'Do you love Union.E? Express your feelings on the 7th 
and 8th of June. Do not miss this opportunity I'887 Another poster, which showed 
people kissing inside a double sleeping bag, read: 'It's better to be in'.888 In contrast 
to the moralising threats of the 'no' campaign, the Unia Wolnosci presented the EU 
as modern and desirable. Its campaign attempted to bring down the barriers 
between the Catholic, conservative anti-integrationists and the atheist, liberal 
supporters of accession. A poster featuring a smiling priest stated: 'Polish,
Catholic, European' and another showed a young woman proclaiming: 'Polish, 
Atheist, Euro-enthusiast'.889 Another slogan read: 'Poland in Europe: logical'.890 Like 
its opponents at Radio Maryja, the Freedom Union appealed to the voters on an 
emotional level, presenting a humorous alternative to their conservative rhetoric 
but also not addressing the implications of EU membership for the Polish political 
system and its economy.
885 Jaroslaw Kaczyriski, 'Silna Polska w Europe', Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the 
Polish Academy of Sciences, European integration folder.
886 Unia WolnoSci pre-referendum leaflet, 2003, European Integration Folder, Political Parties Archive, Institute 
of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences.
887 Ibid.
888 Ibid.
889 Ibid.
890 Ibid.
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Unia Pracy was similarly enthusiastic. One of its leaflets stated:' Unia Pracy is not a 
party which believes in miracles. We believe in freedom, choices, an independent 
viewpoint and tolerance. This is guaranteed by the European Union'.891 The 
Citizens' Platform meanwhile attempted to kill two birds with one stone, 
encouraging referendum attendance and criticising the Miller cabinet at the same 
time: 'Indifference is the greatest threat to the success of the European 
referendum', its leaflet stated. 'The result is not yet certain! It seems that the Poles 
have left the promotion of the Union to the incompetent government.. .Wake up! 
Wake up others!' the PO  proclaimed.892
The SLD's pre-referendum campaign combined support for accession with 
affirmations that EU membership would not threaten the Polish economy and 
national identity. When they defined the SLD's campaign strategy in January 2003, 
Lech Nikolski, the minister in charge of the campaign, and President Kwasniewski 
agreed that the key to a successful campaign lay in preventing the 'no' vote 
supporters from 'taking patriotism away from us'.898 The SLD's slogan stated: 'Yes 
for Poland', emphasising that the communist-successors put Polish interests above 
European ones. During the campaign the SLD frequently rebuffed claims that 
accession would endanger Polish national identity and sovereignty. 'The European 
Union is not a United States of Europe, nor is it a super state with a capital in 
Brussels' one leaflet stated.894 Another assured the voters that the Union could not 
ban the teaching of religion from schools and provided them with a list of 
European saints. In the publication 'Poland in the European Union - YES!' the SLD 
stated:
891 Unia Pracy pre-referendum leaflet, 2003, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish 
Academy of Sciences, European integration folder.
892 Platforma Obywatelska pre-referendum leaflet, 2003, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences 
of the Polish Academy of Sciences, European integration folder.
893 Interview with Lech Nikolski, 22 July 2005.
894 'Polska w Unii Europejskiej - TAK', Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish 
Academy of Sciences, European integration folder.
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No one is forcing us to accede to the European Union. We 
know however, that entering this great family of the 
nations of Europe will be beneficial for our country, our 
economy, society and especially for future generations...In 
Copenhagen we negotiated the best possible conditions 
and the best among all the other candidate states; 
conditions which guarantee an equal partnership for 
Poland from the first moments of membership.895
The referendum resulted in a 77.5% vote of support for accession. The proposal to 
hold the referendum over two days proved beneficial for the turnout, which 
reached only 17.6% on the 7th of July but rose to a total of 59% on the 8th. Following 
treaty ratification in other member states, Poland joined the European Union on 1 
May 2004.
One could argue that such a resounding vote of support for accession provided the 
democratic legitimacy required for a decision as important for Poland as accession 
to the European Union. As Polish legal scholar Jablonski points out896, from a legal 
perspective, the referendum served to guarantee adequate legitimization for 
accession. As such, it legally absolved the ruling elites from responsibility for 
accession and the terms on which it took place, he also points out. But legitimizing 
accession by means of the referendum was problematic for several reasons.
Firstly, the electorate was being asked to legitimize a complex and lengthy 
harmonization process that was already largely complete at the time of 
referendum. EU membership required wide ranging adaptation measures to be 
implemented before accession that could no longer be reversed regardless of 
whether Poland acceded or not. As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, by the time of 
the referendum Poland had already undergone an extensive harmonization
895 'Unia bez tajemnic', p5, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of 
Sciences, European integration folder.
896 M. Jablonski. Polskie Referendum Akcesyjne. (Wroclaw 2007), p!4.
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process initiated as early as 1991 with the legislative and policy changes required 
by the Association Treaty.
Secondly, as McManus-Czubinska points out, rather than unequivocally 
supporting immediate accession 54% of those polled in an OPOB study would 
have preferred to accede 'at some more favorable time in the future' whereas only 
25% wished to join immediately.897 Most of those who voted in favour of 
membership therefore did not agree with the timing of accession.
Lastly, polls from both CBOS and Eurobarometer taken shortly before the 
referendum reflected low levels of information about accession among the Polish 
public. According to a Eurobarometer May 2003 study 4% of Poles felt they were 
not at all informed about accession, 40% 'not very well informed' and 48% 
described themselves as 'well informed'. 898 Although respondents did not feel well 
informed about accession a large majority were either 'very' or at least 'a little' 
interested in it. Whereas 18% of respondents in an April 2003 CBOS study declared 
themselves to be 'very interested' in accession and as many as 53% 'a little' 
interested899 only 11% felt they were well informed about it.900
Why did so many Poles vote in support for accession in spite of their limited 
understanding of what it entailed and preference for it to be delayed? According to 
a February CBOS study the majority of respondents expected accession to be 
beneficial for themselves as well as their country and its economy. 32% of 
respondents expected for accession to benefit themselves personally, compared to 
28% who expected to lose out. 42% expected accession to benefit Poland as a
897 C. McManus-Czubinska, 'The Misuse of Referendums in Post-Communist Europe', in The Quality of 
Democracy in Post-Communist Europe, ed. D. a. K. Hutcheson, Elena (London and New York 2006).
898 Eurobarometer CC-EB 2003.2 Public Opinion in the Candidate Countries, Fieldwork: May 2003, Publication: 
June 2003.
899 CBOS, Polish Public Opinion, April 2003.
900 CBOS, Polish Public Opinion, April 2003, see also Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 'Polacy i Parlament 
Europejski. Postawy Polak6w wobec polskich i europejskich instytucji demokratycznych', (Warsaw 2001), p6.
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whole, as opposed to only 31% who felt it would not.901 Although most expected 
prices for household goods to rise as many as 47% believed accession would 
benefit the private sector, compared to 22% expecting it to be disadvantageous for 
this sector. Overall, 50% felt accession would benefit the Polish economy while 
28% felt it would not. The farming industry was perceived as the biggest loser of 
EU membership with 27% of respondents expecting benefits compared to 49% 
expecting losses. *>2
Similar results were shown in a Eurobarometer study carried out one month later, 
in May 2003. Although 61% of respondents described accession as a 'good thing' 
and 53% felt it would bring more advantages than disadvantages to Poland as a 
whole only 40% expected it to bring more advantages than disadvantages to 
themselves personally. While both studies show majority support for accession 
they also underscore that most respondents expected accession to bring greater 
benefits for Poland as a whole rather than for themselves as individuals. Indeed, 
according to Eurobarometer less than 50% of respondents felt accession would 
benefit them personally. Expectations of improved economic growth hence appear 
to have been a key determinant of support for EU membership.
The studies also brought to light strikingly high levels of trust in EU institutions. In 
May 2003 as many as 63% of Eurobarometer's Polish respondents stated they 
trusted the EU while only 17% did not (20% were not sure). 904 Such high levels of 
trust contrasted sharply with increasingly low levels of public trust in Polish 
domestic institutions. As Lena Kolarska-Bobiriska, director of the Institute of 
Public Affairs, has pointed out, only between 12% and 16% of Poles declared they
901 B. Roguska, 'Polska Droga do Unii Europejskiej', in Polska, Europa, Swiat. Opinia Publiczna w Okresie 
Integracji., ed. K. a. S. Zagorski, Michal (Warszawa 2005), p27.
"2 Ibid, p29.
903 Eurobarometer CC-EB 2003.2 Public Opinion in the Candidate Countries, Fieldwork: May 2003, Publication: 
June 2003.
994 Ibid, pi 7.
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trusted the fundamental democratic institutions in Poland whereas only 7% 
believed that the national political institutions function effectively.905
CBOS studies have shown that public confidence in the parliament (sejm) 
decreased from 44 percent in 1998 to 20 percent in June 2002. ** Moreover, the 
belief that government officials represented the interests of the citizens weakened 
significantly throughout the pre-accession period. In 1993, only 19 percent of 
respondents claimed that the councillors represented their own interests but in 
2002, this figure grew to 29 percent.907 In 1993, 22 percent of respondents stated 
that people got involved in politics out of willingness to help others. In 2002 only 
6% were of the same opinion. As many as 89 percent of respondents thought that 
members of parliament represented their own interests or those of their 
parliamentary clubs, and only 8 percent disagreed with this statement.900 Most 
favoured EU institutions when compared to Polish ones. When they were asked to 
compare Polish institutions with those of the EU the majority of respondents in a 
2001 Institute of Public Affairs study felt that EU institutions were closer to the 
public, more honest and more worked more effectively than Polish ones.909
Not only was public trust in Polish democratic institutions significantly lower than 
in European ones but there was an expectation that Polish institutions would 
improve with EU membership. In February 2003 40% of CBOS respondents 
expected accession to have a positive effect on the functioning of the Polish
905 Unia—szansa na reforme, Paristwa', interview with Lena Kolarska -Bobirtska, Gazeta Wyborcza (Warsaw)
3 August 2003, quoted in W. Sadurski, 'Accession's Democracy Dividend: the Impact of EU Enlargement upon 
Democracy in the New Member States of Central and Eastern Europe.', European Law Journal, 10,4 (2004), 
371-401. p373.
906 Opinions on the Functioning of Public Institutions (Warsaw, Poland: CBOS, June 2002)., in Kolarska 
Bobiriska, East European Politics and Societies, p.93 East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 17, No. 1, pages 
91-98.
907 My Village—Opinions prior to the Self-Government Elections (Warsaw, Poland: CBOS, February 2002) in L. 
Kolarska-Bobinska, 'The EU Accession and Strengthening of Institutions in East Central Europe: The Case of 
Poland', East European Politics and Societies, 17,1 (2003), 91-98.
908 Psychological Portrayals of Party Electorates (Warsaw, Poland: CBOS June 2002), Public Opinion on Politics 
and the Motives of the Politicians' Actions (Warsaw, Poland: CBOS, May 1992) quoted in L. Kolarska- 
Bobinska, 'The EU Accession and Strengthening of Institutions in East Central Europe: The Case of Poland', see 
also Instytut Spraw Publicznych.
909 Instytut Spraw Publicznych, p5.
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political system910. A 2001 Institute of Public Affairs study found that 48% felt that 
accession would benefit the functioning of the parliament and local government, 
54% that it would improve that of the cabinet, the public service and the judiciary. 
911 There was also a strong correlation between the expectation that accession 
would benefit Poland's political institutions and the intention to participate in the 
accession referendum; approximately 80% of those intending to vote in the 
referendum also expected accession to improve the functioning of these 
institutions. 9*2
In summary, the Polish public had limited expectations of personal gain from 
accession but they did expect EU membership to benefit Poland as a whole, and 
especially its economy. Also, a significant proportion of those who voted in favour 
of accession appear to have done so at least partly out of an expectation of 
improvement in the functioning of Poland's political institutions.
Was the Polish public justified in this expectation? Would accession bring with it 
less corrupt, more trustworthy political institutions? In some respects EU 
regulations certainly contributed to greater transparency and accountability of 
public institutions. The introduction of the EU's strict rules on the quality of the 
judicial process, its anti-discrimination measures and the possibility of referral of a 
case against public bodies to the European Court of Justice improved the checks 
and balances in place to protect civil liberties. But, as several scholars of European 
integration have pointed out,913 accession also significantly limits the powers of 
national parliaments, shifting decision making powers from the directly elected 
legislative to the executive. While it tightens measures against corruption among
910 Roguska, 'Polska Droga do Unii Europejskiej', p35.
911 Instytut Spraw Publicznych, p5.
912 Ibid, p6.
913 Grabbe, 'How does Europeanisation affect CEE governance? Conditionality, Diffiusion and Diversity', 
Jablonski, Polskie Referendum Akcesyjne, Sadurski.
298
elected representatives therefore EU membership also diminishes the extent to 
which voters can influence policy.
According to Jabloriski, sejm and senate jointly lost 60% total legislative 
competences, and as much as 80% with regards to economic issues.914 The sejm did 
retain some involvement in decision making but this was mostly consultative. The 
Council of Ministers was obliged to inform the parliament about a range of 
documents including draft EU legislation and international agreements, Council 
decisions and plans of work of the Council, Commission and European Parliament 
as well as other documents that may have bearing on the EU's legislative process 
such as white and green papers and Commission communiques. 916 But apart from 
items falling under unanimous voting in the Council or those significantly 
impacting the Polish budget the Polish Council of Ministers is entitled to formulate 
its stance without taking the Polish parliament's opinion into account916.
The transfer of decision making competences that took place as part of accession 
has hence been two-fold. Firstly, competences were transferred from the level of 
national legislative to the national executive, which represents Poland in the 
Council of Ministers, the body with the strongest legislative powers in the EU. 
Secondly, competences with regards to any decisions made on the basis of non­
veto voting were transferred away from the Polish legislative to the Polish 
executive. All in all, the individual voter had much less visibility, understanding 
and influence on most of the policies and laws affecting them. Far from improving 
the functioning of democracy in the aspiring member states therefore, accession 
appears to have diminished it, by shifting power from directly elected 
parliamentarians to an indirectly appointed executive917. Matters were made even
914 Jablonski, Polskie Referendum Akcesyjne, p275.
916 Ibid, p277-278.
916 Ibid, p278.
917 Grabbe, 'How does Europeanisation affect CEE governance? Conditionality, Diffiusion and Diversity'.
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worse by the fact that the Polish sejm lacked access to appropriate expertise to 
enable it to form quality opinions on the wide range of EU legislation it is informed 
about. 918
Given the above shortcomings of democratic representation within the EU it is 
surprising that so many Poles would have expected EU membership to improve 
the functioning of Polish political institutions. The low levels of knowledge about 
the EU may form part of an explanation as to why the public believed a process 
that transfers power away from the electorate to be beneficial for political 
institutions. Perhaps the Poles' levels of trust in Polish parliamentarians and 
institutions were so low that most perceived any transfer of power, and especially 
one to Western and 'democratic' decision makers as a potential improvement. A 
further explanation may lay in the over-all positive views of the EU. As Sadurski 
has suggested, Polish public and elite perceptions of the EU may be based on an 
'inferiority-superiority' complex dynamic. While opponents of accession strove to 
prove that Poland was not 'worse' than its Western neighbours supporters of 
accession saw the West as a model that could be used to 'civilise' Poland, including 
its unruly, corrupt politicians.919
CBOS studies confirm that the Poles did indeed have a lower opinion of 
themselves than of EU citizens. The majority considered Europeans to be more 
ambitious, confident, educated, cultured, hard working, honest, frugal, and 
friendly and extrovert than Poles920. On positive note the Poles did see themselves 
as more religious, patriotic, helpful and team oriented than their EU counterparts. 
921 But over-all the CBOS studies confirm that Poles maintained a lower opinion of
918 Sadurski, T. Raunio, 'Why European Integration Increases Leadership Autonomy within Political Parties?', 
Party Politics, 8,4 (2002), 405-422.
919 Sadurski, p.372, see also Tomquist-Plewa, 'The Complex of an Unwanted Child./.
920 Roguska, 'Polska Droga do Unii Europejskiej'.
921 Kolarska-Bobinska, Kucharczyk, Firlit and Roguska, 'Duchowienstwo Polskie Wobec Integracji z Unia 
Europejska', Roguska, 'Polska Droga do Unii Europejskiej1.
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themselves as compared to their West European counterparts. There may have 
been an expectation among the Polish public that joining the EU would facilitate 
Poles becoming more "European7 i.e.: educated, hard working, cultured etc and 
that it may also have a similar effect on their political elites.
Conclusion
The 2001 parliament differed from all of its pre-accession predecessors in that it 
was the first to include a large anti-integrationist grouping: the League of Polish 
Families. For the first time voters who did not want Poland to enter the EU were 
able to choose a party that promised to guarantee this.
Although the LPR was the only party to explicitly oppose accession approximately 
30% of seats, including of the LPR's 8% was won by parties either explicitly 
opposed to EU membership or critical of the government's strategy of speedy 
accession, such as Samoobrona, Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc or the Polskie Stronnictwo 
Ludowe. The 2001 contest hence presented the voters with less ambiguous choices 
regarding European Integration than the previous parliamentary elections of the 
pre-accession period. Ambiguity about the implications of accession remained a 
part of the rhetoric however and the discussion continued to be carried out in 
largely symbolic, undefined terms. But the 'for and even against'922 stance so 
prominent in the rhetoric of the ideologically multifarious Solidarity Electoral 
Action was no longer a part of the debate. Even at this late stage of the pre­
accession process however, EU membership was not a key campaign topic for any 
of the major groupings and it was also not a decisive factor in most voters' 
electoral choices.
As could be expected, the programmes of the LPR and Samoobrona both proposed a 
range of policies at odds with accession requirements. The economic platforms of
922 Kucharczyk, 'Za a Nawer Przeciw. Partie Polityczne Wobec Perspektywy Integracji w Wyborach 1997'.
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parties such as Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc and PSL also contradicted the liberal EU 
conditionality. The programmes of the SLD-UP and that of the liberal Platforma 
Obywatelska meanwhile were better aligned with accession requirements.
The break-up of the SLD-PSL coalition once again underscored the fragility of 
coalitions formed on the basis of past association with the communist regime. 
While the leadership of the PSL supported EU membership many PSL 
parliamentarians did not, and the PSL's scepticism contrasted sharply with Miller's 
pro-integrationist strategy. While individual parties were increasingly clear about 
their stance on accession therefore negotiating in-depth consensus within the 
coalition once again proved challenging.
The presence of the right wing, euro-sceptic groupings put concerns about 
morality and religion firmly on the parliamentary agenda and these topics 
dominated the final two years of the debate on Europe. The sale of land to 
foreigners, the threat of abortion and same sex marriage and most of all, the EU's 
perceived immoral and anti-Christian nature, dominated the discussion. In 
contrast, relatively little was said about the economic costs and benefits of EU 
membership, the EURO, the implications of the European Constitution on the EU's 
decision making processes and the extent of national competences liable to be 
transferred to Brussels. The uproar over the symbolic threat of Westerners 're- 
colonising' the Recovered Territories contrasted sharply with the way in which the 
political elites accepted the lengthy transition periods on the right to work in other 
member states. Limited elite knowledge about the EU was underscored by the 
misunderstanding about the European Parliament's 2002 recommendation for the 
liberalisation of abortion. Although the EP was only expressing its opinion about 
the desirability of abortion on demand, the Polish right wing groupings appeared 
to believe that it was in fact forcing member states to adopt legislation to this effect.
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The impact of accession on Polish sovereignty, including the wide ranging transfer 
of competences away from Poland to the EU and the potential use of qualified 
majority voting in the Council of Ministers to legislate against the preferences of 
Polish representatives did feature in the materials of anti-integrationist parties both 
during the 2001 election and in the referendum campaign. 923 But concerns about 
accession effects on the quality of Poland's democracy and the empowerment of its 
electorate often became subsumed in an emotive nationalist rhetoric that placed 
diminishment of democratic representation alongside the threat of Teutonic 
invasions and the murder of the Christ of Nations. Parties that opposed or were 
highly sceptical of accession tended to be on the nationalist right of the political 
spectrum and appeared to be more concerned about the adverse impact of 
accession on the culture, sovereignty and national identity of the Polish nation and 
state as a whole, rather than the impact on the political choices available to 
individual citizens. Meanwhile, liberal and centre left groupings such as Platforma 
Obywatelska, Unia Pracy or the SLD, who could have been expected to address the 
impact of the democratic deficit on the choices available to individual voters did 
not adress it.
The way in which accession would change Poland's political decision making 
powers was also markedly absent from the government sponsored pre-referendum 
campaign. Rather than provide objective information about the costs and benefits 
of accession, the explicit aim of the campaign was to convince the voters to ratify 
the membership treaty. Judging by the 77% vote in favour of EU membership the 
campaign was hence successful. But a more in-depth analysis of the voters' views 
about accession showed that support for membership was less enthusiastic than 
would at first appear. A large proportion of voters did not feel well informed 
about accession and most would have preferred to postpone it even though they
923 Interview with Jan topuszariski, 14 July 2005.
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voted in favour. The single most influential factor in the referendum choice was an 
appeal for support of accession by the Polish Pope. 924
Lastly, the use of a referendum as a means to legitimize accession was problematic 
in itself. In the referendum the public was asked to legitimize a process of 
legislative and policy harmonization that started over a decade beforehand, and 
that was almost complete at the time of ratification (with the exception of the 
transition period on the few issues covered during negotiations). The question of 
how the harmonization process was legitimized and what choices were available 
to the Polish electorate throughout the pre-accession period will be addressed in 
the concluding chapter.
924 A. Szczerbiak, 'The June 2003 Polish EU Accession Referendum', pl25.
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions
Almost twenty years have passed since the start of Poland's integration with the 
European Communities. Poland is now a fully fledged member of the European 
Union and the dream of 'returning to Europe' has become a reality for many Poles. 
The accession project appears to have been a great success. Economic growth 
averaged over 5% from 2004 to 2008 and continued even during the global 
recession when Poland was the only EU country to show positive GDP growth at 
1.7% in 2008.925 Public support for EU membership has risen steadily since the 
accession referendum and now stands at 87 %.92*
But as this historical analysis has shown, sustaining consensus on EU association 
and membership proved problematic for a majority of political parties throughout 
the 14 year pre-accession period. The first section of this concluding chapter will 
review the continuities in the way parties sustained the nominal consensus on EU 
membership throughout the pre-accession period. It will also highlight the reasons 
why although opposition to EU membership was present among Polish elites for 
the entire period in question it was rarely heard in the parliament or government. 
The second section will consider the reasons why sustaining consensus on 
accession proved so challenging for the Polish elites. It will also address the 
implications of the problems Polish parties experienced in sustaining consensus for 
Poland and on other current and aspiring EU member states.
925 Eurostat, 'Growth rate of GDP volume - percentage change on previous year',
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/ table.do?tab=table&init=l&plugin=l&language=en&pcode=tsieb020
926 E. Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, ed, 5 Years of Poland's Membership of the European Union in the Social Context 
(Warsaw 2009), CBOS Polish Public Opinion Report April 2010, 
http://www.cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/public opinion/2010/04 2010.pdf.
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The continuing challenge of attaining consensus
The two main challenges parties faced at every stage of the pre-accession period 
had to do with reconciling accession conditionality with their existing electoral 
platforms and attaining consensus on integration policy within governing 
coalitions.
Regarding the alignment of conditionality with different policy platforms, right- 
wing groupings such as ZChN, ROP, Centre Accord, and KPN  found it especially 
difficult to reconcile their support for accession with the loss of national 
independence inherent in the transfer of national competences to the EU. 
Accession presented the nationalist right with a dilemma. Re-directing Polish 
foreign policy towards the West and establishing closer links with its Western 
neighbours (whilst severing those with Russia) was very much in line with their 
over-all ideological preferences. The transfer of key policy making competences, 
especially ones traditionally judged to be the domain of the sovereign state such as 
industrial, migration and monetary policy, did not, by contrast, sit easily with the 
right wing groupings' emphasis on Polish national independence. Nonetheless, 
neither ZChN, ROP, KPN, PC, or any of the other smaller right wing groupings 
presented a clear stance against the transfer of these competences to the EU. 
Moreover, they also did not address the issue of the EU's democratic deficit. The 
increasing use of qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers and the 
subsequent possibility that key policy decisions impacting Poland would be made 
against the will of its representatives were not addressed.
The right wing groupings did repeatedly raise concerns about the threat which the 
EU posed to both Polish sovereignty and national identity. But they did not 
address the specifics of how the EU posed such a threat either in terms of policy 
transfer or the democratic deficit. Instead, these groupings addressed the issue of 
accession impact on Polish sovereignty and identity in a more general and
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emotional fashion. They reconciled the tension between the emphasis in their 
ideology on national independence and sovereignty and the adverse consequences 
accession would have on independence and sovereignty not by opposing 
accession, but by re-presenting the EU into something they could support. 
Paradoxically, they appeared to support accession to a European Union which did 
not exist: an international body of fully independent, sovereign nation states.
The EU's liberal approach to trade and the limitations it placed on the protection of 
domestic enterprise927 also became problematic for both the communist successor 
and Solidarity-successor elites. ROP, KPN, ZChN, PSL, AW S and initially also the 
SLD, all opposed the privatisation of telecommunications, energy and banking 
sectors, called for a more relaxed monetary policy or advocated increases in 
customs tariffs on EU products. This was in contravention of both the Association 
Agreement and the 1997 Accession Partnerships detailing the accession 
requirements. Both SLD and AWS struggled to reconcile support for accession with 
the implications its stringent economic restructuring requirements would have for 
their trade unionist support bases. Following increasing pressure from the EU, the 
unpopular reforms were pushed through in 1998 by the controversial Finance 
Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Leszek Balcerowicz of the Freedom Union.
The second challenge parties experienced as they strove to sustain consensus on 
accession was that of establishing a common stance within ideologically 
heterogeneous coalitions. Accession was a key point of dissent within most 
coalition cabinets of the pre-accession period. Difficulties in presenting a 
consistent stance on the EU first became manifest during the government of Hanna 
Suchocka in 1992 which united the pro-accession liberals of the Unia Demokratyczna 
and Liberal Democratic Congress with the euro-sceptic ZChN. Marked tensions on 
the subject of Europe were also evident in both of the SLD-PSL coalitions and
927 M. Golonka, ’International Regimes and Credibility Problems: An Assessment of the Role Played by the EU 
in Locking in Polish Trade Policy Reform1, in International Relations, (London 2003), p288.
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accession was also an almost constant subject of disagreement within the A WS- 
Freedom Union partnership.
The fact that historic affiliation with the communist regime or opposition to it, 
rather than shared policy and ideological preferences, formed the basis of each of 
the above coalitions made the establishment of policy consensus on Europe, and on 
many other issues928, all the more problematic. The 1993-1997 and 2001-2003 
governments united the euro-sceptic, conservative and interventionist PSL with 
the centre-left, liberal and euro-enthusiastic SLD. The 1997-2000 coalition 
meanwhile united Solidarity Electoral Action, several of whose most powerful 
member organisations were euro-sceptic or doubtful about accession, with the 
uncompromisingly euro-enthusiastic, liberal Freedom Union.
All pre-accession coalitions were built on the basis of shared pre-1989 heritage 
rather than shared policy preferences. As subsequent governments resorted to 
legitimizing their claims to power on symbolic, historical rhetoric so also 
individual policy issues had to be addressed in line with this symbolic rhetoric.
The debate on Europe, and indeed all political debate, remained divorced from 
policy. Perhaps the most prominent example of this was the Solidarity Electoral 
Action. Unable to unite its ideologically diverse member organisations on the basis 
of shared policy preferences, the AW S  resorted to the historic myth of Solidarity's 
struggle against the communist enemy. The implicit narrative was that the 
transition was unfinished since the reincarnated communists were still in power.929 
Patriotic, Catholic, conservative Poland was mobilized against implicitly foreign, 
cosmopolitan, liberal and left wing Poland. The AWS' reconciled this stance with 
support for accession by re-inventing the EU into an organisation of 'fully 
independent member states' that did not impinge its members' independence.
928 A. Grzymala-Busse, 'Coalition Formation and the Regime Divide in New Democracies', Comparative 
Politics, 34,1 (2001), 85-104.
929 W. Wesolowski, 'The formation of political parties in post-communist Poland', in Stabilising Fragile 
Democracies: comparing party systems in Southern and Eastern Europe, ed. G. Pridham (London 1996).
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Although a rhetorical consensus was hence sustained throughout pre-accession 
parties its maintenance was a continuing challenge.
How did parties maintain the appearance of consensus in spite of the challenges it 
involved? How did several ideologically different governments maintain a pro­
accession foreign policy and continue the harmonisation effort? What strategies 
did they use to reconcile their declared support for accession and policy proposals 
that went against accession requirements? And how did they present a common 
stance on accession in spite of the on-going disagreements it caused within 
governing and electoral coalitions?
What is perhaps most striking about Poland's party-political debate on accession is 
that while all major political players declared their support for accession, the ways 
in which they envisaged the kind of Europe Poland was acceding to were 
markedly different. Moreover, the parties did not address how different the 
'Europes' they supported were. They also did not take into account the fact that the 
shape of the EU Poland aspired to join could only be influenced by its current, not 
aspiring, members. Instead, they continued to declare support for accession, but 
only as long as Poland acceded to a 'Social', 'Christian' or 'Liberal' Europe. Such 
rhetoric gave the appearance of a debate but the discussion lacked a common 
denominator: the different 'Europes' Polish parties supported were more of a 
reflection of domestic ideological preferences than of the EU itself. Consensus 
could be maintained only by prefixing 'Europe' with adjectives.
Several such constructs of 'Europe' can be distinguished. The neo-liberal, 
economically right wing groupings such as the Citizens' Platform as well as the 
Freedom Union and its predecessors Democratic Union advocated a 'Liberal 
Europe' whose economic conditionality became a convenient blue print for the 
laissez-faire approach to economic transition. Being so closely aligned with their
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existing ideological and policy proposals, Liberal Europe proved useful for its 
proponents in legitimizing their economic agenda. Harsh reform was necessary, 
they argued, as without it Poland would not be able to 'return to Europe'.
The SLD supported a 'Social Europe' and a 'European Fatherland' -  'Europa 
Ojczyzna', a play of words on the right w ing's'Europa Ojczyzn' -  'Europe of 
Fatherlands', or the Europe of Nations. Proving their newly acquired democratic 
credentials was critical for the communist successors and an enthusiastically pro- 
integrationist stance played a key role in the SLD's disavowal of its authoritarian, 
pro-Soviet past. 'Social Europe' was a tolerant, modem and, most importantly, 
democratic antithesis to the implicitly parochial, intolerant and anti-integrationist 
'Europe of Nations'.
Meanwhile, 'Europe of Nations' was, above all, Christian. It was especially 
prominent in the rhetoric of the solidarity-successor right. AWS representatives, for 
example, frequently emphasised the 'Christian' roots of the continent and Poland's 
role in defending it from Eastern (i.e. un-Christian) invasion. The concerns of the 
AWS' euro-sceptic member organisations were assuaged by a rhetoric which 
implied that rather than allow accession to weaken Polish Catholicism, Poland 
would 're-evangelise' Europe, once again becoming the European 'Christ of 
Nations'.
Europe hence proved to be a useful means of re-invention, an instrument that 
could strengthen radical reform agendas, diffuse association with an unpopular 
past or provide an ideological umbrella for diverse political groupings. But the 
proponents of these different types of Europe did not address the fact that Poland 
did not have a say in the shape of the European Union to which it acceded and on 
the extent to which accession would impact Polish sovereignty. Even after 
accession Poland would only have a limited influence on the Christian, Social or 
otherwise nature of the EU. But the way in which political groupings presented
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Europe suggested that the Europe Poland acceded to would become 'Christian', 
'Social' or a 'Europe of Nations' as long as its proponents were elected to power. 
What the political rhetoric did not address was the non-negotiable nature of 
accession. EU membership required wide ranging, detailed and largely 
economically liberal policy adjustments that Poland had no choice but to 
implement if it wanted to accede. Supporting these requirements proved 
problematic for all parties but the liberals. Yet rather than reconcile the tensions 
between their ideological and policy proposals and accession conditionality, 
parties continued to express support for accession without reconciling its 
requirements with their electoral and policy proposals.
The abstract, symbolic nature of the Polish debate is not surprising given the 
complexity of the European Union and the Polish elites, at least initially 
understandable, limited knowledge about it. The ideal-type scenario, where parties 
completely align their policies with accession requirements is of course not a 
realistic one. It is, however, a valid benchmark against which to measure the 
quality of democratic choice that was available to the Polish public. A fully 
informed electorate presented with crystal clear choices is an ideal. But it does not 
follow that only because the European project is complex and open to 
interpretation the public should not be able to hold political elites to account about 
it. And in order to measure the quality of the choices available we must have a 
concept of what would be the most desirable scenario. As I have shown, the Polish 
case has been far from the ideal type.
The expressions of support for membership that a large majority of political parties 
continued to make throughout the pre-accession period gave the appearance of an 
elite consensus. But the way parties presented their stances on the EU proved so 
vague and had so little to do with the real policy implications of accession that no 
in-depth consensus could be put in place. As a result, the single biggest change 
Polish society experienced since 1989 was never really addressed in political
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debate. The integration project was propelled forward not by in-depth consensus 
but by a series of rhetorical compromises which were the incidental result of 
coalition and electoral committee configurations. At each stage of the accession 
process the parties' inability to negotiate more than a nominal consensus 
prevented meaningful public debate. Support for accession was possible precisely 
because the implications of accession were not addressed.
Moreover, even this shallow, rhetorical consensus was not sustained across the 
entire political spectrum. More than marginal opposition to EU membership was 
present on the Polish political scene from very early on in the accession project. 
The fact that it was not be heard in the sejm and that it did not impede the pro­
accession foreign policy direction was more due to parliamentary representation 
thresholds and coalition configurations than due to the wide elite consensus in 
favour of membership that has so often been credited with the success of Poland's 
integration project. 939
The first steps towards association and eventual membership in the European 
Communities were taken during the contract parliament by the liberal, pro- 
Western cabinet of Tadeusz Mazowiecki with support from the reformist wing of 
the PZPR and later its social democratic incarnation, SdRP. Politicians such as 
Henryk Goryszewski, Antoni Macierewicz and the Kaczyriski brothers, who went 
on to form Porozumienie Centrum and ZChN  that would call for a renegotiation of 
the Association Treaty, were not a part of Mazowiecki's cabinet. Even at this early 
stage, however, the ZChN  was already sceptical about the 'sell-out' of Poland to 
Western powers by the liberals and communist-successors.931
930 Grabbe and Hughes, 'Central and east European views on EU enlargement: political debates and public 
opinion', Los-Nowak, Jacoby, Vachudova.
931 Henryk Goryszewski, quoted in Artur Domoslawski, 'Tajemnica Goryszewskiego', Gazeta Wyborcza, 
nr.254,17/18 October 1992, p6.
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Scepticism about EC membership became increasingly salient following the 
challenging association negotiations and parties such as the Christian Nationalist 
Faction, Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland and the Centre Accord called 
for a re-negotiation of the Association treaty during the 1993 parliamentary 
campaign. But these parties' concerns were not heard in the 1993-7 sejm as they 
did not cross the newly introduced 5% parliamentary representation threshold. 
Instead, the SLD-PSL coalition was formed on the basis of fewer votes than those 
wasted on parties which did not cross the threshold. «2 The 1997 election enabled 
the euro-sceptic groupings to return to the sejm. But they were only able to cross 
the representation threshold and form part of the government under the 
ideologically heterogeneous umbrella of the AWS. Although the euro-sceptics 
formed a significant proportion of the Electoral Action they had to negotiate their 
stance on Europe with other, euro-enthusiastic member organisations within the 
AWS and with an uncompromisingly pro-integrationist coalition partner in the 
form of the Freedom Union. Similarly, the Polish Agrarian Faction, which also 
called for a re-negotiation of the association agreement, had to contend with the 
increasingly pro-integrationist SLD. It was hence only in 2001, when the vocally 
anti-integrationist Liga Polskich Rodzin gained almost 18% of the vote, that 
accession opponents were able to gather sufficient support to attain parliamentary 
representation without having to compromise with euro-enthusiastic colleagues. 
But doubts about and opposition to both association and EU membership had been 
present on the Polish political scene from the start of the accession project. The fact 
that that they were infrequently heard in parliament was more due to strategic 
coalition considerations and electoral legislation than due to the existence of an 
elite consensus on accession.
932 Dawisha, p268.
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Causes and implications of the nominal consensus
Why did finding common ground on Europe prove so problematic for the Polish 
parties? And why did they have to resort to the uncomfortable exercise of 
rhetorically re-constructing the EU into something which had little to do with the 
organisation to which Poland was actually acceding?
The process of reconciling policy and ideological preferences both within 
individual parties and among electoral committee and coalition partners is part 
and parcel of political competition and a key element of the role political parties 
play in prioritizing and channelling public preferences. Establishing consensus on 
individual policies or ideological declarations is relatively simple in that in the case 
of most individual policies there is ample room for negotiation. Compromise on 
another policy issue, deemed of less importance by one of the negotiation partners, 
can often be attained. It may also be the case that electoral committee or coalition 
partners simply do not agree on a particular issue, but still as they share support 
for the majority of their other policy proposals disagreement on a one or a few 
individual policies is not detrimental to the coalition.
The accession project, however, was far more complex and wide ranging than most 
individual policy matters. Defining a stance on accession was very different from 
defining a stance on individual policy areas such as education or monetary policy 
for example 933. The breadth of the acquis meant that establishing consensus on 
accession was more akin to establishing consensus on the future shape of the entire 
Polish state, ranging from national identity, foreign, economic and defence policy 
down to minutiae encompassing detailed health and safety or consumer protection 
regulations. Consequently, parties did not have the room for negotiation and
933 Sedelmeier.
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compromise with regards to accession they would normally have when agreeing a 
common stance on individual policy matters.
The extent of accession conditionality hence limited political debate on the terms of 
accession. 934 Moreover, Poland was presented with the EUrs wide ranging 
requirements at a time when it had only recently discarded the failed communist 
model and had not yet defined its own. Association with the EC and adaptation of 
the strict norms started even before the first fully democratic election took place, 
and well before the Poland's nascent political parties were able to form sufficient 
links with different social groups for interest based political competition to evolve.
The velvet revolutions of 1989 united dissidents from diverse ideological 
backgrounds with a common goal of opposing the communist regime. 935 Having 
ascended to power the nascent political elites were confronted with a policy and 
identity vacuum that was initially defined in negative terms of 'not communism'.936 
They needed to rapidly rebuild the entire political and economic system in parallel 
to defining new, politically legitimate national identity narratives. The legislative 
vacuum enabled not only the en-masse adoption of the EU's wide ranging 
conditionality937 but also brought with it the need to reconcile the impact 
integration with the Union would have on Polish national identity and its newly 
regained national independence. As Tornquist-Plewa has pointed out, the Poles 
have historically struggled with adapting European models while dealing with the 
way in which Europe and the West challenged their traditional identity.933 As a 
model, the EU served a two-fold purpose. It was powerfully symbolic and 
promised the economic prosperity and accountable political institutions that the
934 Grzymala-Busse, 'Great Expectations'.
935 J. Rupnik, 'Eastern Europe: the International Context', Journal of Democracy, 11,2 (2000), 115-129.
936 Przeworski, Adam, Sustainable Democracy, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p3.
937 Jacoby.
938 B.Tomquist-Plewa,'The Complex of an Unwanted Child: The Meanings of Europe in Polish Discourse', in 
The Meaning of Europe, ed. B. Strath and M.Malmborg, (Oxford and New York 2002), p215-242.
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former dissidents had fought to attain. It was therefore a useful tool to legitimise 
new, post-communist political identities. 'Europe' proved sufficiently ambiguous 
and malleable to be re-presented according to the different parties' ideological 
flavours, and even for the contradictions between the parties' policy proposals and 
the EU acquis to be disregarded. Secondly, it also provided the nascent decision 
makers with a ready-made economic policy framework that did not require a 
lengthy public debate, which some leading reformers feared would sabotage the 
reform process, 939 and instead could be legitimized on the basis of the popular 
desire to 'return to Europe'. On the other hand, however, accession posed a threat 
to the policies and ideas of almost all Polish political elites apart from the liberals.
It required an extensive transfer of national competences to a supranational body, 
the implementation of economic policies that were disadvantageous to the nascent 
small domestic businesses and the restructuring of state owned and former state 
owned enterprises, and it also challenged the conservative, religious values of the 
Polish right. The parties hence continued to struggle, declaring support for 
accession on the one hand but unable to reconcile themselves with its implications 
on the other.
Accession conditionality thus became both a blueprint for transition reforms and a 
tight policy 'straitjacket' leaving pro-EU domestic political actors little room for 
policy based electoral competition. 940 Accession presented a paradox: while 
reinforcing the process of systemic transition, accession conditionality also 
constrained domestic political competition. Economically, it provided the nascent 
elites with a policy blueprint and a 'carrot' to justify painful economic reform. But 
politically it pre-empted the debate on alternative policy options that may have 
enabled the nascent Polish party system to consolidate on the basis of forward 
looking policy rather than the symbolism associated with historic affiliations.
939 Balcerowicz, 'Socialism, Capitalism, Transformation'.
940 Abby Innes, 'Party competition in post-communist Europe: The great electoral lottery', Comparative Politics 
35, no. 1 (2002), pp. 85-105, Raik, p577.
316
Unable to differentiate themselves on the basis of competing policy proposals, 
political parties were limited to competing primarily on a symbolic, rhetorical 
basis. The concept of Europe was an appealing instrument in this. 'Europe' often 
conflated with the EU was a kind of conceptual sponge94! or a mirror of the 
different parties preferred visions not only of the EU but of their political identity 
and the Polish state. Political discourse in post-communist Poland in general, and 
especially the discourse on Europe, was intended less to solve specific social 
problems but rather to build and maintain the identity of political actors.942
Europe was hence a useful tool in differentiating the parties' political identities.
The problem is that ambiguous slogans such as 'Europe of Nations' or 'Social 
Europe' could be interpreted in any number of ways, enabling each participant of 
the debate to define the terms of discussion as they saw fit. The use of such rhetoric 
is typical of 'catch-all' parties943, where competitors for political power attempt to 
attract as wide an electorate as possible by making use of vague concepts whose 
ambiguity allows voters to interpret them in the way they wish. As a result, the 
voters are able to vote, but not to choose.944
Procedurally, accession was fully legitimate. The public elected the decision 
makers who propelled accession forward and even ratified the final agreement in a 
referendum. But on closer inspection, Poland's accession project was elite driven 
for its entire duration. The use of the referendum to ratify accession was 
problematic in itself. The voters were asked to legitimize a complex and lengthy 
harmonization process that was largely complete at the time of the referendum 
and moreover, would have been very difficult to reverse if they rejected accession.
941W olff-Pow^ska.
942 Hausner and Marody, JakoSc Rzqdzenia: Polska Blizej Unii Europejskiej?, pl26.
943 P. Mair, ed, The West European Party System (Oxford 1990).
944 Przeworski, Adam, Pranab Bardham and Luiz Carlos Bresser Periera, Sustainable Democracy, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995, quoted in Golonka, p301.
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Moreover, had they been given the choice most would have preferred to delay 
accession. The referendum served only to put the final seal of approval on a wide 
ranging set of complex policy decisions that had been already executed. These 
choices were legitimised not by the referendum but by the political elites' 
consensus in favour of EU association and accession. It was not so much the 
accession referendum but the policies competing groupings proposed during 
subsequent electoral contests of the pre-accession period that reflected the choices 
available to the Polish electorate. But here, rather than with alternative policy 
options that would have enabled it to hold decision makers to account, the public 
was presented with ambiguous rhetoric that had much more in common with the 
Polish political parties' attempts to forge distinct identities than with the realities of 
European integration.
It seems that a vicious circle develops when the processes of European integration 
and systemic transformation take place in parallel. By providing applicant states 
with a pre-defined policy blue-print accession conditionality precludes debate on 
policy and hence prevents parties from establishing links with social groups and 
representing their supporters on the basis of policy. 945 This in turn leads to political 
debate becoming increasingly abstract and elites distancing themselves from their 
voters. Elites have little choice with regards to differentiating themselves on the 
basis of policy options so instead they have to resort to differentiating themselves 
on the basis of rhetoric. As political debate becomes increasingly abstract so the 
public is increasingly disenfranchised and distanced from the elites, and public 
trust in the elites decreases. Eventually, the public may even place greater trust in 
outside bodies such as the EU than in their own decision makers. This dynamic
945 Innes, 'The Great Electoral Lottery'.
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may form part of the explanation as to why public trust in Polish domestic 
institutions decreased steadily throughout the pre-accession period.946
In spite of the ambiguous nature of the debate about accession, the majority of 
Poles continued to favour EU membership. According to CBOS polls public 
support for accession ranged from just over 50% in March 2001 to almost 80% 
shortly after the accession referendum in July 2003947. After an initial drop in 
support following the accession referendum, support for EU membership has risen 
reaching 87% in April 2010.948 But high levels of support were accompanied by 
low levels of knowledge about the EU. 949
Would the public have been as supportive if an in depth debate on the implications 
of accession had taken place and if they did have a better understanding of 
accession requirements? The two Polish parties whose programmes remained 
consistently aligned with accession conditionality during the pre-accession period 
were the liberal Unia Wolnosci and its later incarnation, Platforma Obywatelska. But 
the liberals never attained more than 13% of the parliamentary vote, which 
suggests that only 13% of the voters were fully supportive of both EU membership 
and accession conditionality. This suggests that had they been presented with a 
clear overview of accession conditionality and had their decisions been based on 
the policy implications rather than the symbolic appeal of accession the majority of 
voters may have opposed it.
According to opinion polls, the key reason why most respondents supported 
accession was an expectation that it would benefit the Polish economy. Judging by 
the scale of Poland's economic growth since accession this expectation has been
946 Kolarska-Bobiriska, 'The EU Accession and Strengthening of Institutions in East Central Europe: The Case of 
Poland'.
947 Roguska, 'Polska Droga do Unii Europejskiej', p17
948 CBOS Polish Public Opinion Report April 2010,
http://www.cbos.pl/PL/ publikacje/public_opinion/2010/04_2010.pdf.
949 Eurobarometer CC-EB 2003.2 Public Opinion in the Candidate Countries, Fieldwork: May 2003, Publication: 
June 2003; CBOS, Polish Public Opinion, April 2003.
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fulfilled, which may also explain continuing support for EU membership. But 
using economic growth to legitimate support for a set of institutions that have 
taken on a large part of competences of the state is in itself problematic. As Helen 
Wallace has pointed out, legitimising EU enlargement on economic grounds does 
not form a sustainable basis for the Union's long term political stability. 950 The 
recent events in Greece have shown that legitimising institutions such as a 
common currency on the basis of economic prosperity poses the risk of political 
instability during economic downturn.
While accession bolstered public support for the EU it did not increase its 
prominence in political debate. As was reflected in the 2005 victory of the euro- 
sceptic PiS and LPR coalition, parties' stance on accession continued not to be a 
determining factor in electoral choice.951 Given the electorate's low interest in the 
issue it is not surprising that there was a dissonance between elite and public 
views. But it is surprising that an issue of as much historic importance as accession 
and one that has as much impact on the future shape of the Polish state should 
consistently be judged to be of relatively low importance by the electorate. Had 
political parties not been subject to the constraints that the 'all or nothing' 
conditionality imposed on political rhetoric then the Polish debate on Europe may 
have taken place in more transparent terms, which may have in turn have led to a 
greater interest in accession among the public.
As this study has shown, the establishment of consensus in favour of accession 
among Poland's political elites proved much more challenging than the elites' 
declarations of support suggest. Contrary to the assertions of several studies of
95° h . Wallace, 'Deepening and Widening: Problems of Legitimacy for the EC', in European Identity and the 
Search for Legitimacy, ed. S. Garcia (1993).
951 A. Szczerbiak, 'Why do Poles love the EU and what do they love about it?: Polish attitudes towards 
European integration during the first three years of EU membership.', Sussex European Institute, SEI Working 
Paper No 98, (2007), p37.
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accession952, the establishment of consensus on accession proved problematic for 
almost all Poland's political groupings at all stages of the pre-accession period. 
Although most parties declared support for EU membership, throughout the entire 
pre-accession period they also supported policy proposals that contradicted 
accession conditions. The EU's strict neo-liberal economic requirements and the 
loss of national sovereignty accession entailed proved particularly challenging.
The thesis also shows that the discrepancy between parties' overt declarations of 
support and the policy platforms they competed on, first identified by Kucharczyk 
in his study of the 1997 election**, occurred during all electoral contests of the pre­
accession period. Moreover, the tension between accession conditionality and the 
way in which parties differentiated themselves occurred not only at the level of 
policy but was consistently evident in the parties' policy and ideological platforms 
as well as during electoral and cabinet coalition negotiations. Polish elites' 
consensus in favour of accession, was, as described by Kucharczyk and Skotnicka- 
Illasiewicz, a 'shallow' one46. But as this historical comparison of how elites 
maintained consensus on accession during all stages of the accession period, the 
'shallow' nature appears to have persisted throughout several very ideologically 
different cabinets including both solidarity-successor and communist successor 
ones as well as different electoral ordinations and coalition configurations. 
Unwillingness to be 'politically incorrect' and oppose accession among the 
solidarity-successor right, as Skotnicka-Illasiewicz has suggested, may hence have 
contributed to the 'shallow' or 'nominal' consensus954. The underlying reason for
952 Vachudova, Jacoby, Grabbe and Hughes, 'Central and east European views on EU enlargement: political 
debates and public opinion'.
953 Kucharczyk, 'Za a Nawer Przeciw. Partie Polityczne Wobec Perspektywy Integracji w Wyborach 1997', in, 
Kucharczyk, 'Porwanie Europy. Integracja Europejska w Polskim Dyskursie Politycznym 1997-1998', in, E. 
Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, 'Czlonkowstwo w Unii Europejskiej w Badaniach Opinii Spolecznej', in Polacy Wobec 
Integracji z Unia Europejska, ed. B. Mach (Warsaw 1998), E. Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, 'Czlonkowstwo Polski w 
Unii Europejskiej w Kulturze Politycznej Parlamentarzystow', in Obciazeni Polityk .^ Poslowie i Partie, ed. W. 
Wesolowski (Warsaw 2001).
954 Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, 'Czlonkowstwo w Unii Europejskiej w Badaniach Opinii Spolecznej', in, Skotnicka- 
Illasiewicz, 'Czlonkowstwo Polski w Unii Europejskiej w Kulturze Politycznej Parlamentarzystow', in, E. 
Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, 'Polska w Europie - odmienne Wizje', in 6wiat Elity Politycznej, eds. W. Wesolowski
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the difficulties parties experienced in sustaining consensus however was the strict 
accession conditionality which presented them with the structural problem of how 
to compete on alternative policy options when accession required them to agree on 
an EU-prescribed policy framework for most policy areas. The difficulties parties 
experienced reconciling their ideological and policy proposals with accession 
conditionality were hence not only the result of the heavily polarized political 
scene of the AW S  period** Rather, they were more structural and caused by the 
combination of the wide span of the acquis and its non-negotiable nature which, 
together, left the applicant states in the 'policy straitjacket' Innes describes. 956
Contrary to Innes' hypothesis however, in the Polish case the 'straitjacket' did not 
result in parties competing on the basis of how competent they were to implement 
the policies required for accession. 957 This study has found that rather than 
reconcile their policy proposals with EU's conditions, or change their stance on 
accession, parties rhetorically re-presented the EU into different visions that 
aligned with their ideological offering. Declarations of support for 'Social Europe', 
'Christian Europe' or the 'Europe of Nations' gave the appearance of consensus. 
But in fact no such consensus was possible since the way in which political 
groupings presented the 'Europe' they claimed to support was so different as to 
remove any common denominator they could agree on. The consensus was so 
shallow as to be only a rhetorical one.
As a result, the single biggest change Polish society experienced since 1989 was 
never really addressed in political debate. The integration project was propelled 
forward not by in-depth political consensus but by a series of rhetorical
and I. Pahkow (Warsaw 1995), E. Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, Powrot czy Droga w Nieznane? Europejskie Dylematy 
Polakow (Warsaw 1998).
955 Kucharczyk, 'Za a Nawer Przeciw. Partie Polityczne Wobec Perspektywy Integracji w Wyborach 1997', 
Kucharczyk, 'Porwanie Europy. Integracja Europejska w Polskim Dyskursie Politycznym 1997-1998', 
Szczerbiak, 'Europe as a Re-aligning Issue in Polish Politics?: Evidence from the October 2000 Presidential 
Election'.
956 Innes, 'The Great Electoral Lottery'.
957 Ibid.
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compromises. At each stage of the accession process the parties' inability to 
negotiate more than a nominal consensus prevented in-depth public debate. 
During each electoral contest of the pre-accession period voters were presented 
with ambiguous rhetoric in place of alternative policy options that would have 
enabled them to hold decision makers to account. The Polish public had numerous 
opportunities to vote on the topic of accession but it was never presented with 
meaningful choices about it.
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